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“Globalisation has turned the international financial system into a money-launderer’s 
dream [. . .]” (Arlacchi, 1998, p. 5). How often have we heard this and similar 
statements about money laundering and globalisation in the past two decades? 
We have almost started taking this for granted, even though the basis of this 
statement has never been conclusively clarified. The statement is based on an 
assumption of a link between two highly elusive phenomena – globalisation 
and money laundering – and ultimately asserts that there is a “need for a global 
attack on money-laundering” (Arlacchi, 1998, p. 5). Despite the lack of clarity 
with regard to the underlying phenomena, this assumption has become so 
commonplace in our day-to-day language that it now appears to reflect reality, 
thus resulting in it becoming ‘conventional wisdom.’ However, we can be 
fooled by language. 
 This chapter will guide the reader to the main theme of the thesis: the ade-
quacy of the legal term ‘money laundering’ in the context of globalisation, 
particularly the globalisation of money laundering and of the fight against it. 
How clear is the concept of ‘money laundering’ and, based on this concept, 
how constructive can anti-money laundering efforts be in the current globalis-
ing penal-law environment? The main theme gives rise to a number of issues 
which warrant examination. 
 
1.1. Once upon a time . . .  
 
Once upon a time, about 4000 years ago, there was a king, King Hammurabi, 
who ruled the Kingdom of Babylon and who was believed to be chosen by the 
gods to “to bring about the rule of righteousness in the land” (The Code of Hammu-
rabi, paragraph 1, see Hooker (Ed.), 1910/1996; Horne, 1915; Kowalski, 
2004). He administered justice and punished those who did wrong, often using 
methods that in our civilised society today would be regarded as too cruel. The 
collection of his legal decisions became known as the Babylonian Code of 
Hammurabi. It contains approximately 282 case laws and is considered to be 
one of the earliest legal codes. Hammurabi ordered his laws to be carved on a 
black stone slab, so that no one could change or misquote them. 
  However, laws did change over the years, as beliefs and views changed 
within the different societies. As definitions of crime have changed, so have 
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punishments. It is difficult to generalise acts of criminality: individuals’ motives 
vary, as do the circumstances for their actions. Crimes may be committed for 
very confusing reasons, but crimes for profits have a clear rationality, which is 
recognisable over time and space.1 While ‘theft’ is a crime which has been 
deemed wrong, since the time of King Hammurabi, the history of other profit-
related crimes is not as long, and varies according to different societies and cul-
tures. As new economic relationships and interests developed, penal law pro-
tection against dishonesty and deceit was required.2 Depending on the national 
interests, the penalisation of infractions varies, as can be observed with envi-
ronmental and economic regulations. Yet the evolution of law over the years 
has led to some degree of commonality, which relates to an increasingly grow-
ing cohesiveness and homogeny of economic and societal interests world wide: 
the so-called ‘globalisation’. Penal law protection of such interests also has 
global features.  
 A prominent example is the phenomenon of money-laundering. Although 
40 years3 ago money laundering was not a penal law issue, it is now interna-
tionally considered as one of the major crimes of the 21st century. The phe-
nomenon of money laundering has been, historically, usually associated in the 
media with the mafia, drug dealers and other forms of organised crime. Origi-
nally, it was observed that the drive towards an anti-money laundering policy 
was motivated by the fear of laundering being used to channel drugs money 
(Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). Furthermore, policy makers aimed for more 
effective laws to confiscate the proceeds of drug traffickers (Stessens, 2000). As 
Alldridge (2008, p. 438) notes: “money laundering, more than any other, is the crime 
that reflects and energizes globalization.” He further adds: “A common tactic in the 
extension of criminal law is to select ‘soft targets’, that is, conduct to the criminalization 
of which few would object, and then advance the frontiers of criminality incrementally 
from them onwards. Had the decision to pursue the war on drugs […] not been taken in 
the early 1970s, then the concern with the profits of drug dealing and consequently the 
entire anti-money laundering (AML) industry would not have arisen.” The war on 
drugs provided the politically acceptable ‘fuel’, although there were more (fi-
nancial) interests at stake, as we will see later.  
                                               
1  For the purposes of this thesis we exclude from our analysis crimes that are claimed to be caused 
by mental disorder (e.g. kleptomania) rather than a desire for a material gain.  
2  For instance, while now insider trading and market abuse are increasingly becoming a topical 
issue, some 10 or 15 ago we would harldy hear about such offences.  
3  The phrase ‘money laundering’ was first publicly used during the 1970s, during the Watergate 
scandal (see next chapters).  
 3 
 Awareness of the money laundering phenomenon was apparently raised by 
reputed money-laundering pioneers, such as Mayer Lansky, who have become 
‘household names’ for allegedly using numbered accounts and tax havens to 
hide ill-gotten gains. Today, the phenomenon of money laundering is also 
associated with infamous banking scandals including the financial empire of 
BCCI with its manifold layers of offshore holding vehicles, nominee account 
holders and banks-within-banks, which was caught ‘red handed’ in a US sting 
operation (Adams and Franz, 1992). History bears witness to early forms of the 
phenomenon and the potential to compare the US robber barons of the late 
19th century with the Russian oligarchs that emerged during the 20th century 
and whose past business practices continue to give rise to questions about the 
legitimacy of their wealth. The common feature between Lansky, BCCI and 
the Russian oligarchs is that they all have taken advantage of globalisation in 
the management of their money. They have shifted money across the world, 
used offshore accounts and shell firms. Such techniques have the capacity to be 
aimed at avoiding regulatory interference.  
 But what is money laundering and why is it so important to make people 
aware of it? This is an area covered in more detail in a later section. We will 
note that essentially and strictly speaking, it is the false representation of crime 
money as legitimate earnings. In this thesis we will distinguish the strict or nar-
row meaning of money laundering from the broad meaning. Broadly speaking, 
as interpreted by policy makers, it concerns the handling of criminal incomes. 
It is this conduct - money laundering in broad terms - which policy makers 
and regulatory agencies claim that it is a threat to the integrity of the entire 
financial system with a devastating effect on society. They claim that staggering 
amounts of crime-money is being laundered every year through the global 
financial system. Consequently, this has become the cause of increasing concern 
for the international financial community. Since 11 September 2001 specula-
tion about the use of money laundering techniques for terrorist aims has addi-
tionally fanned the flames.  
 With the US being the driving force behind anti-money laundering legisla-
tive developments, the international community has sought to address these 
concerns and enforce global policies to fight money laundering. This has af-
fected our every-day financial life and the functioning of the global financial 
system with ever increasing costs for due diligence and know-your-customer 
compliance. Opening a bank account now means more paperwork for both 
business and non-business customers, as it is required by anti-money laundering 
legislation. A financial transaction such as transmitting money home by migrant 
 4 
workers usually entails some sort of basic customer identification. Also, if the 
value of the transaction is more than €15.000, a high level of customer due 
diligence checks is required, according to Directive 2005/60/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terror-
ist financing. In some countries, such as Germany, foreign currency transfers 
involving a minimal amount of €2.500 require customer identification checks.  
 For over 20 years, i.e. since the introduction of the first anti-money laun-
dering laws (as discussed in this thesis), regulators have sought to curb the phe-
nomenon of money laundering, but to little avail. As it will be reviewed in this 
thesis, it is not surprising that little has been achieved in reducing the money 
laundering volumes: by broadening the money laundering concept beyond its 
strict meaning to include any handling of crime money, policy makers have 
made the laundering phenomenon a built-in feature of people’s everyday life, 
not just the cathedral of finance. As it happens, money laundering in the sense 
of handling crime money will exist, almost tautologically, as long as crime for 
profit exists. As a result, the fight against money laundering continues to be a 
priority issue on the international political agenda and a significant challenge to 
the financial industry. We observe a continuous search for practical solutions 
that would ensure the effectiveness of the fight against this unwanted elusive 
phenomenon while also providing a means of dealing with the ever-increasing 
burden imposed on the financial sector. However, this search for a solution has 
never included a definitive measurement of the effect of current anti-money 
laundering policy making on crime and our financial and economic life. This 
should have been the ultimate priority. But except for simply tallying the num-
ber of suspicious transactions – a process which is not usually conducted in a 
consistent manner – the authorities have never seriously contemplated the im-
plementation of proper performance measures (Van Duyne, 2007a). 
 
1.2. Evasive global control  
 
The fight against money laundering has absorbed enormous efforts, as it is be-
lieved that by fighting money laundering we effectively fight crime for profit. It 
has become a common saying that money laundering is the ‘Achilles Heel’ of 
profit-oriented criminals and that the solution ensuring effective fight against 
crime for profit is in the fight against money laundering. As Bernasconi (1998) 
has pointed out, money laundering is the ‘Achilles Heel’ of organised crime 
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because it makes criminals cooperate with legitimate institutions (see for com-
ments also Stessens, 2000). However, if the fight against it is the effective solu-
tion ensuring success in the fight against crime, what has been the effect of this 
approach on the crime for profit thus far?  
 Even if the measurement of crime-markets remains an uncertain undertak-
ing, putting the scarce evidence together, one can maintain that after two dec-
ades of fighting money laundering, crime-markets continue to ‘flourish’ or, at 
least, to sustain sufficient profitability. This is certainly true with regard to the 
two big ‘demand markets’: sex and drugs. For example, the illegal drug trade 
has continued and the incentive for drug dealers remains, despite the fact that 
the price of drugs has declined since the 1980s (Van Duyne and Levi, 2005; 
UNODC, 2008; UNODC, 2009; UNODC 2010).4 As a result of intensified 
health policies, certain crime-markets unfolded, like the illegal cigarette market. 
Consequently we witness an increase in cigarette smuggling in certain states 
which had introduced a higher tax in an attempt to support better health poli-
cies, deter smoking and collect more revenue from the cigarette smoking habit 
(Bartlett, 2002; Van Duyne, 2003; Von Lampe, 2006; Van Dijck, 2007; Van 
Duyne and Antonopoulos, 2009). The sex market never faltered, contributing 
to the mobility of thousands of women, many involuntary, but also many in-
tentionally looking for the best place abroad to earn an income (Aromaa and 
Lehti, 2007; Spencer, 2007; Markovska and Moore, 2008; Siegel, 2009). Of 
course, this criminal mobility is accompanied by a commensurate financial 
mobility, i.e. laundering. 
 It may well be the case that somewhere there are oases which are clean of 
crime, but no society, whether developed or developing, socialist or capitalist, a 
totalitarian regime or democracy, has yet discovered the perfect vaccine against 
profit-oriented crime. Probably such a panacea does not exist at all as such 
crime, in addition to much of it largely being driven by greed, is also often 
related to two basic economic conditions: scarcity and price differences. One 
can strive for 100% virtue, but that is only attainable with a 100% penal dose 
and total control, which amounts to enforced virtue (see Van Duyne et al., 
2007c). Absolute virtue implies an absolute state. 
                                               
4  This trend, both for wholesale as well as ‘street prices’, appears to have continued in the past two 
decades to varying degrees and with certain ups and downs, depending on the type of drugs and 
geographical region. According to estimates provided by the UNODC, European street prices 
in 2008 were about half of what they were in 1990. However, purity-adjusted quarterly street 
prices for various drugs sold in Hong Kong grew between 2007 and 2009 (UNODC, 2010).  
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 If criminal enrichment and theft have existed since the times of King Ham-
murabi or indeed, any other ancient ruler or mythical legislator, why is money 
laundering presented now as a new menacing phenomenon? What is so differ-
ent today compared with the early days of modern capitalism, when the notion 
of money laundering remained un-labelled and robber barons like Carnegie or 
Vanderbilt freely reinvested their tainted money in powerful business empires 
(see Abadinsky, 2002)?  
 If, in the early days of modern capitalism, money laundering did not exist at 
all (or so it is believed), now it is cause for major international panic. Not only 
did money laundering emerge as a ‘new’ (political) phenomenon, it also proved 
to have different forms and shapes, being plugged into different definitions and 
attached to a range of other different phenomena such as globalisation and 
cross-border organised crime. Literature abounds with statements that money-
laundering patterns have developed and become more sophisticated. Given that 
the police have always complained about criminals becoming increasingly 
clever, this observation is not surprising. Naturally, money-laundering schemes 
are embedded in their financial and economic cultural landscape, the complex-
ity of which they mirror. They range from fairly simple to quite complicated 
schemes involving numerous banks and companies, often fictitious and often in 
offshore areas. Sometimes it proves too difficult to follow the money trails, 
especially in the context of financial worldwide money flows.  
 In response, policy makers and regulators have been looking for a global 
Panopticon5 (see Gill, 2001; also Levi, 2002, p. 31) that would enable global 
financial control. Is the global Panopticon the much desired panacea against 
crime for profit? The search for a global Panopticon is, according to Gill 
(2001), a modern myth, undermined by the contradictions of globalisation. 
Hobbs and Dunninghan (1998), for instance, point out that one shortcoming 
of global-transnational-international studies of organised crime is the underes-
timation of the importance of local contexts. Indeed, while creating the global 
Panopticon we might be overlooking important differences in local contexts, 
including national legal frameworks, law enforcement systems, socio-economic 
environment, ethnic-cultural values and language. Interestingly, the same dif-
ferences can impede the globalisation of crime and money laundering, as crimi-
                                               
5  The word originates from the Greek mythology and means something which sees everything. 
In modern days the Panopticon is a term that refers to a type of prison building the design of 
which allows an observer to observe all prisoners without them being able to recognise that they 
are being watched. The idea was developed by English philosopher and social theorist Jeremy 
Bentham in 1785 (see Bentham, in Bozovic (ed.), 1995). 
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nals have to become familiar with the local environment before they begin to 
operate there. 
 In order to ensure optimal and effective global financial control to curb 
profit-driven crime policy makers need to understand how, if at all, this global-
ising system of control affects the purported ‘Achilles Heel’ of criminals.  
 
1.3. Purpose of this thesis 
 
Policy makers and regulators claim that money laundering is a threat to society. 
One may wonder how this claim can be substantiated, given the virtual ‘in-
eradicableness’ of this phenomenon: if it remains a threat today, so it should 
have been a century ago and by now we should be walking through the ruins 
of moral and financial decay.6 It is claimed that money laundering allows crimi-
nals to enjoy their money. This applies to the present Colombian cartels the 
same way it should have applied to the old gang of ‘Lucky’ Luciano. It is also 
claimed that crime-money corrupts the financial system. The ‘integrity of the 
financial system’ is considered one of the basic dogmas underlying anti-money 
laundering policy. Whether the validity of this dogma is of a moral or empirical 
nature, it is difficult to determine. For an empirical test one should compare the 
financial systems of the periods prior to and after the introduction of anti-
money laundering legislation. Unfortunately, neither FATF7 reports nor any 
other literature that focuses on money laundering address this matter. It appears 
that this dogma is more of a moral nature than empirically substantiated. If money 
laundering conduct in broad terms led the financial system to ruin, it should be 
surprising that places such as Liechtenstein and Switzerland, historically known 
as financial havens, are still doing well. Tax evaders and other so-called crimi-
nals prefer to hide their money in banks in such places. Does it mean that these 
banks lack integrity or are in a financial ruin, given that even a rich criminal 
would certainly avoid trusting his hard-earned crime-money to a bank which is 
badly managed and lacks integrity?  
 It is widely believed that the process of globalisation and market liberalisa-
tion has enabled money launderers to easily shift and hide money across the 
                                               
6  Around the time of finalising this thesis the financial system did indeed prove to be a hidden 
ruin. However, this was not due to sly and vile launderers, but owing to respected yet, as it ap-
pears, irresponsible bankers and a range of risks inherent to the free market, all of which in com-
bination brought the market to a global economic crisis at the end of 2008 and early 2009. 
7  The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is an inter-governmental body 
set up in 1989 to develop and promote anti-money laundering policies (the role of the FATF 
will be further touched upon in other sections of this thesis). 
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world. Yet globalisation also means a process of global streamlining of law en-
forcement efforts, improved international cooperation between national regula-
tory agencies and homogenisation of criminal justice systems across the world 
(see Alldridge, 2008).8  While success is claimed this is yet to be proven. Why, 
despite enhanced global cooperation and globally coordinated efforts, do crime-
entrepreneurs continue to find ways to earn money and consequently launder 
these revenues and enjoy their wealth? This is what regulators would have us 
believe: staggering amounts of dirty money are purportedly being laundered 
every year. However, there is little evidence to substantiate this claim despite 
some (methodologically unconvincing) attempts to provide such evidence (see 
for instance Walker, 1995; Walker, 20049).  
 Undeniably, crime for profit continues, as far as we can observe. We can 
measure financial losses on the basis of registered property crimes and on that 
basis estimate the income of criminals. Although, rough estimates have been 
carried out to assess the profits from drug trafficking (Reuter and Greenfield, 
2001), such estimates are normally based only on estimated criminal money 
making rather than precise figures. But can we observe money laundering? What 
we can observe, to an extent, is how offenders manage their illegal gains. How-
ever, this conduct of crime-money management is subsequently broadly construed 
as ‘money laundering’.  
 In the last decade much attention has been devoted to ‘transnational crime’ 
and consequently to the related money flows. However, what happens with 
the crime-money that never crosses international borders? Does the manage-
ment of crime money necessarily include taking advantage of global financial 
vehicles to escape regulatory scrutiny? Are money-laundering patterns in differ-
ent local contexts the same or similar? Is it possible to measure the interaction 
between money laundering and globalisation? That question could only be 
answered if both terms, money laundering and globalisation, were clearly de-
fined. These are two unclear terms and therefore with unknown implications.  
 Nevertheless, there appears to be a connection between the purported phe-
nomenon of globalisation and the phenomenon of money laundering. This 
connection is multi-faceted and at least two main aspects of it can be noted. On 
the one hand, as highlighted above, globalisation can be seen as a process that 
                                               
8  Nevertheless, there are still serious issues to be addressed with regard to the homogenisation of 
the various national systems where it concerns the rights of ‘cross-border’ victims (see Groen-
huijsen and Pemberton, 2009; see also Letschert and Groenhuijsen, 2011). 
9  Walker bases his analysis on: (a) a definition which is too broad, (b) unproven assumptions and 
(c) an uncalibrated measurement instrument. 
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has led to money laundering facilities, such as financial channels for shifting 
money across the world, becoming globally and easily available to criminals. 
Thus, it can be claimed that the process of globalisation fosters money launder-
ing. On the other hand, law enforcement and regulatory efforts aimed at fight-
ing money laundering are becoming increasingly globalised too. This is also 
part of globalisation. In this sense we can say that there are two opposite poten-
tial movements within the process of globalisation: it helps curb money laun-
dering but it may also further its progress at the same time.10  
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the applicability and adequacy of 
the legal term ‘money laundering’ in the context of an anti-money laundering 
system that is becoming increasingly globalised. How clear is the legal term that 
has been accepted internationally? Is its implementation empirically effective: is 
there an unambiguous purpose and is it being achieved? If the purpose is to 
curb crime for profit and related money laundering, is the anti-money launder-
ing system built on solid grounds, i.e. on clear definitional basis, or is rather 
built on a constantly shifting platform similar to a Panopticon built on quick-
sand?  
 In order to address these issues, the thesis will review the background to and 
history of international anti-money laundering legislation, including the history 
of globalisation processes affecting the international world of economy and 
trade and developments which led to the introduction of anti-money launder-
ing legislation. In addition it will study the origins of US anti-money launder-
ing legislation as the driving force behind the introduction of international 
conventions and directives in this field (Chapters 2 and 3.1).  
 Further, it will examine the money laundering concept, both in its strict 
meaning and in broad terms, as defined by international conventions and direc-
tives, as well as the most common variations of the money laundering defini-
tion (Chapter 3.2). This thesis will also review the purported effects of crime 
money and money laundering, and the aspect of distinguishing between the 
various types of criminal earners and forms of financial management conduct 
(Chapter 3.3). Throughout the thesis, although the focus will be on the legisla-
tion of the USA and, most importantly, the resulting international conventions 
and directives, the analysis of the definitional basis will also include, where 
relevant, examples from the national legislation and legal practices of various 
countries around the world.  
                                               
10  An interesting line of research could be looking into whether the cost of money laundering 
investigations weighs the two opposing forces differently. 
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 Finally, this thesis will study the issues arising from the broad money laun-
dering definition, including in terms of examining its link to the hidden econ-
omy and the bias towards developing countries. It will address the challenges 
facing the business community in meeting the requirements of anti-money 
laundering legislation (Chapter 4). 
 This thesis will test general assumptions and opinions that have, for many 
years, dominated and defined national and international policymaking. It will 
look for answers to unresolved issues relating to the fight against economic 
crime and money laundering and review the feasibility of addressing these issues 




2. The globalisation phenomenon 
This chapter will address the multidimensional facets of globalisation by analys-
ing its meaning and contents. What is the underlying reality? Is ‘globalisation’ 
just a buzz word? The chapter will discuss the genesis of this purported phe-
nomenon, its pre-history, connecting it to the opening of the boundaries of the 
transition economies to the outside modern capitalist world and linking it to 
the unclear phenomenon of money laundering. Developments in the transition 
economies11 are interesting to review as the transition process was to bring the 
old socialist and capitalist worlds together into a truly globalised environment. 
What was the situation in the socialist world prior to the transition to market 
economy and what was it after that point in the context of money laundering?  
 
2.1. General definition and semantic analysis  
 
The usage of terms and the phenomena they intend to denote often come into 
the daily life of people as something taken for granted. We talk as if it is a mat-
ter of fact that we have ‘instincts’ and ‘sub-consciousness’, because psychologists 
like Freud have previously introduced these words with a somewhat unclear 
but appealing meaning. Sometimes we first coin a word and then assume that 
we know what it denotes, which is not far from the opening sentences of the 
Book of Saint John: “First was the word and the word became flesh.” Globalisation 
is a modern substantiation of this tendency and so is ‘organised crime’ (see Van 
Duyne, 1996; Von Lampe, 1999, 2001).  
  To many it seems quite clear what globalisation means. We believe we see 
it and sense it daily. People everywhere watch world-wide transmitted TV 
channels, use the internet and go to McDonalds. The big shopping malls in 
virtually all parts of the world look similar. The food and fashion culture, as 
well as the spread of information technologies illustrate how the world is be-
coming ‘globalised’. If this sounds abstract, consider the millions of workers 
who globalise ‘with their feet’ by swarming around in search for work and 
income elsewhere. The term ‘globalisation’ is shorthand or a concise descrip-
tion of how different cultural, socio-economic, political units (nations, districts, 
cities) become more open to each other, more interactive, thus acquiring the 
                                               
11  ‘Transition economies’ or ‘transition countries’ is a term used to describe economies which are 
undergoing a change from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy.  
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same characteristics and beginning to look similar while sharing the same or 
similar values. Only certain features of the different societies have remained 
thus far distinctive, like religion and social relationship cultures.  
 It is the homogenising force of globalisation, as Fitzpatrick (2000) exclaims 
in reference to this phenomenon. Countries become increasingly integrated. 
Many policy makers within the European Union (‘EU’) believe that the EU is 
on the way to turning into a greased joint mechanism functioning on the basis 
of harmonised legislation, single currency and unified monetary system. In fact, 
the whole world seems to be moving in this direction. As Axford (2001) re-
marks, globalisation is a shorthand for a process that is making the world more 
interconnected and inter-dependent.  
 As we see, globalisation is a multi-faceted phenomenon but although its 
definitions vary broadly, they all unite around a common theme: the world-
wide spread of certain characteristics or standards. The American Heritage Dic-
tionary of the English Language (by Soukhanov, 1996) defines ‘globalization’12 
(coming from ‘globalize’) as the process of making something global or world-
wide in scope or application. Similarly, the Random House Dictionary of the 
English Language (by Flexner, 1987) states that ‘globalization’ comes from 
‘globalize’, which means to extend to other or all parts of the globe or to make 
worldwide. According to this dictionary, the term ‘globalise’ emerged in 1940-
45. In this regard one can say that it is a term that should have ‘matured’ by 
now in the sense of having obtained a well-defined meaning. Yet, there re-
mains a questionmark over this. 
 As the Random House Dictionary of the English Language indicates, the 
term ‘global village’ – meaning the world, especially considered as the home of 
all nations and peoples living interdependently – was introduced in 1968 by the 
book “War and Peace in the Global Village” by Marshall McLuhan and Quentin 
Fiore. James and Albanese (2011) point out that the Oxford English Dictionary 
gives as the earliest reference to the current usage of the term ‘globalisation’ an 
academic article from 1972. They further note that the word had been used 
earlier, but in a different sense, i.e. as a diplomatic term referring to the connec-
tion between different policy areas (for instance, simultaneous negotiation on 
financial and security matters). According to James and Albanese, the first 
known reference to ‘globalisation’ in its contemporary sense was to be found in 
a 1970 issue of the radical left-wing Italian underground periodical Sinistra Pro-
                                               
12  The author of this thesis has used the US spelling of words only in relation to quotes from US 
sources. 
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letaria which published an article entitled “The Process of Globalization of Capital-
ist Society.” It was a description of IBM as an organisation which ‘globalises’ all 
activity in the productive process and, as it produced in 14 countries and sold 
in 109, it contained the ‘globalisation’ (mondializzazione) of capitalist imperial-
ism. The noun ‘globalisation’ began to be used in a more consistent way some 
years later, in the mid-1980s, when globalisation theory began to develop. 
According to James and Albanese (2011), the term ‘globalisation’ came to be 
commonly used in the 1990’s reaching its highpoint of popularity in 2000 and 
2001. They further note that the term ‘globalisation’ originated as a form of 
criticism against the political tendency it described but ended up being used 
even by the respective tendencies’ proponents.  
 Tomlinson (1999) distinguishes two sociologists as the most outstanding 
theorists of globalisation: Roland Robertson, who was one of the first to use 
the term in a scientific-theoretical way in the mid-1980s; and Anthony Gid-
dens, who connected the globalisation theory to social modernity.  
 Giddens (1990) highlights the inherent ability of modern societies to global-
ise mainly via the development of communication technologies. He describes 
the social relations as being taken out “from local contexts of interactions” and rear-
ranged “across indefinite spans of time-space” (Giddens, 1990, p. 21). This process 
is to be distinguished from the process of internationalisation. Internationalisa-
tion means a process of intensifying relations between different sovereign states, 
but not necessarily subordinating national policies to supranational events and 
regulations (see Hirst and Thompson, 1996). Yet internationalisation is clearly a 
vehicle of globalisation, particularly when it furthers the mobility of people, 
trade and capital. 
 Hence, the term ‘globalisation’ is a general term with a complex underlying 
meaning, impossible to be linked to just one specific sphere of life. Although 
the origin of the phenomenon may well be connected to economic processes, 
the phenomenon encompasses far broader contexts – cultural, political, social 
and economic. As Tomlinson (1999) says, the term ‘globalisation’ has been 
quite loosely applied. But it undoubtedly epitomises an obvious tendency of 
introducing or adopting same or similar habits and standards world-wide, 
whereby the performance of a single state and society is being influenced by 




2.2. Implications of globalisation: old wine in new global casks 
 
The fuzziness of the globalisation concept, however, arises not so much from 
its contents but rather from its implications: the consequences that the process 
of globalisation brings about may vary broadly. According to Axford (2001), 
globalisation generates positive developments. He believes that it has facilitated 
the spread of democratic values and practices around the world and that the fall 
of state socialism after 1989 provides the most dramatic evidence of this process. 
However, this representation may be overly positive. It cannot be denied that 
globalisation furthers the spread and accessibility of technologies. It implies easy 
access to high quality goods and services in the field of information technology. 
It also entails international tourism. But in terms of furthering international 
competition it appears that globalisation is more beneficial to advanced indus-
trialised countries than to the developing world. In that respect it appears to 
have some negative impact as well. The fall of socialism may have been indeed 
facilitated by globalisation but it has not automatically ensured a level playing 
field and democracy. Globalisation is not a ‘healing’ phenomenon which 
washed away ‘bad (governmental) habits’.  
 Developments in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European block 
provide evidence of the shady side of globalisation with the collapse of state 
socialism. It appeared that these regions suffered soon from the spread of new 
forms of crime, cronyism in economic relations and endemic corruption. These 
manifestations of bad governance are not causally related to globalisation, but it 
appears that the regime change did unleash these abuses or took the ‘lid from 
the pot’ in which they had started to develop previously. Apart from that, nu-
merous reports and official statements suggest that globalisation has an antago-
nising effect on some parts of society. For instance, according to the environ-
mental activist Vandana Shiva (2000), the “rules of globalisation are undermining the 
rules of justice and sustainability, of compassion and sharing” and therefore we have 
to “move from market totalitarianism to an earth democracy.”13  
 Financial crises such as the credit crisis and financial market turmoil we 
witnessed in 2008, inevitably bear the signs of financial globalisation. The glob-
ally mutual investment in each other’s derivatives, which proved to be mainly 
‘soap bubbles’, underlines that globalisation has also uncontrollable negative 
consequences.  
                                               
13  The article was derived from an online source and therefore no page number is available.  
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 Explaining the origins of the globalisation phenomenon, Jeffery (2002) 
notes that the anti-globalisation movement actually placed globalisation on the 
map. In the 1960s and 1970s multinational companies were blamed for widen-
ing the gap between rich and poor, for polluting the environment, and other 
‘evils’. However, anti-globalisation protests on a significantly larger scale began 
only in the mid-1980s. The wave of protests put the word ‘globalisation’ in the 
mouths of ordinary people who began to believe that something was happen-
ing to their life, that some kind of world order was being established by influ-
ential politicians and wealthy entrepreneurs who had the money to enjoy 
worldwide mobility. Therefore, there are reasons to associate globalisation with 
elitism, something the common man experienced happening to him. The 
words attributed to David Rockefeller, one of the world’s richest-ever men, 
might not have come as a surprise to conspiracy theorists:  
 “But, the world is now more sophisticated and prepared to march towards a world 
government. The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers 
is surely preferable to the national auto-determination practiced in past centuries”14 
(quoted by Vizzutti, 2003, p. 105). 
 
2.3. Prehistory of globalisation  
 
Current processes of globalisation have their historic roots in the incessant mo-
bility of the human race. Some of our first ancestors started moving from east 
to west and then from south to north settling down in lands favourable for 
agriculture and stock-breeding. Where they did not settle as agriculturists they 
spread the idea of using the soil and domesticated animals (Sykes, 2001). Forms 
of trade and exchange transactions began to develop gradually, including credit 
transactions and primitive forms of banking.15 Banking received a boost during 
the time of the Roman Empire and re-emerged in Europe around the time of 
the Crusades when payments for supplies and equipment required safe and 
swift transferring of funds (Davies, 2002). In Rome, Venice and Genoa, and in 
the trade fairs of France, the need to transfer money for trade led to the devel-
                                               
14  He reportedly said this at a Bilderberger meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany, in 1991 (see 
Vizzutti, 2003). 
15  Some forms of banking and credit transactions date back to the times before Hammurabi’s 
Code. In fact, the invention of banking preceded that of coinage. It is believed that banking 
originated in Ancient Mesopotamia where temples provided places for safe-keeping of grain and 
other commodities. Receipts were invented to be used for transfers to depositors and third par-
ties. Basic regulations of banking operations were included in Hammurabi’s Code (see Davies, 
2002). 
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opment of the use of financial instruments such as bills of exchange (see Davies, 
2002).16 During the Middle Ages, long distance trade became a form of global-
isation (Dillard, 1967). The development of transport should not be underesti-
mated, particularly transport over water. Particularly during the seventeenth 
century well equipped royal vessels as well as vessels of English buccaneers, 
Dutchmen and other North-western European nations, ventured to travel 
across the ocean in a quest for new fortunes and markets. Two circumstances 
contributed to their supremacy: the improvement of the sailing ships and the 
cannon. Indeed, the ocean ships became floating fortresses, for which there was 
no match in other maritime territories (Kennedy, 1991).17  
 In terms of geopolitical planning, we may say that the process of globalisa-
tion began slowly to develop in a more systematic way with the establishment 
of the first colonial, sea-borne empires (Boxer, 1973). It speeded up in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when these, already powerful, empires 
expanded their territories and virtually carved up the globe, subjugating practi-
cally all territories except for a few, including China, Japan and Ethiopia. Colo-
nisers imposed on other nations (often by exterminating the indigenous popu-
lation) their own political-economic rules but also certain non-economic val-
ues, such as culture and (religious) traditions which proved to be the seeds of a 
not so globalising division of minds.  
 The process of globalisation was enormously boosted by the use of the 
steam engine in international transport: the train and steamship. This gave an 
unprecedented impetus to international trade. The invention of the steam en-
gine marked the beginning of a new epoch in the development of human soci-
ety, as Adam Smith believed. In the eighteenth century he was the one to pro-
claim the significant role of technical development and the real opportunities 
for gains from liberal economic relations and interdependence between national 
states (in his classic work “The Wealth of Nations”18).  
 A fully integrated world economy did not begin to appear until the second 
half of the nineteenth century (see Gill and Law, 1988). It was the time of in-
dustrialisation and crucial success of technical science. The transportation revo-
                                               
16  Davies (2002) notes that it is possible that such bills had been used by the Arabs in the eighth 
century and the Jews in the tenth, and that evidence exists that a contract was issued in Genoa in 
1156 to enable two brothers who had borrowed 115 Genoese pounds to reimburse the bank’s 
agents in Constantinople by paying them 460 bezants one month after their arrival. 
17  The Western supremacy was facilitated by the withdrawal of the Chinese fleet from the western 
Indian Ocean in the 15th century, leaving space for the western traders, including Portuguese, 
English and Dutch (see Hok-Lam Chan, 2004; Chanda, 2007).  
18  It is based on the complete 1904 edition of “An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth 
of nations” (see Smith, abridged edition of “The Wealth of Nations”, 2010). 
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lution increased immensely the speed of communications in the nineteenth 
century. The invention and introduction of the telegraph and, later in the same 
century, of the telephone practically eliminated the distance barriers. The effi-
ciency of the new means of communication far outmatched the slow and unre-
liable exchange of letters used between merchants in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
The widespread introduction of the telegraph in the 19th century led to the 
widespread use of wire transfers (see Davies, 2002).  
 The financial capital accumulated by the wealthy Western European nations 
began to quickly spread further afield in the form of colonial investment. As the 
main focus of this investment was in obtaining raw material, it involved the 
implementation of transportation infrastructure, thus contributing to the devel-
opment of accompanying communication and railway construction.  
 
2.4. The dawn of globalisation from the ashes of World War I 
 
The use, progress and spread of means of communication and their interna-
tional interconnectedness required the establishment of international treaties 
and organisations. Axford (2001) points out that between 1865 and 1910 
thirty-three intergovernmental bodies were created, among which were the 
Universal Postal Union (1874) and the International Bureau on Weights and 
Measures (1875). The latter part of the 19th century and the early years of the 
20th century also saw the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(1899)19 and the International Association for Labour Legislation (1900). A 
significant international development was also the adoption of the gold standard 
in the late 19th century (see Davies, 2002).20 
                                               
19  The first permanent forum for political multilateral negotiations, prior to the establishment of 
the League of Nations (which will be mentioned later in this chapter), was the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU). The IPU is the international organisation of Parliaments, founded 
in 1889 at the initiative of two parliamentarians, William Randal Cremer (United Kingdom) 
and Frédéric Passy (France). The organisation was established to promote peace and interna-
tional arbitration of conflicts and it played an important part in setting up the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in 1899 (see IPU and PCA websites).  
20  Although Britain had previously adopted the gold standard for the pound in 1816, other coun-
tries followed suit towards the end of the 19th century. In 1900, the USA also officially adopted 
the gold standard. With the outbreak of World War I a number of countries, including Britain, 
broke the link with gold and reintroduced it again some time after the war to break the link 
again during the Great Depression (mentioned further in this chapter), with Britain leaving the 
gold standard in 1931. The gold standard era finally ended in 1971 when the US authorities 
abandoned the system of fixed exchange rate and direct convertability of the dollar to gold (see 
Skidelsky, 1998; Davies, 2002). 
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 Coinciding with this was the introduction of the first international treaties 
relating to the opium trade. During the 1840s and 1850s two so-called Opium 
Wars against China were fought. They ended in humiliating treaties between 
Britain and (later) France on the one hand, and China as the defeated country 
on the other hand. China was forced to open its ports to western trade, the 
main commodity of which was opium. These were the first enduring policy 
initiatives concerning the global drug trade. However, within seven decades 
these initiatives would become converted into a form of international police 
cooperation and globalisation of the penal law approach against (psychoactive) 
substances. The traffic of opium is a good example of early global trade be-
tween continents. But in the end it became an illegal global trade evoking an 
equally global penal law counter movement.21  
 At the beginning of the 20th century a large part of the world’s industrial 
resources were concentrated in the British Empire. In 1900 it “covered a quarter 
of the habitable globe” and was the one among European countries that could be 
defined as a world power (Howard, 1998, p. 103). However, Germany man-
aged to gain momentum and quickly became Britain’s powerful economic rival 
with increased military potential. Germany’s attempts to expand its power base 
led to a global and devastating war. Japan allied with France, Russia and the 
United Kingdom, while the latter engaged its dominions, Australia and Canada 
as well as South Africa. International neutral shipping was disrupted, while the 
German colonies spread over the African continent and Polynesia. To disrupt 
supplies from the USA to the allied powers, Germany launched unrestricted 
submarine warfare in the Atlantic Ocean against non-army ships (see Howard, 
1998). This caused the entry of the USA into the European war (1917), which 
then became the first worldwide or global war – the First World War.  
 After the First World War, one of the first issues raised at the summit in 
Paris in January 1919 was about ‘collective security’, another dimension of 
globalisation. As a result, the League of Nations was established in 1920 to help 
keep peace world-wide through open negotiations that would replace “the secret 
diplomacy of the discredited old order” (Howard, 1998, p. 108). Under the aegis of 
                                               
21  In some respect, this can be defined as the second truly global movement after the anti-slavery 
movement. As Van Duyne and Levi note (2005), it is rather paradoxical that the ‘war on drugs’ 
was preceded by ‘Opium Wars’ that were led for the sake of drug trafficking, namely the colo-
nial trade to China. The first Opium War (1839-1842) started after the Chinese authorities tried 
to halt the import of opium from British India. As the export of this commodity was essential 
for maintaining a trade surplus with China, Britain reacted by occupying Chinese harbours (Van 
Duyne and Levi, 2005). As a result of the second Opium War (1856-1860), in which Britain 
was joined by France, China had to accept humiliating peace terms which included legalisation 
of the opium trade (Beeching, 1975; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005).  
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this organisation, in 1922 the Permanent Court of International Justice was 
created.  
 However, despite formulating the concept and signing the Covenant, the 
USA was not among the member-countries of the League.22 The USA de-
clined to join the League out of fears for its sovereignty (see Roberts, 1998). 
But they were members of certain special committees, such as the one on nar-
cotic drugs. Furthermore, during the 1930s, eighteen other nations, including 
Germany, Japan, Italy and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), left 
the organisation or were expelled from it. This was a clear indication that the 
League was weak, as it had been from the very beginning. During the inter-
war years the League failed to respond adequately to the Japanese invasion of 
Chinese Manchuria in 1931-32 (see Iriye, 1998; Skidelsky, 1998), to the Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia in 1935-36 (Skidelsky, 1998), and to the intervention by 
the Axis Powers in the Spanish Civil War in 1936-39 (see Howard, 1998).  
 The League was also not able to prevent the German rearmament, the oc-
cupation of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Poland in 1939, which 
unleashed the Second World War. Neither could the Treaty of Rapallo of 
1922, the Locarno Pact of 1925 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 prevent 
this war. Prior to its outbreak, another event with a global impact contributed 
to the deterioration of international relations – the Wall Street Crash in 1929. 
It evolved into an unprecedented worldwide economic depression, known as 
the Great Depression (Galbraith, 1975).  
 “The Great Depression of 1929-32 was the greatest peacetime breakdown of the 
world economy since the Industrial Revolution” notes Skidelsky (1998, p. 55). The 
economic pressure led to the collapse of the gold standard system (previously 
mentioned) and consequently the multilateral clearing system. The short-term 
result of these events was the raising of tariffs and strengthening the control 
over international exchange. In a long-term perspective it led to the break up 
of the world trade order which had been established until that time and repre-
sented a step back from globalisation (see Skidelsky, 1998).  
 Despite the years of economic pressure, in the inter-war period, when the 
US became the main industrial power, its largest companies expanded their 
activities in other parts of the world, encouraged by the US ‘Open Door’ pol-
icy. Yet the ‘open door’ was not reciprocal: foreign firms had limited access to 
US markets and resources because of the US policy of protectionism. American 
                                               
22  The League of Nations had 42 founding members. A further 21 countries joined between 1920 
and 1937, but 7 left, withdrew or were expelled before 1946 when the League of Nations was 
dissolved (see Walters, 1960). 
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multinationals originally began to create world cartels, despite existing and 
newly introduced national anti-trust laws.23 Then some multinational compa-
nies began to aspire to conquering the globe on their own instead of sharing 
the markets with rivals (see Vernon and Wortzel, 1980).   
 The progress of information and communication technologies continued 
between the two world wars. The radio-telephony or wireless transmission of 
voice, experimented in 1915 at the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, signalled the beginning of a transatlantic telephone service in the inter-
war years and was followed by a rapid development of cable systems and com-
munication satellites (see Porter, 1980). The achievement of Marconi in the 
late 1890s, the father of the wireless telegraphy,24 and the work of other ex-
perimenters led to the development of international broadcasting industry. In 
the early 1930s the Radio Corporation of America began broadcasting signals 
corresponding to moving images (in monochrome)25 (see Maddox, 1998). This 
was the beginning of a new era – the era of access to information and vision no 
matter whether you are at the centre of events or at the other end of the globe, 
and the era of international banking and money transmission, where money 
could move offshore or to any location in the world. 
 
2.5. Globalisation and de-globalisation after World War II 
 
The onset of the Second World War meant that all communications were 
severed, but a lesson was learned that nations had to be cemented into a global 
political system. This inevitably meant reducing protectionism and establishing 
international financial institutions and agreements such as the Bretton Woods 
agreement (see below). 
 After the Second World War previously interrupted developments were 
restored, furthered by the widespread use of new technologies. By the late 
1960s worldwide television broadcasting as well as communication satellites had 
turned into a common thing for ordinary people. In the 1960s and 1970s the 
‘digital’ electronic machines, created in the USA in the late 1930s, developed 
into unexpectedly powerful computers. In the late 1960s, researchers sponsored 
                                               
23  The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was the first United States federal law introduced to limit 
cartels and monopolies.  
24  In 1896 Marconi was granted the world’s first patent for a system of wireless telegraphy (Nobel 
Lectures, 1967). 
25  Prior to that, General Electric Co., the British Broadcasting Company and other organisations 
began radio broadcasting of scanned pictures accompanied by sound (see Hogan, 1979).  
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by the US Department of Defense created the microprocessor (‘chip’) which 
enabled the production of modern personal computers. These developments 
gave an impetus to new technological companies, such as IBM, to produce and 
trade on a large scale (see Maddox, 1998). 
 The evolution of money continued as well, at full speed. While Britain and 
other countries had broken the link to gold during the global economic crisis 
in the early 1930s, the US kept the link to the gold standard and after the Sec-
ond World War the US dollar replaced the British pound sterling as the key 
global currency (see Davies, 2002). Subsequently many countries fixed their 
exchange rates against the US dollar. However, as a result of growing interna-
tional inflation, in the early 1970s this system of fixed exchange rates started to 
break down and the US abandoned the gold standard. This was later to con-
tribute to the gradual development of intangible or e-money, especially from 
the 1990s onwards (see Davies, 2002), which was to make the shift of funds 
across the world so easy. 
 After the war, the aspirations of large businesses to become global became 
more evident than ever. The term ‘multinational enterprise’ emerged in the 
1960s. Multinational enterprises were represented mainly by US companies 
which had gained momentum during the inter-war period (as mentioned in 
the previous section). However, multinational companies from other countries 
started gaining momentum too.  
 Multinationals spread their business culture and standards worldwide, thus 
acting as a vehicle of globalisation. Undoubtedly they contributed to the after-
war world economic boom. The period between 1950 and 1973 was marked 
as the ‘Golden Age’. The rapid economic development was also boosted by 
integrated supranational post-war politics. The Bretton Woods26 Agreement of 
1944 came as a “compromise between the United States’ new economic internationalism 
and Britain’s demand for national autonomy to pursue full employment policies” 
(Skidelsky, 1998, p. 58). The early post-war years also saw the emergence of 
the Organisation of the United Nations,27 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion, the European Economic Community, the International Monetary Fund, 
                                               
26  The Bretton Woods system was the international monetary framework of rules that prevailed 
from the end of World War II until the early 1970s. It was designed to govern currency rela-
tions among states at fixed, but adjustable exchange rates, with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank playing a key role (see Skidelsky, 1998).  
27  The United Nations Organisation in fact emerged out of an anti-Axis wartime military alliance 
which from 1942 onwards called itself the ‘United Nations’. After the war, the new organisation 
took the same name (see Roberts, 1998).  
 22 
the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other inter-
national organisations.  
 The immediate post-war period, however, proved to also be a period of 
social and political turbulence as well as of a clear division between the capital-
ist and socialist world. This was to put a brake on the trend to globalisation for 
decades to come. The Korean War in 1950 - 53 (see West et al., 2001) but 
even more so the Vietnam War in the 1960s antagonised many in the USA and 
abroad and led to anti-war protests. Additionally, various leftist, anti-imperialist, 
civil-right movements, uprisings against materialism, consumerism, and racial 
segregation demonstrated the level of public discontent with existing govern-
ment policies and culture in the USA (see Patterson, 1996). This wave of social 
discontent spread to other parts of the world.  
 As mentioned earlier, in the 1960-70s, multinational companies also became 
the subject of widespread disapproval, being accused of concentrating power 
and capital in the hands of just a few influential entrepreneurs. Many began to 
regard the multinational companies and international organisations, created in 
the post-war period, as an instrument for the US to further their own interests 
and impose their own idea of capitalism on other nations (see Axford, 2001). 
After the Second World War the US became undoubtedly an economic world 
leader. Yet the Soviet Union emerged from the war as a powerful rival. It be-
came a conductor of order and ideological concepts that were unwanted by the 
US (see Freedman, 1998). Stalin created a powerful state apparatus28 and began 
the subjugation of the whole of Eastern Europe seeking to impose on them the 
Soviet concept of state and society. In response to the threat of a ‘global com-
munist conspiracy’, the US issued the Truman Doctrine and elaborated the 
Marshall Plan to provide economic support to post-war Europe to contain the 
Soviets (Ambrose, 1993) by overcoming an economic breakdown of Western 
Europe and creating a strong anti-Soviet alliance. The underlying political ob-
jective of this aid was obvious to the Kremlin and they opposed it by establish-
ing the Council of Mutual Economic Co-operation (COMECON) and the 
Warsaw Treaty. In the years to come, the trade and industry of the Central-
Eastern European socialist bloc was to develop within the framework of the 
Warsaw Treaty and COMECON.  
 And here we have it: a division of the globe, as it had never been before. 
The ‘Iron Curtain’ symbolising the emerging global bipolarity was most visibly 
represented by the division of Germany. The clash between the different ideo-
                                               
28  A process that had begun before the war. 
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logical systems of the socialist and capitalist blocs, and their ambitions to gain 
greater control in the world became notoriously known as the Cold War.  
 The political divide impeded globalisation. Over the years, the flow of 
goods, capital and people continued to expand but was still confined to certain 
parts of the globe on either side of the big divide.  
 
2.6. Globalisation break-through after the fall of the Wall 
 
Globalisation unfolded powerfully after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
when its homogenising force began to spread from the capitalist world into the 
former socialist countries. It may well be that the collapse of the socialist 
economies was inevitable, but what happened after that crucial moment of the 
opening of borders, of letting globalisation spread capitalist attitudes and thus 
bring the ‘benefits of a free market’?  
 It is true that democracy brought to the transition countries more freedom 
to speak, travel and trade but only to a certain extent. Various export quotas 
and visa regimes still impeded trade and travel, especially in the early years of 
transition. Globalisation manifested itself in various market-oriented reforms, 
not all of which had an immediate and positive impact. The free market poli-
cies of Milton Friedman applied as a ‘shock-therapy’ resulted in serious down-
side effects on the economy and society (see Stiglitz, 2002; Klein, 2007). It 
appears that the rules of liberalism proved largely to be the rules of money, 
serving corporate culture and the interests of multinational companies and 
powerful bankers (the credit crisis which unfolded in 2008 is also, to some 
extent, proof of this). The Western business culture and lifestyle began to influ-
ence the social and commercial life in the countries of transition (a process that 
can to an extent be described as Americanisation). Political developments 
showed that, in the minds of many, the Cold War was not quite over yet as the 
US and Russia appeared to continue to compete for world political domina-
tion, a process elsewhere defined as Cold Peace (see Bugajski, 2004).  
 The fall of the socialist regime in the East led to – sometimes illegal – mo-
bility of people, which started haphazardly but soon unfolded along more or-
ganised lines, such that law enforcement agencies denoted it as ‘organised 
crime’. However, the picture is very mixed. For example, woman trafficking 
ranges from the organisation of exploitative prostitution networks to young 
female fortune seekers (Maljevic, 2005; Aromaa and Lehti, 2007; Spencer, 
2007; Gounev et al., 2009). Some of these women, looking for a better life, 
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wandered from Russia to as far as Israel to work in the sex industry (Siegel, 
2009).  
 It also furthered commercial and financial globalisation which meant that 
the circulation of crime-money was largely unimpeded. However, the question 
was raised (but never properly researched) whether, and to what extent, these 
money flows contained loot derived through privatisation by the previous so-
cialist elite, now converted to a new kind of robber capitalists. Criminal finan-
cial schemes abounded and continued relatively undisturbed (Baloun and 
Scheinost, 2002) including their return-flow as ‘direct investment’ (see Van 
Duyne and Donati, 2008).  
 As with other aspects of civilisation, the advantages of globalisation are not 
necessarily evenly distributed, nor are its effects necessarily beneficial. It appears 
that globalisation is fine as long as the rich can occupy the best parts of the 
globe and dump their welfare pollution elsewhere.29 Some argue that legislation 
and courts’ decisions globally are a variable which depends on the interests of 
those who control the big transnational corporations, which are stronger than 
some governments. According to these arguments, weaker states have no other 
alternative but to adapt and conform their policy to the world order dominated 
by transnational corporations (see Genov, interview in 2003). Tax laws, in-
vestment regulations and privatisation rules are often designed to benefit large 
businesses and transnational companies (TNCs), while smaller enterprises, espe-
cially in emerging markets, are being pushed into their shadow or even into the 
shadow economy. Transparency appears to have become a bargaining counter 
referred to only when it suits. Governments appear to focus more effort on 
what protects the interests of large corporations rather than what is truly good 
for the ordinary people.30  
                                               
29  See, for instance, media reports on the scandal of the Probo Koala ship, sailing from Amsterdam 
to the Ivory Coast, unloading a cargo of poisonous slobs, the processing of which was refused in 
Amsterdam. Reportedly in the summer of 2006, 16 people died in Ivory Coast’s port city of 
Abidjan and thousands more became ill following the dumping of waste from the ship (see 
Braanker, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 2008; for further details regarding this and other exam-
ples, see also Knauer et al., Spiegel, 2006).  
30  It can be argued, for instance, that the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which will be touched 
upon in later sections (see section 4.4), was introduced in 1977 primarily to protect US com-
mercial interests rather than to fight corrupt practices. Otherwise one may wonder how US 
government advisors who have pushed for the Iraq war agenda could have ended up with con-
tracts for consultancy and reconstruction work in Iraq allocated to their own companies. When 
Becthel Group, which is known to have close links to the Bush administration, won a $680 mil-
lion worth contract for the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure in April 2003, Democrats in 
Congress as well as European firms criticised the invitation-only contract awarding process. The 
Guardian noted that the US government claimed that the restriction is for practical reasons and 
that non-US firms will have the possibility to paricipate as subcontractors. The US government 
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 The dictionary of the International Society for Ecology and Culture criti-
cally defines globalisation as: 1) the process by which governments give away 
the rights of their citizens in favour of speculative investors and transnational 
corporations; 2) the erosion of wages, social welfare standards and environ-
mental regulations for the sake of international trade; 3) the world-wide impo-
sition of a consumer monoculture (see Woodin and Lucas, 2004).  
 We must face the problem of social inequalities and poverty, as well as the 
growing threat of environmental catastrophe but can we blame all this on glob-
alisation? Globalisation is not an agent, a ‘being’ doing things, but a process 
which is driven by human beings, their need to share and socialise and their 
need to reconnoitre new horizons for social as well as commercial objectives. 
As Williamson (2002) notes, no country can afford to remain isolated from the 
world economy: a complete autarky is hardly feasible. Wherever it was tried it 
resulted in impoverishment of the population as was the case with Germany 
before the Second World War, Albania in the late 1970s and, as it appears, 
North Korea at present.  
 Whatever the implications, globalisation is a historical fact. It is an irreversi-
ble process entailing both positive and negative developments, past and present. 
It affects trade of any kind, legal and illegal, as well as its related (criminal) fi-
nances. Therefore, returning to our subject, we have to face the fact that 
crime-money can now move anywhere across the world along with legitimate 
money flows fed by globally operating multinationals and global labour forces 
sending savings home. Given this background of globalisation processes can we 
take appropriate measures to curb the phenomenon of global crime-money 
movements? 
 
2.7. Globalisation and money laundering 
 
Globalisation should be considered a neutral empirical phenomenon: it is the 
confluence of historical developments. However, its effects are not neutral. As 
mentioned earlier, it entails not only positive but also negative developments, 
like ‘globalisation of law breaking’, as illustrated by the following example: 
In 1999 several senior officials of the Ministry of Sport and Tourism and the 
Senate Committee on Social Affairs in Brazil were denounced for having al-
legedly assisted the Mafia in distributing more than 20 thousand slot video 
                                                                                                              
also argued that their decision is comparable to EU policies (Burkeman, the Guardian, 2003; see 
also Roche and Silverstein, Los Angeles Times, 2004). 
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bingo machines. The alleged scheme took place at a time when the game 
was banned. It reportedly involved the Italian Mafia, including an alleged 
Mafia member named Lillo Rosario Lauricella. The criminal ring operated 
in two groups: one dealt with drug trafficking; the other focused on the fi-
nancial management of the affair. The activities of the second group in-
cluded the establishment of international vehicles for money laundering via 
banks in the USA, Spain, Brazil, Switzerland and Andorra (see Mingardi, 
2001).  
 
This example (among many others) illustrates how crime and crime-money 
management may expand beyond the territory of one specific country. Crime-
entrepreneurs, similarly to their licit counterparts, respond to market incentives 
(see Mittelman and Johnston, 1999). In the context of globalisation this means 
that criminals may seek to use the advantages of the global market wherever 
they appear to be: in Brazil, Spain, the USA or elsewhere. Crime-
entrepreneurs, as is the case with any entrepreneur, have always sought to bring 
the goods where there is a demand and an opportunity for a higher profit, bal-
anced against risks. In a world of weak or inefficient border controls, liberalised 
trade and finances, crime-entrepreneurs can easily move to where price differ-
ences, corruption, legislative loopholes and ineffective law enforcement enable 
them to meet high yielding demand markets for contraband. The present pere-
grination of cocaine through Western Africa is an illustration of this global 
criminal flexibility (see Van Duyne and Levi, 2005).  
 This criminal flexibility enjoyed by crime-entrepreneurs is on a par with the 
continual trend of globalised law breaking by legitimate firms (for example, the 
on-going dumping of (toxic) waste and medicine in Africa). Indeed, existing 
‘regulatory asymmetries’ such as differences in the regulation of offshore juris-
dictions and onshore countries (see Adamoli, 2002) encourage licit entrepre-
neurs to do ‘jurisdiction-shopping’ and choose the jurisdiction which best suits 
them (see Van Duyne, 2002). The paths of licit entrepreneurs are soon fol-
lowed by crime-entrepreneurs or vice versa.  
 Trade liberalisation, globalisation and the development of communication 
have increased the mobility of funds, including crime-money. According to 
policy papers, such as issued by the FATF and OECD (FATF-OECD Policy 
Brief, 1999) this is (supposed to be) a real threat to the global financial system. 
The hundreds of billions of crime-monies flowing through the arteries of this 
system are supposed to affect its integrity. However, according to other experts 
like Van Duyne and Levi (2005), estimates about the scope of crime-money 
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management (or money laundering) are largely unreliable. They argue that 
these estimates only serve as an excuse to governments and international bodies 
to impose further measures of global control “ranging from civil asset seizure and 
criminalization of association at home, to beating up on helpless island states and sending 
military advisors to burn down Andean peasants’ huts (‘cocaine labs’) abroad” (Naylor, 
2002, p. 1; see also Harvey, 2003). Such flaws never hindered the anti-
laundering proponents in their zeal to drive home the same moral theme. For 
example, the very fact that such monies can float anonymously and covertly 
within and between financial institutions is considered as a kind of abetting or 
even complicity to crime by those institutions. This is a token of ‘lack of integ-
rity’ with a global impact, given the global financial system.  
 At this point the overarching framework of globalisation turns into an un-
beatable every-thing-is-globally-connected-to-everything argumentation. 
Whether that is empirically correct does not matter: when the financial system 
is of a global nature, and who can deny that, then money laundering is global 
too. And consequently it is a global threat too.  
 This looks like a cast iron chain of reasoning, which should be more than a 
kind of semi-Aristotelean syllogism of which the Greek sophists would be jeal-
ous. But what do we have, apart from this anti-laundering sophism? We have a 
proclaimed threat of a purported global nature, supported by some mega esti-
mates of questionable reliability and otherwise very little insight into the actual 
threat that has been posed by all this crime-money after the opening of borders, 
whether at its beginning in 1989 or twenty years later. Management theorists 
would note: what must be managed, needs first to be measured. But where the 
measurement of dirty money did not produce more than debatable results, one 
may question whether it is possible to assess and measure a more complex de-
rivative: the process of spreading the money-laundering phenomenon globally. 
In doing so we face the difficulty of assessing the second derivative: the effects 
of the spread and enforcement of anti-money laundering policies across the 
world other than by counting the number of agencies which have been estab-
lished. While acknowledging the importance of these questions, it must be 
noted that they are a methodologist’s nightmare. 
 In the next chapter we will review the origin of money laundering, global 
anti-money laundering policy developments and some of the issues that arise 






3. The phenomenon of money laundering  
3.1. Money laundering on the political agenda  
 
In this chapter we will review the developments which placed money launder-
ing on the political agenda. When did policy makers and legislators start paying 
attention to the money-laundering phenomenon and why did it take so long 
for them to notice it and raise the alarm?  
 
3.1.1.  Genesis of the money-laundering phenomenon 
 
Prehistory 
According to Morris-Cotteril (2001), money laundering is not a modern phe-
nomenon. He quotes the historian Sterling Seagrave, author of “Lords of the 
Rim,” who describes how, over 2000 years ago, Chinese merchants used vari-
ous means, including purchasing movable assets and sending money abroad, to 
protect their wealth from the government. Seagrave writes that “[o]nly those 
who remained invisible could expect to hold on to their wealth in the face of continual 
extortion by imperial eunuchs and bureaucrats” (Seagrave, 1995, pp. 69). However, 
even if many of these merchants were greedy, engaged in “predatory commerce” 
(Seagrave, 1995, pp. 66-69) and working in conditions where risk-taking was 
condemned by Confucianism (Seagrave, 1995), they were seeking to conceal 
their wealth rather than conceal its origin. Illegitimacy of wealth is a key ele-
ment in the concept of money laundering but indeed, as in the case of the an-
cient Chinese merchants, laundering techniques are often used protectively to 
hide one’s wealth irrespective of its origin. 
 Uribe (2003) suggests that money laundering practices date back to at least 
the Middle Ages when moneylenders invented various mechanisms to cover up 
their evasion of laws which criminalised usury. Uribe also links the phenome-
non of money laundering to the concealment of loot by the pirates of the 
Mediterranean who deprived Rome of its supplies but were defeated by 
Pompey in 67 BC. Uribe then describes the pirates who targeted European 
commercial vessels during the 16th-18th centuries as “pioneers in the practice of 
laundering gold” (Uribe, 2003, p. 131). The comparison may well be appropriate, 
although there is no clear evidence that pirates’ practices of laundering gold 
                                               
31  Page 1 of the online available pdf version.  
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ever went beyond the mere concealment of their loot and the bribing of local 
administrators. Some of them perhaps successfully pretended to be legitimate 
traders or managed to earn the status of privateers. Many pirates were able to 
legitimise their wealth with the support of British, French and Dutch govern-
ments32 and some of them operated under a royal licence, although that would 
not constitute laundering the way we understand it nowadays. The phenome-
non of laundering in the narrow sense of the term, i.e. providing a legitimate 
appearance to the loot, was yet to evolve.  
 
Early preconditions  
As reviewed earlier, hiding one’s wealth, or, as we know it today, tax evasion, 
is an ancient phenomenon. Tax evasion techniques, involving the use of tax 
havens and offshore bank accounts, began to develop many years ago. Secret 
banking in Switzerland, for instance, dates back to at least the time of the 
French Revolution (Robinson, 2003; Taylor III, 1984) and by the end of the 
19th century Switzerland had began to offer numbered accounts (Robinson, 
2003). In 1932, a political scandal in France exposed the large scale of tax eva-
sion and the use of secret Swiss banking by the French elite. The scandal be-
came known as the ‘Paris affair’ or the ‘Basler Handelsbank affair’, after the 
name of the Swiss bank implicated in the matter. The French police discovered 
a list with about 2000 names of French citizens, including politicians, judges, 
bishops, generals and wealthy industrialists, who were hiding their money in 
Switzerland and who were denounced by the socialist deputy Fabien Albertin 
as tax evaders (see Hug, 2002; Komisar, 2003; Vogler, 2006). This demon-
strates that the recent disclosures of Liechtenstein accounts have old ancestors.33  
 Over the years, tax evasion techniques improved, laying the foundations of 
today’s money laundering (most of which, however, is technically still fairly 
                                               
32  One of the most famous British pirates, Sir Francis Drake, was knighted by Queen Elisabeth I in 
1581 and was appointed the second-in-command of the English fleet in the victorious battle 
against the Spanish Armada in 1588 (see Cummins, 1996; Turner, 2005; Kelsey, 1998). 
33  The accounts were disclosed amidst a scandal involving hundreds of wealthy German tax evad-
ers hiding millions in bank accounts in Liechtenstein. Reportedly Germany’s intelligence service 
paid €4,2 million to an informant, a former employee of Liechtenstein banking group LGT, to 
provide the incriminating list of tax evaders allegedly stolen from LGT. The UK was also re-
ported to have followed suit and paid a whistleblower £100.000 pounds (€132.931) for details 
of Liechtenstein accounts held by Britons after having originally refused to pay for the informa-
tion.The scandal raised the issue about the ethics and accountability of the highly-paid business 
elite in Germany and elsewhere. However, it also sparked a debate about the manner in which 
the information was obtained and then shared with the authorities of other countries. A repre-
sentative of LGT was quoted by the media describing these methods as illegal and extremely of-
fensive (see reports by Deutsche Welle, 2008). 
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simple). However, although tax evasion techniques existed, the legal concept of 
money laundering, in terms of providing a legitimate appearance to ill-gotten 
gains, did not exist yet. In the second half of the 19th century bank robbers like 
Jesse James did not need to launder their criminal profits (Hafner, 2002). They 
would simply leave the place of crime and go to another town to deposit the 
money. This money would be ‘clean’, as nobody would ask Jesse James where 
and how he had obtained his money (unless he was recognised). As the ques-
tion was never raised, the concept of money laundering was of no relevance. 
There was no need for money laundering. Yet, in those days, the tainted 
money did flow through the legitimate system without any apparent devastat-
ing effects.  
 It was not until the early years of the 20th century, when the US tax au-
thorities began to require proof of legal earnings, that the concept of money 
laundering became relevant (see Anderson 1979; Von Lampe, 1999). Criminals 
had to justify their standard of living and for that purpose they resorted to 
money laundering, although the legal term was not yet introduced.  
 In April 1930, in the USA, the Chicago Crime Commission published a list 
of 28 notorious gangsters, with Al Capone leading the list. These gangsters 
were denounced as public enemies and the Commission required prosecution 
against them by all possible legal means (Von Lampe, 1999). The Commission’s 
initiative was an essential development towards the personification of ‘organised 
crime’, as it referred not to the specific crimes of these gangsters but to their 
public status as criminals (Von Lampe, 1999). At this point of time it appeared 
less possible to prove any crime other than tax evasion. Prosecution for tax 
evasion became particularly effective after the US Supreme Court decided in 
1927 that illegal earnings should also be subject to taxation (see Von Lampe, 
1999). Following this ruling, in 1931 Al Capone became one of the first to be 
convicted of tax evasion and sent to jail.34  
 Saltmarsh (1990) notes that the term ‘money laundering’ is reputed to have 
originated from the 1920s, when gangsters like Al Capone and Bugsy Moran 
opened up laundrettes in Chicago to clean their ‘dirty money’. It is possible 
that during the 1920-30s, the time of Al Capone, police officers coined the 
term ‘money laundering’ referring to criminals trying to justify their earnings, 
                                               
34  Al Capone’s brother, Ralph, was indicted on tax evasion charges too. Reportedly a week later 
after the indictment for tax evasion Al Capone and sixty-eight members of his gang were also 
charged with some 5000 violations of the Volstead Act (Prohibition), some of them going back 
to 1922. However, the tax cases took precedence over the Prohibition violations (see Bergreen, 
1994). 
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specifically from alcohol trade during the Prohibition era.35 Saltmarsh’s view 
seems to be a suitable explanation of the semantic origin of the term ‘money 
laundering’. Yet it somehow succumbs to the logic of what happened to Al 
Capone. He tried hard to cover his tracks – he reportedly used assumed names, 
never opened a bank account or acquired property assets in his own name, paid 
only in cash and tried not to sign anything. Given this background, it is difficult 
to believe that Al Capone might have thought of securing a legitimate appear-
ance for his crime-money as prosecutors managed to demonstrate that he en-
joyed a lavish lifestyle even though he claimed he had no income and never 
filed any tax returns. Additionally, they linked him to proceeds from a gam-
bling operation. He was indicted with evading taxes of over $250.000 on unre-
ported income for the period from 1924 to 1929 (Crumbley and Apostolou, 
2007).  
 As Robinson (2003) notes, the legend about the laundrettes sounds more 
like a “bedtime fable” (p. 24). In any case, the rise and fall of Al Capone served as 
a lesson to his successors, who wished to avoid his fate. The next kingpins of 
the Italian-American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra, notorious criminals such as 
Luciano, Sindona and Lansky, decided it was high time to start managing their 
illegal money more efficiently, or so the legend says.  
 
Lansky’s groundwork  
It is commonly believed that Lansky is the “patron saint of money launderers” 
(Blunden, 2001, p. 58), who took “capital flight to the next level [. . . and] laid the 
groundwork” for money laundering (Robinson, 2003, p. 24), including organised 
money laundering (Suendorf, 2001). Even the Australian Federal Police has 
posted on its website an article by Peter Huck (1997), which asserts that laun-
dering was first conjured by Lansky. It appears that if we want to better under-
stand the history of money laundering and its interconnectedness to globalisa-
tion, we will need to have a closer look at Lansky’s track record.  
 A number of references suggest that Lansky laundered drug money (see 
McCoy, 1972; Suendorf, 2001; Scott, 2003; Robinson, 2003) and that he be-
gan mastering his laundering techniques soon after Al Capone’s conviction 
(Blunden, 2001; Komisar, 2003; Robinson, 2003). McCoy (1972) even sug-
gested that Lansky collaborated with the CIA in heroin distribution.36 How-
ever, according to Lansky’s biographer, Lacey (1991), throughout his adult 
                                               
35  The Prohibition era lasted from 1920 to 1933. 
36  McCoy also claims that at some point Lansky bought a Swiss bank, the Exchange and Invest-
ment bank in Geneva (see also Komisar, 2003; Scott, 2003). 
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years Lansky steered away from drugs, prostitution and murder. Yet Lacey 
admits that Lansky’s associates were involved in all three. Thus Lansky’s joint 
ventures were effectively a melting pot for money from the very same activities 
from which he allegedly stayed away. However, Lacey believes that Lansky was 
a money manager rather than a money launderer, in the strict sense of the term. 
According to Lacey, there is little evidence that numbered Swiss bank accounts 
began to be used by American criminals during the 1930s (Lacey also refers to 
Eisenberg et al., 1979). Lacey makes a point that, at the time, it made no sense 
for Americans to transport cash across the world by steamer or railway when 
they could simply hide it in an unregulated local bank. Yet it should not have 
been difficult for Lansky to make wire transfers overseas. Western Union, for 
instance, already existed at the time. Lansky had reasons to be concerned about 
his money. Overseas tax havens must have been a better place for his savings 
than a local unregulated bank. While it is likely that Lansky gained the knowl-
edge about tax evasion techniques from people who were intimately involved 
in that sort of operation,37 it is difficult to believe that he would have waited 
until the 1960s to take advantage of the offshore world. But Lacey has a point 
that Lansky did not learn the craft overnight.  
 Lansky assumed the role of a crime-money organiser at quite an early stage 
in his career, during the Prohibition era. He learned how to work between 
legality and illegality from alleged criminal authorities such as Arnold Roth-
stein.38 Lansky established a car rental business, which not only provided trans-
portation for his bootlegging but also served as a legitimate front to his illegal 
activities (Lacey, 1991), which was not far removed from money laundering.  
 During the 1930s, after the end of the Prohibition era, when the profits 
from his bootlegging business could no longer be sustained, Lansky launched 
his gaming enterprise in Saratoga Springs and, later, in other places across the 
United States. According to Lacey, Lansky ran his gambling business through 
joint ventures in which his main role was to organise the share-out. At the 
time, gambling was largely illegal.39 Nevertheless, casino gambling flourished. 
                                               
37  Lacey believes that Lansky was introduced to the offshore world by associates, including former 
bootlegger John Pullman (who moved to Switzerland during the 1950s), and began to actively 
use offshore tax schemes during the 1960s, at a time of increasing pressure for more efficient tax 
collection.  
38  During his early career Lansky worked for Rothstein who made his fortune in bootlegging and 
gambling, and managed to hide the dark side of his activities behind legitimate businesses such as 
real estate investments and Broadway shows (Lacey, 1991). According to Katcher (1994), Roth-
stein transformed organised crime into a vast business empire, run like a corporation. 
39  Casino gambling was legal only in Nevada, which re-legalised casinos and other forms of gam-
bling in 1931. The second state to legalise casino gambling was New Jersey, in 1976. By that 
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Lacey notes: “Saratoga’s month of summer indulgence operated on the basis of bribery 
and corruption” (Lacey, 1991, p. 83). It appears that as a result of flourishing 
corruption Lansky and the likes perhaps did not need to worry too much about 
securing legitimate appearance to their wealth at that point.  
 In the late 1930s Lansky went to Cuba where, for the first time, he could 
manage his gambling operations in a legal fashion (Lacey, 1991). Lansky’s in-
vestments in Cuba gave him the opportunity to legitimise some of his wealth. 
Robinson (2003) suggests that Lansky moved money from the US to Switzer-
land and back, both ways through Cuba, as a legal return on investments over-
seas.40  
 In the mid-1940s Lansky received his “second great chance in his life to go legit” 
(Lacey, 1991, p. 152). Jointly, with mobster Benjamin ‘Bugsy’ Siegel, Lacey 
invested in several projects, including the Flamingo Hotel Casino in Las Vegas 
where casino gambling was legal. The Flamingo was largely financed by the 
Mafia (see also Schott and Wilson, 1994). Yet Siegel’s and Lansky’s ultimate 
idea was more likely to have been to make a lucrative investment rather than to 
create a convenient money-laundering vehicle.41  
 During the 1940s Lansky launched also other legitimate enterprises such as 
Emby Distributing Company, a distributor of jukeboxes. But even these busi-
nesses were often operating in the “grey area between hard-nosed tactics and illegal-
ity” (Lacey, 1991, p. 169). Despite the illegality of much of his business, Lansky 
managed to run it relatively unimpeded until the early 1950s, when Senator 
Estes Kefauver launched his pursuit of the Mob and set up a committee (Spe-
cial Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Com-
merce) to investigate the Mob’s activities, including gambling.42 In 1953 
Lansky pleaded guilty to gambling charges. However, his sentence was hardly 
commensurate with the scale of his alleged crime.43 He was sentenced to three 
months in prison and a fine of $2.500 (Lacey, 1991; Robinson, 2003).  
                                                                                                              
point, especially during the 1930s and 1940s, other states had legalised only some forms of gam-
bling such as low-stakes charity gambling and pari-mutual betting on horse races (see Rose, 
1995). 
40  According to Lacey, by 1960 Lansky had been listing his Cuban income in his official tax re-
turns in the US. 
41  It appears that Siegel was later killed by his backers who were unsatisfied with the way he man-
aged their investment (Lacey, 1991; Schott and Wilson, 1994). 
42  This was the first time organised crime firmly reappeared on the political agenda after Al Ca-
pone’s conviction in 1931 (Von Lampe, 1999). 
43  The light sentence could be explained by the fact that gambling businesses were largely tolerated 
and Lansky enjoyed protection from patrons in high society. Besides, investigators found little 
evidence to link Lansky to the gaming room in Saratoga (but proved his link to the restaurant 
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 In the years to come, according to Lacey, neither the IRS nor FBI was able 
to identify any evidence that Lansky was laundering money offshore.44 Yet 
Lacey admits that during the 1960s the IRS found evidence that Lansky was 
sending money overseas, in particular to Switzerland. Lacey notes that Lansky 
regarded his numbered Swiss account as “an elaborate version of cash under the bed” 
(Lacey, 1991, p. 305). Lacey highlights that there may well have been skilled 
Wall Street dealers who, during the 1960s and early 1970s, managed to bring 
their money ‘full circle’ back to the US via loan-back transactions in Switzer-
land or elsewhere. However, there was no evidence to suggest that Lansky was 
involved in such operations. According to Lacey, Lansky did not launder 
money as there was nothing to suggest that Lansky brought any laundered 
money back. However, this conclusion is arbitrary, as he may have brought 
money back undetected, in the name of his brother or nominee holders.45 
Lansky feared tax evasion charges and did everything to obscure the trail. Since 
the Kefauver investigation Lansky’s tax returns had been scrupulously scruti-
nised by the IRS, which applied net-worth analysis to compare his declared 
income with his expenditure. For many years Lansky managed to remain unaf-
fected. However, in 1973 he was eventually indicted on tax evasion charges.46 
But Lansky was let off the hook again.47 In 1976 his indictment was dismissed.  
 What was Lansky’s real wealth? According to Lacey, when in 1983 Lansky 
died, he left little to the surviving members of his family. Lacey notes that sto-
ries about Lansky’s wealth, estimated at $300 million during his lifetime, were 
grossly exaggerated. But Lansky’s $300 million myth survived for years. From 
Lacey’s account it appears that Lansky was indeed “a master of the casino skim 
                                                                                                              
that was part of the business). According to Lacey, Lansky agreed to plead guilty only in order to 
avoid further publicity and the possibility of incriminating others (Lacey, 1991). 
44  Laundering was not criminalised yet but investigators were looking for international trails of hot 
money. Besides, after the Watergate scandal (see section 3.1.3. of this thesis), money laundering 
became a topical issue.  
45  According to Lacey, Lansky’s Cuban income ended in 1960 (after Fidel Castro overturned the 
regime of Batista) and since then Lansky had listed in his tax returns only American sources of 
revenue, including the Flamingo’s finder’s fee and dividends from oil and gas investments. 
Lansky feared extradition and, therefore, it is possible that he never brought money back as he 
intended to spend it abroad. If, however, any money was brought back, it could have been in 
the name of Lansky’s relatives. According to Lacey, a substantial part of Lansky’s business was in 
the name of his brother, Jake.  
46  Prosecutors linked him to the tax evasion at the Flamingo through his legal finder’s fee contract, 
which he so meticulously listed in his tax returns. During the 1960s tax evasion, in the form of 
skimming (the simplest form of which was removing cash from the counting room every night), 
was widespread (Lacey, 1991).  
47  A crucial witness, Vincent Teresa, proved to be unreliable. Additionally, Lansky’s health seri-
ously deteriorated and he failed to appear in court on a number of occasions which impeded 
court proceedings (Lacey, 1991). 
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share-out” (Lacey, 1991, p. 386) but there is little evidence to suggest that he 
was involved in money laundering in the strict sense of the term (except for, 
perhaps, his Cuban investment return).48 His tax evasion techniques, however, 
must have contributed to the development of the money-laundering phe-
nomenon. But Lansky’s story also shows that the human desire to pay less tax –
shared by a host of tax payers– has been at the bottom of much of the anti-
money laundering developments in the US and globally.  
 
Hitler’s loot 
Perhaps the nearest to laundering in the strict sense of the term, in the years 
prior to the official recognition of the phenomenon, was the effort of Hitler’s 
intelligence forces, not simply to conceal their loot but to present it as if it had 
a legitimate origin.  
 In order to buy supplies with the gold, which Hitler’s officers plundered 
mainly from Jewish families during the Second World War, its origin had to be 
hidden. As gold bars were easily recognisable, Reichsbank officials decided to 
re-melt the gold. It was then shipped to Switzerland and other neutral coun-
tries to be used as collateral for credits. The gold was accompanied by fake 
documents that showed it had been legitimately acquired (Naylor, 1996; Smith, 
1989).   
 
Other  pioneers in money laundering  
Michele Sindona is also widely viewed as one of the pioneers in money laun-
dering. Sindona studied law at the University of Messina and in his early career 
years worked as a tax lawyer, which allowed him to achieve a high level of 
sophistication in his later activities. He became known as an Italian financier, a 
former adviser of the Vatican Bank, but most importantly as the banker of the 
Italian Mafia. In this capacity he became involved in the management of the 
money of crime-families in Italy and the US, and the financing of their “hidden 
political monopolies” (Rossetti, 2003, p. 83).  
 When Sindona decided to leave Italy in 1971, he left behind a well-
established network of shell companies and banks, including offshore. This 
network was inherited by Roberto Calvi, who was appointed general director 
of Banco Ambrosiano in 1971 and President of the bank in 1975. Banco Am-
brosiano was founded in 1896 to serve the interests of part of the Lombard 
Catholic bourgeoisie. The bank acquired international notoriety after its dra-
                                               
48  This does not exclude the possibility that he laundered the money of other mobsters. 
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matic demise, caused by dubious transactions and the fall of the dollar. Having 
managed to flee from prosecution, Calvi was found hanging under Blackfriars 
Bridge in London in 1982. The bank was declared bankrupt a few weeks later. 
According to investigators, Calvi’s expansion strategy, designed with Sindona’s 
assistance, had brought the bank to its collapse. The bank had become a major 
provider of illicit financial services, such as money laundering and loan-sharking 
to powerful Mafia clans and freemasonic lodges as well as to minor criminals 
(see Cornwell, 1983; Paoli, 1995).49 It illustrates that affluent criminals have 
little to gain by undermining the integrity of the financial system, putting their 
monies at risk as well.  
 During the 1970s another criminal scheme in the banking sector took place. 
The Australian Nugan Hand Bank was used by drug and arms dealers for 
money laundering and other illicit financial operations in 13 countries (see 
Common-wealth-New South Wales Joint Task Force on Drug Trafficking, 
1983). There was also evidence to suggest that high-ranking US military and 
intelligence officers, particularly from the CIA, had links to the bank and were 
implicated in the bank’s highly questionable dealings (Kwitny, 1987; New York 
Times, 8 March 1987). It was also reported that one of the main organisers 
committed suicide or died under suspicious circumstances (New York Times, 8 
March 1987). 
 The financial empire of the notorious BBCI was also established during the 
1970s. As Truell and Gurwin note (1992), “BCCI’s role as a dirty money machine 
came naturally [. . .]. BBCI’s most unscrupulous bankers were often the best marketers, 
since they did not hesitate to handle dirty money” (p. 169). However, it appears that 
the BCCI was not established as a money-laundering bank or a bank for dirty 
money. The BCCI was a badly managed and ill-supervised bank, which even-
tually faced serious deficits. This made it susceptible to all sorts of deposits to 
stop the gaps. This raises the question whether lack of efficiency and integrity 
                                               
49  In the meantime, Sindona continued his activities out of America. His fate was no less dramatic 
than Calvi’s. In 1972 he bought a controlling stake in Franklin National Bank, in Long Island, 
New York. In 1974 the bank collapsed amidst allegations of large-scale financial speculation, 
mismanagement and fraud. This also affected his banking interests in Italy, where the Italian 
lawyer Giorgio Ambrosoli became the liquidator of his banks. In 1979 Ambrosoli was mur-
dered. In 1980 Sindona was convicted in the US on 65 counts of conspiracy, fraud and perjury 
in connection with the collapse of the Franklin National Bank. He was sentenced to 25 years 
imprisonment but was later extradited to Italy where, in 1986, he was convicted for arranging 
Ambrosoli’s murder. In 1986, in prison, Sindona was poisoned with cyanide (the matter was 
covered by the press: Time Magazine, 7 April, 1980, also Dionne, The New York Times, 22 
March 1986). Laundering can be bad for one’s health. 
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are actually preceding laundering instead of laundering as a cause of eroded integ-
rity.  
 These examples illustrate that by the 1970s the money-laundering phe-
nomenon had already began to emerge in some form in many places in the 
financial system. Rather, because it was connected to other forms of financial 
wrong-doing (e.g. fraud, currency violation, embezzlement), it was increasingly 
coming to the surface and recognised as such. As long as bankers do not create 
scandals, their laundering is more likely to go unnoticed. 
 Some authors (see for instance McCoy, 1972; Chambliss, 1988) argue that 
during those years, alongside the Mafia, governments became also involved in 
some forms of illicit operations and money laundering and, while doing so, 
contributing to the emergence of various money laundering techniques (see 
references to Nugan Hand Bank above). Chambliss (1988) for instance talks 
about ‘state-organised crimes’ or, in other words, illegal acts committed by state 
or government officials in the pursuit of their official job. A number of authors 
provide examples of illegal covert operations allegedly conducted by the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see Lernoux, 1984; Chambliss, 1988; Bain-
erman, 1992; Brewton, 1992; Simon and Eitzen, 1993; Robinson, 1994; Blum, 
1995). The CIA was established in 1947 and since the early years of its exis-
tence it has been linked to controversial and covert activities for which it 
needed funds.50 However, if the funds of the CIA were of licit origin, they 
would not need laundering, or perhaps ‘inverse laundering’. Likewise, if the 
CIA has used illegal funds for illegal operations, these funds would not need to 
be legitimised either. On the other hand, when legal funds are used for illegal 
purposes, they become tainted. But transactions with tainted money do not 
necessarily constitute money laundering (in the strict meaning of the word), 
though these transactions must be dressed up in such a way that their illegality 
remains covered. And does the handling of money after the ‘dip in the dark’ 
not qualify as laundering?  
 As we see, the term ‘money laundering’ began to be widely equated with 
the full range of money-laundering techniques, although such techniques may 
also be used for hiding legitimately acquired assets. (For instance, Walter (1991) 
refers to hiding assets in alimony law suits, heritage disputes and other civil 
disputes about money, which explains the need for a ‘financial secrecy industry’ 
                                               
50  The CIA was alleged to have conspired to create the coup d’état in Iran in 1953 and to have 
financed it with laundered money (see Robinson, 1994). Numerous references on the internet 
claim that the CIA has been involved in similar events in other countries (including Guatemala, 
Cuba, Chile). 
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also for licit matters.) This overlap or, to an extent, confusion, continued de-
spite, or even because of, legislative developments and the emergence of offi-
cial, legal definitions of money laundering.  
 
3.1.2.  Early legislative developments 
 
The USA has undoubtedly been the main driving force behind the introduction 
of anti-money laundering regulations worldwide and the establishment of Fi-
nancial Intelligence Units (FIUs).51 The Financial Record-Keeping and Re-
porting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970, known as the Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA),52 constituted the first comprehensive American anti-money 
laundering law. The Act did not explicitly contain the term ‘money laundering’ 
and neither did subsequent regulations of 197253 and of 1977.54 However, the 
Act was introduced to target crime-money concealment and laundering, but, in 
the main, tax evasion. It stipulated that financial institutions maintain records 
and file reports so as to enable law enforcement authorities to track financial 
transactions in criminal, fiscal or regulatory investigations. Basically the Act 
established a financial intelligence tool, the effectiveness of which has remained 
a question. 
 In 1970 the US enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) Statute as title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970.55 The RICO-Statute played an important role in the context of future 
anti-money laundering regulations as it was designed to prevent criminals from 
infiltrating legal enterprises and to prosecute criminals who had already ac-
quired a share of the legal economy (Von Lampe, 1999). The RICO-Statute 
and other laws and regulations that were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s 
were ultimately aimed at assisting law enforcement agencies in confiscating the 
proceeds of crime. Such a process was observed internationally. As Stessens 
(2000) notes, law enforcement authorities needed a more effective legal instru-
ment to fight crime and ensure that criminals were deprived of their illegal 
profits. Stessens further notes that while the majority of criminal justice systems 
were familiar with the more traditional forms of confiscation, namely, the con-
                                               
51  Acronym for government bodies responsible for anti-money laundering compliance. The de-
velopment of the international network of FIUs will be discussed in more detail in another sec-
tion.  
52  31 U.S.C.1051 et seq. 
53  Sec. 103.23 Reports of transportation of currency and monetary instruments.  
54  Sec. 103.24 Reports of foreign accounts. 
55  RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968. 
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fiscation – often known as forfeiture – of the instruments (instrumentum sceleris) 
or the subject of crime (objectum sceleris), they did not necessarily provide effec-
tive instruments for the confiscation of the proceeds from crime (producta/fructa 
sceleris) and this gap was mostly observed in proceedings against drug traffickers. 
However, to an extent, as a result of these new laws and regulations, criminals 
felt urged to begin more actively diversifying their activities through infiltrating 
the legal economy in order to protect their ill-gotten assets (see Von Lampe, 
1999). If this assertion holds true, we have the paradox that these legislative 
developments not only failed to kill the money-laundering phenomenon at its 
earliest stage of development, but in fact furthered its expansion and sophistica-
tion. We will see whether there is sufficient evidence for this claim. 
 
3.1.3.  First published use of the term ‘money laundering’: Watergate  
 
The events involving Al Capone and other underworld figures in the 1920s 
and 1930s prepared the stage for the emergence of legendary tax evaders and 
pioneers in money laundering such as Lansky and Sindona described earlier. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the term ‘money laundering’ may well have 
been coined some time during the 1920s, during the Prohibition era. It is also 
likely that metaphors conveying a similar meaning were used during that pe-
riod. For instance, a reference posted on http://www.wordorigins 
.org/index.php, a website which studies the origin of words, provides the fol-
lowing citation from the San Francisco Call-Bulletin (now San Francisco Ex-
aminer) of 3 June 1935: “There is not a hot money passer in America who will 
“wash” this money exchanging it for “cool” currency - unless it is offered him at such a 
tremendous discount that he can afford to hold it for years, if necessary, before attempting 
to pass it.”56  
 However, although the previous chapter elaborated on the old history of 
money laundering techniques by renowned pioneers (e.g. by Lansky, Sindona, 
and allegedly intelligence agencies, specifically the CIA), it was not until the 
1970s, at the time of the Watergate scandal, that the money-laundering phe-
nomenon was recognised and named as such. The first public use of the expres-
sion ‘money laundering’ can be traced back to 1972-73 when it appeared in 
printed media during the Watergate scandal (Lacey, 1991; Gilmore, 199357; 
                                               
56  The reference was posted by Wilton (2007) who quotes Safire (1993, p. 398) as the source of 
the San Francisco Call-Bulletin citation.  
57  Gillmore (1993) makes a reference to Vallance (1992). 
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Robinson, 1994; Blunden, 2001).58 The term was first used in a judicial con-
text in 1982 in the case US v $4, 255, 625.39 (1982) 551 F Supp 314, and it 
subsequently spread worldwide (Gilmore, 1993).   
 The Watergate scandal was a crucial moment in the history of money laun-
dering. It exposed high-level political corruption and implicated the CIA in 
highly questionable dealings.  
In the morning of 17 June 1972, the police caught five burglars inside the 
Democratic National Committee headquarters. They were there to take 
pictures of documents and adjust bugging devices that had been installed 
during an earlier break-in in May the same year. The burglars had report-
edly been sent by Nixon and were acting on the orders of CREEP (Com-
mittee to Re-elect the President). One of the burglars was James McCord 
who had a long CIA work record. CREEP was later accused of ‘laundering’ 
President Nixon’s illegal campaign funds. The Committee was also alleged 
to have financed its activities via a CIA’s front company (see Blum, 1995, 
and Steve Kangas,59 1996). Maurice Stans, Secretary of Trade at the time, 
                                               
58  According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989, second edition), the first use in print of the 
term ‘money laundering’ was during the Watergate scandal. The Dictionary cites a Guardian ar-
ticle of 19 April 1973 which reported: “Suitcases stuffed with 200,000 dollars of Republican campaign 
funds; money being “laundered” in Mexico.” A number of earlier references have been cited on the 
internet (see the website of Barry Popik, 29 June 2010, quoting Google News Acrhive): (i) 1 
September 1972, Milwaukee (WI) Journal, “Outside Investigator Needed” (editorial), pg. 16, col. 
2: “They are worried about the way much of the $114,--- was first “laundered” in Mexico—that is, checks 
were deposited in a Mexican bank account and converted into dollar drafts so donors could remain un-
named.”; (ii) 13 September 1972, Daytona Beach (FL) Morning Journal, “Money As A Campaign 
Issue” (editorial), pg. 4, col. 1: “Money could be a prime issue in the 1972 campaign, the National Ob-
server notes. Succinctly, one of its top political writers said: “Remember: ITT, Watergate, the dairy lobby, 
tales of contributions being ‘laundered’ in Mexico, a safe full of $350,000 in cash. All of this, and much 
more, proves the point.”; (iii) 13 October 1972, Albuquerque (NM) Tribune, “Watergate case com-
pared to capers of GOP-bugging prankster Tuck” by William Steif, pg. B4, col. 5: “I would have 
hired an armored truck for $60 in San Antonio,” said Tuck, “and sent it to the ranch to pick up the 
money. And I would have had a laundry truck following it—to launder the money.”; (iv) 12 April 1973, 
Lakeland (FL) Ledger, “Reelection Became Boyish Fantasy” by Russell Baker, pg. 1D, col. 4: 
“Whether the stachel full of cash, the Mexican money-laundering operation, the Arab bazaar in Ambassa-
dorships—whether these seem to be symptoms of a new low in political rot or merely low comedy in slightly 
bad taste will depend on the observer’s political bias.”; (v) 12 May 1973, The Bulletin (Bend, OR), 
“Adviser Connally leaves Texas law firm to avoid possible conflict of interest,” pg. 7, col. 6: 
“Newsday said that he identified the money as his own “personal” contribution after federal investigators un-
covered the Mexican “money-laundering” scheme.” 
59  Steve Kangas, a former Army intelligence officer, who described himself as a liberal, became 
widely known for maintaining a web page, “Liberalism Resurgent,” on which he criticised the 
conservative causes. A frequent target of his attacks was billionaire publisher Richard Mellon 
Scaife. He also wrote about the CIA and claimed that it played a significant role in creating an 
‘overclass’ in which Kangas included Scaife. In 1999 Kangas was found dead. He was alleged to 
have committed suicide. Although not everyone viewed his writings seriously (see Tony Snow, 
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became responsible for CREEP’s financial operations. In 1971 they started 
fuelling funds into the President’s treasury in secret. Donors reportedly in-
cluded representatives of the US dairy industry who wanted to reward 
Nixon for raising federal subsidies; multi-millionaire Howard Hughes; also 
Robert Vesco who at that time was under investigation for alleged embez-
zlement; American Airlines, Ashland Oil and Gulf Oil. The donations of 
the latter three were allegedly laundered money derived from fraud and 
other offences (Robinson, 1994).  
 
Reportedly the underhand practices orchestrated by CREEP involved illegal 
wiretapping and break-ins and subsequent cover-ups, audit irregularities, politi-
cal sabotage and conspiracy as well as financial scams aimed at concealing the 
origin of the campaign funds which was effectively a campaign fraud. Even 
money from legitimate sources would have become tainted when in contact 
with so much illegality.  
 While the whole operation may not have been exactly money laundering in 
the narrow sense of the term, it certainly involved what we view today as clas-
sic laundering techniques. But it was not the Watergate scandal that urged policy 
makers to start paying attention to the money-laundering phenomenon.  
 
3.1.4.  Circumstances that shifted attention to money laundering 
 
The war on drugs 
Global trends were dictated by developments in the USA where, during the 
1980s, illicit drug trade became the main target of law enforcement.  
 While during the 1970s organised crime in the USA attracted relatively less 
public attention, in 1983 it again became the centre of growing concern and 
interest due to two main factors: the RICO-Statute began to be rigorously 
applied against members of La Cosa Nostra; and between 1983 and 1986 the 
Commission on Organized Crime, established by president Reagan, unfolded 
an active anti-crime campaign which targeted illicit drug trade (see Von 
Lampe, 1998). 
 An important document introduced by the US government during that 
period was the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program 
adopted in 1982 (Wisotsky, 1990). This document contained measures which 
turned the war against ‘organised crime’ into a ‘war on drugs’ (see Von Lampe, 
                                                                                                              
“Life and death on the lunatic fringe”, The Star-Ledger Newark, 23 March 1999), many believed 
in what Kangas said and, after his death, founded mirror sites to recreate his essays.     
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1999; see also Del Olmo, 1991; Bullington, 1993; Bertram et al., 1996). Ac-
cording to this document, the ‘war on drugs’ became the prerogative of the 
FBI and the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) (Wisotsky, 1990; see 
also Von Lampe, 1999). The DEA was established in 1973 as a successor of the 
Bureau of Narcotics at the Treasury Department which was dissolved in 1968 
(Wisotsky, 1990; Von Lampe, 1999; Abadinsky, 2002). During those years it 
became clear that the war on drugs was to become a priority on the agenda of 
policy makers, although drug consumption had been a problem for decades.  
 
Earlier developments that led to the war on drugs  
The history of drug control policies dates back to at least the end of the 19th 
century, at the time of the Industrial Revolution, when opium products began 
to be widely used as a panacea against all sorts of diseases ranging from a sore 
throat to cholera.60 According to Laniel (1999):  
“It is no exaggeration to say that as far as the modern drug phenomenon is concerned, 
the United States is where it all started in the late 19th century and early 20th cen-
tury. Indeed, the present legislation of the majority of countries is modelled on, or in 
agreement with, international legislation, which is itself inspired to a large extent on 
the American drug control model.”61 
 
The first legislative step taken to limit the use of drugs was the introduction of 
restrictions on import and trade in opium in the 1880s. These restrictions tar-
geted ethnic minorities, specifically Chinese, but later also Mexicans and Afri-
can-Americans (see Laniel, 1999). During the 19th century, immigrants became 
a major part of the working classes in the USA. Naturally anti-drugs policies, 
specifically the criminalisation of “the bad habits of ‘non-Americans’,” had an ele-
ment of xenophobia (see Van Duyne and Levi, 2005, p. 11) and white Anglo-
Saxon fundamentalism which condemned every worldly pleasure, including 
drinking, sex and gambling, as sin. Yet there were indeed serious issues relating 
to drugs use that needed to be addressed. Medics were concerned about the use 
of psychoactive substances in the production of certain consumer goods, for 
instance wines and sodas laced with cocaine or heroin-based cough syrups 
(Laniel, 1999). The danger that consumption of such commercial products 
                                               
60  The medical definition of ‘addiction’ as a disease-like condition was first developed for ‘habitual 
drunkenness’ in the late 18th century. During the 19th century the concept was broadened to in-
clude the use of ‘illegal drugs’ mainly due to the concern about the increasing use of opiates by 
American Civil War veterans and middle-to-upper class white women (see Levine, 1978; 
Parssinen, 1983; Courtwright, 1982; Laniel, 1999). 
61  Section “The United States and the MOST-Drugs Network”, second paragraph (no page 
number available as the paper was derived from online sources). 
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could lead to drugs abuse habits was a serious issue. Concerns were additionally 
fuelled by reports about increasing drugs-induced violence (Van Duyne and 
Levi, 2005; ch. 2). These concerns led to the adoption of the first important 
drug-related federal act, Pure Food and Drug Act, in 1906. The law required 
that labels of goods indicate whether the product contains any psychoactive 
ingredients.  
 However, US policy makers were not satisfied. What they really sought to 
achieve was not ‘soft’ reduction but outright prohibition, ideally not just in the 
USA but internationally. This inevitably was to have an impact on the interests 
of colonial powers such as the Netherlands, France and Britain (McCoy, 1972; 
Gerritsen, 1993; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). By lobbying “continually and 
forcefully around the world” the US authorities sought to achieve its domestic 
control objectives (Sinha, 2001, p. 9) while turning its domestic drug issue into 
a global problem, thus effectively ‘exporting’ the war on drugs (Friman, 1996; 
Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). Reportedly, in order to ensure justification for 
prohibition policies in the USA and internationally, Hamilton Wright, a US 
delegate to the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1908, presented a deliberately 
inflated number of addicts (Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). Wright did so, despite 
evidence that opiates consumption had in fact decreased during the previous 
decade (Courtwright, 1982), because he strove to achieve his ultimate aim: the 
1912 Opium Treaty62 of the Hague which introduced the international prohi-
bition of all opiates and cocaine (Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). The 1912 Treaty 
helped Wright to push further for domestic US legislation (Sinha, 2001). 
Shortly after the international treaty was signed, the USA introduced its second 
major federal statute: the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, which taxed the 
trade in opiates and required opiates and cocaine to be supplied only on medi-
cal prescription. The Act effectively banned the free sale of opiates. As the 
Treasury Department was responsible for the enforcement of this act, by 1920, 
it had developed a special department, the Narcotics Division of the Prohibi-
tion Unit, to deal with related issues. In July 1930, the Narcotics Division was 
transformed into the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which (as mentioned earlier) 
was later succeeded by the DEA.  
 The restrictions on trade in opium and cocaine, and the subsequent bans on 
heroin in the 1920s, and marijuana in the late 1930s, combined with the in-
creasing demand for these substances, naturally led to the development of illicit 
                                               
62  The treaty was signed in 1912 but came into force in 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles, which 
ended the First World War. The treaty became also known as International Opium Convention 
or the Hague Convention. 
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production and an underground drugs market (Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). 
During the 1960s illegal drug trade became a serious problem largely because in 
the quickly developing new youth culture drugs consumption became wide-
spread (at least as far as cannabis products were concerned). This raised ques-
tions about the effectiveness of prohibitionist policies and led to a worldwide 
debate about the causal connection between the use of drugs and crime (see 
Rasmussen and Benson, 1994; Pieth, 1999; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005).  
 It appeared that the USA had not only dealt with its problems short-
sightedly but had also imposed its ineffective solutions on other nations (Van 
Duyne and Levi, 2005). According to Pieth (1999), despite rigorous drug con-
trol measures, in the second half of the 1980s, the illicit drug situation had dete-
riorated, especially in the US. Pieth notes: “The traditional prohibition policy, 
trying to climb from the street vendors up the chain of dealers to the bosses, had obviously 
failed, the influx of drugs had grown further and the number of dependants had multi-
plied” (Pieth, 1999; pp. 530-531). It took long for policy-makers and law en-
forcement officers to realise that it was not enough to arrest the Mafia bosses to 
prevent illicit drug trade because “if we cut off the head of the hydra, another one 
will grow up quickly”63 (Hafner, 2002, p. 21).  
 In order to achieve greater effectiveness, policy-makers had to take a new 
approach to the war on drugs. It was suggested, as mentioned previously, that 
drug dealers should be hit in their pocket and that this could be achieved 
through confiscation of assets and criminalisation of laundering the proceeds 
from drug trafficking (see Pieth, 1999; Stessens, 2000; Hafner, 2002; Van 
Duyne and Levi, 2005). Although, as reviewed in the previous chapter, anti-
money laundering measures could have been implemented much earlier, dur-
ing the 1970s, to support the ineffective Bank Secrecy Act, it was during the 
1980s, that the US authorities apparently saw the need for an anti-money laun-
dering regime. The first US federal law which criminalised money laundering, 
the Money Laundering Control Act, came into force in 1986, as part of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198664 (passed in 1984) 
created the offence of “money laundering”, which is chargeable as a violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §1956 (Sec. 1956. Laundering of monetary instruments) or 18 
U.S.C. §1957 (Sec. 1957. Engaging in monetary transactions in property de-
rived from specified unlawful activity). It enhanced the Bank Secrecy Act es-
sentially by making it a crime to structure transactions in such a way as to avoid 
                                               
63  Translated from German. 
64  Pub.L. No. 99-570. 
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BSA’s reporting requirements. The war on drugs appeared to be a good cause 
for declaring a war on money laundering. But was anti-money laundering leg-
islation really driven by the desire to reduce drugs consumption? Meanwhile 
the US administration began to prepare the international community, through 
the United Nations, to adopt a more severe attitude to drugs and related 
money laundering. In the resolution of the 7th United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1985, it introduced 
the fight against drug trafficking and drug abuse as ‘imperative’. Also a section 
on money laundering was introduced, containing the basic outlines of the later 
anti-money laundering regime (Van Duyne and Nelemans, 2011).  
 
3.1.5.  Confluence of other motives behind anti-laundering policies  
 
On 18 September 1989, the Washington Post reporter Jack Anderson wrote 
about a drug cartel that was turning into a clandestine superpower threatening 
the security of the USA. He called upon the US government to exercise pres-
sure on other states in order to urge them to adopt drug money confiscation 
provisions.  
 However, some observers have questioned the veracity of US official mo-
tives to introduce asset confiscation and criminalisation of drug proceeds laun-
dering. According to Hafner (2002), the US government would hardly dare to 
attack, directly and overtly, tax-evading by large businesses and wealthy citizens 
(at least at the time it appeared so, but the recent case of UBS, see below, dem-
onstrates a changed attitude), but could easily pry into their pockets under the 
cover of chasing drug money. Indeed, who could say ‘no’ to the lofty aim of 
confiscating the proceeds of drug traffickers? Once the principle was accepted 
for ‘serious’ offences, it could be extended. Hafner points out that during a 
hearing before the Justice Commission of the US-Senate in 1982 in relation to 
possible anti-money laundering measures, a senior official of the General Prose-
cution Office claimed that hundreds of millions in untaxed money was avail-
able and that with an appropriate confiscation law, the state budget could easily 
be filled in (Hafner quotes Fried, 1988; see also Alldridge, 2008).  
 Apparently the US Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970, designed to detect 
crime-money flows, including those from tax violations, was not particularly 
effective, whether it concerned tax evasion or laundering. In 1993, a senior 
official of the US Department of Justice admitted to a congressional committee:  
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“The Bank Secrecy Act was not enough, standing alone, to combat money launder-
ing. Rather, it was necessary to make the handling of dirty money a crime in itself” 
(Hoekje et al., 1993, p. 3). 
 
During a 1993 public hearing on money laundering in the State of New Jersey, 
Mary Medina, Chief of the Examination Division for the Internal Revenue 
Service in Newark, made the following statement:  
“[T]he IRS views money laundering very broadly. Any activity or practice used to 
conceal or disguise the existence and origin of profits or money generated, whether from 
legal sources or illegal sources, is a money laundering concern for us” (Hoekje et al., 
1993, p. 7).  
 
Such a statement coming from an official of the IRS clearly indicates that tar-
geting money laundering serves the IRS well. It appears that in the early 1990s 
the implicit targeting of tax evasion by the BSA and anti-money laundering 
measures was more clearly out into the open. It became also obvious that the 
money laundering definition had been broadened in order to target tax evaders, 
even though tax evaders and tax fraudsters do not always necessarily need to 
undertake laundering in the strict sense of the term. The US authorities needed 
a tool to gather intelligence outside the USA to ensure that US citizens were 
not hiding their wealth overseas. As Pieth (1998) points out, it can be argued 
that anti-money laundering efforts have been partly aimed at ensuring global 
financial control (see also Alldridge, 2008). Indeed, it appears that the efforts of 
the US authorities to clampdown on tax evasion are far-reaching and their 
attacks against Swiss bank UBS demonstrate that.65  
 It should come as no surprise, of course, if the ultimate objective of US 
authorities has been primarily to ensure optimal amounts of state revenues. This 
is a priority for every government. In this context, the allegations of the CIA’s 
complicity in drug trafficking should come as no surprise either. If the CIA 
wanted to keep the funding of its secret operations out of sight of the US Con-
gress, then the CIA could not have used tax money but slush funds accumu-
lated through other means. For instance, there are strong reasons to believe that 
the CIA has funded secret wars of the Contras against communist movements 
                                               
65  Following an aggressive tax-evasion investigation, in August 2009, in a groundbreaking settle-
ment the Swiss authorities agreed that UBS should reveal the names of 4.450 wealthy US citi-
zens holding offshore accounts at UBS. Douglas Shulman, commissioner of the Internal Reve-
nue Service, was quoted commenting: “The IRS will vigorously pursue tax cheats around the world, 
no matter how remote or secret the location.” The matter was widely covered by the press (see, for in-
stance, Simonian et al., Financial Times, 19 August 2009). 
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(including the Contra war in Nicaragua66) partly through complicity in, or at 
least the condoning of, drug or arms sales (Scott, 1992; Levi, 2002; Van Duyne 
and Levi, 2005). Historian Alfred McCoy (1972) believes that the CIA has 
been complicit in the activities of foreign drug dealers and has benefited from 
prohibition policies. As obvious as it may be, prohibition limits the supply of 
illegal drugs thus contributing to an increase in prices, which makes drug trade 
more profitable (Laniel, 1999). Prohibition policies have thus provided the CIA 
with ample opportunities for higher revenues for its alleged off-the-record 
budget, than it maintained officially, to finance illegal covert operations. Natu-
rally, the CIA has denied these allegations (mentioned by McCoy, 1972).  
 In any event, the massive flows of monies into the Bahamas and other tax 
havens and the zest of US tax authorities to prosecute the likes of Lansky are 
difficult to disregard. Indeed, the US administration has had a number of vary-
ing political aims, some of which evidently conflicting, served by different 
agencies. While the Inland Revenue Service had to investigate the rush for 
offshore services, the CIA needed money for covert operations such as fighting 
left-wing movements, and the DEA had to chase drug dealers and their ill-
gotten profits. As Van Duyne and Levi (2005, p. 39) observe, “where foreign 
policy and the ‘War on Drugs’ collide, the CIA largely prevails over the DEA.” 
 The question is how all this comes together and whether, while zealously 
pursuing anti-drug and anti-laundering policies, the US authorities have not 
exhibited some degree of political hypocrisy. It appears more plausible that the 
war on money laundering was driven by the implicit but overwhelming need 
to ensure higher tax revenues transcending the equally serious desire to reduce 
drug consumption. It goes without saying that in seeking national and interna-
tional support, furthering and getting the anti-laundering policy globally ac-
cepted, the drug problem could serve as an undisputed banner.  
  In any case, the end result is that the US approach to fight drugs through 
hitting drug dealers in their pockets, was adopted internationally. By insisting 
that other nations should adopt anti-drug and anti-laundering regulations simi-
lar to US, the US government has effectively launched a process of Americani-
sation of international law enforcement and its sacred war against ‘the evil’ 
(Nadelmann, 1993; Hafner, 2002; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005) but not with-
                                               
66  See media reports (Parry, The Associated Press, 16 April 1986; Pincus, The Washington Post, 17 
March 1998). The CIA has been also alleged of complicity in opium smuggling by anti-
communist Hmong hill tribesmen to fund the “secret war” in Laos (McMurtry, Kitchener-Waterloo 
Record, 15 August 1991; Cropley, Reuters News, 7 March 2006). See also studies by Chambliss, 
1994, and Scott and Marshall, 1998. 
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out, at the very least, the tacit consent of some industrialised countries (Pieth, 
1999; Boekhout van Solinge, 2002; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). At this point 
globalisation coincided with a process of voluntary penal law Americanisation.67 
 
3.1.6.  International developments 
 
The Vienna Convention and the Basle Statement of Principles 
Two years after the introduction of the US Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986, on the eve of global economic liberalisation and just before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the international community reached agreement on two docu-
ments and these represented the first major steps towards the international co-
operation in the fight against money laundering. The two agreements in ques-
tion were the UN Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (“Vienna Convention”/19 December 1988) and 
the Basle Statement of Principles on the Prevention of Criminal Use of the 
Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (“Basle Statement”/12 
December 1988).  
 The Basle Statement outlined several basic principles with regard to the 
banking system, including the need for customer identification and record 
keeping as well as cooperation with law enforcement authorities. The Vienna 
Convention addressed the confiscation of assets and the issue of bank secrecy, 
and envisaged, inter alia, mutual legal assistance between Member States.  
 While the Vienna Convention refers only to proceeds of illegal drug traf-
ficking, the Basle Statement of Principles does not specify the predicate crimes. 
However, the latter is not a legal document but only a statement that outlines 
generally recommended practices aimed at preventing the use of the banking 
system for the purpose of money laundering. The Vienna Convention, how-
ever, does not merely recommend but requires its signatory states to undertake 
a set of specific measures, among which the criminalisation of laundering of 
proceeds derived from illicit drug trafficking.68 Prior to this Convention inter-
national anti-money laundering initiatives had always resulted merely in general 
recommendations and conclusions. One of the earliest documents of this kind 
is the report of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of June 
                                               
67  As we shall see in the next sections, the wording of the internationally adopted laundering 
definition was effectively copied from the US 1986 law. 
68  Notably the Vienna Convention states that each Party may consider ensuring that the onus of 
proof be reversed regarding the lawful origin of alleged proceeds or other property liable to con-
fiscation, to the extent that such action is consistent with the principles of its domestic law and 
with the nature of the judicial and other proceedings. 
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1980, which states that the banking system can play a highly effective preven-
tive role and that the cooperation of the banks can assist in the repression of 
criminal acts by the judicial authorities and the police. 69   
 By adopting the Vienna Convention, policy makers recognised the need to 
address money laundering at an international level. However, this attention was 
still restricted to the context of illicit drug trade, which was a consequence of 
the awareness campaign launched in the USA.70 As we have seen earlier in this 
thesis, legislative developments in the USA spurred international developments 
in the fight against money laundering. The Vienna Convention and the Basle 
Statement of Principles were largely based on concepts developed in the USA. 
In turn the Vienna Convention and the Basle Statement of Principles laid 
down the foundation for further international legislative developments, fostered 
by globalisation. The worldwide spread of US standards in the area of law en-
forcement, specifically anti-money laundering policy making, became an in-
creasingly pronounced trend. Since the late 1980s we have seen how local 
contexts have been reshaped to adapt to the unfolding global order. Interna-
tionally shared concepts have been translated into endorsed legal definitions and 
assumptions, which have influenced the development of national legal stan-
dards.  
 
The 40 Recommendations of the FATF as an instrument for global pressure 
The process of spreading standards in policy making takes place either indi-
rectly, on the basis of general recommendations or, in the case of treaties, di-
rectly and explicitly, on the basis of harmonisation requirements to signatory 
states. Some changes may be required, others remain optional. However, in the 
field of money laundering control, the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF), an informal ad hoc structure formed by the G7 in 1989,71 
                                               
69  Recommendation No.R(80)10 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe on 27 June 1980 entitled ‘Measures against the transfer and safeguarding of the funds of 
criminal origin’ (see for comments Stessens, 2000). This appears to have been largely driven by 
the introduction of the BSA and related regulations in the USA during the 1970s. 
70  The US Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 refers to proceeds from “specified unlawful 
activity” which, in addition to drug proceeds also includes, inter alia, the proceeds of theft, em-
bezzlement, bribery and other crimes. Nevertheless, for a number of years the focus remained 
largely on drug-related offences. As previously mentioned, the Act was signed into law as part of 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 
71 The FATF was established in July 1989 in Paris during the 15th annual Economic Summit of the 
G7: USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Canada. The Summit participants also invited 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Australia to 
join the Task Force. Since then the list of Member Countries of the FATF has expanded (see 
Kremer, 2004, for a detailed account of FATF’s history and activities). Additionally, a number of 
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has set an unusual precedent. As Pieth (1999) points out, the FATF introduced 
a new methodology into international law: recommendations that proved to be 
no less imperative than treaty obligations. As the Vienna Convention alone was 
not sufficient to establish a global anti-money laundering regime, the FATF 
stepped in to speed up the process. The USA needed an international forum to 
promote or, if necessary, to impose policies worldwide and the FATF became 
this forum. It was created to help enhance international cooperation and assess 
the results of anti-money laundering policies globally.  
 In 1990, the FATF issued a report, which laid down 40 anti-money laun-
dering recommendations.72 The report described the purported state of affairs 
concerning drugs money and claimed that crime-proceeds annual estimates 
reached $300 billion. Although this claim appears to be based on evidence of 
highly questionable validity (see Van Duyne, 1994), it proved to be a token of 
clever rhetoric which strengthened FATF’s case in imposing global control 
policies and justified its recommendations. But even this was not sufficient. The 
FATF had to ensure that these recommendations would be implemented. So 
the FATF introduced procedures of peer review and multilateral monitoring of 
the implementation processes in order to assess the extent to which countries 
have complied with the recommendations. With its procedures of country 
evaluations the FATF effectively turned its recommendations into an instru-
ment of social and political pressure (see Pieth, 1999; Stessens, 2001; Levi, 
2003; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005).73 Stessens (2000, p. 18) denotes FATF’s 
recommendations as a “non-binding soft law” and points out that the choice of 
recommendations over treaty, as an instrument to enforce certain standards, was 
deliberate, as it made it possible to avoid the complex ratification procedures, 
by-passing democratic structures. However, the end result was not a ‘soft’ in-
                                                                                                              
FATF-style regional organisations have been established to promote and enforce the FATF rec-
ommendations (Asia / Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), Caribbean Financial Action 
Task Force (CFATF), Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of 
Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL) (formerly PC-R-EV), Eurasian Group 
(EAG), Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), Middle East and 
North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)). 
72 The FATF revised its recommendations in 1996 and in 2003, and additionally issued nine special 
recommendations on terrorist financing (eight in 2001, and one in 2004) as well as various In-
terpretative Notes to reflect developments in money laundering practices and to provide further 
guidance. 
73 The FATF website (Monitoring the Implementation of the Forty Recommendations) states: “The 
mutual evaluation process is enhanced by the FATF’s policy for dealing with members not in compliance 
with the Forty Recommendations. The measures contained in this policy represent a graduated approach 
aimed at reinforcing peer pressure on member governments to take action to tighten their anti-money launder-
ing systems”. 
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formal approach, but a process of imposing politically binding standards on the 
evaluated countries.  
 In 1998, when it was recognised that many countries still lacked an ade-
quate anti-money laundering regime, the FATF launched the Non-
Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative. Unless evaluated 
countries (and territories) complied with FATF’s standards they risked to be 
branded and blacklisted as ‘non-cooperative’, and consequently to be rejected 
as partners in the international payment system with serious potential conse-
quences for their economy (see Stessens, 2000). The FATF’s aim was that 
evaluated countries feared the potential reputational damage which would urge 
them to address the deficiencies identified by the FATF (see FATF Eight 
NCCT Review, 2007). The adopted approach ensured a one-sided verdict 
with virtually no possibility for appeal but with the only alternative: to comply. 
Thus the “name and shame initiative” proved to be quite a success (Kremer, 
2004, p. 23).  
 Yet the FATF came under mounting criticism from the academic world 
(see Pieth, 1999; Stessens, 2001; Levi, 2003; Williams and Baudin-O’Hayon, 
2002; Kremer, 2004; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005). Taking the role of an audi-
tor with no mechanisms for shared accountability for its work the FATF risked 
being accused of applying double standards, exhibiting an approach that cannot 
but be described as authoritarian. While listing some countries as ‘non-
cooperative’ for certain deficiencies, the FATF seems to be overlooking, or 
looking upon with a lesser degree of criticism, similar deficiencies in the re-
gimes of other countries. For instance, FATF’s acceptance of Luxembourg’s 
endowment outside the normal funding system was interpreted by some blog-
gers as a sign of willingness to turn a blind eye, or at the very least, be less criti-
cal, to possible deficiencies in the anti-money laundering control system in that 
country. In its 2006-07 Annual Report (of 29 June 2007) the FATF not only 
diligently listed its expenditures and explained its regular funding scheme but 
also expressed gratitude to Luxembourg for “a generous grant” (FATF, 2007, p. 
12) that helped the FATF improve its information technology systems. This 
provoked blog comments including: “Luxembourg and the FATF: Profoundly 
unethical conduct”74 and “the ‘generous gift’ received by the FATF from Luxembourg is 
a threat for the financial community worldwide […]. The affair is worrying.”75 Al-
though criticism does not appear to have extended beyond these references 
                                               
74  Murphy, posted on 22 December 2007. 
75  Turquey, posted on 25 December 2007. 
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(and the FATF apparently did not condescend to address this criticism, which 
risked it being viewed as exhibiting an undemocratic attitude), these instances 
certainly indicate that the FATF is not immune from public scrutiny, albeit 
ineffective.  
 On its website the FATF has highlighted that the NCCT Initiative was 
aimed at ensuring the implementation of “internationally recognised standards”.76 
Yet these standards were primarily created by the G7, with the USA taking the 
lead. Therefore, after twenty years of rigorous anti-money laundering cam-
paigning by the US authorities, one would expect the USA to have by now 
put in place a nation-wide dirty-money resistant system. Whether this is the 
case, remains a question. It is interesting to note, however, that in its 2006 
review of the anti-money laundering regime in the various states of the USA, 
the FATF mentioned that corporation laws and reporting requirements in 
Delaware and Nevada “are such that the information on beneficial ownership may not, 
in most instances, be adequate, accurate or available on a timely basis” (FATF, 2006, p. 
9). The FATF further noted that this is “a vulnerability” for the anti-money 
laundering regime in the USA (FATF, 2006, p. 9), a quite benevolent conclu-
sion compared to the measures that the FATF has meted out towards other 
countries, some of whose defects were arguably even smaller.  
 Indeed, over the years the FATF seems to have generally softened its ap-
proach and as of 2007 no countries were listed as ‘non-cooperative’. But that 
does not mean that money laundering is no longer taking place or that the 
degree of ‘vulnerability’ in Delaware is lower or higher than in other states and 
countries, irrespective of whether they are wealth or tax heavens. Whether 
information on beneficial ownership should be easily available and be a matter 
of public record for the sake of transparency per se is a debatable matter the 
approach to which continues to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We 
should not forget, however, that even in countries with the most transparent 
business environment it may be difficult to penetrate beneath the corporate veil 
of a business to identify the ultimate beneficial owner. It may be sometimes 
practically impossible to understand whether a registered shareholder is a nomi-
nee figure or indeed a beneficial owner. Therefore, rigid requirements for dis-
closure of ownership alone may not necessarily guarantee transparency and 
prevent money laundering. It is important to ensure that requirements are real-
istic and take into account the differences in the various economic, political and 
social conditions, culture and legal traditions across countries. In some countries 
                                               
76 FATF website: About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative. 
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reporting institutions readily disclose their records to the authorities if required, 
but these records may be poor; in others, disclosure can take place only after 
lengthy procedures of issuing court orders but the degree of detail of the dis-
closed information may prove to be reasonably high. The FATF has sought to 
achieve some level of consistency in the anti-money laundering approach across 
the world as money laundering is a ‘global’ phenomenon. While some level of 
consistency in disclosing ownership to the public may indeed be helpful, it 
remains a question how consistent has been FATF’s effort in naming and sham-
ing the countries it evaluates.   
 
Further legislative developments 
The 40 Recommendations of the FATF, as it appears, were prepared “within 
less than half a year, with no ulterior ambition and very little academic preparation” 
(Pieth, 1999, p. 531). However, they served their purpose: to create tools for 
global financial control and lay the foundations for further international legisla-
tive developments along the US lines. According to a 1996 report of the US 
General Accounting Office,77 “the United States’ multilateral efforts to establish 
global anti-money-laundering policies occur mainly through FATF” (p. 8). The FATF 
also became instrumental in the efforts of the US to broadcast the “threat image” 
of organised crime (see Van Duyne, 2004, pp. 22-34). The FATF has directed 
the war on financial crime and money laundering by acting as an informal ve-
hicle for enforcing US foreign policy in this field. The push for further interna-
tional policy making based on the FATF recommendations led to the introduc-
tion of several legislative anti-money laundering documents including: 
 The 1990 Council of Europe Convention No 141 on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (the Convention, 
which became known as the Strasbourg Convention, was adopted in Sep-
tember 1990, opened for signing on 8 November the same year, and en-
tered into force on 9 January 1993); 
 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confis-
cation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism 
Warsaw (opened for signing on 16 May 2005 and signed by the European 
Union on 2 April 2009); 78 
                                               
77  Renamed in 2004 Government Accountability Office. 
78  Essentially the Warsaw Convention adds the anti-terrorist financing element to the Strasbourg 
Convention. It also specifically states that each Party shall ensure that a prior or simultaneous 
conviction for the predicate offence is not a prerequisite for a conviction for money laundering; 
and each Party shall ensure that a conviction for money laundering is possible where it is proved 
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 Council Directive of the European Communities of 10 June 1991 on Pre-
vention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laun-
dering (91/308/EEC) (also referred to in this thesis as the ‘First (EU) Direc-
tive’); 
 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on Prevention 
of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering 
(also referred to in this thesis as the ‘Second (EU) Directive’); 
 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 October 2005 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (this Directive 
repeals Directive 91/308/EEC and Directive 2001/97/EC) (also referred to 
in this thesis as the ‘Third (EU) Directive’); 
 UNDCP Model Law of 1995 on Money Laundering and Confiscation in 
Relation to Drugs and the model texts of the Organisation of American 
States.  
 
These documents were no longer centred on drug trafficking. The 1990 
Council of Europe Convention expanded the definition of money laundering 
beyond that laid down by the 1988 UN Convention, which defined launder-
ing in association with drug-related offences only. The Council of Europe 
Convention describes as a “predicate offence” the underlying criminal activity 
that generates the proceeds79 subject to subsequent laundering (see Gilmore, 
1993, for a further account of international legislative developments). Now the 
list of predicate crimes includes practically all types of economic crimes (with 
some exceptions in various countries).  
 
The global network of FIUs in an extended conceptual framework 
An important element of the global anti-money laundering regime has become 
the system of reporting suspicious or unusual activities to designated authorities, 
or, as they became known, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs).80  
                                                                                                              
that the property, the object of paragraph 1.a or b of article 9 (see Addendum 2), originated 
from a predicate offence, without it being necessary to establish precisely which offence. 
79  As reviewed later in this thesis, the Convention defines ‘proceeds’ as: any economic advantage, 
derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal offences. It may consist of any 
property as defined in sub paragraph b of this article. 
80  In 1996 the Egmont Group (the establishment of Egmont Group is discussed later in this sec-
tion) adopted a definition of FIU that was later incorporated in the revised FATF recommenda-
tions of 2003 and other international documents. Egmont Group defined FIU as: a central, na-
tional agency responsible for receiving (and, if permitted, requesting), analysing and disseminat-
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 As reviewed earlier, the USA has been a major driving force behind the 
establishment of the existing global anti-money laundering control system with 
its integral network of FIUs worldwide. Through the FATF the US imposed a 
strategy that required financial and other businesses to start reporting any suspi-
cious or unusual activities to “the competent authorities”, i.e. the FIUs. This 
was mainly the result of a distinctive drive for financial intelligence (intelligence 
concerning, in the main, financial transactions and money flows) and the need 
to streamline efforts in the process of intelligence gathering and processing. The 
US agency which was tasked to further this development, FinCEN, will be 
mentioned again later.  
 In some places, primarily world financial centres, appropriate units were set 
up in the mid-to-late 1980s, at around the time of the introduction of the Vi-
enna Convention and the Basle Statement of Principles as well as relevant na-
tional anti-drug trafficking legislation. For instance, the UK established the 
National Drugs Intelligence Unit (NDIU) in 1985. The NDIU81 was assigned 
with the task of collecting disclosures concerning drug-related suspicious trans-
actions from financial institutions and providing relevant intelligence to other 
investigative agencies (see Price, 1992). The Isle of Man Financial Crime Unit 
became operational in 1986, while the Cayman Islands’ Financial Reporting 
Authority (CAYFIN), and Hong Kong’s Joint Financial Intelligence Unit 
(JFIU), both became operational in 1989. Guernsey’s FIU, the Financial Intel-
ligence Service, was formed in 1989. Australia founded its own FIU, the Aus-
tralian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), in 1989 in ac-
cordance with the Financial Transaction Reports Act of 1988, and the unit 
began operating in January 1990. The American FIU, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), was established in April 199082 (see Gele-
merova, 2008).83 Clearly in many jurisdictions the authorities had already taken 
                                                                                                              
ing to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information: (i) concerning suspected 
proceeds of crime, or (ii) required by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter 
money laundering (Egmont Group, 2003, p. 2). This definition was later expanded further to 
include terrorist financing.  
81  For many years the UK’s FIU was the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), which 
was formed out of the NDIU and set up as a separate body in 1992. In 2006 NCIS was merged 
into a newly created agency, Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). 
82  In October 1994 FinCEN was merged with the Treasury Department’s Office of Financial 
Enforcement (OFE) which had previously administered the BSA (see posting by Pike on the 
website of FAS, 1998). 
83  The history of FIUs and the strategy of expanding the intelligence drive internationally was 
examined in detail in “On the frontline against money-laundering: the regulatory minefield” 
(Gelemerova, 2008). I am grateful to the Egmont Group Secretariat for assisting me in confirm-
ing these dates.  
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anti-laundering measures or, otherwise said, the minds were already ripe for 
establishing such a regime before the FATF started its work. One may wonder 
why the 1990 FATF report was so necessarily alarmist, but once the G-7 en-
dorsed the new policy, FinCEN assumed the lead role in expanding the intelli-
gence drive internationally.  
 However, despite these early developments, the role of FIUs as central units 
for gathering intelligence on potential money laundering was yet to be en-
forced and strengthened during the 1990s. The 1990 Council of Europe Con-
vention and the 1991 EU Council Directive (91/308/EEC) urged member 
states to assign authorities specifically responsible for combating money laun-
dering. However, it was not until the mid-1990s that FIUs were recognised on 
a larger scale as a central component of the global anti-money laundering strat-
egy.84 This was achieved largely through the establishment of Egmont Group. 
It was founded as an informal organisation by several FIUs, including FinCEN, 
on 9 June 1995 in Brussels. The establishment of the Egmont Group strength-
ened international cooperation as it helped improve the cross-border exchange 
of information.85 This role of Egmont Group and the process of intelligence 
gathering and sharing on a global scale have been fostered by FinCEN in par-
ticular. FinCEN states86 that since 1995 “the U.S. has pursued an aggressive policy 
of promoting a worldwide network of financial intelligence units in its overall strategy of 
fighting money laundering and terrorist financing.” By sharing information that may 
help identify criminals and money launderers (some of whom are one and the 
same person) FIUs help fight money laundering on a global scale. However, 
apart from the obvious human rights and data protection limitations relating to 
such procedures, FIUs had at some point to address problems of cooperation 
resulting from the differing legal statuses of different types of FIUs. The Eg-
mont Group (2003) defines the following types of FIUs:  
(i) the judicial type (or prosecutorial, as defined by the IMF (2004)) exists 
within the judicial branch of the state; 
(ii) the law enforcement type exists within the national law enforcement sys-
tem;  
                                               
84  During the early 1990s the establishment of FIUs was still viewed as “isolated phenomena related to 
the specific needs of those jurisdictions establishing them” (see Egmont Group, 2003, p. 3). 
85  The Egmont Group designed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to help FIUs over-
come problems relating to information sharing. The MOU is a set of principles for information 
exchange based on reciprocity and only for the purposes of analysis at FIU level, with no further 
use allowed without the prior consent of the FIU that provided the information. 
86  See report by US Department of the Treasury and FinCEN (2006, Appendix A, p. 41).  
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(iii) the administrative type is “a centralized, independent, administrative authority, 
which receives and processes information from the financial sector and transmits dis-
closures to judicial or law enforcement authorities for prosecution. It functions as a 
‘buffer’ between the financial and the law enforcement communities” (Egmont 
Group, 2003, p. 3); 
(iv)  the hybrid type combines elements of at least two FIU models (of those 
named above) and functions as an intelligence processing and disseminating 
body for the police and judicial authorities.87   
 
According to a report by the European Commission (1998), at some points 
FIUs of law enforcement type in certain Member States were only able to co-
operate with similarly placed law enforcement counterparts. The report states 
that with regards to cooperation “[t]he main obstacle has been found to be the differ-
ent nature of the FIUs in different countries” (p. 14). Gradually, however, as a result 
of further legislative developments, particularly following the terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001, an increasing number of countries have introduced meas-
ures that allow their respective FIUs to share information with other FIUs, 
even if they are of a different type (IMF, 2004).88  
 Over the years changes in the strategy for the war against money laundering 
have resulted in the constant expansion of the outreach of anti-money launder-
ing measures. As was observed earlier, originally money laundering was associ-
ated primarily with illicit drug trade but, gradually, the list of predicate crimes 
came to include practically all types of crimes-for-profit89 (with some excep-
tions in various countries).  
 Additionally, the group of entities obliged to report suspicious transactions 
significantly expanded over the years to include not just classical financial ser-
vice institutions, but also casinos, brokerage and securities firms, lawyers, nota-
ries, auditors, real estate agents and so on.90  
                                               
87  See for more details on the effects of these types, Gelemerova, 2008. 
88  In some instances problems relating to information sharing have been overcome through Eg-
mont Group’s MOUs, mentioned previously. 
89  The Strasbourg Convention (1990) expanded the definition of money laundering beyond that 
laid down by the 1988 UN Convention, which defined laundering in association with drug-
related offences only. The Strasbourg Convention describes the underlying criminal activity that 
generates the money subject to subsequent laundering as a “predicate offence” (see Gilmore, 
1993, for an account of international legislative developments). The European Commission’s 
report of 1998 (p. 8) notes with regard to the First EU Directive (91/308/EEC): “The Directive 
only requires the prohibition of the laundering of drugs proceeds, as required by the Vienna Convention, but 
encourages Member States to apply the approach of the Strasbourg Convention, namely of combating the 
laundering of the proceeds of a wider range of criminal offences (often referred to as "predicate offences").”  
90  Following the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, the US government introduced a 
number of additional federal statutes and regulations that significantly expanded the list of re-
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 Furthermore, after the events of 11 September 2001 the criteria for report-
ing suspicious transactions expanded to include also transactions that may be 
related to terrorist funding. The Third EU Directive places a particular empha-
sis on this issue. This means that reporting entities now have to watch out not 
just for potentially dirty money but also clean money that may serve terrorists. 
 All these changes have resulted in extending the outreach of the anti-money 
laundering regime. The effect of this outreach has been underpinned by the 
broad definition of money laundering. The concept of money laundering has 
been broadened to include virtually every consequential act of any crime for 
profit (Stessens, 2000; Van Duyne et al., 2005), as we will see in the next chap-
ter.   
 
3.2.  Definition analysis 
 
Numerous official reports and research papers have been written about money 
laundering but views about the phenomenon continue to vary broadly. This 
chapter will review some more common and some less traditional interpreta-
tions of the money laundering definition.  
 
3.2.1.  Requirements for a definition 
 
Every phenomenon that is being observed for the first time attracts the atten-
tion of researchers who try to explore it and understand its nature. Sometimes 
they attempt to coin a word for that phenomenon, but very often there is al-
ready an existing word, which is adopted to denote the observed phenomenon. 
This word becomes a common term. While the meaning of certain terms is not 
strictly delineated, others have definite boundaries that leave little or no room 
for interpretation.  Terms with clear meaning and measurable contents are easy 
to apply. It is important to use such clear terms with measurable contents in 
socio-political and economic contexts where specific phenomena may affect 
the organisation of the whole society. Often such phenomena represent urgent 
matters of an immediate and evident societal effect. When that is the case, we 
may regard such phenomena as social ‘problems’. However, not all social prob-
                                                                                                              
porting institutions and ensured that certain groups of organisations outside the banking system 
were also subject to formal reporting requirements. For instance, the Money Laundering Sup-
pression Act of 1994 imposed more rigid reporting requirements on non-banking financial insti-
tutions (e.g. brokerage companies and some tribal casinos), which prior to that point had been 
largely unregulated. Gradually, the US approach to extend the list of reporting institutions was 
adopted globally.  
 60 
lems are clear and neatly delineated. But, if such a problem has to be tackled, 
particularly by the authorities, it has to be defined. Not only because the ad-
ministration (and the citizenry) has to be aware of its precise nature (often diffi-
cult enough), but also because addressing the problem can have an impact on 
the society as a whole. For example, while increasing the pay of just one 
teacher does not affect the society, increasing the pay of all teachers in order to 
pre-empt an announced strike may have irreversible consequences (e.g. a wave 
of pay-rises, inflation and so on) for the whole nation.  
 In order to address a specific problem it is critical to measure it, especially if 
this problem is the subject of policy making. If we are to use a modern ‘buzz 
word’, policy making needs to be ‘evidence-based’, i.e. based on sufficient and 
reliable data to ensure that decisions are adequate and do not deviate from real-
ity. Otherwise, the collateral damage from the problem solving may be more 
harmful than the problem itself. For example, policy makers may resort to far 
reaching measures because of an insufficiently specified fear, as is the case with 
organised crime, or, as some authors describe it with regard to EU organised 
crime policy making, end up with ‘ritual incantations’ (Van Duyne and Vander 
Beken, 2009). What does this evidence-based policy making look like in the 
field of crime-money?  
 For many years researchers and policy makers have sought to assess the so-
cial and economic consequences of crime and crime-money. While certain 
crimes, such as theft, have had an unambiguous meaning since the times of 
King Hammurabi, other forms of delinquency have puzzled researchers and 
(sometimes) policy makers alike because of their blurring contents. This has 
applied particularly to categories of criminal conduct, which have been con-
structed out of a range of or cover a range of other forms of unwanted con-
duct. The meaning of terms such as ‘organised crime’, ‘serious crime’ or ‘trans-
national crime’ have been the subject of an ongoing debate. Definitions of 
these phenomena vary from colourfully ‘impressionistic’ and ‘expressionistic’ to 
purely ‘black-and-white’, and none of these necessarily reflects the reality: bits 
of it are depicted, albeit through ‘frosted glass’ (see Van Duyne and van Dijck, 
2007b). With a few exceptions, these definitions hardly meet the requirement 
for an empirical definition: to unambiguously determine the outline of observ-
able behaviour that is being described by means of its distinct features, while 
excluding all other, irrelevant types of behaviour. 
 Apart from the possible defective wording, the problem with these terms 
may also be that they do not only intend to denote identifiable phenomena (if, 
at all, these phenomena can be identified), but the application of their defini-
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tion depends on other processes and conditions of observation. These processes 
and conditions in turn also have to be adequately defined, and possibly made 
measurable: this is the process of operationlisation of a concept. If there are 
defects on this point, one may end up with a compilation of, and interaction 
between, fuzzy concepts and procedures. For example, transnational (organised) 
crime is supposed to develop in the context of the equally not very clear phe-
nomenon of globalisation. Transnational crime and organised crime themselves 
are predicate to money laundering, an equally ambiguous term. Money laun-
dering in turn is arguably facilitated by globalisation. These are all ill-defined 
(or difficult to define, as is the case with ‘globalisation’) terms with an intercon-
nected application, accumulating distortions implied in each of them. The in-
teraction between the underlying phenomena can hardly be observed, let alone 
measured. But while measuring globalisation may not be viewed as an urgent 
necessity for the organisation of the society, measuring phenomena such as 
organised crime and money laundering are considered a serious undertaking. 
This is because they are supposed to have a direct impact on the fabric of soci-
ety and the establishment and maintenance of law, order and justice.  
 Since recently Eurostat, the EU statistics bureau, has started developing 
methods of measuring ‘organised crime’ and collecting relevant statistics. Thus 
far this undertaking appears to be failing: without a proper operational defini-
tion ‘counting’ organised crime is like ‘counting clouds’ (see Van Duyne, 2006; 
Verhage, 2008). Given the unsatisfactory outcome of the annual situation re-
ports, the High Level Group of the EU invited Europol to design an annual 
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA). According to some authors (see 
Van Duyne, 2007; see also Van Duyne and van Dijck 2007b; Van Duyne and 
Vander Beken, 2009) this failed too due to a fuzzy (but secret) methodology 
and defective definition. Therefore the question remains whether an adequate 
method and coherent definition can be found which can be applied across the 
EU, and possibly further afield.91  
 In general one can say that definitions containing immeasurable compo-
nents, e.g. value elements such as ‘seriousness’, do not qualify as definitions 
because of the arbitrariness of interpretation. For instance, how serious is the 
crime committed by an organised group of shoplifters or pickpockets causing 
unrest in the city centre and among stores personnel? In terms of scope and 
timespan it may prove to be more serious than other crimes against property. 
                                               
91  The EU-supported project Assessing Organised Crime designed an empirical ‘bottom-up’ proce-
dure for assessing organised crime. For a more elaborate description see the website of Cross-
Border Crime Colloquium: www.cross-border-crime.net. 
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According to criminologist Paul Cromwell et al., shoplifting has significant 
economic implications for consumers (Cromwell et al., 1999). Yet shoplifting 
and pocket-picking are generally perceived as minor offences. General percep-
tions, however, cannot be translated into penal law without precise considera-
tions. Arbitrary interpretations and lack of clarity mean that the application of 
terms may have uncertain consequences which within the rule of law can be at 
odds with the principle of lex certis. Therefore, concepts such as ‘organised 
crime’ should have a clear empirical definition to be applied as a decision rule. 
This decision rule is to determine the observables that are to be included in the 
set of counting units subject to examination (Van Duyne and van Dijck, 
2007b).  
 The phenomenon of money laundering appears also difficult to assess as it 
depends on other crimes. It is a consequential crime that only exists in the con-
text of another, predicate crime. However, the phenomenon in its strictest 
sense is not difficult to understand and define. It is the range of its broader defi-
nitions that complicates the situation and makes it difficult to research the ‘phe-
nomenon’ of money laundering. In order to address the ‘phenomenon’ of 
money laundering and measure it, we first need to have a working empirical 
definition as a basis. Researchers at the Utrecht School of Economics have 
identified 18 existing definitions of money laundering (Unger et al., 2006). The 
majority of existing definitions, however, do not necessarily reflect the essence of 
the laundering phenomenon. Instead they mirror the broad definition intro-
duced by the USA, as it will be reviewed in the next chapters.   
 
3.2.2.  The essence of money laundering 
 
(Money) laundering – in the strict meaning of the word – is aimed at a clear 
final result: the achievement of a misleading appearance of ‘cleanness’, or le-
gitimacy, whether it concerns illegally acquired money or illegally acquired 
property such as stolen valuable objects. In other words, laundering takes place 
where “someone constructs a pretended false legitimate origin of money or other illicit 
property. All other actions of concealment remain what they are: concealment as long as 
they are not followed by that very step of false legitimation” (Van Duyne and De 
Miranda, 1999, p. 262). 
 For example: stolen objects of art must be laundered by forging a document 
of origin; stolen cars are laundered by tampering with the chassis and engine 
numbers, as well as with the registration details. The English term appears to be 
self-explanatory. Its semantic kernel of ‘whitening’ and ‘cleansing’ is also prop-
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erly expressed in the German, Dutch and French words: Geldwäscherei (or 
Geldwäsche), witwassen or blanchiment. Despite this apparent semantic clarity 
of the term, definitions of ‘money laundering’ vary widely and in many cases 
extend beyond their semantic meaning. The expression usually conjures images 
of complex financial operations undertaken in several jurisdictions, most likely 
offshore as well. Robinson (1994) defines ‘money laundering’ as a series of 
transactions at the end of which the illicit or ‘dirty’ money re-emerges as licit 
or ‘clean’. Aninat et al. (2002), representatives of the IMF, note: 
“Money laundering involves transforming the proceeds of crime into usable form and 
disguising their illegal origins. After the criminal proceeds are introduced to the finan-
cial system, they are hidden – laundered – through a variety of transactions and fi-
nancial vehicles and finally invested in financial and related assets. These operations 
often involve international transactions as a means of ‘layering’ – that is, of obscuring 
the source of the funds.”92 
 
This description contains repetitions and ambiguities and even, to an extent, 
inaccuracies. Typically criminal proceeds are not hidden after they have been 
introduced into the financial system but, by their very nature, they are hidden 
from the start. It is also not necessary to perform a variety of financial transac-
tions: a fictitious loan or a forged inheritance document may suffice to provide 
the appearance of legitimate origin (especially given that due diligence checks 
are not always adequate or are altogether lacking). Running a casino could also 
be a way to launder. Hence, money laundering does not need to be as sophisti-
cated and achieved through international operations but can entirely be carried 
out domestically. What is important to crime-entrepreneurs is to purge the 
crime money of its criminal smell (needless to say that Vespasian’s observation is 
apparently no longer valid) in order to enjoy the fruits of their undertakings. 
Spending crime-money can create evidence against the spender. For instance, 
spending on registered goods, like cars, houses and boats, creates direct evi-
dence. Spending on other objects can also leave traces that allow investigators 
to conduct a net-worth analysis (Albanese, 1996; Abadinsky, 2002). In order to 
prevent this from happening criminals have to put certain mechanisms in place, 
for instance: 
  to place the assets in the name of a straw man or an offshore vehicle; 
  or to seek to spend their money in an undetectable manner by avoiding the 
issue of invoices and the consumption of services, such as air travel, that 
have to be documented; 
                                               
92  Third paragraph (no page number available as the material was derived from online sources).  
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  additionally, criminals may resort to forgery, facts misrepresentation, docu-
mentary fraud and so on.  
 
Policy makers define all these manoeuvres as ‘disguising’ the crime assets. Along 
these lines FinCEN has provided the following definition on its website: 
“Money laundering involves disguising financial assets so they can be used without 
detection of the illegal activity that produced them. Through money laundering, the 
criminal transforms the monetary proceeds derived from criminal activity into funds 
with an apparently legal source.”93  
 
Indeed disguising is not good enough if it does not achieve the ultimate goal of 
money laundering: the apparently legitimate origin of the crime assets. Even if 
one takes his funds through a series of transactions, obscures the source of funds 
and avoids leaving traces when spending money, any visible increase in wealth 
that exceeds the declared income will normally have to be accounted for retro-
spectively. This means that even if such measures, as the above mentioned, are 
taken, the laundering remains imperfect if justification for this increase in 
wealth has not been ensured. Therefore, definitions which suggest that blurring 
the paper trail suffices to make the criminal proceeds usable and untouchable, 
to an extent deviate from reality.94  
Had the late Jose Gonzalez Rodriguez-Gacha, one of the most notorious 
leaders of the Medellin cartel, ensured that his funds had not only been well 
hidden but had been justified, his family would most likely have retained 
some part of his personal income and properties worth many millions of 
dollars. The money went through a series of transfers to various accounts in 
the USA, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria and the UK, but was eventu-
ally tracked down and frozen by the US Department of Justice in 2001.95  
Unlike Gacha, the late Konstantin Dimitrov aka Kosyo Samokovetsa, an al-
leged drug dealer and contraband smuggler from Bulgaria, managed to leave 
to his wife Angelinka substantial wealth, some of which he had justified as 
legitimate profits from potato production (this subject will be touched upon 
later in this thesis96). 
 
                                               
93  FinCEN’s website (Frequently Asked Questions. What is money laundering?).  
94  Although sometimes the reality may be that, due to high-level corruption, funds from obscure 
offshore vehicles are easily accepted, i.e. some blurring of the paper trail may well suffice for cor-
rupt government officials to accept such funds without questioning the origin. 
95  See report by Beaty and Hornik in Time, 2001. 
96   See section 4.3.3. Developed versus developing economies and something in between. 
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Making crime-money really white is supposed to be the prime concern of 
crime-entrepreneurs and law enforcement alike. Nevertheless, as we will see 
from the next sections, the wording of the majority of existing money launder-
ing definitions goes no further than to describe money laundering as hiding the 
source of the illegal wealth, although this can be expected from any sensible 
profit-oriented criminal. However, as reviewed in earlier sections, the money 
laundering theme was placed on the political agenda during a time when sig-
nificant attention was paid to the cash-based cocaine economy. Therefore the 
approach was (and still is) mostly centred on the movement and concealment 
of crime money in the form of bags of bank notes. On the other hand, it may 
be the case that even affluent criminals launder much less in the sense of ‘whit-
ening’ than they are supposed to. If that is the case, the integrity of the financial 
system is much less at risk than it is assumed to be. 
 
3.2.3.  Broadening the definition 
 
While it is commonly understood that money laundering is ultimately aimed at 
presenting the funds as having an apparently legal source, legislative develop-
ments in the USA and internationally have led to the adoption of far broader 
definitions. It appears that the definition clarity we normally strive for may be 
something different to what law enforcement or a legislator is striving for. The 
concern of the latter is not to have a subtly worded definition with impeccable 
semantics but to have a penal clause that covers enforcement interests.  
 In 1984 the US Commission on Organized Crime defined money launder-
ing as “the process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal applica-
tion of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate” (President’s 
Commission on Organized Crime,97 1984, quoted in Humberto Fidel Re-
galado Cuellar, petitioner v. United States of America, No. 06-1456, p. 17). 
The Commission apparently sought to create an all-inclusive definition which 
covers also instances of corrupt application of money that is not necessarily of 
illicit origin (for instance, the use of legal funds in circumvention of election 
laws). However, in its all-inclusiveness the definition is inherently contradic-
tory. If one has found a way to conceal the illegal application of income, this 
                                               
97  The Commission was established by President Ronald Reagan in 1983 to investigate organised 
crime, including sources of income, and to assess the effectiveness of relevant federal laws (Exec. 
Order No. 12,435, 3 C.F.R. 214 [1983]). The Commission’s report led to the initiative in 
Congress to criminalise money laundering (see Humberto Fidel Regalado Cuellar, petitioner v. 
United States of America, No. 06-1456).  
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would mean that one has already found a way to apply his income without 
being detected, hence there is no need of disguising that income.  
 Nevertheless, this definition is more coherent than some subsequently de-
signed definitions. It contains the essential element of making the proceeds 
appear legal. Yet it laid the foundation of the later conceptualisation of money 
laundering (Werner, 1996; see also Stessens, 2000) in that the concept has been 
extended to include the mere possessing and concealing of the very existence of 
one’s illegal income. One may wonder whether the authors of this definition 
realised the logic of the wording: the conjunctive ‘and then’ implies that if the 
sentence component after the conjunctive does not occur, the whole proposi-
tion does not apply. Namely: a conjunctive only holds if and only if both com-
ponents are true. 
 When enacting the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, the first US 
federal law which criminalised money laundering, the US Congress chose to 
use the disjunctive ‘or’ instead of the conjunctive ‘and’ in the ‘disguise provi-
sion’. Thereby the concept was broadened to the extent that it now covers the 
mere movement, deposit and handling of dirty money (thus making practically 
no differentiation between money laundering and fencing), but not necessarily 
the element of false justification.98 Every type of transaction, financial or com-
mercial, in criminally derived assets, regardless of whether it is aimed at provid-
ing legitimate appearance to the assets constitutes money laundering as long as 
it is not reported to the authorities. Along these lines, the Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986 provides the following definition: section 1956 (a)(1) of 
the Act makes it unlawful to engage in a financial transaction with knowledge 
that the funds are the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity and 
§ with the intent to promote specified unlawful activity (Sec. 1956 
(a)(1)(A)(i)); 
§ with the intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of certain tax 
laws (specifically sections 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code) (Sec. 
1956 (a)(1)(A)(ii)); 
§ knowing that the transaction was designed in whole or part: (i) to conceal 
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the con-
trol of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity (Sec. 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i)); or 
                                               
98  Of course, ‘false justification’ can be interpreted as ‘handling’ and thus be covered by the defini-
tion but ‘the false justification element’ is not made explicit and mandatory. However, it is un-
certain whether the insertion of a false invoice into a firm’s paperwork should count as ‘han-
dling’ crime-money. For instance, with Enron’s managers, charged with fraud and money laun-
dering, we have a case of laundering by means of justifying false invoices and tampering with the 
books. 
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(ii) to avoid a state or federal reporting requirement (Sec. 1956 (a)(1)(B)(ii)). 
(See Addendum for full text of the section.) 
 
Section 1956 (a)(2) makes it unlawful to transport, transmit, or transfer a mone-
tary instrument99 or funds into or out of the US: 
 
§ with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or 
§ where the defendant knows that the funds are the proceeds of unlawful 
activity and that the transportation or transfer is designed to conceal or dis-
guise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity or to avoid a transaction reporting requirement. 
(See Addendum for complete text of the section.)100 
 
Section 1957 of the Act appears broader as it addresses all financial transactions 
involving any unlawfully derived property exceeding $10.000.  
 Essentially the Act introduced two main types of money laundering offences 
which became known in the US legal community as ‘promotion money laun-
dering’ (to conduct a financial transaction using criminal proceeds with the 
intent to promote a criminal activity) and ‘concealment money laundering’ (to 
conduct a financial transaction using criminal proceeds knowing that the trans-
action was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, source, location, owner-
ship or control of the proceeds). 
 Since the introduction of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 
almost every newly invented definition or description of money laundering has 
reflected the 1986 Act, except that definitions no longer centre on financial 
transactions and monetary instruments but encompass any type of activity and 
any type of assets (and also, ‘promotion money laundering,’ although it has not 
been universally accepted across countries).  
 Apart from such broadening, the wording of the ‘definitions’ itself shows a 
varying degree of impreciseness.  In 1993, a State New Jersey Commission of 
Investigation provided the following interpretation:  
“The various strategems used to conceal the money and protect the illegal sources from 
which it is derived are commonly called money laundering” (Hoekje et al., 1993, p. 
1). 
 
                                               
99  Which can also mean banknotes. 
100  Section §1956 contains the promotion and concealment statutes. Section §1957, the spending 
statute - Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity: 
whoever knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally de-
rived property of a value greater than $10.000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, 
shall be punished (see Addendum for complete text of the section). 
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This definition covers not only the concealing of the origin but also the hidden 
existence of the illicit money. Such definitions imply that any way of hiding 
stolen money (or objects), including under the mattress at home (or lying as 
will be noted further), could constitute money laundering.  
 The US Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998101 
focuses on the ‘movement’ element as a description of money laundering and 
related financial crimes: 
 “[. . .] the movement of illicit cash or cash equivalent proceeds into, out of, or 
through United States financial institutions” (see 31 U.S.C. 5340(2)(A) ) 
 
The US National Money Laundering Strategy of March 2000 provides a simi-
lar definition:  
“[S]omeone who conducts a financial transaction with knowledge that the funds or 
property involved in the transaction are the proceeds of crime, and who intends to fur-
ther that crime, or to conceal or disguise those proceeds, is laundering money.” (US 
Administration, 2000, p. 5)  
 
This description (formally it cannot be called ‘definition’) equally lacks clarity. 
The furthering of the crime or, as formulated in the 1986 Act, promoting the 
carrying on of specified unlawful activity, can also mean reinvestment of the 
crime money in the commitment of another offence. Thus a drug dealer who 
buys drugs with his criminally derived money is committing a laundering of-
fence. This is also the case if he buys a vehicle (boat or car) to smuggle the 
contraband and/or if he pays the driver or a courier to complete the smuggling 
task. 
 The US approach of ever broadening the meaning of money laundering 
and expanding the international outreach of US legislation was reinforced with 
the USA PATRIOT Act.102 It was introduced in 2001, shortly after the 11 
September terrorist attacks. The USA PATRIOT Act was adopted to 
strengthen anti-money laundering measures in an attempt to counteract terror-
ism. Charles Doyle, in a 2002 Congressional Research Service Report relating 
to the US PATRIOT Act, gave the following interpretation of money laun-
dering: 
                                               
101  The introduction of the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act was aimed at 
developing a stategy to coordinate and concentrate law enforcement efforts in certain areas 
where money laundering and related financial crimes were extensive or presented a substantial 
risk (see FinCEN’s website, section “HIFCA”). 
102  The acronym stands for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001” (Public Law Pub.L. 107-56). 
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“In federal law, money laundering is the flow of cash or other valuables derived from, 
or intended to facilitate, the commission of a criminal offense. It is the movement of 
the fruits and instruments of crime. Federal authorities attack money laundering 
through regulations, criminal sanctions, and forfeiture. The [USA PATRIOT] Act 
bolsters federal efforts in each area” (Doyle, 2002, p. 3). 
 
This interpretation again appears to lack the main idea of the money-
laundering concept: that the aim of money laundering is to ensure a legitimate 
appearance of the crime-money. This description is just about the movement 
or flow of money to facilitate crime. If we relate this to corruption, paying a 
bribe is also laundering: ‘facilitating the commission of a criminal offence’, re-
sulting in a confluence of offences as was already indicated above. That means 
that any offence, the execution of which requires paying for expenses to be 
incurred, implies laundering, irrespective of whether that offence will succeed 
and bring in profit. Could a failed crime for profit (an attempted offence) also 
be prosecuted as an attempt to launder, if the two are so connected? Applying 
strict logic, the answer must be “yes”. 
 Considering the history of money-laundering control in the USA, we 
should not be surprised that in the end the legal definition of money laundering 
has become so broad as to cover, finally, the mere shifting and transporting of 
illicit money. As reviewed earlier in this thesis, the US Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) 
of 1970, which supposedly helped detect crime-money flows, was largely de-
signed to address tax violations, particularly money flowing out of the country. 
However, it did not succeed in halting this outflow. Therefore, as the Act was 
not particularly effective, whether it concerned tax evasion or laundering, it 
was decided that the definition of laundering had to be broadened (as discussed 
earlier in this thesis). 
 However, even if the broad definition is imprecise, clearly it fulfils a law 
enforcement objective, as noted above. Equalling money movements to money 
laundering and criminalising it enables regulators to scrutinise a wide range of 
activities, both domestically and abroad. With this penal clause the authorities 
could tackle the large cash flows within the US and particularly those leaving 
the country. The large money flow related to the reported cocaine consump-
tion boom in the USA may appear to have served as a good pretext. Indeed, it 
was certainly a generally applauded target. It needed little justification to launch 
a war on drug-money laundering in which there was little attention to subtle 
definitions. The wider aim – raking in tax money – remained at that time in 
the background, but was certainly not forgotten. Ultimately, tax evaders would 
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experience the effect of the broad definition, which fate they became bound to 
share with all sorts of economic criminals. So, originally, the tune of propa-
ganda conveniently took the pitch of the war on drugs song in which the accu-
racy of the legal definition was subordinate to reaching the ultimate target: 
global acceptance. The USA, as the main driving force behind international 
legislative developments, set this tune (as it did in the past nine decades) and, 
because other countries followed suit for reasons of (international) political 
acceptance, it also determined the global model for fighting money laundering.  
 
3.2.4.  Reference to the predicate crime 
 
While during the 1980s, money laundering was understood mainly to relate to 
drug proceeds, during the 1990s policy makers expanded the scope of the defi-
nition by pointing out that the origin of laundered funds can be a range of 
predicate crimes.103 The US National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 
(NASD)104 provides the following definition (2002): 
“Money laundering is the process of disguising illegally obtained money so that the 
funds appear to come from legitimate sources or activities. Money laundering occurs in 
connection with a wide variety of crimes, including illegal arms sales, drug trafficking, 
robbery, fraud, racketeering, and terrorism.”105 
 
In a strict sense, here we are not dealing with defining a meaning (of launder-
ing) but delineating its circle of application. Here we enter the area of criminal 
policy making which should not be confused with determining the correct 
meaning. However, in the documented discussions this line between delineat-
ing meanings and the circle of application is regularly blurred (as is evidenced 
by the inclusion of terrorism).  
 
Seriousness of the predicate crime  
The policy making question concerns the kind of crimes that should be quali-
fied as ‘predicate’ to money laundering: only ‘serious’ crimes, offences commit-
ted by ‘organised crime’ groups, or any kind of profit-seeking crime, including 
tax evasion. The range of political choices is broad. Some might argue that 
evasion of inheritance tax, or tax on dividends is not as serious a crime as child 
                                               
103  As mentioned earlier, the 1990 Council of Europe Convention expanded the definition of 
money laundering beyond that laid down by the 1988 UN Convention, which defined laun-
dering in association with drug-related offences only.  
104  Succeeded by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in 2007. 
105  Derived from online sources, therefore, no page number is available.  
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pornography. But why are things the way they are? The answers depend on 
political choices: every crime for profit can be rated as ‘serious’. For decades 
researchers in the area of fraud have observed that policy makers have merely 
paid lipservice to the seriousness of white-collar crime and fraud while concen-
trating on illegal drugs trade.106 A recent report prepared by the UK authorities 
states: “As far as the relative scale and significance of the threats, it is still the case that 
most of those identified as involved in organised crime are engaged in drugs trafficking and 
distribution. The profits to be made from drugs up and down the supply chain continue to 
attract criminals of all levels. They support criminal lifestyles, sustain the drugs trades, 
foster other criminal activities, and fuel acts of extreme violence. The harms caused to 
individuals, to families, to communities, and in some instances to states, are often only 
too visible. However, it is important to recognise that drugs have been a priority for law 
enforcement in the UK and overseas for many years, and as a result more is known about 
the drugs threat than about, for example, organised immigration crime or fraud, the true 
scales and significance of which are therefore harder to assess” (SOCA, 2009/2010, p. 
5).  
 According to Palmer (2001), an expert in international documentary fraud, 
it seems indeed that over the years little attention has been paid to fraud and for 
many years banks have preferred to assume the cost of fraud (and share the cost 
with other banks) rather than report fraud and seek litigation as a solution. It 
appears that during the 2000s this situation has started to change as the amounts 
involved in fraud have become increasingly higher. Furthermore, the fall of the 
Berlin wall arguably signified a new wave of enlargement of the European 
Economic Community:107 another dimension of fraud - fraud against EU funds 
- was (again) firmly placed on the political agenda. The European Commission 
forced the EU Member States to recognise fraud against EU funds as important 
as defrauding the national fund.108 The repetition of this statement is an indica-
                                               
106  Lately also on human trafficking. 
107  The European Union (EU) was established by the Treaty of Maastricht on 1 November 1993. 
The Maastricht Treaty changed the name of the European Economic Community to “the 
European Community”. From 1 December 2009 date of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the title of the “Treaty establishing the European Community” is replaced by “Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union” (Treaty of Lisbon article 2§1). The EU succeeded the 
European Economic Community (EEC) established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 which in 
turn had been preceded by the European Coal and Steel Community formed among six coun-
tries in 1951. 
108  EC Treaty Article 280 (ex Article 209a): (2) Member States shall take the same measures to 
counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Community as they take to counter fraud af-
fecting their own financial interests. (Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice con-
solidated version) - Part Five: Institutions of the Community - Title II: Financial provisions - 
Article 280 - Article 209a - EC Treaty (Maastricht consolidated version) - Official Journal C 
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tion of the shallowness of the feeling of seriousness. The assimilation principle is 
not necessarily productive where it is based on varying perceptions of serious-
ness. As Tupman (1996) notes, in the UK for instance, the Serious Fraud Of-
fice may not investigate frauds below a certain threshold,109 because of the high 
costs involved in investigating and prosecuting fraud. This also applies to au-
thorities in other countries. Law enforcement resources will be allocated to 
matters considered a priority but prioritising is often dependant on political 
choices, which in turn may be a variable of economic circumstances (and often, 
of their byproduct, the popular mood, or, in other words, the dictate of the 
election period). Thus, although tax evasion has always been a priority for all 
governments, as soon as the credit crisis began to spread in 2008 and set the 
financial system alight, policy makers found themselves in a position that con-
veniently enabled them to reinforce the belief that hiding the proceeds of tax 
evasion was a serious thing. Hence, evading inheritance tax and hiding the 
proceeds in a sunny tax holiday island has moved up the ladder of seriousness. 
And so has other fraud, following Stanford’s and Madoff’s exposure.  
 The dependence of the perception of seriousness on political choices is most 
obvious in the case of corruption. Hence prosecution of laundering the pro-
ceeds of corruption becomes a variable of political choices too. We see this 
happening every day.  
 
The ‘organised crime’ connotation 
As we noted earlier in this chapter, seriousness cannot be part of the empirical 
definition, unless it can be precisely measured. Despite that observation, in the 
policy making discourse money laundering is often associated with the perpe-
tration of ‘serious’ crimes committed by ‘organised crime groups’ or, by what 
they are often equalled to, the Mafia. Werner (1996), for instance, links the 
definition of money laundering to ‘organised crime’. According to him, money 
laundering is a consequence and prerequisite of ‘organised crime’, since it helps 
criminals integrate their illicit proceeds into the legitimate economy and com-
mit new crimes. Indeed, as elaborated in previous sections, the message of the 
global anti-money laundering propaganda has been that fight against money 
laundering is the best way to fight drug trafficking and ‘organised crime’. In its 
                                                                                                              
325, 24/12/2002 P. 0145 – 0146; Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0293 - Consolidated 
version; Official Journal C 224, 31/08/1992 P. 0074 - Consolidated version;http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E280:EN:HTML, 12002E280). 
109  At least at the time, according to sources at the SFO interviewed by Tupman (1996), this 
threshold was £5million.  
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Presidency Conclusions of 15 and 16 October 1999 the Tampere European 
Council stated: “Money laundering is at the very heart of organised crime. It should be 
rooted out wherever it occurs.”110 Early anti-money laundering legislation was 
largely aimed at reaching the money of organised crime groups. As these 
groups are supposed to have a huge financial capacity which one way or other 
has to flow through the financial system, this angle is not overly irrational. 
However, it is not new either: the argument – based on insufficient evidence 
brought by policy makers – being used for decades has become a ‘historical 
classic’ by now.  
 Nonetheless, whether for opportunistic reasons or not, the connection be-
tween laundering and ‘organised crime’ in the laundering definition is put for-
ward regularly and politically readily accepted. Nonetheless it remains mislead-
ing because it would incorrectly narrow down the meaning of this concept, by 
connecting it to another vague and ill-defined concept that attracts all sorts of 
emotional associations (Van Duyne and Van Dijck, 2007b). In addition, large-
scale earnings that may need laundering are not the exclusive prerogative of 
‘organised crime’ groups. For instance, corporate and bank fraud can be com-
mitted single-handedly and can yield a massive income. But the accumulation 
of ‘convincing vagueness’ only increases the distance to clarity. 
 
Varying financial results 
Not only the ‘organised crime’ connotation attached to the money-laundering 
concept creates vagueness. There is also uncertainty as to the right application 
of the laundering definition with regard to the varying financial results, both of 
‘organised crime’ and ‘non-organised crime’. For instance, in the case of child 
pornography, regardless of the level of organisation, it is clear that all proceeds 
from this offence are illicit. Hence, all proceeds (perhaps minus expenses) can 
potentially be in need of laundering. However, in the case of evading tax (on 
licit income), the resulting crime money is not the total sum subject to tax, but 
the resulting illegal tax saving. For instance, an income of 1.000 euros may be 
perfectly legal but not having paid 30% income tax results in an illegally saved 
amount of 300 euros. In addition, even where it is clear what portion of the 
financial result is illegal proceeds, there is uncertainty as to whether proceeds 
should mean ‘net profit’ or ‘gross receipts’. For instance, in the US the term 
‘proceeds’ is not defined in the money laundering statute. However, despite the 
ambiguity of the law, for more than twenty years it has been commonly as-
                                               
110 European Council (1999), Section X, paragraph 51 (online retrieved).  
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sumed that the ‘proceeds’ are the ‘gross receipts’ (including tangible and intan-
gible objects) from an offence (for relevant case examples see Cassella, 2009). 
As a result, US sentencing practices abound of examples where defendants have 
been sentenced for promotion money laundering, even though the alleged 
transaction entailed nothing more than just a payment of a necessary expense 
for the underlying crime (particularly in cases of a (partial) merger between the 
laundering offence and the underlying offence) (see Cassella, 2009). In short, 
criminal business expenses constitute laundering too. It seems that a recent 
court decision (United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008)) has now rein-
forced the uncertainty as to whether the term ‘proceeds’ should be construed as 
‘net profits’ or ‘gross receipts’ (the term ‘proceeds’ was construed as ‘net profits’ 
in the case of United States v. Santos which will be discussed again later in this 
thesis111). 
 
Predicate crime and laundering intermingled 
In addition, the laundering definition has been broadened to such an extent 
that it makes no clear separation between the laundering act, which is supposed 
to be subsequent to the predicate crime, and the predicate crime itself. Laun-
dering and committing the predicate crime become intermingled. This does 
not only apply to the smuggler who spends his crime-money on buying a truck 
or vessel for his newly planned undertaking. This combination is particularly to 
be found in economic crime and fraud. Invoicing for the provision of fictitious 
services can be a predicate crime, i.e. a way to earn money illicitly (for instance 
through corrupt public procurement deals), but such invoices can also be an 
instrument for laundering money that had already been earned, for instance 
through drug dealing.112 While in the latter case the laundering act, i.e. the 
invoicing, and the predicate crime are separate acts, in the former case (corrup-
tion and procurement fraud) the predicate crime and the laundering act coin-
cide. This means that the perpetrator of the predicate crime can also be charged 
                                               
111  See section 3.2.8.  An empirical analysis of the application of the definition. 
112  Sometimes, the line is blurred not because of the broad definition but by the nature of the 
predicate offence. An employee, who has access to the company bank accounts, can embezzle 
company funds by simply transferring them to an account of his own and can continue to do so 
until someone notices the missing funds. But the offender can also create bogus procurement 
contracts in the name of sham firms and cronies, for example, for the delivery of stationery that 
is actually never delivered. As the dishonest employee has sole responsibility for this, it may go 
unnoticed (at least for some time) ‘as valid’ reasons are given for payments, e.g. money ‘paid for 
large stationery orders’. The employee’s associates could also have money in their account that 
has come from an apparently legitimate source, i.e. the sale of stationery. This is the perfect way 
to launder the embezzled funds. The problem arises if the employee is asked to account for an 
undocumented increase in wealth in the absence of a valid reason, for example, inheritance. 
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with money laundering, on the basis that he has handled crime assets and has 
sought to conceal the traces of his crime with the very same instrument (false 
invoices) with which he committed the predicate offence. Van Duyne (2003b, 
p. 72) calls this “canned laundering”. Van Duyne et al. (2005) elaborated this 
problem in an example of combined corporate and income tax fraud: the 
fraudulent corporate tax papers being the fraud annex laundering instrument, 
which were again the fraud instrument for the income declaration.  
 One may wonder about the potential consequences of such over-stretching 
of the laundering definition or its overstretched logical implications. One of the 
consequences can be observed in sentencing in penal law systems where there 
is maximum penalty for laundering that is higher than for (some) predicate 
offences. For example, the maximum penalty for laundering is six years impris-
onment and for theft, embezzlement or tax evasion the penalty is four years.   
  
3.2.5.  The three-stage model 
 
An important input made by the US Customs Service (see Bongard, 2001) to 
the conceptualisation of money laundering is the description of the phenome-
non as a process of three possible stages:  
  placing the money with a financial institution (or introduction into the 
economy); then  
  layering it in several different amounts through a series of transactions 
(“giro-criss-crossing”, as Van Duyne (2003b) describes the avalanche of 
money transfers to numerous accounts) in order to take it away from the 
criminal source and blur the paper trail; and subsequently  
  integrating the money into the legitimate mainstream.  
 
This description designed by practitioners illustrates how money-laundering 
processes usually run when the money had originated in a cash-based under-
ground economy. However, in addition there is a range of white-collar and 
economic crimes such as VAT fraud, subsidy and investment fraud, and corpo-
rate and income tax fraud, where there is no need of placement but instead it is 
needed to take the money out of the domestic financial system, for instance to 
a safe account abroad (which is closer to ‘displacement’ rather than ‘place-
ment’).113 In cases of elite crime such as the Enron, Madoff and Stanford cases, 
the criminal money management process does not start with a bank deposit, 
                                               
113  For instance, in cases of VAT fraud or social contribution fraud by employers the ‘white’ in-
come tax form is in the end also a laundering instrument. 
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because the money is already in the bank, e.g. as corporate funds, or money 
wired to the perpetrator by the victim, or illegal tax saving or as a criminal 
saving of business expenses (for instance, social security contributions or envi-
ronmental cost saving). 
 As reviewed earlier, originally the anti-money laundering regime was aimed 
to halt the proceeds of tax evasion. But eventually, for political reasons, it began 
to target mainly (lower class) traditional crimes-for-profit the proceeds of which 
are in cash.114 (Needless to say that cash from both drugs trade and tax eva-
sion115 was often dumped offshore, including in the Bahamas, in order to be 
safely deposited with banks there and avoid leaving a money trail, see Robin-
son, 2003). As the competent law enforcement agencies, e.g. the Customs and 
the DEA, frequently target these amounts of cash entering the financial system 
or leaving the country, it is understandable they produced this limited three-
stage model. Its application should not be underestimated, although it is not 
intended to be a definition and, therefore, lacks a proper theoretical frame. 
Once introduced, this model was spread by the same uncritical ‘copy-paste’ 
procedure which had characterised the spreading of the money-laundering 
offence formulation. This has not furthered to develop a more realistic insight 
into more sophisticated forms of laundering. 
 Firstly, the described process does not explicitly include the most important 
phase of money laundering: the phase of justification, where the money laun-
derer achieves his ultimate goal of a ‘clean’ appearance of the money. Indeed, 
according to some official interpretations (see for instance The Secretary of 
Treasury et al. Report to Congress, 2002), during the integration stage, crime 
money is being converted into apparently legitimate earnings.116 However, 
neither layering nor integration, or intermingling, illicit with licit money per se 
leads necessarily to such a conversion. More than that is required, because oth-
erwise a net-worth analysis (Albanese, 1996; Abadinsky, 2002), such as the one 
that Lansky was subjected to (Lacey, 1991), could potentially establish the ex-
cess of money of unaccountable origin.    
 Secondly, this description dismisses the possibility that in fact a ‘clean’ ap-
pearance of crime money can be achieved prior to the placement stage or in 
                                               
114  It appears that the anti-money laundering measures were conveniently high-jacked by the DEA 
which during its investigations hit on large cash flows. After all, the FATF has been launched to 
fight drug money. But the regime serves them all quite well.  
115  For instance, skimming in casinos, mentioned previously.  
116  Although such scenarios are possible: the money has only entered the licit money flow between 
banks, i.e. has jumped over the layering stage straight into the integration stage or the conversion 
has taken place during the layering stage. 
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ways that do not necessarily involve placing the money with a financial institu-
tion (or introducing it into the economy) or layering it through a series of 
transactions. The money can stay locked in a safe at home, accompanied with a 
forged invoice that shows a legitimate origin. Before being used, i.e. introduced 
into the legitimate economy, the money will already be laundered, apart from 
the seeping of crime-money through the daily living expenses. The problem is 
that the entry into the legitimate financial system, or the placement stage, is 
sometimes the most difficult or rather risky step in the crime-money manage-
ment process. Under increasing pressures for due diligence procedures financial 
institutions have tightened their know-your-customer rules. Thus, criminals 
operating in the cashed based crime-economy have become most vulnerable to 
detection at the stage where they have to enter the financial system. Therefore, 
they often have to resort to means, such as fictitious commercial transactions, 
fictitious contracts signed by notaries, setting up shell firms, nominee relation-
ships and so on to ensure some initial disguise, if not as yet a perfect legitimate 
appearance, prior to entering the financial system. 
 It is a plausible assumption that in much of the crime-economy such detours 
and disguises are not even considered. If, for example, we were to consider the 
investment of illicitly derived $8.000 in a small music-shop, risk of detection at 
the placement stage would be minimal. As this is beneath the reporting thresh-
old, it is unlikely that anyone would require proof of licit origin, even if the 
money is run through the financial system. So this is an example where the 
illicit origin of the money does not necessarily have to be ‘masked’ or layered 
for the money to enter the legitimate system and integrate with licit money, i.e. 
placement and integration occur concurrently. On the other hand, if the ‘loan’ 
(i.e. the crime-money) to the music-shop has to enter the books of that firm, 
this may expose the ‘lender’. Examples, summed up by Van Duyne (2003b), 
illustrate handling of crime-money without laundering techniques. Even 
fraudulent businessmen resorted much less to laundering techniques than ex-
pected: they simply took the proceeds of fraud out of their firms to spend it on 
their personal indulgences rather than laundering it for reinvestment. 
 Even if not laundered, strictly speaking, crime money can be deposited with 
an offshore bank just to avoid tax, which is an element of the money manage-
ment process rather than part of a process aimed at ensuring a legitimate ap-
pearance (but is still laundering in broad terms). 
 Furthermore, if we take the three-stage model as a yardstick for comparison, 
we will see that some existing definitions (including official ones) centre pri-
marily on the placement phase. For instance, if we are to interpret the US 
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Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (see Addendum), placing the money 
with a financial institution, knowing that it is the proceeds of unlawful activity 
or intending to promote unlawful activity, already constitutes a money-
laundering offence because the act of placement is implied in the meaning of 
transaction.  
 As a matter of fact, as soon as the money is placed with a well-known finan-
cial institution (media reports abound with examples of fraudsters and corrupt 
politicians who manage to slip through the fire-wall and place their tainted 
proceeds with reputable banks117), the money can already be viewed as part of 
the legitimate mainstream, i.e. as integrated into the licit financial system. It is a 
different story if the money is placed with an offshore bank of questionable 
reputation. Money placed with an obscure offshore bank may raise a few eye-
brows. Therefore this money may need to undergo a series of transfers before it 
reaches the safe shore of a reputable institution, i.e. the stage of integration. 
Yet, as mentioned above, integrated does not necessarily mean laundered in the 
strict sense, i.e. looking perfectly legitimate.  
 Moreover, the three-stage model is not consistent with the logic of the 
broad definition that describes as laundering the mere keeping/hiding of crime 
money at home, right under the proverbial mattress. Additionally, one may 
wonder where criminals’ daily expenses fit in. Crime-money spent on daily 
needs, for example buying foodstuff in food-stores, penetrates the legitimate 
economy as it integrates into the legitimate economic turnover. Indeed the 
three-stage model has not been prepared with the ambition to cover all possible 
situations. The UK Crown Prosecution Service, for instance, notes (on its 
website) that this model applies only to “most sophisticated money laundering 
schemes”,118 apparently measuring sophistication from an intellectually low bot-
tom line. It appears that the three-stage model lacks sophistication as events can 
take place outside of its remit, where legitimate appearance is invented and 
ensured at the end of the process - or even the beginning, inventing ‘legitimisa-
tion’ before the three stages commence. A sophisticated fraudster would plan 
the laundering route. As discussed earlier, many sophisticated schemes would 
most likely involve some form of pre-wash before placing the money within 
the financial system.  
                                               
117  It seems it is mainly white-collar elite crime that manages to slip through the money laundering 
detection system with little or no difficulty.  
118  See UK Crown Prosecution Service’s website (posting updated 15 September 2010), section 
Principle. Introduction to Money Laundering.  
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 Although designed from a very basic, cash based underground economy 
perspective, the three-stage model remained the prevalent conceptual frame-
work and, to an extent, stood in the way of developing further ideas of crimi-
nal money management in more elaborate economic crime schemes.  
 
3.2.6.  Money laundering and political financing   
 
The lack of precision of the term ‘money-laundering’ and its over-stretched 
application are quite evident in the case of political financing. Where a cam-
paign is being financed with crime-money, the case is relatively straightforward. 
The picture becomes more complicated when a legitimate origin of funds has 
to be concealed or licit funds are being used in an illegal or semi-legal way to 
finance political campaigns. In that case the term ‘money laundering’ is applied 
to describe the techniques that are used to cover up the flows of money. Lid-
dick (2000, p. 111) notes:  
“In order to circumvent restrictive contribution and spending limits and to conceal the 
source of contributions, campaign finance solicitors, contributors, and brokers from both 
sides of the political aisle engaged in a variety of illegal schemes best described as 
money laundering.” 
 
The slush funds of Nixon (discussed earlier) or those maintained by the CDU 
party under former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl119 are a perfect illustra-
tion of these schemes.  
 Funds contributed over the spending limits, even if from legitimate business, 
have to be subjected to a series of transactions to circumvent these limits. 
However, the use of money laundering techniques does not necessarily mean 
that laundering, in the strict sense, is taking place. This is different, if the use of 
money laundering techniques involves illegal means such as documentary fraud. 
In that case the money becomes tainted, although not necessarily in need of 
subsequent ‘whitening’ because the fraud achieves that. However, the money is 
nevertheless tainted and, therefore, under the broad money laundering defini-
tion, any further use of these funds is laundering. As discussed earlier, the fol-
low-up fraudulent acts that are designed to hide something, whether some 
                                               
119  In the late 1990s-early 2000s revelations emerged about illegal funding of the German Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) under Kohl’s leadership. Investigations revealed that part of the 
funds came from the privatisation of the Leuna oil refinery in East Germany. Allegedly, Leuna 
was sold to French oil company Elf Aquitaine in a corrupt deal arranged by Kohl and the late 
French President François Mitterrand (Nübel, TAZ, 2010). It has been reported that Kohl 
avoided trial by paying a fine of DM300,000 for receipt of illegal party donations (Birmingham 
Post, 2009). 
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minor irregularities, civil infringements, corruption or perfectly legitimate ac-
tivities, create a ‘hereditary’ chain of laundering actions (Van Duyne et al., 
2005, to be discussed later). In such cases it is not clear at what stage the money 
can be considered as derived from crime. But somewhere in the chain of con-
cealing transactions such a transformation takes place. 
 A less traditional rationalisation but one that offers political convenience, is 
the definition suggested by Yordan Sokolov in 2000. Sokolov, a senior political 
figure in Bulgaria, then chairman of the Bulgarian Parliament, interpreted the 
term ‘money laundering’ as follows:  
“Money laundering is a form of circulation of money that is either of ‘dirty’ origin or 
is handled by a ‘discredited’ sender, and that eventually returns to its sender” (see 
Raikov, 2000, p. 10).120  
 
Sokolov’s partisan statement came in defence of Elena Kostova, the wife of 
then prime minister of Bulgaria Ivan Kostov. At the time she was alleged to 
have accepted money of questionable origin. It was suggested that her founda-
tion had accepted funds from the Russian-Israeli businessman Grigory Lu-
chansky121 (see Raikov, 2000).  
 According to Sokolov, as long as the allegedly illicit money does not go 
back to the donor, there is no money laundering. Such a definition, however, 
would open the gate for criminal party funding and corruption. The practice of 
donations for ‘good causes’ by businessmen who derive their money from 
questionable activities has a long history and, depending on the nature of the 
transaction, it often represents the perfect way of legitimising tainted funds. 
Lansky’s gambling business thrived on such donations (see Lacey, 1991). Dona-
tions can be made to ensure certain economic advantages, for instance prefer-
ential treatment in privatisation, or simply to ensure support for whatever rea-
son.  
 In any case, it seems that the danger of having a broad and ill-designed defi-
nition is that it allows room for convenient, self-serving interpretations not just 
to the advantage of law enforcement authorities but also to those who may 
want to circumvent the law.  
 
 
                                               
120  This is translated from Bulgarian. 
121  According to media reports, Grigory Luchansky, often described as controversial, has alleged ties 
to organised crime and has been investigated in many countries (Tavernise, The New York Times, 
2003; Warner, Financial Times, 2004; Ryle and Magnay, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2007). 
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3.2.7.  Politically accepted international definitions and assumptions 
 
Legislative developments – a recap 
Let us summarise the chain of legislative events leading to the global penalisa-
tion of handling crime-money under the denomination of laundering. After 
that, we will dissect the definition to the bone. 
  The USA triggered international developments in the area of anti-money 
laundering regulations. First, the national legislation was put into place.  
  Then the foreign campaign started, beginning with the UN, where the US 
influence was paramount. The Vienna Convention,122 drafted at the initia-
tive of the USA and largely based on concepts developed in the USA, set 
the pattern for the subsequently internationally adopted legal definitions of 
money laundering. However, although the convention defined the offence, 
it did not explicitly name the offence: ‘money laundering’. But all knew its 
name: all subsequent legislative documents, particularly the Strasbourg 
Convention and the EU Directives, copy-pasting the Vienna Convention’s 
definition almost verbatim, called it ‘money laundering’.  
  The US approach of defining money laundering as broadly as possible, so 
that covering the mere concealment of the location of property knowing it 
is from a criminal source (in the Vienna Convention restricted to drug of-
fences), was copied by the Vienna Convention and then further enforced 
by the FATF Recommendations and all subsequent international docu-
ments.  
  The Basle Statement of Principles (1988) similarly extends to all aspects of 
laundering techniques, including the mere concealment of location, but 
through the banking system, e.g. by means of deposit or transfer of money 
derived from illicit activities. 
  The definition of the laundering offence under the Strasbourg Convention 
and the EU Directives, real imitations of the Vienna Convention’s provi-
sion, but with the important gradual extension to all forms of crime, and 
explicitly stating that assisting money launderers is also a laundering offence 
(see Addendum, paragraph (d) of the definition in the US Act).123  
                                               
122  The 1985 United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offend-
ers had also laid some foundations in this direction (see Van Duyne and Nelemans, 2011).  
123  This now entails the whole financial consultancy sector, from single tax advisors to major con-
sultancy firms, and also some professions outside the traditional financial sector such as real estate 
agents and casinos. As mentioned previously, this extention was gradual. The First EU Directive 
focused on the traditional financial services sector and on fighting the laundering of proceeds 
from drugs related offences. The Second EU Directive extended the scope of predicate offences 
and sectors obliged to report suspicious transactions. 
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Now that we have seen the outer surface of the ‘definitional union’, we will 
peel it off, layer after layer. The definition contains three basic elements: object, 
purpose and action. The action may also be passive: omitting to undertake 
certain measures required by law (and often also by public morals). The action, 
in fact, describes the modus operandi of money laundering, or how it is done. 
These three elements constitute the formal components of the money launder-
ing offence and represent the trinity of aim, meaning and spirit of the criminali-
sation clause. 
 
Definition dissection  
 
a. Object  
The object of the money laundering offence is the criminally derived economic 
advantage, as defined by the Strasbourg Convention (see below). Although this 
advantage or gain is frequently referred to here as ‘crime money’ in shorthand, 
its forms can extend far beyond just ‘dirty’ cash. More generally it is described 
as ‘any property derived from crime’.  
 
  The ‘object’ evolving  
As indicated before, developments since 1986 have been marked by a tendency 
to broaden the definition to cover any type of property.   
 Section 1956 of the US Money Laundering Control Act refers to ‘launder-
ing of monetary instruments’ (which may reflect the worries of the time and 
place, i.e. cash flow problems facing the US authorities) meaning: 
(i) coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travellers’ 
checks, personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or  
(ii) investment securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or oth-
erwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.  
  
The focus appears to be on monetary instruments and funds, although the Act 
also refers to ‘property’. Section 1957 defines the term ‘criminally derived 
property’ as any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from 
a criminal offence. These objects, i.e. monetary instruments, funds and prop-
erty, represent the ‘proceeds’ of specified unlawful activity. The term ‘pro-
ceeds’, however, was not defined in the original text of the Act which led to an 
ongoing debate as to whether proceeds is ‘gross receipts’ or ‘profits’. The de-
bate seemed to have culminated in United States v. Santos (discussed in this 
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thesis). Subsequently, in 2009 the US Congress amended the Act by defining 
proceeds as gross receipts.124 
 Through the Vienna Convention, international policy-makers began to 
abstract from the focus on tangible monetary instruments and to target any 
asset, not just their monetary equivalent. ‘Property’ under the Vienna Conven-
tion means assets of any kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or 
immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evi-
dencing title to or interest in such assets. 
 The Strasbourg Convention uses the term ‘proceeds’ meaning any crimi-
nally derived economic advantage and this may consist of any property, corpo-
real or incorporeal, movable or immovable, and legal documents or instru-
ments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property.125  
 
  The abstract element  
The introduction of an abstract element such as ‘advantage’ raises the question: 
how ‘an advantage’ is laundered and does the Convention really mean any 
advantage, even competitive advantage? Given the provisions of the US For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (which will be discussed later), a competitive advan-
tage gained through bribery of foreign government officials is crime proceeds 
and concealing the criminal origin, specifically concealing the bribery or any 
form of illegal payment made to gain that advantage would amount to launder-
ing (see Gelemerova, 2010). However, if, for example, a US company gains a 
competitive advantage over local market players by breaking EU market regu-
lations, is the US company laundering this advantage by covering up the of-
fence? Here we may run into trouble. Strictly interpreted, the fraudulent US 
firm is laundering, but not necessarily everywhere. In some jurisdictions, price 
fixing, for instance, is an offence of an administrative nature and in others a 
criminal one. Environmental crimes can raise similar problems: the illegal 
dumping of toxic waste by Trafigura in around Abidjan, the capital of Ivory 
Coast, in 2006 (see the Guardian, 2009) aimed at saving processing costs which 




                                               
124  The amendment was introduced through the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 
which amended the Money Laundering Control Act by defining that the term “proceeds” 
means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some 
form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity. The Act was signed into 
law on 20 May 2009. It is debatable whether courts will apply the ‘gross receipts’ definition to 
cases of conduct that had occurred prior to the date of the introduction of the amendment.  
125  The Warsaw Convention makes no amendments to this definition.  
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  The varying legal contexts  
Varying legal contexts have to be taken into account too. For instance, price 
fixing was not a criminal offence in the UK (similar to the majority of EU 
jurisdictions) prior to the introduction of the UK Enterprise Act of 2002. At 
present, activities which undermine fair trade may result not only in civil but 
also in criminal penalties.126 However, this is not the case in all jurisdictions 
within the EU and outside the EU. This means that in a multi-country price 
fixing case, one may face laundering charges in the UK, but not in Germany127 
for example.  
 Of course, the origin of an (unlawful, but not criminal) advantage gained 
via violations which are only regarded as an administrative or civil offence is 
not criminal. Therefore the money-laundering criminalisation clause should 
not apply in such instances. However, if subsequently the company was to 
fraudulently cover its administrative wrongdoing, then it would be slipping 
from an administrative into a criminal offence. Yet, if executives engage in 
adjusting invoices (which does not necessarily constitute documentary fraud) to 
settle mutual claims rather than to conceal a violation and the advantage gained 
through this violation, then, it seems, no laundering of the advantage would be 
taking place (see also example of cartel building in Van Duyne and Van Dijck, 
2007a). For example, a cargo of cement is delivered at a 30% discount to settle 
a payment: the cement is real, the invoice is not fraudulent and is duly included 
in the paper work and the payment is also a real one, plus VAT. What is being 
laundered? This example can be extended to other areas, like environmental 
violations. Therefore, there is room for further interpretations and complica-
tions in cases of international legal differences.  
                                               
126  An interesting development in this regard was the Norris v USA case. In 2004, US prosecutors 
requested the extradition of Ian Norris, a UK national, on charges of price-fixing in the carbon 
industry in the US, among other countries, during the 1990s. Norris claimed that, at the time, 
participation in a cartel was not a criminal offence in the UK. The Enterprise Act of 2002 cre-
ated such an offence. On 12 March 2008, the UK House of Lords supported Norris’ claim and 
ruled that secret price-fixing is not itself dishonest in the absence of aggravating conduct such as 
fraud or intimidation. As Stephan (2008) notes, the Lords’ reading of dishonesty is treated as 
contextually distinct, applying only to cartel conduct prior to the Enterprise Act coming into 
force. That aside, the case raised criticism as to the extra-territorial reach of US law with regard 
to conduct outside the US but with US ramifications. Failing to extradite Norris on price-fixing 
charges, in 2008 US prosecutors managed to obtain an extradition ruling on obstruction of jus-
tice charges. Norris was extradited in March 2010. (See Croft, Financial Times, 12 July 2010; 
Wilson, The Daily Telegraph, 16 July 2010.) 
127  The German penal code (Strafgesetzbuch, “StGB”) criminalises price fixing only in connection 
to public contracts (§ 298 StGB, Wettbewerbsbeschränkende Absprachen bei Ausschreibungen). 
Otherwise, price fixing is only an administrative offence according to § 81, Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen. 
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 Not only in the area of what we typically perceive as economic crime are 
cases to be found where the predicate act is not universally criminalised.128 The 
range of acts that count as criminal activities vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion and so do the related proceeds. For example: abortion is a criminal offence 
in Poland,129 but not necessarily in other EU countries. A doctor who carries 
out an illegal pregnancy termination for profit in Poland and who deposits the 
money with a Berlin bank is not necessarily punishable in Germany for the 
predicate offence, but may still be arrested in Germany and extradited for the 
laundering offence130 (Van Duyne et al., 2005).  
  
  Implications of the broad interpretation 
The EU Directive moves slightly away from the definition laid down in the 
Strasbourg Convention by not using the term ‘advantage’. Otherwise, the di-
rective copies the Strasbourg Convention131 almost verbatim and the interpreta-
tion of the object remains as broad. According to the EU Directive, ‘property’ 
means assets of any kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or im-
movable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing 
title to, or interests in, such assets.  
 These international definitions extend the reach of the criminalisation clause 
beyond money or monetary instruments to any material and immaterial advan-
tage (it is also possible to interpret the definition so that the broad term ‘advan-
tage’ is covered by ‘intangible’ or ‘incorporeal’ assets).  
 No object of acquisition is exempt, even livestock. If A steals a cow in Po-
land and B helps him to transport it to Germany using false certificates to show 
that the cow has been bred in Bavaria, both A and B will be committing a 
money laundering offence: B for offering the service and A for possessing a 
laundered (‘white’) cow after obtaining the papers.132  
                                               
128  As mentioned earlier, the Vienna Convention refers only to drug related offences, whereas the 
Strasbourg Convention and the Second and Third EU Directives extend their scope to other 
criminal activities. 
129  It is allowed only in limited circumstances, for instance, when the continuation of the pregnancy 
puts in danger the woman’s life. 
130  Under the European Arrest Warrant that would likely be enough as the extraditing court will 
only marginally test the request. 
131  While the Strasbourg convention states more vaguely that ‘proceeds’ means ‘any economic 
advantage’ and that it may consist of ‘property’, the Vienna Convention says ‘proceeds’ means 
‘any property’ and ‘property’ means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, 
movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing 
title to, or interest in, such assets. 
132  This happened in an extensive meat fraud in the 1990s: Polish cows had been bought in Poland, 
obtained a false certificate in Germany and were transported to the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France and Spain, destined for pretended export to North-Africa. (Van Duyne, 1993).  
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 If A steals a sculpture from B and presents it to C as his own, this could be 
qualified as money laundering. The transplantation of illegally trafficked human 
organs and all related paperwork could also fall into the category of money 
laundering. Article 1.a of the Strasbourg Convention, however, attempts to 
reduce potential interpretation absurdity by stating that the property is pro-
ceeds, meaning any economic advantage from criminal offences. In the case of 
illegal trafficking of human organs, not the human organs but the payment 
received for them would be the economic advantage gained through crime. 
The nature of the payment is irrelevant. Although the organ itself is not an 
instrument of payment, the question is whether by-passing a national waiting 
list, can also be interpreted as an ‘economic advantage’ or criminal proceeds 
gained by the beneficiary of the organ. Presumably not, if this is to be viewed 
as an advantage gained for non-commercial purposes, i.e. it is not the proceeds 
of a crime for profit (from the perspective of the organ’s beneficiary). How-
ever, there is still scope for absurd interpretations, especially given that prece-
dents have been set of raising money laundering charges for predicate crimes 
that are not necessarily crimes for profit per se. One such example is the Russian 
spy ring scandal in July 2010 when a number of individuals in the USA were 
charged with acting as unregistered agents of a foreign government and related 
conspiracy to launder money. Prosecutors claimed that the defendants wilfully 
and knowingly conducted financial activity, including the purchase and rental 
of residences, using the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, specifically vio-
lations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.133 It appears irrelevant 
in this case whether this specified unlawful activity was in fact crime for profit. 
This raises the proverbial question what was first: the chicken or the egg. Ex-
actly which funds constituted proceeds and how were they derived? Firstly, the 
defendants needed money to fund their espionage activities and simply to cover 
their daily expenses. The funds for this must have come from the Russian state 
budget, i.e. from a legitimate source, but were used in an illegal way (from the 
perspective of the US authorities). Secondly, the pay for the job also came from 
the Russian state budget. Presumably the alleged spies spent that money in a 
legal way, i.e. for daily expenses, leisure, but the money was earned through an 
unlawful activity (from the perspective of the US authorities). Which of the 
                                               
133  See USA v. Christopher  R. Metsos et. al, Sealed Complaint, 28 June 2008. 
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two categories of funds could be considered the object of money laundering 
remains a question.134  
 An essential characteristic of the subject of money laundering is its criminal 
origin: the property is derived from crime. This gives rise to the question 
whether activities such as the earlier elaborated campaign fund-raising abuse, 
circumvention of spending limits, concealment of the source of donations for 
party financing or for financing of unlawful covert operations fall into the cate-
gory of money laundering if the source of funds is legitimate (compare Liddick, 
2000). Such activities do involve typical money laundering techniques. Yet, as 
long as the funds are from a legitimate source, it seems that the money launder-
ing criminalisation clause is not applicable. However, as noted in the previous 
section, once these funds have been run through an illegal scheme, e.g. the use 
of false documents, they can subsequently be viewed as derived from crime. 
Consequently it is crime-money. After that point, whatever is done with this 
money to make it ‘white’, should logically be qualified as money laundering. 
Furthermore, the investment of this tainted money into the election campaign 
of a political party secures an economic advantage for both the party and the 
owner of the money. It is arbitrary whether the tainted money that has resulted 
in an ‘economic advantage’ has been really laundered. Phrases like ‘economic 
advantage’ and the wide scope of the definition may result in much arbitrary 
interpretations. Unless one sticks to a logically strict interpretation, the effect is 
much ambiguity. Sticking to a broad interpretation leads to such a broad cover-
age that, it seems, it is easier to escape from Alcatraz than to escape a laundering 
verdict.135  
 Furthermore, not only the range of crimes but also the financial scope of 
crime will of course vary. But is that relevant? According to Article 1.g of the 
Strasbourg Convention, ‘predicate offence’ is any criminal offence resulting in 
proceeds that may become the subject of money laundering. This can be any 
crime for profit. Clearly a hungry man stealing small amounts of food is not 
committing a crime for profit. However, a gang stealing foodstuff from a su-
permarket to sell it later on the black market, is committing crime for profit 
too. This crime may be of limited scope that barely necessitates laundering in 
the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless, the sale of stolen goods may qualify as 
                                               
134  Not surprisingly, this became a highly politicised case in which the defendants pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign country while the graver money launder-
ing charges were dropped in a swap deal between the US and Russia (BBC, 8 July 2010).  
135  This appears to apply to ‘small fry’ rather than Mr Bigs, large-scale white collar criminals and 
corrupt politicians who can afford good lawyers (see section 3.2.8). It can be argued that the 
broader the legal definition, the weaker it is because it is easier to manipulate it. 
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laundering: technically the shoplifters do launder, because they sell the loot, 
while concealing its origin, and convert it into money. The application of the 
laundering definition has no quantum limit. Whatever, and how much, is done 
after the criminal acquisition should apparently count as laundering. This is not 
an example ad absurdum: it is a general experience that criminal law devices 
destined for ‘serious’ criminal offences are in the end used in minor cases.  
 However, the 2001 amendments (Directive 2001/97/EC) to the original 
Directive of 1991 raised an important point that looks like a shrinking of the 
broad laundering net. According to the amended Directive, Article 1.(E), the 
predicate crime has to be a serious crime. As noted earlier, descriptions such as 
‘seriousness’ of a crime have to be defined adequately, possibly in a way that 
allows the measuring of the effect of ‘seriousness’. According to the Second EU 
Directive (2001/97/EC), serious crimes include, at least, drug related offences 
as defined in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention; or the activities of 
criminal organisations as defined in Article 1 of Joint Action 98/733/JHA; or 
fraud, as defined in Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Convention on the protec-
tion of the European Communities’ financial interests; or corruption; or an 
offence which may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a 
severe sentence of imprisonment.136 However, even though the authors of the 
directive have attempted to put the element of ‘seriousness’ in a specific frame 
and context, the definition remains broad with fuzzy edges. It is also deter-
mined by a range of politically vague concepts and interests: it is almost taken 
for granted that drugs are ‘of course’ a serious offence; the ill-conceived ‘organ-
ised crime’ is in every instance serious; as to EU fraud, even though it has been 
included by the EU Commission, it is otherwise paid relatively little atten-
tion.137 Equally, it is unclear what type and scope of corruption offences fall 
into the category ‘serious’, or how much money amounts to ‘substantial pro-
ceeds’.  
 In the 2005 amended EU Directive we see an attempt to define ‘serious’ 
more precisely. This time, the directive avoids the vague description “an offence 
which may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a severe sentence of 
imprisonment” (Article 1, (E) of Directive 2001//97/EC) and replaces it with 
“all offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a 
maximum of more than one year or, as regards those States which have a minimum 
                                               
136 Theft can carry several years of imprisonment. So, in some situations, shoplifting too can proba-
bly fall into the category of crimes that are predicate to laundering. 
137  Except for, as it appears, when it concerns weaker countries such as Bulgaria (see reports on 
suspended EU funds for Bulgaria, Weaver, Guardian, 23 July 2008). 
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threshold for offences in their legal system, all offences punishable by deprivation of liberty 
or a detention order for a minimum of more than six months” (Article 3 (5) (f) of 
Directive 2005/60/EC). Given the valuation of crimes for profit and the rele-
vant punishment in the Member States, this can hardly be considered as a limi-
tation or a more precise definition: there are hardly any crimes for profit pun-
ishable with a lower term of incarceration (and there may be some criminal 
(economic) offences which are not punishable by deprivation of liberty, which 
appears to mean that these are not included). Otherwise, Directive 
2005/60/EC contains the same check-list of ‘serious crimes’ as Directive 
2001/97/EC adding to it also acts as defined in Articles 1 to 4 of Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA, i.e. offences relating to terrorist activities, even 
though these do not necessarily generate any proceeds. Corruption continues 
to be listed as a ‘serious’ offence with no further details provided as to scope or 
type of corruption. But its maximum penalty exceeds one year imprisonment 
in all jurisdictions involved. 
 In any case, it is now said that the proceeds from ‘serious’ crime are the 
object of money laundering. As broad as it is, this term is of little help in un-
derstanding the laundering phenomenon. It is important to know the nature of 
the specific crime to be able to understand the subsequent act of laundering as 
it is often the specific nature of the crime, and the amount of proceeds derived 
from it, that predefine the laundering techniques or the way money laundering 
takes place: a drug baron starts from another position than a VAT fraudster. 
The former starts with a heap of banknotes, the latter with a tax return or a 
bundle of invoices. And here come the second and third elements of the defini-
tion: action and purpose.  
 
b. Action and purpose 
With regard to these elements of the definition, there is a clear conformity 
between the Strasbourg Convention and the EU Directives. As we have seen, 
they in turn copy the Vienna Convention verbatim, except that they include an 
additional, fourth part of the provision (reviewed below), which was not in-
corporated in the Vienna Convention.  
 
 Laundering v. self-laundering and other issues with the recurring legal 
contradiction 
The element of action is in fact the modus operandi. The definition does not 
require the action to be a completed money laundering cycle in the sense of 
providing legitimate appearance to the illicit proceeds. It can be the mere han-
dling of the proceeds, or even possession. Furthermore, anyone involved in the 
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handling of the property, after its illicit acquisition, can be a money launderer. 
This could be the person who committed the predicate crime; the person who 
acquired the illicit property (if different from the person who committed the 
crime); or an intermediary. Conceptually, most often, a third party is assumed 
to be involved along with the predicate perpetrator. In a way, laundering can 
be seen as a form of accession to the predicate crime post factum, which is the 
majority view in many countries (see Pieth, 1999).  
 From Article 6.2.b of the Strasbourg Convention it seems that self-
incrimination is implicitly required, or at least not explicitly excluded. It states 
that national legislation may envisage that the money laundering offence does 
not apply to the perpetrator of the predicate offence. In the event that local 
legislation does not envisage such a possibility, the successful perpetrator auto-
matically handles ‘proceeds’, unless he surrenders to the authorities immediately 
after committing the predicate offence in order to avoid committing a launder-
ing offence. There is also the uncertainty about the situation in which the of-
fender does not want to disclose where the proceeds are hidden. That is ‘hid-
ing’, but qualifying this as laundering implies a violation of the non-
incrimination principle. If he lies about the location, then he is certainly laun-
dering. 
 The definition contains four, or, in the case of the Vienna Convention, 
three sections, which describe different laundering acts or techniques. The first 
action is: 
“. . . the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from 
criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of con-
cealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is 
involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences of his ac-
tion . . .” (Art. 1 / 2. (a), Directive 2005/60/EC). 
 
According to this section of the definition, even the mere transfer of property 
can qualify as a money laundering offence. The definition requires that any 
subsequent act after the illegal acquisition of the property is viewed as a laun-
dering offence. However, it is important that the action of conversion or trans-
fer is done with the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the 
property or assisting the person involved in this activity to evade the legal con-
sequences of his actions. This is the third element of the money laundering 
offence: the purpose of the action. In fact, this provision stipulates two possible 
purposes. One is to conceal or disguise the origin. The second possible purpose 
is to assist the person involved in the predicate crime to evade the legal conse-
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quences of his actions. If the latter applies, it is clear that an intermediary is 
involved. The person who is instrumental in converting or transferring the 
property may not necessarily be aware of its origin and of the purpose of the 
transaction. In that case, there is no ‘laundering purpose’ for the intermediary, 
so the intermediary is not committing a laundering offence, unless the negli-
gence clauses apply: he ‘should have’ known.  
 Generally, the knowledge aspect is important: knowing that such property is 
derived from an offence. The clause is applicable only where the individual is 
aware (or ought to have been aware). For instance a bank officer should not be 
held responsible for any transfer of illicit funds but only for transfers where he 
was aware (or ought to have been aware) of the criminal origin of the funds 
and the purpose of the transaction.138 This, of course, raises a major problem for 
those involved in the legal profession and related fields. Even the toughest 
criminals have the right to legal defence but their lawyers might need to defend 
themselves too against possible money laundering charges when they know or 
should have known that their client has no legitimate funds to pay for their 
services. This issue has been raised in a number of jurisdictions, including in 
Germany139 and the USA (see the case of Benedict Kuehne discussed in the 
next chapter).  




                                               
138  What happens if the bank officer is aware of the criminal funds but is made to believe that the 
purpose of the transfer is not to conceal the origin of these funds but to provide the funds to a 
charity foundation? As incredible as this may sound, the naïve banker will be carrying out the 
transaction not with the purpose of concealing the origin of the funds. Yet, his actions still may 
constitute a money laundering offence, as they may be qualified as criminal negligence or may 
be construed as assistance to the perpetrator in avoiding the legal consequences of the actions of 
the latter. Apart from that, he is handling crime money. Of course, in many cases, bankers are 
not naïve but prefer not to know (see Palmer, 2001) and not to have proper due diligence pro-
cedures in place (this subject will be discussed later in this thesis).  
139  For istance in Germany, where the law has been largely based on international regulations, in 
1999 the Supreme Court of Hamburg decided that the money laundering offence is not appli-
cable to defence counsel who accepts proceeds of crime as a fee. In 2000 the Federal Supreme 
Court reversed that ruling. In 2004 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that that the launder-
ing offence can only be applied to defence counsel who knowingly accepted dirty money as a fee. 
The Court noted that the money laundering offence prevented counsel from defending clients 
adequately and underlined the courts’ responsibility to consider the special role of the defence 
counsel. Critics claim that the Court does not provide clear criteria for such considerations and 
that the Court’s decision cannot protect the defence against disturbing investigative means such 
as searches or surveillance (Bussenius, 2004). 
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“. . . the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such prop-
erty is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity . . 
.” (Art. 1 / 2. (b), Directive 2005/60/EC). 
 
Here the action and purpose coincide: concealment or disguise mean any action 
the purpose of which is just to conceal or disguise. Although this section of the 
definition seems to largely overlap with the previous one, there is one major 
difference between the two. The previous one refers to concealing the origin of 
the funds, while this one covers not only the origin (source) but also the location 
and movement of proceeds, and their true nature. While it is clear what is meant 
by ‘location’ and ‘movement’, the meaning of ‘true nature’ is not specified. 
Does this term refer to whether the property is corporeal or incorporeal; mov-
able or immovable? Why should the concealment or disguise of the true nature 
be defined as money laundering? How does this work in practice? If ‘true na-
ture’ means ‘origin’ or ‘source’, or even ‘ownership’ of property, then the 
clause is a tautology, unless it means that the proceeds get another identity. For 
example, the identity of an object is changed by changes in its appearance: 
giving a car a new chassis number or changing the serial numbers of stolen 
electronic articles. 
 Concealing the ownership of the property can be achieved in different 
ways, including the registering of it in the name of a relative. However, con-
cealing the ownership does not necessarily imply a legal title to the property. 
To realise that one has to complete fraudulent owner deeds. In the case of the 
theft of a car or a piece of art where the proof of origin has been changed, (e.g. 
by producing a new registration number, i.e. changing its nature, together with 
forged papers of origin) one conceals the ownership in an attempt to provide 
legal title to the property.  
 The definition broadly describes the laundering offence by covering every 
possible action that can be construed as concealment of the source or location 
of property including hiding the property under the mattress or lying. But here 
we hit on the previously mentioned legal contradiction. The reflexive applica-
tion entails a significant juridical problem. The ambiguity of the laundering 
clause means that anything the perpetrator does to conceal the criminal source 
of his funds, including lying or even possibly remaining silent during interroga-
tion, can be construed as laundering (see for relevant analysis Van Duyne, 
2002b). This means, as discussed elsewhere in this thesis, that the laundering 
clause implies or, at least does not explicitly exclude, self-incrimination, which 
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is in conflict with the lex certa and the basic non-self incrimination principle of 
law (see Van Duyne, 2002b and 2003b). The reflexive application of the laun-
dering clause implies that the perpetrator of the predicate crime cannot escape 
the consequential laundering offence, unless he either disposes of the crime 
property (destroys it – if destroying is not aimed at concealing the origin and 
nature of the property - or gives it back) or turns himself in (Van Duyne, 
2003b and 2002b). 
 Furthermore, it appears that the concealment clause can be applied to any-
one close to the perpetrator or self-launderer, as anyone in his closest surround-
ings, even if inadvertently, participates in the perpetrator’s life and actions that 
involve the criminal proceeds. The Swiss case BGE 119 IV 59 ff demonstrates 
how broadly the laundering definition can be applied. In this case, the defen-
dant let his friends hide drug money on his balcony, and later in his kitchen 
(initially CHF 70.000, later CHF 120.000). In addition to hiding the money, at 
some point he also consumed part of it. Under Article 305 of the Criminal 
Code the defendant was sentenced to 20 months imprisonment on charge of 
repeated money laundering (see Pieth and Estermann, 2002).  
 The third part of the definition is: 
“. . . the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, 
that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in 
such activity . . .” (Art. 1 / 2. (c), Directive 2005/60/EC). 
 
The above mentioned Swiss case seems to be a good example of the application 
of this definition. The defendant used (and possessed – having it in his kitchen) 
the property, so he committed a money laundering offence on this point too. 
The action described in this provision is the acquisition, possession or use of the 
property knowing it comes from crime. This section seems to distinguish the 
perpetrator of the predicate crime from the person who receives the property. 
By adding “. . . at the time of receipt . . .” the legislator appears to split the act of 
receipt from the criminal activity suggesting that the two acts take place at dif-
ferent points in time.  
 However, the provision is ambiguous and leaves room for other interpreta-
tions as well. If we take the element of ‘possession’, here the act of possession, 
receipt and the laundering merge. Even if laundering is not intended, as long as 
the perpetrator is still in possession, he launders assuming the reflexive applica-
tion. For instance, in the Swiss case above, if the owner of the proceeds shared 
the flat with the friend that let him hide the money there, he would be laun-
dering the proceeds, assuming the reflexive application. 
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 In addition, one may argue that receipt is acquisition, and acquisition can be 
theft. Therefore the thief and the person who ‘receives’ the property can be the 
same person which is a tortuous legal interpretation and contrary to usual se-
mantics, but fully, and on purpose, adopted in many jurisdictions (even though, 
according to the Convention, the criminalisation of self-laundering is optional). 
For instance, in the Netherlands, until 2001, law enforcement agencies consid-
ered it as a defect that a ‘self-launderer’ could not be prosecuted, because the 
penalisation of laundering was contained in the clause concerning receiving. So 
police and prosecution pressed for criminalisation of the act of self-laundering. 
Whether this was so urgently needed, remains debatable. In contrast to the 
Netherlands, the Austrian penal law, for instance, and to an extent, the Swedish 
system, does not incriminate self-laundering.140 However, financial institutions 
in Austria are obliged to report if they suspect self-laundering, for the purpose 
of detecting crimes. In the UK a criminal can be prosecuted for ‘own proceeds 
laundering’ or self-laundering and, in fact, there have been a number of high-
profile cases, where money laundering was the sole charge that could be proved 
or the easiest charge to prove without having to wait for a conviction in rela-
tion to the predicate crime (see for instance the Terry Adams case which will 
be discussed in a later section). According to UK law, in ‘stand alone’ money 
laundering prosecutions it is not necessary to wait for a conviction in relation to 
the underlying criminal conduct, and in any case, circumstantial evidence of 
association to crime (no need to prove a specific act) is sufficient to prove that 
the laundered assets are the benefit of ‘criminal conduct’ (the same applies to 
the Netherlands). The problem with this is that law enforcement officers and 
prosecutors seem to view this as quite a satisfactory result: if they manage to put 
someone behind bars for money laundering, they view this as a victory in their 
fight for justice. Criminals, however, may also be happy, as in some (albeit rare) 
instances they can get away with a lighter sentence for the laundering charge 
rather than for the predicate crime (unless the laundering offence carries a 
higher punishment).  
 An interesting recommendation, but one that sounds ambiguous and is 
hardly followed, was made by MONEYVAL (Council of Europe Select 
                                               
140 In Sweden, as a result of a Supreme Court ruling, self-laundering in the form of receiving the 
proceeds of crime offence is not separately punishable but is “co-punished” with the predicate 
offence (if the latter can be proven). As a result, when evaluating the Swedish system, in its 2006 
report the FATF concluded that the predicate offence could be considered as an aggravated of-
fence and could result in higher penalties. The FATF noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling did 
not explicitly indicate whether punishing of self-laundering would be in breach of the Constitu-
tion or fundamental principles of Swedish law (FATF, February 2006). 
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Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 
formerly known as PC-R-EV, a FATF-style regional body) in its 2000 annual 
report. The report states: “[A] number of the prosecutions, of which the examiners 
were aware, appeared to involve charges of ‘own funds’ laundering, brought together with 
charges against the same defendant for the predicate crime. The appropriate authorities 
must guard against prosecuting self-laundering at the expense of bringing money launder-
ing proceedings independently against and affording priority to separate investigations 
involving professional money launderers.” (CDPC and PC-R-EV, 2001, pp. 32-
32). It is not entirely clear what this means but it sounds as if MONEYVAL are 
afraid that only the ‘easy’ cases of self-laundering are being prosecuted. This 
fear is not imaginary: there is a tendency with the public prosecution to go for 
easy charges which have a greater likelihood of conviction than the more com-
plicated one. 
 
  Implications of the awareness element when using the property 
In the event that there is no self-laundering, i.e. the person who receives the 
property is different from the predicate perpetrator, as was the case with the 
defendant in the Swiss example above, this person would be committing a 
laundering offence if he was aware of the criminal origin of the property. 
However, it is not quite clear whether the receipt of the property has anything 
to do with concealing the origin of the property. The purpose of the receipt and 
use of the property may well be the disguise of its illicit origin, but not neces-
sarily. The property can simply be used for its convenience. Someone who is 
living in the house of a mafia ‘kingpin’ for a month or two, enjoying the lux-
ury of it, might be committing a money laundering offence: he is ‘using’. Just 
swimming in the pool owned by the mafia head would constitute use of prop-
erty knowing it comes from crime. It could be said that staff who are aware 
they are being paid out of criminal proceeds are also committing a laundering 
offence - as previously noted, this includes legal services hired by the launderer 
and being paid with tainted money (see the case against Kuehne discussed in 
the next chapter). However, the definition, as laid down in the Convention 
and the Directives, is preceded by an introductory note which states that the 
conduct must be committed intentionally, i.e. with mens rea. Logically this 
should mean that the person who uses the property is not committing a money 
laundering offence as long as he has no intent to launder the property. Accord-
ing to the basic principles of criminal law, the intention (mens rea) consists of 
two elements: knowledge and will. If the ultimate purpose of a money launder-
ing offence is to cleanse the property from any indication of illegitimacy, the 
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person who is carrying out the action is committing a money laundering of-
fence only if this person knows about the ultimate ‘cleansing’ purpose of the 
action and wishes it, or at least accepts its potential outcome. However, accord-
ing to the money laundering definition, laundering is not necessarily aimed at 
providing a legitimate appearance to the property. The definition states that 
anything from movement to use and possession of the property can be qualified 
as laundering. This appears to imply that intent to launder is the same as intent 
to use. Laundering is such a broad concept that it turns into a vicious circle: 
knowingly and wilfully using the assets, like the luxurious assets of a criminal, 
implies intent to use but use of a criminal property is laundering. Hence intent 
to use a property can potentially qualify as intent to launder. As it appears, the 
ultimate purpose of ‘cleansing’ is not necessarily part of the definition which 
means that the circularity is perfect and, as a result, knowingly using the prop-
erty without purpose (i.e. the purpose of cleansing) is sufficient. Therefore 
swimming in the swimming pool of the crime-boss entails laundering, similar 
to the Swiss defendant knowingly using part of the hidden money. The same 
applies to the husband/wife of a social security fraudster: using the items and 
facilities of the household expenses paid from the fraud can be qualified as 
laundering. The intent to launder and the action of using appear to have be-
come fused. Unless intent concerns only the ultimate purpose of laundering in 
the strict sense of the term, knowingly using, inter alia, is using with intent to 
launder in the broad sense of the term. Therefore, the application of the defini-
tion becomes overstretched and incoherent. The ultimate laundering intention 
(of ‘whitening’ or ‘cleansing’) has evaporated. Consequently the intent is now 
focused on all other components of the clause.  
 Furthermore, under the broad laundering definition we are bound to make 
little difference between the ‘intent’ to launder and ‘knowing that a property 
comes from crime’. Both will be considered as different wordings of intention-
ality, although knowing is weaker. Additionally, the threshold for proof is al-
most levelled between ‘knowing’ and ‘should have known’. Article 6.3 of the 
Strasbourg Convention suggests that national legislators can also criminalise 
negligence (“ought to have assumed that the property was proceeds. . .”). In the ex-
ample discussed earlier, if negligence clauses applied, the bank officer would 
have probably been charged with money laundering.  
 It seems that legislators have drafted a broad and ambiguous definition, the 
application of which becomes an activity tautology. Yet this appears to be of 
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little concern to legislators, as there is little opposition from legal science141 or 
criminology, while law enforcement agencies naturally welcome any increase 
of their powers. Whether it borders on arbitrariness is of less concern. 
 
  Further ambiguity: abetting the use of property 
The fourth action described in the definition, particularly in the Strasbourg 
Convention and the Directives (but not included in the Vienna Convention), 
is: 
“. . . participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the fore-
going points” (Art. 1 / 2. (d), Directive 2005/60/EC).  
 
This section of the definition focuses on the actions of an accessory to a money 
laundering offence. If self-laundering was explicitly excluded, it would have 
been those who assist in the laundering activity that would have been targeted 
by the law.  
 The immediate purpose of the accessory’s actions, we may assume, would 
be to help the principal in the money laundering offence to cleanse the assets. 
Any type of complicity in any type of crime is normally criminalised as an of-
fence. For instance, the financial and tax advisor who assists in the management 
of the proceeds automatically commits a laundering offence. However, if the 
laundering offence has been defined so broadly as to include use of property, 
then facilitating the use of the property could mean anything, including the 
electrician coming into the house of the mafia kingpin to fix the cables (know-
ingly, with intent).  
 At first sight this sounds absurd: would any prosecutor submit such a charge? 
Yes, this may well happen, because it can be used indiscriminately against the 
whole social environment of an ‘organised criminal’. Such a legal trawler net 
has its predecessors: the US RICO Act and the wire fraud statutes. So the po-
tential absurdity of interpretations, stemming from the broad scope and ambi-
guity of the definition, will not worry law enforcement. Yes, the electrician, 
who is important for the safety system around the villa of the gangster can be 
charged for participating in a criminal organisation in conjunction with money-
laundering. Regrettably, in view of the history of prosecutions and convictions, 
it appears that money laundering is a legal trawl, mainly used successfully for 
catching just the smallest fry.  
                                               
141  Although there has been an effort on the part of lawyers and lawyers associations to address 
issues arising from anti-money laundering legislation, this effort remains inconsistent across 
countries and has achieved little.  
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3.2.8.  An empirical analysis of the application of the definition  
 
As noted earlier, a laundering charge apparently can fit the frame not only of 
any act that follows the predicate crime but, under certain circumstances, can 
be applied to that predicate crime too. It generally targets not so much the 
intent to provide legitimate appearance to crime money, but any form of crime 
money management or logistics, or, in other words, any relationship between 
the (new) illegal owner and the criminally derived advantage. 
 In case of some forms of (tax) fraud the overlap is so significant that the 
instrument of fraud is the same as the instrument of laundering. Of course, the 
concurrence of penal clauses is a normal practice and prosecutors have the free-
dom to choose what charge to file (e.g. at any rate in the Netherlands as long as 
they select the charge with the highest maximum sentence). So why should the 
reflexive application (self-laundering) of the laundering definition be a problem 
for practitioners? The fact that it creates arbitrariness, particularly in situations 
where the maximum punishment for laundering is higher than that for the 
predicate offence, seems to be of little concern.  
 This section will seek to assess the degree to which the internationally ac-
cepted money-laundering definition (reviewed earlier)142 is empirically con-
vincing. Its construction will be applied and tested in different predicate crime 
contexts on the basis of hypothetical and real case studies.  
 
Washing one’s own dirty linen or the legal implications of self-laundering 
As we have seen, practically in every case of crime for profit the perpetrator can 
be charged with laundering along with the predicate crime (in those countries 
where self-laundering is criminalised). Empirical research shows that, indeed, a 
prevailing number of money laundering cases involve laundering of one’s own 
proceeds or self-laundering (Levi and Reuter, 2006). For instance, every drug 
trafficker can be put on trial for laundering irrespective of the subsequent ways 
or success of possessing or managing his crime-money. Based on concepts de-
veloped in the USA, the definition aimed from the beginning at a legal trawler-
net effect, allowing easy application and no escape. So, what does the ‘catch’ 
look like and what about the size of the fish? Research shows that confiscation 
laws are more successfully applied to criminals of minor importance rather than 
Mr Bigs (see Vruggink, 2001; Van Duyne, 2002b) who, in the economic crime 
field, often get away with more lenient sentences, if they are prosecuted in the 
                                               
142  In a number of countries outside the European Union, regulations similar to the ones within the 
EU have been adopted following the US approach.  
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first place. If one reads the press, it seems indeed that the trawl net catches usu-
ally a lot of relatively small fish and relatively few cases involve Mr Bigs (one 
may wonder why). Among those few cases is the Colombian drug kingpin 
Diego Montoya, one of the FBI’s ‘ten most wanted’, who was captured in 
September 2007, after over fourteen years of criminal activities. According to 
press reports, he was to be extradited to the US to face trial on drug trafficking, 
murder and the inevitable money laundering charges introduced in 2004. 
However, the majority of cases, where money laundering charges have been 
raised, involve small-scale offenders and self-laundering.  
 
The embezzled cheques 
For instance, in United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 
1993), after the defendant had embezzled IRS refund cheques, he cashed 
them and spent the money on personal items. The court decided that the 
act of cashing ‘promoted’ the predicate crime, hence it constituted a laun-
dering offence. As mentioned earlier, in the US this is known as ‘promotion 
money laundering’, because converting fraudulently obtained cheques into 
cash is said to promote the underlying fraud by giving the defendant access 
to funds. An intent to plow back the proceeds into the scheme was not re-
quired here as it was decided that a defendant can engage in financial trans-
actions that promote not only ongoing or future unlawful activity, but also 
prior unlawful activity. The cheques created a value. If the cheques were 
not cashed, they would have been worthless. In a way, the argument about 
contributing to the prosperity of already completed transactions is reversed 
causality.143 Paramo received a sentence of forty-six months imprisonment.  
 
Punishing for promotion money laundering is in the spirit of US legislative and 
sentencing tradition to punish for wire fraud and the use of interstate com-
merce and communication facilities (e.g. mail and telephone) in committing 
                                               
143  Some courts have considered that ‘promoting’ entails investing the proceeds in maintaining the 
scheme in the future (see, for instance, United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 247-48 (4 5 th Cir. 
2008), a prostitute who uses the money received from her first customer of the day to pay for 
her motel room commits promotion money laundering where the payment gives her the right 
to the use of the room for the rest of the day without further charge, and creates goodwill for 
future transactions); there have been also a significant number of cases where proceeds have 
been spent on personal expenses rather than investing back into the scheme and this has never-
theless been construed as ‘promotion money laundering’ (as in the case United States v. Paramo; 
see for comments Cassella, 2009; see also United States v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 176, 177-78 (2d 
Cir.1991) where a conviction was affirmed of defendant who acquired money orders to pay for 
prior drug purchases). 
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crimes.144 In the above cited case, if the defendant had decided for some reason 
to get rid of the cheques, he might have escaped the laundering offence. Al-
though, even that is questionable: for a while he possessed the cheques, which 
is enough for laundering. 
 By basing their charge on the broad definition of laundering, investigators 
and prosecutors appear to be less concerned about having to prove the predi-
cate crime. This is particularly relevant in countries where in stand-alone 
money laundering prosecutions it is not necessary to wait for a conviction for 
the predicate crime.145  Then, it may be sufficient for sentencing if the defen-
dant cannot provide a proper justification for the ownership of the proceeds or 
his unusual handling of it.  
 It has already been mentioned that the predicate crime may carry a different 
penalty for different moral culpability. Thus, a criminal may be punished more 
severely if charged with laundering (see Van Duyne et al., 2005) than if success-
fully charged with the predicate crime which leaves the gate open for abuse of 
powers by law enforcement agencies and prosecution.  
 
Investing in gambling business 
In United States v. Santos (mentioned previously), Efrain Santos ran an ille-
gal gambling business. His runners took in bets at bars and restaurants, and 
of that money he kept a cut for himself and the rest was used to pay win-
ning bets, labour costs, and other expenses necessary to maintain his illegal 
business. For these transactions he was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(1)(A)(i) for ‘promotion money laundering’. At first, Santos was 
found guilty by a jury but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the conviction in United States v. Santos, 461 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 
2006). This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008). Justice Antonin Scalia, on behalf of a four 
justice plurality, reasoned that the US money laundering statute was am-
biguous in that it was not specified whether the term ‘proceeds’ should 
mean profits or gross receipts. Applying the rule of lenity, he noted that 
courts are required to construe ambiguous statutes in the way that is most 
                                               
144  In the above cited United States v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 176, 177-78 (2d Cir.1991) the defendant 
was also convicted of several counts of use of the mail and telephone in committing a drug trade 
related felony.  
145  For instance, as previously noted, the Warsaw Convention states that each Party shall ensure that 
a prior or simultaneous conviction for the predicate offence is not a prerequisite for a conviction 
for money laundering; and each Party shall ensure that a conviction for money laundering is 
possible where it is proved that the property, the object of paragraph 1.a or b of article 9, origi-
nated from a predicate offence, without it being necessary to establish precisely which offence. 
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favourable to the defendant in a criminal case. Thus, Justice Scalia con-
cluded, because it would be harder for the Government to satisfy a profits 
test in a criminal case, ‘proceeds’ should be taken to mean ‘net profits’ and 
not ‘gross receipts’. As Cassella (2009) points out, it appears that the plurality 
in the Supreme Court, similar to the panel in the Seventh Circuit, was con-
cerned that the Government was abusing the statute by charging promotion 
money laundering, where the transaction was nothing more than a payment 
of expenses relating to the underlying crime, and using the “statute to impose 
a 20-year sentence – the punishment for money laundering – on someone who had 
done nothing more than commit a gambling offense that carried a maximum penalty 
of 5 years. In such cases, the plurality said, the money laundering charge merged with 
the underlying unlawful activity, such that a conviction for money laundering would 
constitute an improper second conviction for the same offense” (Cassella, 2009). Ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, allowing the Government to treat the mere 
payment of the expense of operating an illegal gambling business as a sepa-
rate offence is tantamount to double jeopardy, and it is particularly unfair in 
this case because the penalties for money laundering are substantially more 
severe than those for the underlying crime of running a gambling operation. 
 
And vice versa: a criminal may actually get away with a lighter sentence for the 
laundering offence, as the following case appears to illustrate.  
 
Mr Big 
One of the few Mr Bigs, prosecuted for money laundering, is Terry Adams, 
described in the press as the Godfather of a London-based criminal clan. Af-
ter several years of a lengthy trial, in 2007 Adams was convicted of money 
laundering and jailed for seven years. Adams had managed to previously es-
cape any other charge, although he was believed to have once been heavily 
involved in drug trade, extortion and other violent crimes. He retired in the 
late 1980s, at 35, after having allegedly amassed significant wealth. In the 
following years he enjoyed a lavish lifestyle. Yet he was unable to prove that 
he had a legitimate source of income. He claimed to earn £200 a week as a 
marketing consultant and paid minimal tax. The police and prosecutors 
managed to pin him down after two years of surveillance and forensic trac-
ing of his money. In May 2003 he was arrested and charged with money 
laundering, tax evasion and handling stolen goods. His wife, Ruth, was 
charged with similar offences. However, Adams managed to play the game 
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well and delayed the proceedings as much as possible.146 In the end, he ad-
mitted to the laundering charge – conspiring to hide £1 million – but in re-
turn, the remaining charges against him and his wife were effectively 
dropped.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, according to UK and Dutch law in stand-
alone money laundering prosecutions it is not necessary to wait for a conviction 
for a predicate crime (it would suffice to circumstantially show an association 
with alleged predicate crimes such as drug trafficking and extortion, in which 
Adams was believed to have been involved in his earlier years). Thus, Adams 
was effectively sentenced for self-laundering as this was the easiest charge to 
prove. As a result, he appears to have received a relatively light sentence: seven 
years imprisonment (although he could have been jailed for up to 14 years) and 
a financial penalty which covered only a small fraction of the costs of the inves-
tigation and was minor compared to his estimated illicit wealth.147 A compari-
son with the Swiss case reviewed earlier (the drug money hidden in the 
kitchen) could raise questions about law enforcement efficiency and justice.  
 An interesting question that arises from the Adams case is: if someone 
spends more than he appears to earn, does this automatically mean that he is 
laundering money, even though no predicate crime has been proven? What 
appears to be a reverse burden of proof in a situation like this exposes the dan-
ger of undermining basic procedural safeguards of a trial that can lead to abuse 
of power by the authorities. Or it entails a ‘fiscalisation’ of the penal process: if 
one’s expenditure level is higher than the stated income and wealth and no 
explanation can be given for this deficit, there may appear to be proof of in-
come tax fraud /tax evasion as far as it concerns civil law regulatory proce-
dures.148 But now we have a cross-over to criminal law concerning the same 
                                               
146  Including, as reported by Kirby, The Independent of 8 February 2007, by dismissing his lawyers 
twice, ordering the transcription of thousands of hours of taped conversations and, amazingly, by 
once claiming that his IQ was too low to understand his indictment. 
147  The press has reported on various estimates of the investigation and prosecution costs. Accord-
ing to a BBC report (Summers, BBC, 9 March 2007), Judge Pontius made a £750.000 confis-
cation order against Adams and ordered him to contribute a further £50.000 towards the costs 
of the £1,7 million prosecution, while his ill-gotten wealth was estimated at £11 million. Ac-
cording to other estimates, prosecution costs amounted to over £4 million. So even if Adams 
covered all prosecution costs, there would still be investigation costs outstanding. According to 
various press reports, the estimated costs of the investigation ranged from £ 10 million to £50 
million. (Laville, The Guardian, 10 March 2007 and 19 May 2007; The Irish News, 22 May 2007; 
Rojas and Raif, Aberdeen Press & Journal, 10 March 2007).  
148  The standards of proof required in a criminal case are higher than in a civil lawsuit. In English 
law prosecutors must prove the guilt of a criminal “beyond reasonable doubt” whereas in a civil 
action the plaintiff has to prove his case “on the balance of probabilities”. 
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facts. Tax fraud is a criminal offence; hence spending or even possessing the 
criminal tax savings is laundering. If the authorities want to follow this course, 
one should realise that a substantial portion of the otherwise law-abiding popu-
lation is guilty of money laundering (yet large-scale and morally questionable 
tax avoidance by multinationals goes unimpeded as long as it remains just at the 
very thin blue line). If this is accepted, wielding the stick of money laundering 
charges may be an effective means to rake in a substantial part of the evaded tax 
money.   
 If the authorities do not choose this fiscal path in the criminal world and if 
no predicate crimes are proven to the criminal standard of proof, why would 
they not follow the civil recovery path149 instead of applying criminal proce-
dures? Indeed, in the case of Adams, the defendant was perceived as a big-time 
gangster and perhaps the penal approach was seen as rather morally more ap-
propriate. For law enforcement authorities and prosecutors, to achieve a crimi-
nal laundering conviction appears to be far more impressive than to convict 
someone of tax evasion (although a laundering charge could easily have been 
added to the other charges) and /or to use civil recovery procedures.   
 
The good old launderettes  
The legend about Al Capone’s launderettes is not without basis. Large-scale 
long-term criminal activities which involve individuals with different responsi-
bilities, or what is commonly perceived as ‘organised crime’ (whether drug 
trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, arms dealing and so on), usually 
require a legitimate front that would justify the regular inflow of income and 
serve as a practical pretext for the financial logistics and other organisational 
matters. Cash-rich businesses are the ideal front, as it is difficult, almost impos-
sible, to establish the precise amounts of money actually coming in and going 
out (as expenditures). Thus, crime money can easily blend with legitimate in-
come. Major criminals appoint associates to handle the money laundering op-
erations and run front businesses which can range from restaurants and pizzerias 
to car rental companies, laundrettes and so on. We see a demonstration of this 
                                               
149  For instance, in the UK (under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) law enforcement agencies and 
prosecutors can pursue a civil recovery procedure to recover, in civil proceedings before the 
High Court or Court of Session, property (estimated to be at least £10.000, other than cash or 
negotiable instruments, although cash is recoverable if it is in addition to other property) ob-
tained through unlawful conduct or, in civil proceedings before a magistrates’ court, to forfeit 
property which is intended to be used in unlawful conduct. However, criminal prosecution 
must have been considered and either expected to fail or proved impossible to complete. Addi-
tionally, there must be evidence of criminal conduct that is supported to the civil standard of 
proof (i.e. on the balance of probabilities).  
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phenomenon in the case uncovered by Operation Dinero, a joint law en-
forcement operation undertaken in the USA in the early 1990s. The investiga-
tion discovered that the Columbian drug trafficking ‘cartel’ Cali, the Pasquale 
Locatelli organisation active in France, Romania, Spain, Greece, Italy and Can-
ada, and the Severa criminal organisation in Italy used cash-intensive businesses 
(for instance Severa laundered money via three supermarkets and a car rental 
business) for laundering purposes. They also used complex financial networks 
of shell firms and offshore banks, and other methods including acquisitions of 
art and antiques (Williams, 1997).  
 Criminals may also use ‘front’ businesses that do not actually operate but 
function only on paper, which is quite usual. The real craft of handling a front 
firm lies in its ability to operate under the guise of a bona fide company. For 
instance, in the late 1980s US regulators unearthed operation La Mina, which 
was run by Eduardo Martinez Romero.150 It involved fictitious jewellery 
wholesalers and gold bullion businesses laundering cocaine proceeds on behalf 
of the Medellin Cartel. The laundering operation provided the perfect legiti-
mate appearance for the drug proceeds, except that the choice of an export 
country turned out to be somewhat ill-advised. The US Department of Com-
merce discovered that Uruguay had become the second largest exporter of gold 
to the USA, even though the country had no exploitable gold reserves. Besides, 
the Well Fargo Bank in Los Angeles reported to the FBI that the Andonian 
Brothers, the jewellery front firm, were making cash deposits on a much larger 
scale than usual for jewellery businesses (Williams, 1997). Therefore, if the 
perpetrator of a criminal act does not pay attention to the ‘ceiling’ of his ‘le-
gitimate’ enterprise, he runs the risk of being easily detected when the volume 
of the turnover goes beyond this reasonable ‘ceiling’. 
 The laundering act in the cases described above falls into the category of the 
first and second sections of the earlier reviewed international definition, as the 
primary objective in this operation was concealment of the criminal origin of 
the proceeds by presenting them as jewellery wholesale revenues. Issuing in-
voices in cash-rich businesses appears to be the easiest way. Clutterbuck (1995) 
for instance describes several such cases that took place during the 1980s. In the 
early 1980s $46 million from heroin traffic landed in a bank account in Swit-
zerland through a scheme involving fictitious fruit export from Sicily to a ficti-
tious juice producing company in London. In another case, in 1985, three 
brothers were arrested in Palermo for laundering drug profits for Cosa Nostra 
                                               
150  As reported by Labaton, The New York Times, 23 August 1989. 
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through issuing inflated gold and jewellery invoices to a Maltese jeweller. In 
1985, in the ‘Pizza Connection’ case, it was uncovered that Cosa Nostra launde-
red heroin traffic proceeds through pizza houses and fast food bars bought by 
New York Italians. In such cases, surveillance and other investigative tech-
niques perhaps help to establish the non-existence of a business. But accoun-
tancy control is crucial in comparing observation findings (such as number of 
actual customers and so on) with figures (turnover, profit and so on).    
 All these cases can easily fall into the category of the second provision of the 
money laundering definition: concealment and disguise of the origin of the 
property (plus movement and transfer of crime property). However, strictly 
speaking, this is an underestimate because in these schemes criminals tried to 
achieve more than simply hide their money or conceal the origin of it. They 
also fabricated an appearance of legitimate origin of the property. These 
schemes took place when the anti-money laundering war was in its early years 
of development and the legal concept of money laundering was relatively new. 
However, criminals already knew how they should best manage their money 
and had their own idea of money laundering. As these schemes suggest, crimi-
nals tried to justify the existence of their crime money (or its movements) in 
order to be able to freely enjoy it. This was money laundering in the strictest 
‘classic’ sense. 
 
Washing with no detergent or the ‘hereditary’ chain of laundering actions 
If the owner of a restaurant business with no apparent economic viability, or a 
casino that is empty most of the time, regularly pays income tax, it would not 
be far-fetched to think that they must be laundering ill-gotten gains through 
fictitious sales. But how can we best qualify the following situation: a restaurant 
business boomed after the investment of drug money as a one-off financial 
injection. This investment was not intended to provide a justification for the 
crime proceeds, but to give a boost to the business and earn more money 
through a successfully and legally run restaurant. Nevertheless, this first invest-
ment easily qualifies as money laundering under the third provision of the in-
ternational definition: acquisition, possession or use of criminal proceeds with 
knowledge as to the origin of the money. But there is more to it: the question 
is whether the ‘post-laundry’ profits from the licit restaurant exploitation, duly 
recorded and taxed, are also the ‘fruits of crime’. The application of the laun-
dering definition is so broad that it creates “a long ‘hereditary’ chain of laundering 
actions with many accessories” (Van Duyne et al., 2005, p. 22). As a result, anyone 
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knowingly involved in the management of the original investment and the 
subsequent profits can potentially be charged with laundering. If laundering 
occurs each time a legitimate profit is generated, even though crime-money has 
been invested just once, then the question can be extended to the situation 
where reputable western banks buy allegedly tainted assets. We observe links in 
a long ‘hereditary’ chain of actions starting with an initial laundering act. But 
where does the chain end?  
 Often this is the situation with investments in emerging markets. If an in-
ternational banking institution buys a share in a small bank in Russia or Central 
and Eastern Europe that had been alleged to be involved in questionable deal-
ings, that international institution could face, inter alia, reputational risks. Yet it 
would hardly be prosecuted for laundering. However, this appears to be politi-
cal choice rather than a legal decision, unless a coherent answer is given to the 
hereditary chain question. For the descendants of alleged criminals knowingly 
inheriting tainted assets the answer to this question does not appear too diffi-
cult: they are at risk of not escaping prosecution for laundering.151 As we can 
see, the application of the money laundering definition lacks a systematic and 
well-grounded approach. It has led to numerous interpretations, most of them 
not very clear, a situation which produces arbitrary results. This leads to the 
question: where is lex certis? As Van Duyne (2002b) points out, we face a prob-
lem of indeterminability or lack of lex certis as anything can be labelled as laun-
dering and it is not clear where the application of laundering ends. As a result, 
the laundering definition can be open to all kinds of absurd interpretations. Of 
course, absurd from the perspective of legal rights, but not for the prosecution 
service, as noted earlier.  
 The range of actions that constitute laundering, even though they are not 
aimed at laundering in the strict (‘white-wash’) sense of the term (and therefore 
can be described as ‘washing with no detergent’), is endless. In the Swiss case 
mentioned previously, (‘drug money hidden in the kitchen’) the action of the 
defendant, i.e. letting his friend hide the money, was hardly aimed at providing 
a justification for the illicitly earned money. Yet for simply keeping his friends’ 
drug money and using some of it, the defendant was sentenced by the Cantonal 
Higher Court of Bern to 20 months imprisonment on charges of repeated 
money laundering. This case falls into the category of the third and also fourth 
                                               
151  In the Netherlands the guardian of two minors has been prosecuted for accepting the heritage of 
their diseased criminal father who left a fortune after having received social security benefits for 
decades (see court case HR 05-09-2006 LJN: AU6712).  
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provision of the definition: abetting and facilitation of the concealment of the 
location of the proceeds.  
 In another similar case, in the USA, August 2006, Lenore Henderson of 
Matteson was charged with money laundering and pleaded guilty to using 
$10.000 drug money to post bail for a suspected drug dealer, Anthony Robin-
son.152 Again, the offender was in possession and used crime property. 
 As remarked before, even spending crime money on daily needs can qualify 
as money laundering as it is possession and use of crime property. Of course, 
‘daily needs’ can be interpreted variously, like going on holidays or buying a 
car, which are considered, for instance in the Netherlands, a manifestation of 
laundering. Yet this is nothing like laundering in the strict sense of the term, so 
it is rather washing, but with no detergent.  
 As previously noted, a well known penal law position is the concurrence of 
charges. If someone has knowingly bought stolen goods, he can be charged on 
two counts: handling stolen goods and money laundering. The latter, because 
the buyer of the stolen goods has come to possess and use criminal property (as 
Pieth (1999) points out, in some countries money laundering is perceived as 
the expansion of the typical act of handling but without the focus on stolen 
goods). Here we have the same act, yet two different possible counts carrying 
different punishments. It is not uncommon, of course, that specific behaviour is 
covered by more than one penal clause. The prosecutor can choose but in most 
systems he will charge under the article that attracts the highest sentence.  
 The question is: how helpful is such a major legal overlap, when handling 
stolen goods is not quite the same conduct as laundering in the strict sense of 
the term. As in most legal systems, this strict meaning has evaporated, but this 
may not be a real problem for prosecution or sentencing: handling proceeds, 
whether whitened or still black, can be prosecuted on both counts. To make 
things even more complicated, the handling of stolen goods can itself be a 
predicate crime and anything that follows can be construed as laundering. In 
short, we have a hereditary chain of fencing or laundering actions, as previously 
discussed.  
 As reviewed earlier, the acquisition, possession and use provision is ambiguous 
and it is unclear whether it distinguishes between the predicate perpetrator and 
the person who receives the property, i.e. it includes self-laundering (unless self-
laundering is explicitly excluded). If the thief changes some of the features of 
the stolen object to disguise its origin, under the reflexive application that would 
                                               
152  See report by Main, The Chicago Sun-Times, 20 October 2006. 
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count as (self-)laundering. Is there a laundering offence where the criminal has 
no intention to hide the origin or the location of the stolen property and ex-
hibits it publicly but nobody questions him about its origin? If someone has 
stolen a Picasso painting, and has hung it in his dining room, where every visi-
tor can see it, there still may be a laundering offence. The thief is in possession of 
the painting. He uses it, even if the intent to launder in the strict sense of the 
term is absent.  
 If someone steals goods but eventually decides that the stolen goods are of 
no use to him, then these goods are no longer proceeds to him personally. Yet 
for the legislator (and the Court) these goods still constitute proceeds from 
crime. For the legislator and law enforcement authorities it would be of no 
relevance whether the criminal believed that the jewellery he had stolen was 
valued at €50.000 but in fact turned out to be fake and cost less than €1.000. 
The criminal would still be in possession of criminal property; hence he would 
be laundering it. If the criminal had stolen shares which he believed cost mil-
lions but they proved to be worthless because the issuing company had been 
declared bankrupt, then these shares would no longer present an economic 
advantage to the criminal. Yet again, technically, possessing shares without any 
value could still be construed as money laundering (the Dutch legal system, for 
instance, takes no account of changes in the value of the property). A thief 
might regard the computer he had stolen as nothing more but a pile of cables 
and bolts, if it turned out he was unable to sell it. Yet again, as above discussed, 
technically by definition the computer would still constitute proceeds, even if it 
is not considered as such by the criminal himself and it has no commercial 
value. We see an attempt in the Second and Third EU Directives (Directive 
2001/97/EC and Directive 2005/60/EC), to limit the uncertainty of such 
interpretations. It is noted that the property subject to laundering has to be 
derived from criminal activity that constitutes a ‘serious crime’ (the definition 
of which was reviewed earlier). However, even with this clarification the clause 
remains broad. The theft of securities or computers, even if they turn out to be 
of no commercial value, can constitute a serious crime as long as the maximum 
punishment is at, or over, the threshold stipulated by the relevant directive. As 
there are practically no or few property crimes with punishments below this 
threshold, this would enable prosecutors to describe as money laundering all 
acts subsequent to the property crime, or the act of theft in particular.153  
                                               
153  The chain of laundering actions can be endless. The sale of stolen goods, regardless of the value, 
can constitute laundering. The sale of these proceeds produces further proceeds. Whatever is 
done with the latter, will likely be laundering too. If the thief sold the stolen painting to a col-
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 What is of value to the offender at one point may no longer be of value if 
the offender’s circumstances change. This raises the question about ‘economic 
advantage’. For example, would a businessman who may have corruptly bene-
fitted from preferential treatment (‘economic advantage’) in a tender situation 
but in the end decided to withdraw from the tender, still be accountable for 
money laundering? Presumably not, after a voluntary withdrawal. However, 
the fact that he has withdrawn from the tender does not exonerate him but the 
question is whether a money laundering charge, albeit perhaps technically ap-
plicable, would be the most adequate to raise. As it appears, potential charges 
which years ago would have been considered “far-fetched” or even inadequate 
are being filed nowadays as quite normal (as demonstrated in this thesis, see 
below). Jurisprudence develops and one should take into account that criminal 
clauses tend to develop a “wall-to-wall” coverage. For example, if it has been 
determined that any handling of loot after a crime-for profit is laundering, the 
attempt to commit a crime-for-profit should also be considered as an attempt to 
launder.   
 In the same line of thoughts, how adequate is it to apply the money laun-
dering definition with regard to those who just happen to use a property de-
rived from crime by someone else? As previously discussed, the Strasbourg 
Convention suggests that legislators may envisage the possibility for laundering 
charges in the case of negligence. This is a common legislative practice: many 
penal clauses have the ‘ought to have known’ component. It also applies to 
receiving stolen goods: ‘knowing or should have known’ and has been applied 
to housewives receiving household money from their husbands fiddling their 
social security. Under anti-money laundering laws they can be prosecuted for 
laundering. This further expands the reach of the anti-money laundering re-
gime. The mistress of a Mafia kingpin risks laundering charges if she accepts 
any benefits, whether money, gifts, holiday trips and so on, from her lover, 
because she ought to suspect that her lover’s money is tainted and therefore she 
should not be accepting it. The same applies to anyone from relatives to charity 
organisations. Of course, there are concurrent clauses. As previously noted, the 
                                                                                                              
lector, whatever he would do with the profit would constitute laundering. The buyer of the 
painting could also be charged with laundering, if he knew (or should have known) that the 
painting had been stolen. As remarked previously, even lying about the painting, claiming it was 
a duplicate, could theoretically be construed as laundering. If police informants knew about the 
theft and the whereabouts of the painting but lied about it, they would be helping the thief to 
conceal and possess the painting. As in the case of handling stolen goods, here we would have 
one act but two possible counts: perverting the course of justice or laundering (although, again, 
the observed conduct would not be quite the same as laundering in the strict sense of the term). 
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prosecutor is allowed to choose, and he will see no problem with that because 
the logic is that no one should be benefiting from crime money. In the prose-
cutors’ view, this apparently also applies to defence lawyers, and certainly sus-
pected criminals should be prevented from hiring good lawyers, as the follow-
ing case demonstrates:    
 
Vetting the source of fees for defence lawyers 
In 2008 prominent Miami lawyer Benedict Kuehne, known for represent-
ing Vice President Al Gore in the 2000 Florida vote recount, and for pro-
bono work advocating civil rights in the courtroom, became the target of 
media attention in relation to a money laundering trial. According to the 
media, some of Kuehne’s supporters have suggested that his prosecution 
could be politically motivated.154 An indictment unsealed 7 February 2008 
states that Kuehne was charged with one count of money laundering con-
spiracy, four counts of money laundering concealment and one count of 
obstruction of justice.155  
 The indictment further states that in 2001 Fabio Ochoa, leader of Co-
lombian cartel Medellin was extradited to the US to be tried on drug traf-
ficking charges. In 2002 Ochoa’s Miami-based criminal defence team hired 
Kuehne to vet the source of approximately $5,2 million,156 which Ochoa 
would use to pay the legal fees, and to certify that the funds were not the 
proceeds of, or commingled with proceeds of, Ochoa’s drug trafficking 
business.157 Between April 2002 and September 2003 Kuehne drafted six 
opinion letters stating that the funds were from legitimate sources, including 
transfers from Hernando Saravia who Kuehne had established was a bona fide 
businessman. In the vetting process Kuehne was assisted by his Colombian 
co-defendants - Ochoa’s cousin, attorney Oscar Saldarriaga, and Ochoa’s 
accountant, Gloria Florez. Prosecutors alleged that the defendants prepared 
fraudulent documents (including spreadsheets and receipts) to support Kue-
hne’s false assertions, and in some transactions commingled drug proceeds, 
through the Black Market Peso Exchange. The indictment further states 
that part of the funds which Kuehne attributed to Hernando Saravia in fact 
                                               
154  Pacenti, Daily Business Review, 2008. 
155  The indictment was originally issued in 2005 but remained dormant until Kuehne was added to 
the sealed case in October 2007. See for details Unites States of America v. Gloria Florez Velez, 
Benedict P. Kuehne and Oscar Saldarriaga Ochoa, Case No. 05-20770-Cr-Cooke(s), filed with 
the United States District Court Southern District of Florida. 
156  The author has used in this thesis Arabic numerals (European connotation) with decimal comma 
(e.g. one million British pounds and 80 pence would be 1.000.000,80). 
157  For his services Kuehne was paid $197.300. 
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came from undercover US law enforcement operations and constituted 
drug trafficking proceeds. Whether Kuehne’s engagement in the vetting was 
due to naivety, negligence or was in fact a savvy legal manoeuvre on his 
part is unclear. But apparently Kuehne was not aware that Saravia was fac-
ing federal drug money laundering charges in New York and was cooperat-
ing with federal prosecutors. According to media reports, Ochoa had first 
hired attorney Jose Quinon, but the latter withdrew over concerns about 
Ochoa’s ability to pay with clean funds. As a result, Ochoa hired defence at-
torney Roy Black who in turn retained Kuehne to vet the fees for him, 
“setting up a buffer for any legal jeopardy”.158 Kuehne’s lawyers argued that the 
money laundering conspiracy charge against him violated the 1988 US 
Constitution’s Sixth Amendment guarantee that a person charged with a 
crime has a right to a lawyer. In December 2008 US District Judge Marcia 
Cooke agreed with that argument and rejected the US Justice Department’s 
contention that the payments for the legal fees were not necessary for 
Ochoa’s defence. Thus, the judge dismissed the central charge in the case.159  
 
Reportedly Kuehne’s prosecutors argued that attorneys are not immune from 
prosecution for money laundering simply on the basis that they represent 
criminal defendants.160 However, it is unclear on what evidence prosecutors 
based their case against Kuehne if he was merely providing legal advice and 
appears to have genuinely believed that part of the money was coming from a 
legitimate business run by Saravia. But Kuehne’s situation is tricky. He assisted 
in providing legitimate appearance to the funds, whether or not he believed 
that the money was clean is unclear. The wider question is: even if Kuehne was 
not naïve and was aware of the true origin of the funds, should that mean that 
Kuehne and Roy Black, similar to Jose Quinon, should have refused to take 
the case on? If Kuehne had not vetted the funds and provided his opinion, 
Ochoa would have had difficulty hiring a lawyer to defend himself. As previ-
ously mentioned, one could argue that drug barons should not be able to hire 
private and expensive lawyers. However, the same should apply to a range of 
other crimes, including tax evasion and corruption. As representatives of the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argued, prosecuting defence 
attorneys could deter lawyers from representing clients in cases where there 
might be a reason to believe that the source of the funds for paying the legal 
                                               
158  Anderson, Associated Press, 23 March 2008. 
159  The money laundering conspiracy charge was apparently easier to prove than the money laun-
dering concealment charge. 
160  Anderson, Associatd Press, 23 March 2008. 
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fees might be questionable.161 Furthermore, the fact that a lawyer who was 
providing advice to another defence attorney was charged with money laun-
dering means that there are no boundaries for prosecutors to raise such charges 
against anyone. So while trying to catch the bad guys, are we not creating an-
other danger: the danger of undermining the basic principles of law which 
safeguard against abuse by those who have powers? 
 It is clear that the laundering clause can be used to fill in many prosecution 
gaps, even where there are other, perfectly defined, relevant penal clauses (han-
dling stolen goods or fencing, perverting the course of justice and so on), and is 
applied as a panacea against all kinds of evil as the following case demonstrates:  
 
 Harbouring illegal aliens  
In 2006 Xiang Hui Ye and Xian Xi Ye, owners of Buffet City restaurant in 
Springfield, in the US state of Illinois, were indicted for harbouring and 
employing illegal aliens at their restaurant. The indictment alleged that from 
January 2005 through September 2006, they knowingly provided employ-
ment, housing and transportation to illegal aliens for commercial advantage 
and financial gain. Xian Xi Ye also admitted he had signed checks (derived 
from this illegal employment) to pay for apartments that were used to house 
illegal aliens, and therefore he was also charged with money laundering. 
The statutory penalty for the felony offence of harbouring an illegal alien is 
up to 10 years; the penalty for the misdemeanour offence of hiring or re-
cruiting illegal aliens for employment is up to six months in prison and a 
fine of $3.000 for each illegal alien; while the laundering charge may lead to 
a penalty of up to 20 years in prison. In September 2007 Xian Xi Ye pled 
guilty to harbouring illegal aliens and money laundering. In January 2008 he 
was sentenced to 18 months in prison (but was reported to also face depor-
tation) and was fined $2.500. 162  
 
As we see in this case, because the defendant used crime money to pay for the 
rent, prosecutors have decided that he could be charged with laundering (in the 
spirit of ‘promotion money laundering’), regardless of whether harbouring and 
employing illegal aliens was the actual crime, while the rest was just inevitable 
logistics such as procuring food or paying for one’s own accommodation.  
 
                                               
161  Anderson, Associated Press, 23 December 2008. 
162  See media reports, including US Fed News, 5 October 2006; Antonacci, The State Journal-
Register, 5 September 2007; Antonacci, The State Journal-Register, 13 October 2007; Northwest 
Herald, 29 January 2008; Associated Press, 1 February 2008, see also USA v. Ye et al. 
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The two-wash centrifugation cycle  
The previous sections elaborated already the point that the laundering defini-
tion is so broad that it overlaps not only with the offence of handling stolen 
goods but also with a number of other crimes, specifically fraud and forgery. 
However, while in the case of handling stolen goods, the observed predicate 
conduct is not quite the same as the subsequent laundering in whatever mean-
ing of the term, in the case of fraud, especially tax fraud, the observed conducts 
can be very similar. In fact, the observed conducts can coincide, fully or par-
tially (see Van Duyne, 2002b). Palmer (2001, p. 6) notes that “[f]raud is not 
money laundering. Reinvesting the proceeds of fraud is. [. . . but] the definition of fraud 
has either been ignored or we have not accepted that the definitions of fraud and money 
laundering have blurred into one and the same.” Indeed, the laundering definition 
has been broadened to such an extent that it easily overlaps with fraud, even 
where the purpose of the fraud is not laundering in the strict sense. Where 
fraud is used to launder, the overlap is obvious. Thus, fraud can be both a 
predicate crime, and consequential to the predicate offence. In the latter case 
the fraud is committed to launder and therefore both qualifications can be ap-
plied.  
 Fraud and laundering can be subsequent to a more common property crime. 
If a thief claims that he has legally purchased the painting that he had in fact 
stolen, and produces a false evidence of purchase, he commits documentary 
fraud. But this can also qualify as laundering: the prosecutor can choose on 
which point to charge (if both offences have the same maximum penalty).  
 In the context of tax fraud, money laundering most often overlaps with the 
predicate crime. By committing, for instance, VAT fraud, the offender concur-
rently commits a laundering offence as with the same fraudulent documents he 
instantly produces crime money that looks clean. Figuratively this can be de-
scribed as “canned laundering” (Van Duyne, 2003b, p. 72) and once again we see 
the effects of a reflexive application of the laundering term. All classical tax fraud 
schemes simultaneously constitute a predicate crime and money laundering. 
For instance, if in the case of importation into Bulgaria of materials that are to 
be processed, no VAT would be due, these ‘materials’ could be subsequently 
channelled through a number of intermediary companies, each of which would 
be paying VAT. Afterwards the ‘processed’ materials could be fictitiously ex-
ported. The VAT, accumulated over the whole chain of intermediaries, would 
be due to be returned from the state budget as export is exempt from VAT. As 
soon as the tax authorities return the accumulated VAT, they recognise the 
legality of the transactions. This would mean that the proceeds from the tax 
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fraud scam would be successfully laundered. In such cases prosecutors can raise 
both fraud and laundering charges. As reported by the press and various case-
digest journals in the past few years, particularly in the USA, prosecutors seem 
to have been quite successful in bringing up money (self-) laundering charges 
alongside the charges for the predicate offence of fraud.  
 The timeshare scam reportedly masterminded by the infamous British busi-
nessman John Palmer, also known as Goldfinger, is another example of a predi-
cate crime that technically also constituted a laundering offence:  
 
The timeshare business of Palmer 
John Palmer started his timeshare business in the mid-1980s, when he flew 
from Britain to Tenerife for a holiday. Later the police would discover that 
Palmer and his accomplices had used high-pressure sales techniques to trick 
tourists into the scam, and established a network of ‘independent’ firms to 
run the business. In May 2001 Palmer was sentenced163 to eight years for 
conspiracy to defraud, although he could have potentially been convicted of 
self-laundering too but such charges, it seems, were never raised. He was 
also issued with a confiscation order for £33 million of his reputed £270 
million assets and was ordered to pay another £2,7 million in compensation 
to his victims. As reported by the BBC on 23 April 2002, this was the big-
gest confiscation order in English legal history. Defended by lawyer Gio-
vanni di Stefano, the Devil’s Advocate, as he became widely known, within 
a year Palmer managed to overturn the confiscation order. Lord Woolf, the 
Lord Chief Justice, commented that Palmer should have had his money 
confiscated but ruled that an earlier appeal court decision that allowed him 
to hold onto his assets could not be overturned.164 Not only did Palmer 
keep most of his money but he also served just about half of his term. Soon 
after he was released from prison, however, he was arrested again, this time 
in Spain. In July 2007 the press reported that Palmer was taken by the Span-
ish police at the airport in Tenerife as he was wanted by the court on suspi-
cion of leading an international criminal group. He was reported to have 
faced charges that this time included also money laundering,165 inter alia.166 
                                               
163  After a five-year police investigation, in 1999 Palmer was brought to trial in the UK. His 2001 
sentence was the result of lengthy procedures and a third retrial at the Old Bailey. 
164  See BBC report of 23 May 2003. 
165  Ironically, about twenty years earlier Palmer was nearly convicted of handling about 6.800 
ingots of stolen gold, an act that would have nowadays equalled to laundering. Palmer had 
earned his nickname, ‘Goldfinger’, after allegedly smelting down much of the gold that had 
been stolen by others in what became known as the £26 million Brink’s-Mat robbery near 
Heathrow airport in 1983 (money laundering was first criminalised in the UK in 1986 with the 
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In the autumn of 2009 the media reported that after being held in a Madrid 
prison for two years while a police investigation was taking place, Palmer 
was released on bail and was now believed to be living on his £6 million 
yacht The Brave Goose Of Essex. 
 
Apparently after Palmer appeared to have escaped major punitive justice in 
Britain, Spanish prosecutors decided to resort to the easier and far-reaching 
laundering clause that can plug every hole.  
 It goes without saying that the fight against crime is not easy and legal de-
vices that can plug any hole can be a good thing if balanced against other legal 
principles. However, as noted earlier, it appears that the laundering charge is 
primarily used to catch small fry and apply a higher penalty than for the actual 
predicate crime. In the very rare cases of catching bigger fish, although the 
maximum penalty for laundering in the USA is 20 years, savvy lawyers can use 
to their advantage the loose money laundering definition and help villains walk 
away with lenient sentences because no better clauses have been applied.    
 
Laundering an unconventional load  
As discussed earlier, anything can be proceeds of crime, i.e. object of launder-
ing. We usually think of laundering in financial terms, associating it with either 
money, liquid or highly valuable assets such as precious stones or artwork. But 
there are instances, where although unconventional – because of the object of 
laundering – the application of the term is quite appropriate as it matches the 
strict meaning of it, i.e. ensuring legitimate appearance of the crime property. 
 For instance, in February 2007 Greenpeace released a report (Van de Water 
and Schuiling, 2007) which claimed that in 2006 Dutch harbours facilitated the 
laundering of illegally caught fish from the Barents Sea by allowing ‘pirates’ to 
offload their catch and enter the market unchecked. It was noted that Dutch 
inspection authorities only measured the quantity of fish but carried out no 
verification checks with regard to the legality of the catch (at least this was the 
case as of the time of the report). A catch that simply goes unchecked is not yet 
laundered in the strict sense of the term (although, as soon as it is accepted in a 
Dutch shop or in the marketplace of another country, it is likely that the fish 
                                                                                                              
Drug Trafficking Offences Act). Although Palmer had allegedly admitted smelting the gold in 
the garden of his mansion in Bath, he denied knowing where it came from. As the police had 
failed to prove that he had knowingly dealt in stolen property, Palmer was allowed to walk free 
from the trial in 1987. He famously blew kisses to the jury on his way out of the courtroom. 
166  The case was widely covered by the press (see Vasagar and Hopkins, The Guardian, 24 May 
2001; Tremlett, The Guardian, 13 July 2007). 
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will be automatically perceived as legally caught). However, if at any point of 
the supply chain an inspection is carried out, the crime may get discovered. 
Therefore, pirate vessels ‘launder’ the catch. A report by the Environmental 
Justice Foundation (2007) concerning pirate fish sold in the UK marketplace 
described the range of practices that pirate vessels sometimes employ to ulti-
mately present their catch as legally caught. Referring to these practices the 
report used precisely the term ‘laundering’. These practices include the illegal 
trans-shipping of fish between vessels, the repacking of fish products into boxes 
stamped with the name of a legal boat and more than one vessel purporting to 
be a single ship. The report highlights that for this reason it is difficult to prove 
that the fish within the boxes is ‘IUU-caught’ (IUU meaning illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated).  
 In 2006 Greenpeace (Stark and Cheung, Greenpeace, 2006) released a re-
port with similar claims but concerning another unconventional object of laun-
dering. The report claims that China played an important role in laundering 
illegal timber. Becoming the world’s ‘factory’ for plywood, furniture and paper, 
China imports wood, much of which is illegal, and exports it as ‘laundered’ 
wood products. These ‘Made-in-China’ products are subsequently bought by 
consumers in the USA, Europe and Japan, who are tempted by the low 
prices.167  
 As reviewed above, the ambiguity of the money laundering definition al-
lows it to be applied in a wide variety of ways including such can lead to arbi-
trary results and uncertainties. 
 
3.3.  Money laundering – a threat to society? 
 
Is money laundering really a threat to society? This chapter will discuss the 
moral and socio-economic effects of crime money, of its influx into the licit 
economy and its laundering, especially in the context of globalisation, with 
different historical developments in different countries. We will also review 
whether the difference between the various nuances of ‘grey and black taint’ of 
criminal proceeds matters. 
                                               
167  Ironically Greenpeace has also been accused of engaging in laundering, except that it is not clear 
what it had laundered. In 2003 Public Interest Watch, a Washington-based group, which moni-
tors non-profit charity agencies, posted an article by Miller (Miller, 2003) which reported on al-
legations that Greenpeace illegally spent $24 million in tax-deductible contributions on banned 
activities, such as trying to block military ships, by transferring money between different ac-
counts. According to California Assemblyman Ray Haynes, these transactions amounted to 
money laundering. 
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3.3.1. The effects of crime money and money laundering  
 
Policy makers’ argumentation  
What makes money laundering an unusual offence is that it always exists in the 
context of some other crime (even if in some jurisdictions, a conviction for this 
crime is not a prerequisite for a money laundering conviction). Money laun-
dering is always necessitated by and is a consequence of the so-called predicate 
crime for profit. However, policy makers have restlessly sought to demonstrate 
the existence of the opposite causal or motivational effect and convince the 
public that if criminals could no longer launder their money and enjoy it, they 
would feel less motivated to commit crime for profit. In order to justify the 
robust anti-money laundering regime, policy makers left no stone unturned. 
Their arguments – some of which are well founded, others appear to be mere 
rhetoric – range from moral statements to assertions about the social and eco-
nomic threats that crime money and money laundering pose. Researchers at 
the Utrecht School of Economics have identified 25 empirical effects of money 
laundering (Unger et al., 2006) but some of these largely overlap and can there-
fore be reduced to a smaller number. Available analysis of the effects of crime 
money and money laundering, however, remains non-systematic and largely 
conditional due to the relativity of the different concepts (both economic and 
legal) that are applied and the lack of clear definitional basis. As the concept of 
laundering is so broad, that it covers any use of crime money, it has hardly a 
discriminatory and therefore explanatory value as far as its effects are concerned.  
  Firstly, it does not distinguish between the effects of crime money in its 
own right, the effects of laundered money (which still constitutes crime 
money) and the effects of crime money’s laundering.  
  Secondly, it also fails to differentiate the effects of laundering from the ef-
fects of the predicate crime, when the latter largely overlaps with the for-
mer. 
  And thirdly, it fails to differentiate it from the black economy, encompass-
ing all hidden money generated, including ‘usual’ tax evasion.  
 
Nevertheless, policy makers have not stopped reiterating the same arguments 
over and over again, supporting them with appropriate “threat imagery” (Van 
Duyne et al., 2005; Van Duyne, 2010, p. 356) but with little methodical sub-
stantiation. In the following sections the arguments supporting these perceived 




Categories of effects 
 
a. The corruption of the financial system: the ‘integrity dogma’ 
Policy makers’ central argument has always been that crime money and money 
laundering corrupt or contaminate (see Unger et al., 2006) the financial system. 
Therefore, we should use every possible means to prevent crime money from 
entering the licit economy.  
 This statement has two main aspects, although not always recognised as 
different. The first aspect entails material changes in the financial system. Ac-
cording to McDowell and Novis (2001), the integrity of financial markets is 
undermined when financial institutions rely on crime proceeds and therefore 
run into difficulties in managing their assets, liabilities, and operations. This 
argument refers to the effects on the financial system, as part of the economy, 
and will therefore be reviewed in more detail in the section on socio-economic 
effects below.  
 The second aspect, which reflects the more common understanding of this 
argument, refers to corrupting the integrity of the financial system in the moral 
sense, i.e. lowering the ethical standards within the financial system. The idea 
that when channelled into the financial system crime money would corrupt it 
and then spread this corrosive effect throughout the world through usage of 
global transmission facilities, is widely supported and often quoted as justifica-
tion for rigid anti-money laundering measures. However, it remains unclear 
what its causal connection is supposed to be. It is as if crime money per se is 
infectious and carries a disease. And it may well be that this disease is corrup-
tion. Crime money can indeed be used to corrupt individual bankers and fi-
nanciers and influence decision-making processes in business (“corruptive permea-
tion”, see Van Duyne, 2003b, p. 76; see also Palmer, 2001). However, it ap-
pears that policy makers’ arguments are not aimed at that act of bribery. They 
do not say that bribery contaminates the financial system. They say that the 
results of the act of laundering contaminate it: the undetected (or detected but 
ignored) inflow of crime-money into the financial system. In this context laun-
dering is understood to be the use of the financial system by criminals and the 
subsequent influx of crime money into the veins of the financial system.  
 This immediately raises the question: why is this any different to the effect 
of ‘dirty’ money that is already inside the financial system as a consequence, for 
instance, of VAT fraud or simple income tax fraud? Besides, if we equal the 
mere flowing of crime money through the legitimate system of the economy to 
the act of laundering, then crime-money should have the same contagious 
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effect on all facilities that play part in money transmission, including the inter-
net. Crime-money flows through the internet all the time but to talk about the 
undermined integrity of the internet would require a lengthy metaphysical 
explanation.168  
 The moral argument about integrity, supported with alarming figures on 
crime money, has an “emotive appeal” that conveys controversial images of 
“sickness problems” which are not necessarily actually observed (Van Duyne et 
al., 2005, pp. 123-124). The argument about the integrity of the financial sys-
tem could otherwise have been a strong message, if it was not undermined by 
the vague concept of laundering and its limited focus on the financial system. 
From this perspective the corruptive effects have also been underlined by stat-
ing that by allowing crime-money into the financial system, bankers would 
become –unwillingly and unknowingly– accomplices to crime or at least facili-
tating its commission. That may be true, but for the implication that this state-
ment has also no boundaries: it applies to any sector of our economy in which 
lawbreakers live and spend their proceeds. Policy makers centre their argument 
on the financial system but implicitly they unwittingly call for an assessment of 
the corruptness of every single component of our life, not just the financial 
system. The latter cannot be separated from connected spheres: the economy in 
general, business, culture, and, most importantly, politics. It is true that scrutiny 
has been extended to some spheres outside the financial sector such as the legal 
profession (see Kuehne’s case discussed previously). However, scrutiny over 
donations for political campaigns has not even been anywhere near as rigid as 
scrutiny over the financial services sector. Therefore, this appeal looses it dis-
tinctive value, no matter how lofty it is in a general moral sense.  
 Although the moral appeal should be universal, its application by policy 
makers (usually of the G-7169) appears to cross the line of political hypocrisy and 
the use of double standards. While some countries are being internationally 
targeted for their weak control systems, deficiencies (according to policy mak-
                                               
168  That said, the concept of the internet being contaminated and used as a facility to spread harmful 
content is not new. In 2006 the media reported that Jeffrey Toback, a Nassau County legislator, 
filed but later dropped a federal lawsuit that accused Google of profiting from child pornography 
by allowing operators to advertise child pornography websites through sponsored links (Toy, 
The New York Times, 2 July 2006). In 2009 the Chinese authorities accused Google of spreading 
obscene content (see Daily Mail, 27 June 2009). 
169  Although G-8 was formed in 1997 with the inclusion of Russia, and then G-20 in 1999, inter-
national regulatory and law enforcement policies have largely remained under the influence of 
the countries of the G-7 group, most notably the USA. This can particularly be seen in the area 
of policies relating to money laundering, insider trading and corruption of foreign officials. 
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ers’ standards) in the regime of others (more powerful) appear to be condoned 
(this matter was discussed earlier in this thesis, see section 3.1.6).   
 Michel Camdessus170 (1998171) highlights that: 
“Markets and even smaller economies can be corrupted and destabilised. We have 
seen evidence of this in countries and regions which have harbored large-scale criminal 
organisations. In the beginning, good and bad monies intermingle, and the country 
or region appears to prosper, but in the end Gresham’s law operates, and there is a 
tremendous risk that only the corrupt financiers remain.”  
  
This is a strong appeal indeed, although it appears to be substantiated with little 
evidence. Its validity appears to be undermined by the economic record of 
small economies such as Luxembourg, Liechtenstein or (relatively small) Swit-
zerland. As any tax haven, these countries presumably also harbour money 
from tax evasion, and, possibly, from far more serious offences. Yet these coun-
tries do not appear to have considerably suffered from such inflows of money. 
Whereas poor and politically unstable countries, torn by civil wars, mal-
governance and corruption, such as Sierra Leone, are said to have tremendously 
suffered from the accumulation of crime capital (for analysis of the war-
profiteering in Sierra Leone see Smillie et al., 2000). As a matter of fact, there is 
hardly any significant crime-money accumulation in such countries as illegal 
wealth is often shifted to more stable jurisdictions. The owners of illegal wealth 
do the same as the owners of licit funds: money of any colour eschews instabil-
ity.  
 Indeed crime money empowers criminals and corruptible politicians. 
Criminal ambitions grow as the criminal’s wealth grows and the best way for 
criminals to expand their business, whether legitimate or not, is to forge rela-
tionships with people of power and administrative leverage. Our lives nowa-
days are shaped by the principles of the market economy and everybody knows 
the value of money and how much influence money can buy (Daeubler-
Gmelin, 1994). However, the argument about causality, i.e. that money laun-
dering and crime money lead to corruption can be reversed in two ways: firstly, 
corruption within the system and, more generally, the corruptibility of man, 
precede the money laundering corruption. Actually, the latter is to an extent 
irrelevant to the really smart launderer whose skill is essentially to manage to 
                                               
170  Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund from January 1987 to February 2000. 
171  The quote starts with the fourth sentence of the first paragraph after heading “Macroeconomic 
impact of money laundering” (no page number available as the article was retrieved from the 
internet).  
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stay low-key and unnoticed without the need to corrupt anyone.172 Secondly, 
media reports on investigations and existing records of litigation (especially 
under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) provide evidence of corruption 
that has been caused and enhanced by perfectly legitimately earned money of 
reputable international corporations rather than the money of outright criminals 
(which is a rather ironic observation). In Europe, in all the major corruption 
scandals of the past decades white money was involved.173 
 The reality is that crime money enters the licit economy whether we want 
it or not. As Van Duyne et al. (2003, p. 29) points out, “[t]he treasury is the ‘na-
tional pump’ of all richness, criminal and legitimate alike” and it may easily end up 
handling its own, previously stolen, moneys without recognising it as criminal.  
 How should financial institutions cope with the mixture of legal and illegal 
funds? For instance, during the 1990s, in the course of privatisation in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union illicit or questionable pro-
ceeds mixed up with legitimate earnings like in ‘a melting pot’ (Hignett, 2005). 
The system showed (and in fact, regrettably, continued to show well into the 
new century) strong elements of crony capitalism, where land, hotels, large and 
lucrative enterprises, public procurement contracts, licences and permissions for 
various sorts of business activities were distributed between a limited number of 
people. In many of those countries wealth has undergone a process of eco-
nomic and financial consolidation. What can we say about the colour of this 
money? Is wealth that was accumulated in those years still tainted? (The ‘heri-
tage’ question discussed previously.) How are the financial institutions supposed 
to treat wealthy customers who at some point have been alleged involved in 
questionable dealings?  
 Policy makers and law enforcement authorities send mixed signals on this 
matter. A number of prominent businessmen linked to allegations of involve-
ment in illegal activities in Russia now live in the UK or the US where they 
appear to feel quite comfortable. How should financial institutions treat their 
                                               
172  Why should the criminal want to corrupt the financial system? He is just as interested in having 
his money handled correctly and efficiently as any legitimate market player. Moreover: corrup-
tion involves spreading information, which always carries a risk of exposure. 
173  Including the allegations concerning the Augusta-Dassault deal in Belgium; Germany’s former 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the French oil company Elf Aquitaine; the cash for honours scan-
dal in the UK; the construction industry scandal and the Rotterdam harbour case in the Nether-
lands. The amount of white money involved exceeds anything a drug dealer might have dreamt 
of. One of the exceptions from this list of ‘white’ money corruption scandals was the allegation 
that Forza Italia, the political party led by Silvio Berlusconi (which merged into the People of 
Freedom party in 2009) was financed at some point by the Italian Mafia (see report by Willan, 
The Guardian, 8 January 2003; see also Stille, 2006). 
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money? Or do we expect estate agents or solicitors engaged in property trans-
actions in West London on behalf of wealthy tycoons from Russia or other 
emerging markets to submit suspicious activity reports? Another Russian for-
mer oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who stood trial in Russia for tax evasion 
and was sent to prison, appears to have been hailed somewhat as a hero-figure 
by some Western media.174 One of Italy’s most (in)famous politicians and en-
trepreneurs, Silvio Berlusconi, has attracted considerable attention in the press 
in relation to allegations of involvement in questionable dealings but that does 
not mean that many banks (if not all banks) would treat his money as tainted. 
His money appears to be welcome everywhere. And if it is tainted, it rather 
demonstrates that the argument about ‘crime-money corrupting the financial 
system’ has in its application a very political bias and little empirical content. 
We can also turn the argument around and state that the acceptance without 
any qualms of all these tainted monies actually demonstrates that the system is 
fully corrupted in the sense that it only targets the ‘usual suspects’. 
 The question about the corruptive effect of crime-money on the financial 
system remains unresolved. Of course, it has also a quantitative aspect: how 
much corrupting money is actually in bank accounts and does it have a ‘critical 
mass’ to corrupt the financial system? It is surprising (and telling) that there is 
hardly any empirical data on this issue. Recently Van Duyne and Soudijn 
(2010; see also Van Duyne and Soudijn, 2009) analysed the confiscation data of 
the Dutch public Prosecution Office from 1994 onwards, to find any effect of 
the crime-money within the financial system. From this angle they selected all 
the items concerning (saving) deposits and bonds and shares. Concerning the 









                                               
174  See article by Amsterdam published in The Wall Street Journal Europe on 9 February 2007. West-
ern media has highlighted that many considered the prosecution of Khodorkovsky as politically 
motivated (see report by Walker, The Independent, 2 April 2010; Elder, The Guardian, 23 De-




Number and amount of the confiscated (saving) deposits 
Year N. persons Total amount Median 
1994-1997  13 1.946.006 7884 
1998 15 604.613 24.352 
1999 41 5.959.063 23.483 
2000 48 6.103.034 21.340 
2001 49 5.887.511 13.468 
2002 57 16.170.573 14.933 
2003 64 4.741.863 12.393 
2004 52 9.105.887 20.000 
2005 64 68.279.312 20.588 
2006 37 4.388.243 26.674 
Total 440 123.186.105 18.058 
 
As table 1 shows, the differences between the years can be significant. In 2005 
one offender had three bank accounts totalling €32 million confiscated. Neu-
tralising these exceptions by taking the median, we see that it is around the 
modest sum of €18.000. Approximately 40% of the confiscated offenders have 
a bank account with a deposit of less than €10.000. Only 20% have a bank 
account with more than €100.000.  
 A subset of this bank account confiscation set consists of foreign bank ac-
counts. 32 offenders appeared to have foreign bank accounts with a total de-
posit of €15 million, which is 12 % of all the confiscated bank accounts. The 
median value was also much higher: €93.000. Spread over more than ten years 
it is not easy to determine the financial effects of these monies on the financial 
system: its critical mass is too low to have an observable effect. And what cannot 
be observed does not exist. 
 The researchers also looked at the confiscated bonds and shares. 35 offenders 
had bank accounts for investment purposes with a total confiscated value (be-
fore the financial crisis) of €656.125 (missing values: 16). It is a plausible hy-
pothesis to state: criminals may like to be risk entrepreneurs, but they are not 
necessarily risk investors.  
 Indeed, there is hardly solid evidence which can lend support to the firm 
claims about the disastrous corrupting effect and affected integrity vented by 
policy makers.175 What we see is evidence of hypocrisy and covert acceptance 
                                               
175  As noted previously, policy makers’ arguments appear to be centred on drug traffickers and 
other ‘organised crime’ groups as well as politically inconvenient funds that circumvent US 
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of crime money. History, for instance, concerning the privatisation process, 
demonstrates that crime-money can become accepted and ‘gentrified’. Going 
further back in history, we find, for example, records of the gentrification (see 
Van Duyne, 2003b) of the US robber-barons’ tainted moneys. On the other 
hand, the crime-money corruption thesis should not be dismissed as a mere 
chimera: the need for laundering may be accompanied by corrupt practices to 
which staff of financial institutions may be induced.176 However, that relates to 
human conduct, not to the very substance itself: the crime-money. Besides, in 
the context of the global credit crisis that hit the markets in 2008 and the irre-
sponsible conduct of some stockbrokers and the financial elite, the laundering-
integrity issue dwindles into insignificance (Van Duyne, 2008).  
 
b. Social and economic effects 
Policy makers claim that crime money and money laundering cause a wide 
range of effects on the economy and society. However, to specify and precisely 
analyse the effects of phenomena as broad as these would be an exercise with 
contentious results.  
 During his speech at FATF’s Plenary Meeting in Paris on 10 February 1998 
Michel Camdessus177 noted: 
“Money subject to laundering behaves in accordance with particular management prin-
ciples. There is evidence that it is less productive, and therefore that it contributes 
minimally, to say the least, to optimization of economic growth. Potential macroeco-
nomic consequences of money laundering include, but are not limited to: inexplicable 
changes in money demand, greater prudential risks to bank soundness, contamination 
effects on legal financial transactions, and greater volatility of international capital 
flows and exchange rates due to unanticipated cross-border asset transfers.”178 
 
                                                                                                              
sanctions but somehow the real corrupting effect of the actions of high-level white collar crimi-
nals, such as corrupt financiers and politicians, remains understated.  
176 Palmer (2001) suggests that it may be more economical for criminals to corrupt a bank officer in 
order to gain access to test codes required to issue letters of credit, for instance, than to use com-
puter hackers and internet crime innovation. He further suggests that this can explain FATF’s 
statement (in a press release dated 12 February 1998) that little or no innovation in the use of 
internet for money laundering has been observed.  
177  As noted earlier, Camdessus was the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
from January 1987 to February 2000. 
178  The quote starts with the ninth sentence of the first paragraph after heading “Macroeconomic 
impact of money laundering” (no page number available as the article was retrieved from the 
internet). 
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Summarising the socio-economic effects179 of money laundering Camdessus 
also highlighted that these risks were posed by the scale of money laundering 
transactions: 2 to 5% of global GDP. As reviewed earlier in this thesis, in 1990 
the FATF produced estimates of crime proceeds amounting to nearly $300 
billion a year, of which about 50-70% is possibly available for laundering and 
investment in the USA and Europe alone. These figures were not only based 
on little evidence (Van Duyne, 1994; Van Duyne, 2002b), but were later, 
light-heartedly as it seems, augmented by international organisations, like the 
UN, to figures ranging from $500 billion to one trillion a year, figures that 
appear to be politically convenient (see Naylor, 1999; Van Duyne and Levi, 
2005) but arrived at through non-convincing estimation methods. Further-
more, as Van Duyne (2002b) points out, ‘available for laundering’ soon became 
the affirmative ‘is being laundered’. Thus policy makers and academic literature 
began to often equate the criminal turnover with the volume of laundering, i.e. 
to attribute these figures both to the amount of crime proceeds subject to laun-
dering and to the volume of the illicit trade altogether (despite the 50-70% 
fraction figure cited above). And these are two different things. Crime money 
in need of laundering, in the strict sense of the term, is clearly less than crime 
money in general, i.e. in circulation, part of which is spent on daily needs and 
other crimes inter alia. However, the distinction is blurred due to the com-
monly accepted broad understanding of laundering, which implies that nearly 
any use of crime proceeds is laundering. This is exactly where the problem lies 
with the assessment of and counteracting the socio-economic effects. The ef-
fects on the economy and society are contingent upon criminals’ intents and 
ambitions. If a criminal wants to hide his money out of the reach of the tax 
authorities he would most likely shift it to offshore accounts and keep a low 
economic profile. Whereas, if a criminal wants to use his money freely and 
expand his economic powers, for instance by investing in legitimate business, 
he would behave in a different way. As policy making argumentation does not 
reflect these considerations, it remains largely conditional (as will be reviewed 
below) and achieves little.  
 
 Scope of contribution to economic growth 
The argument that crime money is less productive and contributes minimally 
to economic growth is only partly valid. It largely depends on criminals’ ambi-
tions. Indeed, crime money can be used to further crime and, depending on 
the crime, it can be productive or not (the counterfeit luxury bags industry in 
                                               
179  Camdessus, however, does not refer to any specific historica facts.  
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China or the sex industry, many would argue, are adding a value). Depending 
on circumstances, investing crime money for the commission of further crime 
may require laundering. This may particularly be the case in the wholesale 
smuggling business: the investment in transport (which in itself is productive). 
Otherwise money can keep circling around in the underground economy 
without any need of laundering in the strict sense of the term. On the other 
hand, crime money can also be put to work, i.e. invested in productive assets, 
in which case this money will contribute to economic growth. For instance, 
cash intensive businesses such as pizzerias, car rental parks and so on, that are 
often used as fronts to criminal enterprises, can generate some economic activ-
ity and employment.  
 But this is just small fry. If there is any substance to the allegations concern-
ing Silvio Berlusconi,180 who would deny that his business empire generated 
national activities and huge employment? Also, political party funds allegedly 
embezzled by the nomenclature in the former socialist countries may have fled 
across border but were largely to return and be invested in the economy (this 
subject will be discussed in more detail in a later section). This means that in-
vested crime money contributed to economic growth. However, while in the 
case of cash intensive small or medium-sized businesses, enterprises are often a 
way of laundering crime money, in the second case, the embezzled party funds 
should ideally already have been laundered before being invested, e.g. in priva-
tisation (often investment in privatisation in the former socialist block was done 
via offshore vehicles without adequate government scrutiny over the origin of 
the invested funds which facilitated the laundering). 
 Certainly even money that is put to work can sometimes be insufficiently 
productive. It is claimed that the investment choices of money launderers (or 
criminals and their laundering aides) are mostly determined by their need to 
escape scrutiny by regulators and law enforcement agencies rather than by con-
siderations for investment return. These choices can therefore be detrimental to 
the economy because, it is claimed, they lead to diversion of capital to assets 
that generate little or no economic activity or employment (see Bartlett 2002; 
Unger et al., 2006). McDowell and Novis (2001, p. 8), for instance, point out:  
                                               
180  For many years Berlusconi has been the subject of various allegations. As noted earlier, Forza 
Italia, which he led, was alleged to have been at some point funded by the Mafia. In November 
2010 the media also reported that according to a ruling of a court in Palermo, Berlusconi’s asso-
ciate, Marcello Dell’Utri, an Italian senator, was convicted for links to the Mafia and was appar-
ently identified as the liaison person between Berlusconi and Italian underworld figures (see 
Agence France Presse, 19 November 2010; Hooper, The Guardian, 20 November 2010). 
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“Money launderers are not interested in profit generation from their investments but 
rather in protecting their proceeds. Thus they ‘invest’ their funds in activities that are 
not necessarily economically beneficial to the country where the funds are located. Fur-
thermore, to the extent that money laundering and financial crime redirect funds from 
sound investments to low-quality investments that hide their proceeds, economic 
growth can suffer. In some countries, for example, entire industries, such as construc-
tion and hotels, have been financed not because of actual demand, but because of the 
short-term interests of money launderers. When these industries no longer suit the 
money launderers, they abandon them, causing a collapse of these sectors and im-
mense damage to economies that could ill afford these losses.”181  
 
As a general statement this sounds convincing, but on closer inspection it ap-
pears to be a tenuous argument, as it assumes ‘sound investment’ by owners of 
licit money. This differentiation can only partly be made. Firstly, the basis for 
dividing sectors into such that present opportunities for ‘sound’ investments and 
such that offer only opportunities for low-quality investments is unclear. Low-
quality investments are those that either yield low return or are ill-managed, 
which is no distinctive feature of investing crime-money. Low- or no-return 
investments, such as construction of schools, charity and so on, are not neces-
sarily detrimental to the economy. Escobar may not have been regarded as a 
‘nice guy’, but the construction of a neighbourhood he financed in Medellin 
for impoverished families (see Southwell, 2002) could nevertheless be viewed 
as a contribution to the community. It would be unwise to label any economic 
sector as a low-quality investment destination only because the invested funds 
are derived from crime. Secondly, the distinction between productive and less 
productive assets and sectors is not necessarily related to whether an investment 
yields high or low return. Investment in residential houses, art, jewellery, secu-
rities, may not generate any substantial economic activity (although real estate 
agents, art dealers and stock brokers can benefit from this ‘criminal’ spending), 
but may actually result in significant profits. Indeed, vast amounts of crime-
money may be invested in sectors that generate less economic activity in terms 
of employment than others. For instance, it is said that the real estate sector is 
often (mis)used for laundering purposes (see Unger et al., 2006), but it does 
                                               
181  The question is how many examples there are as evidence to support this argument. There is 
indeed speculative construction, especially in emerging markets, but that is not necessarily in-
vestment of crime money. In Dubai construction is booming and many buildings are empty but 
how much of the invested funds are of illicit origin, remains a question. Bankers there appear to 
be more concerned about money coming from Iran than about the hot money of fraudsters or 
businessmen running away from creditors.  
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create added value (as long as the prices go up). On many occasions, for exam-
ple, the press has reported that the IRA182 has been laundering crime proceeds 
through the acquisition of property in Ireland, Britain, Eastern Europe, the 
Mediterranean and the Caribbean (see Murray and Cusack, 2006). Crime en-
trepreneurs often buy land, for instance, to build villas (see Suendorf, 2001; 
Van Duyne, 2002b). However, little empirical evidence is available as to the 
scale of crime-money investment in the property sector and the assessment of 
the social and economic impact of such investments remains elusive (see Van 
Duyne et al., 2009). The evidence from the Dutch confiscation databases men-
tioned above, table 1 (see Van Duyne and Soudjin, 2010) demonstrates that a 
major part of the crime-money investments in the real estate sector concerns an 
average dwelling of €180.000. Naturally, as the distribution of criminal income 
is skewed, so is the value of the property in criminal ownership: according to 
the study, there are criminal real estate investors who have attained a more than 
average property portfolio. But these high-level examples have been thinly 
spread over time (ten years) and space. 
 If the threat posed by such investments is significant and laundering takes 
place on a vast scale, one may wonder why the real estate and property devel-
opment sector appears to have remained largely under-scrutinised over the 
years.183 Besides, property is not necessarily low-quality investment. Addition-
ally, property encompasses also bars, restaurants, hotels and so on, i.e. businesses 
that may, in fact, generate significant economic activity and employment.  
 The argument put forward by McDowell and Novis misses two other im-
portant comparative points: (a) the question: what is the difference between 
white speculative money invested in real estate (for example from an oil boom) 
and (b) the empirical observation that probably the majority of wealthy crime-
entrepreneurs from the underground economy are inefficient licit managers 
                                               
182  The Irish Republican Army (IRA) can be described as a paramilitary organisation that has 
sought to create a united and independent Irish republic. 
183  Compared to other regulated sectors, e.g. the banking industry, the number of suspicious activity 
reports (SARs) coming from the estate sector is relatively small (see for instance SOCA 2010 re-
port for UK statistics; also Van Duyne et al., 2009, and Van Duyne and Soudijn, 2009, for an 
analysis of public prosecution confiscation data relating to the estate sector, including a 2006 re-
port issued by FinCen on illicit financial activities and the commercial real estate sector covering 
a 10-year period of Suspicious Activity Reports). In the UK the number of SARs submitted by 
estate agents in 2009-10 was 129. In 2008-09 it was 135. SARs coming from the banking sector 
totalled 186.897 and 172.030 respectively (SOCA, 2010). In 2006-07 the number of SARs 
from estate agents was 147, and in 2007-08 the number was 176, whereas SARs from the bank-
ing industry totalled 140.437 and 145.905 respectively (SOCA, 2008). However, although the 
number of SARs from the estate sector is significantly smaller, the figures are still impressive and 
one may wonder about the extent to which these transactions have been scrutinised.  
 129 
irrespective of their criminal wealth. Van Duyne and Levi (2005) put together 
the available case descriptions and noticed a disappointing (or consoling) lack of 
skills to move economically from the underworld to the upperworld. This 
suggests that low grade investing is not caused by the need to hide the money 
from the law, but by insufficient management and business skills. And as far as 
this management skill is concerned, in what way do they differ from the licit 
financial bonus hunters who proved to be only loaded managers as long as they 
did not get into deep water? 
 Moreover, the observation that criminals are generally not guided by con-
siderations for investment return and therefore tend to invest in less productive 
or low-quality investment assets and sectors has little evidence to support it. 
The fact that a crime-money owner (we must differentiate between a launderer 
as a criminal financial service provider, and the crime-money owner, who in-
evitably commits self-laundering) may be prepared to invest two illegitimately 
earned dollars in return for one legitimate dollar does not mean that they are 
not interested in the highest return possible (see case study of Yakuza’s sale of 
French designer bags below). It is true that crime money can be used as a 
“criminal upperworld subsidy” to establish and sustain unprofitable enterprises to 
hide tax evasion or for prestige (sporting clubs, for instance) (Van Duyne, 
2003b, p. 76). However, such enterprises proved to be typically small or at 
most medium-sized businesses as far as the Dutch and German research was 
concerned (see Suendorf, 2001; Van Duyne, 2002b). Research also shows that 
crime-entrepreneurs often acquire financially troubled, loss-making or highly 
indebted firms (see Van Duyne, 2002b; Kaplan and Dubro, 2003). However, 
we can hardly say that in making these choices their only goal is necessarily to 
remain undetected and that they are not guided by considerations for return. 
Kaplan and Dubro (2003) explain, for instance, how Japanese gangsters have 
been allegedly involved in hostile takeovers of firms in financial trouble in or-
der to sell their assets later. They would pocket substantial profits leaving credi-
tors and shareholders empty handed which has resulted in serious economic 
impact. But it is hard to tell whether it is caused by laundering activities or by a 
predicate criminal attitude. One may also wonder whether this conduct is es-
sentially different from corporate hostile take-overs or sometimes even the 
conduct of short-selling hedge funds.  
 The point is that crime-money’s use obviously depends on the criminal’s 
lifestyle, mindset and, ultimately, his intentions. The hedonist will be spending 
on pleasure seeking. The savvy crime-entrepreneurs (of whom there are proba-
bly not that many) and the high-flying criminal tycoons-turned-to-be legiti-
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mate businessmen will be seeking to make real investments. The crime-families 
will consider the accumulated crime-money as family capital and so on. Those 
who are only concerned about concealing their money to keep it out of the 
reach of the tax authorities are likely to deposit their money with an offshore 
bank and leave it there. However, the crime-entrepreneur, like every other 
businessman, wants to see his wealth grow rather than leave it sitting some-
where or, even worse, let it melt by increasing inflation, credit crunches or 
poor bank management. And even if he lets his money sit in the bank, the 
latter will likely not just store the money in the vault, but reinvest it in the 
form of loans as any normal bank would do. As soon as (crime) money enters 
the financial system, the logic is that the financial institutions automatically use 
it to their advantage, irrespective of its origin.  
 An example of an attempt to sensibly invest ill-gotten moneys is the way 
the Yakuza has handled their funds. It is believed that during and at the end of 
the Bubble economy184 in Japan billions of dollars from fraud and intimidation 
was invested by the Japanese Yakuza into art, property and securities (Kaplan 
and Dubro, 2003). “[W]ith so much ‘black money’ flowing to Japanese politicians from 
big industries like construction, [the] authorities were not keen to crack down” (Kaplan 
and Dubro, 2003, p. 206) which meant that big-crime earners enjoyed a cer-
tain level of impunity and could operate relatively unhindered. Thus, it appears 
that Yakuza’s investments were more driven by the insecurity caused by the 
Bubble economy, which induced them to another risk-avoiding investment, 
than merely by the desire to avoid law enforcement action. Moreover, it is 
alleged that during the Bubble period Yakuza also invested in various legitimate 
businesses and assets in Europe, including a French castle and Vatican holdings 
(see Kaplan and Dubro, 2003). During the early 1980s Rondan Doyukai, a 
sokaiya gang, allegedly invested in shares of large European companies, in par-
ticular in Rotterdamsch Beleggings Consortium (known as Robeco), Com-
pagnie Française des Petroles, and Compagnie Financiere de Paris et des Pays 
Bas (PARIBAS) (Kaplan and Dubro, 2003). If true, this would certainly indi-
cate a taste of high-end investment (which does not necessarily require sophis-
ticated crime-money management) rather than low-quality investment choices 
(see below for considerations on Yakuza’s risky operations).  
 There may also be some instances where crime money brings direct eco-
nomic benefits to society. The offshore industry thrives on tainted and hot 
                                               
184  During the Bubble era in the late 1980s rapid increase in asset prices in Japan eventually ended 
in a market crash.  
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money. Even reputable financial centres gain from the inflow and deposit of 
any money: the more, the better, whether tainted or not (see below for reputa-
tional downside effects). Peel (2006) quotes a senior Nigerian law enforcement 
officer saying that approximately 90% of Nigerian state governors have prop-
erty in the UK and accounts in their own or family members’ names. Accord-
ing to this officer, the majority of the money flowing from Nigeria to Britain is 
“government-related [. . .] corrupt money being laundered” (see Peel, 2006, p. 19). 
Little evidence is available about the scale and techniques of these money-
laundering activities. However, Nigerians bring money into the UK, buy 
properties and thus inevitably contribute to UK’s economic growth. The key 
downside effects, as reviewed below, include potential reputational damage to 
the UK financial industry, inflationary pressures on the property market and, 
most importantly, Nigeria losing its national wealth.  
 According to Unger et al. (2006), money laundering in the Netherlands, as a 
transit country for criminal financial flows, has contributed to positive eco-
nomic growth (approximately one billion of additional money laundering is 
estimated to lead to about 0,1% growth). While such debatable estimates 
should probably be taken with a pinch of salt, there are factual examples of 
benefits that crime money can bring about.  
 Manzini (2005), for instance, brings forward evidence of crime money 
changing the look of entire districts of Benin City in Nigeria. Nigerian women 
trafficked to Italy to work in the sex industry reportedly send part of their earn-
ings back home to help their families and entire communities renovate the local 
community. Old houses are being replaced by new buildings. Manzini explains 
that those few who successfully return home become part of the local elite. 
The siblings of these women go to the best schools and members of their fam-
ily stand out because of the way they are dressed. Manzini suggests that such 
status is likely to be achieved by women who have been actively involved in 
the organisation of the prostitution ring itself rather than just being a prostitute. 
Here we can raise the question as to what crime money actually is and in 
which way it is different from other money. In the case of money sent home 
from prostitution versus money sent home from licit work in a construction 
firm (where overtime is paid off the books), what is the difference for the re-
cipient or for the economy at large?  
 Southwell (2002) points out, as mentioned previously, that Colombia’s drug 
baron Escobar personally financed the construction of an entire district of 
Medellin for 200 impoverished families. Van Duyne et al. (2005) also argues 
that the financial system may sometimes benefit from the “surfacing and integra-
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tion” (Van Duyne et al., 2005, p. 125) of crime money. He cites the example of 
the debt crisis in Latin America during the 1980s when the returning drug 
money contributed to softening the crisis. Despite the sensitivity of the matter, 
none of the European lenders (major banks) appeared to have suffered from dam-
age to their integrity (Naylor, 1987). Thoumi (1995) also points out that Colom-
bia’s foreign debt was kept under certain limits as a result of conservative mone-
tary policies in combination with inflows of money from cocaine export. It ap-
pears that while at that time the US legislator and the UN were preparing to draft 
laws and conventions to criminalise money laundering, financial institutions were 
not concerned that part of their loans were redeemed by narco dollars. 
 However, Thoumi (1995) also notes that crime money is frequently spent 
on luxury goods imported from abroad (often smuggled), meanwhile benefiting 
the drug importing and consuming countries. This means slower growth of the 
local economy (of the drug exporting country) as money is spent outside the 
country or on items not produced by the local economy. In such instances 
crime money is indeed less productive which brings us to the point made by 
Bartlett (2002) and Unger et al. (2006) (mentioned above) that criminals’ 
choices can lead to diversion of capital to assets that generate little or no eco-
nomic activity or employment. But, as touched upon previously, to what ex-
tent does this differ from a (licit) financial windfall from other sources like min-
eral oil? In Russia this did not contribute much to the local manufacturing 
industry either, as the new-rich elite spent their money on imported luxury 
items. However, even if this is true, in order to determine the seriousness of its 
effects, it must be projected against the whole volume of the available risk capi-
tal. The question is then: how much criminal capital remains (to be diverted wrongly) 
after the usual life style spending? After all, consumption preferences of the crimi-
nal elite do not differ essentially from that of the upperworld elite. 
 Although crime-entrepreneurs may well be driven by considerations for 
financial return when investing their crime money (as reviewed above), not all 
of them are savvy investors. They often trust and overrate their management 
skills (Van Duyne, 2002b, 2003b), as a result of which their investment outlets 
may simply go bankrupt (see for some examples Suendorf, 2001, and Van 
Duyne, 2002b).  
 However, Van Duyne’s point about “surfacing and integration” is important as 
it highlights the fact that criminals’ varying financial intentions and types of 
conduct are crucial and should not be ignored by policy makers. There is a 
general confusion of money as an economic tool and the social-psychology of 
the criminal owners. Concealing the proceeds of crime (for instance from em-
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bezzlement or tax evasion), i.e. keeping the money low-key - below the sur-
face - for a long time, is different from presenting crime money as legitimate 
and putting it to work. A significant part of the crime money within the global 
banking system is derived from tax evasion and tax fraud, and much of it is 
either simply spent on daily needs and maintaining one’s lifestyle or is kept in 
savings accounts offshore. This does not really undermine the banking system, 
but the state budget system. Therefore different types of financial conduct and 
crime money management should be interpreted and targeted in different ways.  
 
  Inexplicable changes in macroeconomic indicators185  
Camdessus (1998) points out that money laundering can have macroeconomic 
consequences such as incomprehensible changes in money demand, unpredict-
ability of international capital flows and exchange rates. McDowell and Novis 
(2001) also note that money laundering can adversely affect currencies and 
interest rates. It is also claimed that money laundering can unpredictably change 
the exports-imports flows (see Bartlett, 2002; Unger et al., 2006). These and 
similar effects are believed to undermine economic stability.  
 McDowell and Novis (2001) state that one of the main reasons for the ad-
verse effects on currencies and interest rates is that launderers reinvest their 
money in schemes which are less likely to be detected, rather than in transac-
tions with higher return rates (discussed above). The other major cause, as fre-
quently cited in relevant literature, is the unpredictable nature of laundering 
transactions or, in other words, the unanticipated cross-border transfers of 
criminally derived assets and capital (Tanzi, 1998; Camdessus, 1998; 
FATF/OECD, 1999; McDowell and Novis, 2001;186 Boorman and Ingves, 
2001; Unger et al., 2006).  
 However, what are the historical examples as opposed to arguments about 
hypothetical scenarios?187 The most frequent verb form in these publications is 
the subjunctive mood: ‘may’, ‘could’ rather than ‘is’, ‘was’ and ‘did’. There 
                                               
185  Economic growth is also a macroeconomic indicator but its relation to crime money and laun-
dering was reviewed in the previous section. This section is not aimed at discussing each macro-
economic indicator specifically but rather to summarise relevant considerations.  
186  Camdessus, the FATF - OECD (citing the IMF), and McDowell and Novis state verbatim the 
same effects: “inexplicable changes in money demand, prudential risks to bank soundness, contamination 
effects on legal financial transactions, and increased volatility of international capital flows and exchange rates 
due to unanticipated cross-border asset transfers.” As it appears, much of the rhetoric used in the fight 
against money laundering is an exact repetition of the same arguments over and over again, 
based on insufficient factual analysis and is of little help.  
187  Few historical examples and little evidence have been provided to support this argumentation. 
The usual suspects, specifically mentined in the paper of McDowell and Novis (2001), are the 
European Union Bank, the BCCI and Barings Bank (discussed below). 
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appears to be little empirical evidence and insufficient research to support these 
arguments. Moreover, unanticipated cross-border flows will attract attention 
and lead to reporting to the FIUs. Once again, the arguments about the effects 
of laundering appear to be only partly true. Firstly, we have to distinguish the 
movements of the pre-laundered money from the transactions that involve 
money already laundered. Once laundered, the money does not need to float 
around, but can be invested as other funds would be. Therefore the arguments 
about macroeconomic changes do not necessarily always apply and are rarely 
substantiated by valid empirical references.  
 Whether macroeconomic effects are to be observed depends very much on 
the national economy and on the governance of the country. It is plausible that 
the well-governed industrialised countries with an ample availability of risk 
capital are less at risk than emerging markets and developing countries. Serbia is 
a good example of an economy which was exporting huge amounts of money 
to Cyprus (€2 billion, apparently ‘unnoticed’ by the authorities) without proper 
counterflow of goods and services, while direct investments were derived from 
other countries. No questions were asked, while reports from the Anti Corrup-
tion Council about the acquisition of privatised assets with imported shady 
money do not appear to have received the deserved attention (Van Duyne and 
Donati, 2008).  
 As discussed earlier, unless criminals want to simply hide their money and 
keep a low economic profile, it is unlikely that they would not seek the highest 
return possible for their investment. Besides, there appears to be little evidence 
that low-return rate transactions as opposed to high-return investments would 
in any event adversely affect currencies and interest rates. As to the unantici-
pated nature of laundering transactions, what the argument apparently conveys 
is that laundering activities often seem to be economically irrational. McDowell 
and Novis (2001), for instance, note that launderers usually have short-term 
goals and their management principles are inconsistent with free market tradi-
tions. They further explain that financial institutions which rely on crime capi-
tal may eventually run into liquidity problems (presumably because of sudden 
withdrawals of funds). Further elaborating on this, McDowell and Novis state 
that, for example, “large sums of laundered money may arrive at a financial institution 
but then disappear suddenly, without notice, through wire transfers in response to non-
market factors, such as law enforcement operations” (McDowell and Novis, 2001, p. 
7). McDowell and Novis mention as examples the cases of the European Union 
Bank, BCCI and the 1995 collapse of Barings Bank. However, these three ex-
amples do not point to a common (laundering) denominator due to their mutual 
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differences. Furthermore, their demise was not really caused by money-
laundering in the strict sense of the term.188 Besides, whether laundered or not, 
crime money may indeed move in response to law enforcement action, but this 
can hardly be described as ‘unanticipated’ behaviour. In fact, by now, with the 
existing anti-money laundering control regime, some approximate patterns of 
crime-money movements threatening the financial system should have been 
identified after two decades. Indeed, the secretive nature of laundering transac-
tions implies a certain level of mystery but not necessarily economic irrational-
ity. In this respect, the observations of McDowell and Novis and many others 
appear to be inconsistent. Besides, financial amnesties also involve, to an extent, 
unanticipated levels of money returning to the country but nevertheless gov-
ernments are often prepared to consider such measures. A good example was 
the 2004 amnesty in Belgium.189 According to some observers, instead of ‘get-
ting a clean slate’ with the Tax Office, many of those who returned their 
money back to Belgium started redecorating their houses, refurbishing their 
kitchens and bathrooms, creating a short-term boom in these industries. 
 Quirk (1996), who admits that analysis of the macroeconomic implications 
of money laundering is a difficult exercise,190 highlights the relativity of the 
underlying economic phenomena, specifically money demand, when consid-
ered in relation to crime and money laundering. Based on economic-statistical 
calculations, Quirk suggests that a 10% rise in crime can lead to a 6% fall in 
broad money demand and a 10% fall in currency demand as the related pro-
ceeds are being laundered in parallel financial markets. In his theory, Quirk 
refers to Houston’s arguments about the shadow economy. Houston (1990) 
argues that the presence of underground economy could lead to overstatement 
of the inflationary effects of fiscal or monetary stimulus. Interpreting Houston’s 
arguments, Quirk says that the increased currency holdings, presumably caused 
by money laundering, lead to reduced inside money expansion [although this 
actually concerns cash, including cash under the mattress, rather than laundered 
money]. At the same time Quirk notes that some estimates show decreased 
rather than increased currency holdings, which would reverse the argument. 
                                               
188  The European Union Bank was essentially an embezzlement scam. The BCCI’s gradual down-
fall began largely because of badly handled expansion and risky lending, later fuelled by ques-
tionable practices and financial irregularities. The 1995 collapse of Barings Bank was caused by 
mismanagement and lack of an efficient check-and-balances system. 
189  See Private Banker International, 31 December 2006; The Economist, 6 January 2007.  
190  Quirk notes that at the time of publishing his study (1996) there was little literature on the 
macroeconomic effects of money laundering. Now, after more than ten years has elapsed, qual-
ity research is still insufficient (although literature on this matter has certainly grown) while little 
indisputable evidence has been produced to uphold policy-making processes.  
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Thus, Quirk admits that there is a degree of uncertainty with regard to the 
available analysis and estimates of the impact of crime money and money laun-
dering. Broad demand for money and currency demand are variables that de-
pend on many factors and as a result may be incorrectly specified.191 From 
Quirk’s analysis it appears that the connection between crime rise (hence rise in 
crime money) and demand for money and currency nevertheless remains dis-
putable. It inevitably raises the question: from whom does this demand for 
money stem? In addition, what about those ‘parallel’ financial markets? In a 
1997 paper Quirk notes that money laundering methods have changed, mov-
ing away from the banking system and cash based economy “toward parallel 
financial markets, sophisticated nonmonetary instruments (such as derivatives), and possi-
bly barter (such as an exchange of boats and guns for drugs). If money laundering has 
moved to the parallel market—that is, debits and credits booked by organized criminal 
quasi-banks, say, over the Internet—there could be important implications for anti-
laundering efforts, which have typically focused on criminal activity at the point at which 
the proceeds enter the aboveground economy” (Quirk, 1997, p. 8). But even if the 
money is laundered via criminal quasi-banks and no-cash, i.e. electronic, trans-
actions, does the crime money keep floating there without being converted 
into other assets, loans or production factors? After all, the aim of laundering is 
not ‘keeping the money on the move’, but to settle it as legitimate.  
 Moreover, such reasoning can be affected by the meaning of the laundering 
definition. Not all crime proceeds will have to escape to parallel financial mar-
kets in order to be laundered. As we know, by definition money laundering 
involves the concealing of the origin of crime money. However, if we take as 
an example tax fraud proceeds which constitute a substantial part of the crime 
proceeds generated in the economy, we will see that once the tax inspector 
accepts the fraudulent tax form, there is no concealment because the money is 
‘white’ from that moment and integrated into the official money ‘machine’. 
This implies that the tax office is instrumental in the act of laundering. The 
situation is different when the tax fraud consists of hiding income or savings. 
That can be hidden physically (banknotes under the mattress) in which case it is 
not a part of the financial system: it is hoarded and is outside any system. Only 
when spent, it returns to the normal financial system. When it is placed in an 
off-shore bank it is part of the local financial system of that offshore country as 
the off-shore bank will re-invest the money and not hoard it in its vault. 
                                               
191  Drake (1996), for instance, illustrates possible misspecifications in conventional money demand 
models relating to the choice and way of aggregation of monetary assets included in the targeted 
aggregate. 
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 Again, in the strictest sense of the term, laundering involves the ensuring of 
a legitimate appearance for the money. Once this has been achieved, the 
money becomes part of the official GNP and can be spent on any item. As a 
result, as part of the officially recorded money volume, this money contributes 
to the national economy, irrespective of the economic choices of the (criminal) 
beneficiaries. The latter can decide to export the apparently clean money or 
spend it on luxury assets which may have to be imported, thereby contributing 
to a trade deficit. However, this is not necessarily inherent to crime money or 
the process of the laundering procedure, but to micro-economic decision-
making, which is not characteristic of the crime economy but takes place in the 
official economy (“plus VAT”). The preference for foreign luxury articles re-
flects the prevalent fashion rather than some kind of economic criminal mind. 
Once laundered, there is little reason to export the money. Laundered money 
is not necessarily flight capital but an enhancement of the buying power. 
 There are indeed potential effects that are difficult to dispute and these can 
include distortion of competition192 and macro-economic data as well as a strain 
on the macroeconomic balance of a country whereby flows of crime money 
can create inflationary pressures when outflows of (unlaundered) money leave 
the country (see below). But again: in what way does it differ from money 
flows eschewing inflation, bad banking, bad governance and instability? 
  
 Inflationary pressures 
Van Duyne et al. (2005) notes that the surplus of purchasing power above what 
is officially registered can lead to inflation and this is particularly valid for eco-
nomic sectors that attract hot money, such as the real estate sector in Northern 
Morocco and Colombia. According to Unger et al. (2006) and Keh (1996), 
criminals may sometimes be willing to pay more than the market value for 
certain assets (see further comments below) which can lead to an artificial in-
crease in prices.  
 
 Distorted competition 
Criminals can usually afford to spend more, or earn less from what they invest, 
than legitimate market players. Thus they can easily outbid their legitimate 
rivals, for instance, in public procurement tenders, but without deviating too 
                                               
192  This, however, occurs in specific circumstances. It would normally apply to economic crime 
committed by on-going licit enterprises (in the construction industry, for instance, there may be 
some unfair competition due to black labour fraud). These hardly pass their cost reduction on to 
the customers and if they do, they would probably seek to avoid alerting competitors who 
would not waste any time in alerting the tax authorities. This means there is little latitude to de-
viate too much from an average cost price without attracting law enforcement attention. 
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much from an average cost price as this could attract law enforcement atten-
tion, as mentioned previously (another matter is that sometimes corruption is so 
endemic that criminals end up paying less than legitimate businesses by offering 
kickbacks to corrupt officials rather than beneficial financial terms to the state). 
Moreover, criminals can easily raise cash without the burden of paying interest 
on loans. As a result, they can give a financial boost to their enterprises (e.g. 
restaurants, car rental firms and so on, which in economic terms is usually small 
or medium-sized investment with local influence, see Suendorf, 2001; Van 
Duyne, 2002b and Van Duyne, 2003b), while legitimate businesses do not 
always have easy access to funds (Van Duyne, 1998). This means that criminals 
gain a competitive advantage over legitimate businesses which distorts competi-
tion (see Arlacchi, 1986; Walker, 1995; Keh, 1996; McDowell and Novis, 
2001; Unger et al., 2006). However, these general statements do no justice to 
the fragmented nature of the crime-economy. In the majority of economic 
sectors crime money is also generated within licit companies, for example in 
the construction industry, by fraud and cartel conspiracies (Van Duyne and Van 
Dijck, 2007a), and perhaps to a much larger extent than in the underground 
economy. 
 An interesting example of a crafty laundering technique (not just the avail-
ability of quickly raised cash) which can negatively impact fair market competi-
tion is the following case study:  
Investigators discovered a scheme Yakuza used in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, which involved the purchase of French designer luxury goods, such 
as Louis Vuitton, Channel and Hermes clothing and handbags in France. 
The gangsters used Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese students to buy lux-
ury goods in upmarket French shops. The students paid with money wired 
by gang members from Asian banks to Paris via Luxembourg, Switzerland 
and the Channel Islands. The purchased goods were then exported to Japan 
and sold through a front company. The crime money invested in purchas-
ing the bags and keeping the entire operation running apparently exceeded 
the seemingly licit turnover. The balance, however, had a legitimate appear-
ance. Reportedly, over six years, the gang managed to wash about $75 mil-
lion (perhaps a modest amount for the criminals but quite substantial for or-
dinary people). The ring was busted by the French and Japanese police in 
April 1992. The authorities discovered that the gang had been helped by a 
corrupt French customs official. (Kaplan and Dubro, 2003) 
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However, instances of such successful and elaborate laundering operations are 
exceptional. Inevitably, for this operation to successfully run for over six years, 
it had to involve corrupt customs officials prepared to turn a blind eye to forged 
documents and facilitate the export without questioning it. The ring would 
also have had to include corrupt officials on the Japanese side.  
 
 Outflows of crime money 
The outflow of illicitly generated crime money, which sometimes forms part of 
capital flight, may also have implications for the economy. Developing coun-
tries are particularly susceptible to the downside effects of such outflows of 
crime money and, capital flight in general, as it immediately impacts their 
scarce investment capacity and reduces the rate of national savings. This, in 
turn, badly affects the economic growth of a country. Having said that, it 
should be noted that, essentially, there is no difference with the ‘licit’ flight 
capital. Furthermore, laundered capital will not necessarily leave the country, 
unless it faces the same adverse conditions as licit capital: galloping inflation and 
instability as mentioned below. 
 Such outflows can include both sorts of money - money that is seeking to 
escape law enforcement and regulatory scrutiny and money that is seeking to 
undergo (further) laundering (these can overlap). In the latter case, this money 
may well return to the country of origin (or possibly move to the country of 
residence of the criminal where he can enjoy the fruits of his deeds, if that is 
different from the country of origin). But what is important to note is that such 
outflows are not necessarily ‘unanticipated’ or ‘irrational’, especially when they 
form part of capital flight. Capital flight does not necessarily consist of crime 
money that is leaving the country for laundering purposes and, in addition, is 
also far from irrational. Massive outflows of money are usually caused by do-
mestic economic instability, high tax rates and other factors such as inefficient 
banking services that make domestic investment and saving less advantageous 
than investment and saving abroad. As it is usually triggered by certain eco-
nomic or political events theory models can predict the risk of its occurrence. 
Additionally, the money flows must be related to the nature of the market and 
the country where the major profits are made. As far as the drug markets are 
concerned, large profit margins with a sizeable surplus which must be managed, 
occur within the rich industrial consumer countries at the import and first dis-
tribution level (Reuter and Greenfield, 2001). But at the end of the distribution 
chain where the turnover is low and dealers are largely consumers themselves, 
the surplus above own (often drug) consumption and spending does not re-
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quire special laundering measures. The outflow of ‘narco dollars’ or euros does 
take place but is likely to be only a small part of the total money movement 
from those countries. In contrast, the outflow of corruption money out of small 
and fragile economies has a much more detrimental effect. 
 
 Distorted basis for policy making 
Tanzi (1998, p. 12) highlights that the outflow of $20 billion out of a country 
can cause “confusion for policy makers.” This applies not only to the outflow of 
money but to inflows and domestic expenditures that are beyond the registered 
levels. As Keh (1996) points out, criminal flows are beyond government con-
trol and spending behaviour becomes influenced by unregulated factors, such as 
informal credit. Criminals have access to unofficial money supplies and generate 
domestic activity that remains largely unaccounted for. Thus, the use of crime 
money is, by its very nature, part of the shadow economy, implying an unlaun-
dered existence. That said, it should also be noted that the underground econ-
omy is considerably far more fragmented and less developed than the licit fi-
nancial economy with its institutionalised credit facilities. Within the under-
ground economy money changes hands on a personal level and usually within a 
small (family) circle of trusted people. The Hawala system of money transfers is 
a good example of how significant amounts of money can be transferred 
abroad. However, it appears it had never attracted as much attention and had 
not been considered a significant threat to policy making until the revelation 
that it had apparently been used by Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network. 
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Hawala became increasingly the target of 
attention by the US and other national authorities.193 
 In addition, in the strict sense of the term, laundering performs a transition 
or a ‘bridge’ function: it makes the unregulated regulated by legitimising it. 
This can be performed by a launderer such as a financial service provider, the 
criminal himself, or the tax administration, which is the ultimate laundering 
mill (Van Duyne et al., 2003).  
 Quirk (1996) notes that fiddling with unaccounted money may lead to an 
incomplete or even misleading picture of the amounts of generated and spent 
money. He concludes that money laundering can distort economic data and 
thus also distort macroeconomic analysis and policy making. Again, we should 
note the importance of distinguishing between the various meanings of laun-
dering. It is mainly the unlaundered money (that has not surfaced and has yet to 
                                               
193  See report by Anderson, BBC News Online, 2001. 
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integrate into the legitimate mainstream) that distorts economic data. In fact, 
money laundering, in the strict sense of the term, restores data.  
 While such distortion of economic data (due to unlaundered money) re-
mains a real possibility, this reasoning should not give rise to moral panic. 
McDowell and Novis (2001) are adamant that money laundering takes the 
control of economic policy away from the government. However, such argu-
mentation, albeit in a worthy cause, appears to be misguided rhetoric aimed at 
magnifying the real difficulties to justify the expanding control regime. As re-
marked above, laundering, in the strict sense of the term, in fact, brings the 
illicitly derived proceeds into the realm of the official economy. Moreover, it 
can be regarded as the ‘Achilles Heel’ of criminal activity by which offenders 
can be identified, as will be discussed later in this thesis. 
 The problem is that in their attempt to demonstrate the correctness of their 
arguments, policy makers use all-inclusive, vague, but commonly endorsed 
concepts (as we will also see further below). Given the general acceptance of 
this ‘copy-paste’ line of ill-defined arguments, their rhetoric is astonishingly 
successful. But it remains a question as to how much is achieved in terms of 
effectively fighting profit-oriented crime.   
 
 Effects on tax collection  
It is also claimed that money laundering can decrease tax revenues as laundered 
money evades tax (McDowell and Novis, 2001; Unger et al., 2006). However, 
once again it appears that the process of reasoning stumbles over an ill-defined 
problem (or political mainstream correctness). On the one hand, any use of 
money which evades tax can be regarded as money laundering due to the 
broad definition of the latter. On the other hand, crime money which is effec-
tively laundered, in the strict sense of the term, resurfaces and integrates with 
the licit economy. This means that criminals will inevitably have to pay tax on 
these recorded assets and income. If crime money stays in the shadow economy 
(i.e. does not get laundered, in the strict sense of the term) it will remain un-
taxed as long as it remains secreted away or ‘hoarded’. However, financially and 
economically hoarding is a primitive conduct as it prevents money performing 
its basic role of making transactions efficient. As a matter of fact, it means a 
temporary withdrawal of money from circulation. One may wonder whether, 
and to what extent, this may be more damaging to the licit economy than 
laundering. Hoarding usually takes place by amassing and hiding banknotes of 
high denomination, such as the €500 banknote. Like the previous DM1000 
DM or the NLG1000, large banknotes were kept not only by crime/drug en-
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trepreneurs, but also by farmers (particularly horse traders), car dealers and eld-
erly people, who had more faith in their own rustling banknotes than in the 
bank (see Boeschoten and Fase, 1992). To an extent they proved to be right. 
However, this is also relative as money cannot keep circulating for ever in the 
underground economy like in a kind of monetary “aquarium” (Van Duyne, 
1994b, pp. 54-55). In the end it all ends up at the inevitable tax mill because of 
spending on taxed goods and services, such as holidays, cars and healthcare.  
 Some authors also point out that an increase in predicate offences and 
money laundering activities triggers public enforcement expenditure (Unger et 
al., 2006). So if increased enforcement expenditure means that predicate of-
fences and laundering will decrease, then fighting laundering reduces in its turn 
public enforcement spending. This argument hinges on the assumption that 
there is a causal relationship between the predicate offences for profit and laun-
dering on the one hand, and enforcement on the other hand, such that the 
fight against laundering reduces the level of profit-oriented crime. In a ration-
ally balanced world this seems a plausible thesis, albeit of a sweeping generality. 
As a matter of fact, the findings in the drug market belie this consensual wis-
dom. We have here the picture of falling drug prices (since 1986), changing, 
but not decreasing consumption194 on the one hand, and a decrease in property 
crime on the other hand.195 This suggests a correlation between drug prices and 
property crime to pay for consumption. However, that would be jumping to 
conclusions, because a more determining circumstance could be the greying 
population: the reduced perpetrator group in the age range of 16-24. And 
where can we project plausible effects of anti-laundering policy?  
 Apart from that, we have already seen that the cash-based underground 
economy is quite different from the sector of economic crime, particularly elite 
crime.196 Both sectors are themselves subdivided in types that have little in 
common. Indeed, there is little evidence that –after almost 20 years – the pre-
sent global anti-laundering regime has achieved any significant results in terms 
                                               
194  United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
195  Levels of property crime during this decade are generally lower than during the 1990s. Accord-
ing to a study completed in 2005, there has been “near universal decrease in overall levels of crime in 
the Western world” but most pronounced in property crimes such as car thefts and household 
burglaries (Van Dijk et al., 2007, p. 24). For instance, according to UK government statistics, the 
number of domestic burglaries in England and Wales as of 2005-07 has decreased about twofold 
compared to ten years earlier (UK Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 2008/09).  
196  Elite crime, subspecies of which are corporate and white-collar crime, and corruption of offi-
cials, is, as sociologists define it, crimes perpetrated by individuals of high social status in the con-
text of their occupation (see Sutherland and Cressey, 1978; Andersen and Taylor, 2005; see for 
comments on this subject Gelemerova, 2010). 
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of reducing the level of crime. Despite the reporting of some relatively negligi-
ble results, only the associated expenses proved to be significant.197 Anti-
laundering requirements have created an entire anti-laundering complex of 
‘problem-owners’ ranging from regulators to regulated entities, all trying to 
solve an ill-defined problem on the basis of unclear criteria (see Harvey, 2003; 
Verhage, 2008; Gelemerova, 2008). But problem-owners, (meaning here regu-
lators) are seldom problem-solvers: in fact their ever-widening powers thrive 
on the magnitude of the problem.  
 So instead of making generally accepted sweeping statements, in order to 
use the relationship between predicate offences and enforcement expenditure as 
an argument in policy making, we should first refine the basis for a well-
defined problem definition, achievement measures, proper stocktaking and 
critical inspection of the available data.   
 
 Soundness of the financial system  
It is said that crime money can affect the soundness of the financial system 
(Camdessus, 1998; McDowell and Novis, 2001; Unger et al., 2006). Easily 
gained crime money can be associated with risky operations (see Unger et al., 
2006) and the resulting financial speculation can seriously affect the market. For 
instance, Kaplan and Dubro (2003) suggest that Yakuza’s laundering activities, 
specifically their apparently risky operations, in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(during and at the end of the Bubble economy198), caused damage to the econ-
omy and society of Japan. Japan’s top mobsters quickly learned the craft of 
stock speculation and greenmail199 (Kaplan and Dubor, 2003). Yakuza’s taste 
for high-risk operations apparently stemmed from its ability to easily raise quick 
cash in large amounts. In addition to proceeds from extortion and other crimi-
nal activities, Yakuza also had access to credit, with which it bought stock and 
real estate. When the Bubble burst, prices of stock and real estate dropped dra-
matically. As Yakuza largely failed to repay its loans, banks and other financial 
institutions were led to the verge of bankruptcy (see also Mano, 1998; Kattou-
las, 2002; Fabre, 2003; Manabu, 2005). Thus, it is believed, Yakuza’s specula-
tive market transactions contributed, in the first instance, to the emergence of 
                                               
197  For instance, in the UK “the annual spend on anti-money laundering compliance” has been estimated 
at £109 million for all industry streams (Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 2003, p. 58).  
198 As previously noted, during the era of the Bubble Economy in the late 1980s rapid increase in 
asset prices in Japan eventually ended in a market crash. There is a view that economic bubbles 
can be caused by speculation in stocks, which is often followed by a financial crash.  
199 ‘Greenmailing’ is the practice of acquiring shares in a firm in order to threaten a takeover and 
thereby pressurise the target firm into buying those shares back at a premium in order to suspend 
the takeover (Downes and Goodman, 2006). 
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the Bubble and, then, to delaying the post-reconstruction of the financial sec-
tor.  
 However, while Yakuza’s criminal activities were undeniably a calamity for 
Japan, the extent to which Yakuza’s crime money per se contributed to the 
collapse of the economy is disputable. What fuelled the crisis was an unhealthy 
social mixture: Yakuza’s predicate crimes (loan sharking and massive bank fraud 
among other crimes) and the unwise lending policies coupled with the com-
plex financial relations. This took place in the traditional financial structures and 
existing ‘clientelism’ within the Japanese financial sector (see Hafner, 2002). It 
seems that the apocalyptic tendency for stock speculation was a general market 
trend rather than a characteristic exclusive to Yakuza.  
 So it appears that we have here another piece of unfounded rhetoric. While 
investment in the stock market and financial derivatives can indeed be an effi-
cient way of laundering (see Hafner, 2002) (if one succeeds in avoiding the 
paper trail), there is little evidence that criminals prefer risky operations or are 
inclined to engage in risky operations more than the average businessman. As a 
matter of fact, research on confiscated criminal wealth shows that criminal ‘high 
earners’ did not gather ‘abstract’ assets like shares.200 As discussed earlier in this 
thesis, Sindona’s alleged high-risk financial transactions contributed to the col-
lapse of his empire. Risk is risk to anyone, whether a criminal or a legitimate 
businessman, and a criminal can lose as much as a legitimate businessman while 
in addition he faces a tough debt settlement. A range of other factors such as, 
for instance, circulation of oil money coupled with bad governance and, most 
importantly, corruption, are as much (or probably even more) likely to bring 
about serious downside effects on the macro-economy of a country (see Cor-
onil, 1997; Collier, 2007; Ghazvinian, 2007). That does not mean that crime 
money investment should be tolerated. But that is a moral issue. However, 
targeting it as a top priority based on financial market arguments requires a 
better foundation and improved tools. It is not the crime money per se but the 
type of crime-money earner that gives rise to a particular type of financial con-
duct, whether it is unanticipated, risky or irrational. 
  
 Loss of trust in the financial system  
Quirk (1996) points out that crime money and money laundering may have led 
to a weakened confidence in financial markets. But what is the evidence? This 
                                               
200  In the Dutch research this amounts to 0,097 % of the confiscated value (Van Duyne, 2003). In 
the continued research project the attention will again be on ‘high-level’ economic activities, 
like the real estate sector. Thus far crime-entrepreneurs prove to be an utterly (licit) economic 
disappointment (Van Duyne et al., 2009; Van Duyne and Soudijn, 2009 and 2010).  
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may be valid for economically underdeveloped or unstable countries, or stable 
countries in the midst of a financial crisis, but this lack of confidence is rather 
caused by the careless service of banks and the lack of trust in the financial pol-
icy of the state. It is bad service that irritates people and a poorly managed bank 
that frightens them. The collapse of the rouble taught Russian savers a lesson, 
not about laundering, but about bad banking and untrustworthy financial pol-
icy (see Stiglitz, 2002). The 2008 credit crisis taught savers a global lesson about 
trust in the financial system. The public is not afraid of launderers, but of bank-
ers who cannot return their savings (see also Harvey, 2005 and 2007). Also, at 
the time in which sensational stories abounded about serious criminals banking 
in Switzerland, ‘respectable’ tax evaders were undeterred and continued to 
deposit their hidden savings at Swiss banks. 
 The loss of trust in a financial system can adversely affect the economy 
(Tanzi, 1998; McDowell and Novis, 2001). Having said that, the usual exam-
ples mentioned by the majority of authors refer to a phenomenon that is not 
necessarily money laundering in the strict sense of the term (see below), but 
some form of financial crime, or crime money logistics, combined with ineffi-
cient banking management and bad governance.  
 
 Crime money infiltration or crime money generation?  
Arlacchi (1998, p. 5) notes that “globalisation has turned the financial system into a 
money-launderer’s dream and that criminal process siphons away billions of dollars per 
year from economic growth at a time when the financial health of every country affects the 
stability of the global marketplace.” He further notes that the infiltration of crime 
money, albeit sometimes in small amounts, “may prove a catalyst for a chain reac-
tion” of unforeseeable magnitude (Arlacchi, 1998, p. 7). The reason for that, 
according to Arlacchi, is that criminal entrepreneurs bring into the legal market 
“fresh strains of adventurism and anarchy” (p. 7) that can cause a worldwide finan-
cial breakdown. Arlacchi brings forward the old and over-quoted cases of 
BCCI, the European Union Bank of Antigua and Bank Ambrosiano201 as ex-
amples of the collapse of financial institutions due to illegal dealings and use of 
offshore secrecy. 
 When discussing the macroeconomic aspects of offshore money laundering, 
Tanzi (1998) also points out that scandals such as the BCCI and the European 
Union Bank ultimately led to the loss of trust in the international financial sys-
                                               
201  However, of these three examples (BCCI and the European Union Bank of Antigua have been 
referred to elsewhere in this thesis) only Bank Ambrosiano (also discussed earlier) was purpose-
fully turned into a money laundering vehicle in the strict sense of the term.    
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tem. McDowell and Novis (2001) also refer to the same examples, as well as 
the Barings Bank collapse, highlighting that criminal activity can result in bank 
failures. McDowell and Novis further note that financial institutions which rely 
on criminal capital face challenges in adequately managing their assets, liabilities 
and general operations (as mentioned earlier).  
 To an extent this may be a valid point. However, it is important to note 
that such institutions are not necessarily part of the sound banking system and 
are usually isolated and often short-lived phenomena that are bound to end, not 
in a take-over but in collapse due to insolvency. Moreover, this is again com-
paring apples and oranges: these banks collapsed for different reasons. It would 
be helpful to differentiate between banks which are used for laundering, banks 
which operate as financial pyramids and banks which are perfectly legitimate 
but have been misused for criminal purposes, often by their own staff. The 
owners of the European Union Bank, for instance, were thieves rather than 
launderers (in the strict sense of the term) (see Van Duyne et al., 2005). Barings 
Bank is altogether a different case. It was a classic example of accounting fraud 
that occurred due to the lack of an adequate internal check-and-balances sys-
tem. If we are to interpret the broad definition of laundering, by hiding his 
trading rogue trader Nick Leeson was in fact hiding the origin of his potential 
gains (ultimately mainly losses). In a way, this case is an illustration of launder-
ing of losses rather than of gains but this is an over-stretched interpretation of 
the laundering term. These references, such as the reference to Barings Bank, 
represent rather a continual recycling of only a few examples, some of which 
have little to do with laundering but serve the purposes of policy makers. 
 The series of bank failures (as opposed to isolated cases) which occurred 
during the financial crises in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia during the 
1990s were largely caused by mismanagement, asset stripping, misappropriation 
of funds and bank fraud rather than money laundering per se (another matter is 
that laundering was taking place on a large scale too). It was not so much a 
question of crime-money infiltration but a question of crime-money genera-
tion. The process of crime-money generation was largely facilitated by corrup-
tion, sometimes with lethal violence202 and bad governance. For instance, ac-
cording to the IMF (1997), the severe financial crisis in Bulgaria was caused by 
the slow pace of structural reform and the lack of financial discipline in the 
banking sector. There were no efficient regulations in place, and the ones that 
                                               
202  Specifically, the Russian media has widely reported on a series of murders of Russian bankers 
throughout the 1990s and well into the 2000s (see a chronology of some of the murders in 
Newsru.com, 14 September 2006). 
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existed were not effectively enforced (see Baloun and Scheinost, 2002 and 
2003, for an account of similar developments in the Czech Republic). 
 Indeed among such bank failures were also cases of what appeared to be 
money laundering (both in the strict and broad meaning of the term) in com-
bination with mismanagement and fraud: 
This appeared to be the case with the Bulgarian Balkanbank. It was founded 
in 1987, i.e. prior to the market reforms in Bulgaria, as an industry bank in 
the machine-building sector. In 2002 Ivan Mironov, the bank’s former di-
rector, was charged with abuse of office. According to prosecutors, in the 
early to mid-1990s he allowed the granting of 30 loans, mostly with no 
adequate guarantee, to 22 companies. As the loans were never repaid, the 
financial burden on the bank apparently led to its bankruptcy in 1997.203 
Reportedly, a considerable number of the bank’s debtors were companies 
affiliated with the infamous Multigroup,204 the owner of which, Iliya Pav-
lov, was murdered in 2003. Iliya Pavlov has been alleged to have handled 
and laundered money misappropriated by the former socialist regime no-
menclature.205 However, Mironov was acquitted in 2006.206 
 
In effect, the loans from banks that went bankrupt during the 1990s may well 
have been partly used for money laundering but as the money was never (fully) 
returned, it was imperfect laundering because of the scrutiny it attracted. Thus 
it appears that the banks’ collapse was, after all, caused not by crime money 
infiltration but rather by crime money generation and the lack of adequate 
control. Indeed, fraudsters take the money out of the bank, launderers bring it 
into it.207 
 
                                               
203  Expert.bg of 12 June 2006, The Sofia Echo of 8 January 2004.  
204  Mediapool of 12 December 2002. 
205  According to General Atanas Atanasov, former head of the National Security Department of 
Bulgaria’s Ministry of Interior, many of those who were “connected with the genesis of smuggling 
channels and received funds from the former communist party were now being liquidated [killed]” apparently 
referring to the murder of Iliya Pavlov (see Nanev, Maritsa, 21 August 2003). The former 
speaker of left-wing ex-prime minister Zhan Videnov, Krasimir Raydovsky, said in an interview 
for Darik radio on 14 March 2003 that in the early years of the transition period, business was 
established with party funds. He said “future capitalists were given money from the membership fees of 
the former Bulgarian Communist Party.” He noted that Iliya Pavlov’s business empire Multigroup 
was founded by the “party-state”.  
206 In several other cases of Bulgarian banks that went bankrupt during the 1990s, the suspected 
culprits were eventually acquitted as prosecutors apparently wrongfully charged them with abuse 
of office under a provision that was supposed to apply only to state officials. Some of the bankers 
later even sued the Bulgarian state for moral and material damages (see Iliev in Banker, 11 Janu-
ary 2008). 
207  Another example is the phenomenon of ‘tunnelling’ within the banks in the Czech Republic as 
described by Baloun and Scheinost (2003)  
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 Furthering outlawed activities 
Crime money can be used to further outlawed activities including corrupt 
practices and terrorism. Bandurka and Simovian (2003) illustrate how proceeds 
from drug trafficking were used to finance terrorist activities, buy arms and hire 
mercenaries in Chechnya and Afghanistan. Crime-money can also be used to 
bribe officials, bankers and judges; it can be invested to equip laboratories for 
the processing of drugs or the supply of printing equipment to forge banknotes 
or to cover other business costs. However, the organisation of many crimes, 
specifically fraud schemes, requires little (i.e. telephone, e-mail, letter heading, 
straw man) or almost no investment at all. Besides, even where there is invest-
ment in crime, it does not necessarily involve any laundering in the strict sense 
of the term. Indeed, gathering intelligence on potential laundering activities 
(which will be discussed later), within the remits of the broad laundering defi-
nition, can be a useful tool to identify leads to predicate crimes. However, 
trying to root out laundering in order to prevent or eliminate all kinds of profit 
oriented crime seems to have little effect (exceptions include crimes such as 
some financial fraud schemes which can indeed be prevented through a rigor-
ous but well-targeted financial control regime).  
 
 Reputational risks 
A major undesirable effect of crime money and money laundering is the associ-
ated reputational risk (McDowell and Novis, 2001; Clark and Vickers, 2002; 
Bandurka and Simovian, 2003; Unger et al., 2006). To an extent, reputational 
issues are intertwined with the same argument as the integrity and soundness of 
the financial system (which was discussed above). Organisations which in any 
way (even negligently) deal with crime-entrepreneurs or handle tainted money 
risk reputational damage. It is claimed that revelations, suggesting that a finan-
cial institution or any business has been in any way connected to laundering 
activities and crime money, can scare off clients, partners and investors resulting 
in the decline of business and subsequent financial losses in addition to possible 
regulatory penalties (however, there is little evidence that clients have been 
easily scared off by such revelations with regard to banks in tax heavens). Such 
losses can, to an extent, quantify the reputational risk and damage that is oth-
erwise difficult to measure. But a proper differentiation must be made between 
reputational risks due to involvement in crime for profit and risks due to pro-
viding only laundering services. 
 For instance, New York Daily News had to deal with serious reputational 
issues after Robert Maxwell reportedly used it as a laundering vehicle for the 
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money he siphoned off from the London pension fund of Maxwell Mirror 
Group Newspaper PLC in 1991. The news group had to undergo expensive 
lawsuits to prove that it had not benefited from the illicit transactions and that it 
had not been directly involved in their organisation.208 
 The reputational risk can extend to whole sectors and countries. It is 
claimed that if specific economic sectors are perceived to be vulnerable to 
money launderers, this may have a ‘dampening’ effect on foreign direct invest-
ment (IMF, 2010). Southwell (2002) also notes that in weaker countries crimi-
nal business fronts (and within the broad laundering concept, using a front is 
equal to laundering) often out-compete or terrorise their legitimate rivals, 
thereby scaring off investors from entire sectors. For instance, this has been the 
case in Bulgaria when, in the early 1990s, extortion businesses functioning as 
insurance firms made it difficult for some legitimate insurance providers to 
exist. Other small enterprises also suffered from their intimidation. However, 
there is little empirical evidence that money-laundering fronts (i.e. in the nar-
row sense, as a criminal financial service) would function in the same way as 
other criminal business fronts operate. It is unlikely that any business that is 
used to launder money would work in a way that would allow out-
manoeuvring other players in the market in an obvious manner. Instead, 
money-laundering fronts seek to maintain a low profile: their task is to hide 
and disguise, not attract attention. That said, it would be a different matter if 
money laundering is understood broadly – in that event any business that 
evades or has evaded tax at some point or has in any way been associated with 
tainted money could be viewed as a ‘money laundering’ front which would be 
an overstretched application of the term.  
 Nevertheless, reputational risk is a real and undisputable potential effect and 
the growth of the risk management and due diligence industry is proof of the 
growing awareness of this risk. But it seems that these days due diligence209 is 
                                               
208  According to Judge Tina Brozman, Maxwell used the US tabloid New York Daily News, which 
he acquired in March 1991, as a “money laundering device”. Brozman stated that Maxwell and his 
associates could siphon funds from Daily News accounts and transfer them “to and from Maxwell-
controlled private side and public side entities in furtherance of their own private agenda” (Arena, Newsday, 
10 March 1994). The majority of the $200 million claims against the bankrupt New York Daily 
News came from former Maxwell’s companies, including Britain’s Mirror Group Newspaper. 
The laundering scheme included the transfer of funds siphoned from these companies to New 
York bank accounts in the name of New York Daily, where the funds would be deposited for 
several hours or one or two days, and then transferred elsewhere (Sanger, Newsday, 16 June 
1992). 
209  The term ‘due diligence’ is generally understood to be the use of procedures aimed at verifying 
facts and the identity of a customer or a partner. The meaning of the term has gradually been 
broadened to include examining the background, integrity, sources of wealth and extent of po-
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increasingly becoming a matter of compliance rather than a matter of sound 
risk management practice (this subject will be touched upon in a later section). 
At the same time, there is little evidence that the high cost of compliance with 
the current regulations is outweighed by the benefits these regulations are sup-
posed to provide (see Harvey, 2007). As compliance is largely based on vague 
concepts and insufficiently clear guidance (see Gelemerova, 2008), turning into 
“compulsive excessive regulatory disorder” as defined by Van Duyne (2008, p. 1), 
many businesses tend to over-comply, even though over-compliance does not 
necessarily achieve the desired outcome (Harvey, 2007). Moreover, it appears 
sometimes that it is just the regulatory reprimand for inadequate anti-money 
laundering control systems with subsequent over-exposure in the media, rather 
than the connection to any specific criminal activity, that may cause reputa-
tional damage. Even the slightest hint that laundering might happen is sufficient 
for large scale media coverage, including a camera crew in front of the office, as 
happened with Holland Casino in the late 1990s.210  
 Besides, it is ultimately the occurrence of unethical practices rather than the 
inflow of crime money per se that can destroy the trust in an organisation and 
eventually result in withdrawal of business (see Van Duyne et al., 2005). Fur-
thermore (as reviewed elsewhere in this thesis), when discussing the risk of 
reputational damage, we cannot avoid addressing the question: beyond what 
point is illicitly derived money no longer tainted (see Van Duyne et al., 2005) 
and therefore no longer associated with a reputational risk? (This issue will be 
touched upon in a later section). We have seen a process of evolutionary clean-
sing of wealth (‘gentrification’, as discussed earlier) not only in Russia and East-
ern Europe, but also in the USA and other western countries. Should banks 
never accept the money of oligarchs or heads of states only because they may 
have been, at some point in the past, involved in questionable dealings? After 
all, in its non-physical form, as a claim, money is virtually indestructible and 
therefore retains its past. 
 We also have a range of smells and colours for all sorts of other money, e.g. 
from oil and diamond proceeds to ‘hot’ money shifted offshore by wealthy 
                                                                                                              
litical exposure of a customer or a partner (‘enhanced due diligence’). Palmer (2001) notes that 
the concept of ‘due diligence’ has its roots in the legal concept of a ‘duty of care’ which is a 
‘duty to enquire’ further where deemed necessary.  
210  In 1997 the media reported that Theo van Keulen was forced to resign as the president of Hol-
land Casino amidst a scandal involving tax evasion and money laundering allegations. In 1998 he 
was sentenced to six months in prison or 240 hours community service for his role in the alleged 
money-laundering ring (see report by Bos in International Gaming and Wagering Business, 1 De-
cember 1997; Agence France-Presse, 26 February 1998).  
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individuals and rich corporations. In this confusion of colours businesses may 
find themselves in disarray, seeking to find the right balance between reputa-
tional risks, as far as these really matter, and profit targets. However, regulators 
provide no recipe for how to deal with this.  
 Interestingly, prior to the US launching the war against money laundering 
and Switzerland coming under pressure to tighten its control system, hardly 
anyone had any qualms about investing in Switzerland and any fear of reputa-
tional damage. The Nazis and the Jewish community, the drug dealers and the 
secret services, the fraudsters and the bourgeois tax evaders alike believed they 
could safely keep their money in Switzerland, but the Swiss economy barely 
suffered any reputational damage. In the 1980s the tide was turning. In various 
publications Switzerland was accused of being the best ‘white washing’ country 
(see Ziegler’s “La Suisse lave plus blanc” or “Swiss Whitewash”, 1990, and 
Bernasconi’s “Finanzunterwelt” or “Financial Underworld”, 1988). Further-
more, Swiss banks were frequently mentioned in the context of various bank-
ing affairs, like the Banco Ambrosiano affair. Nevertheless, even with some 
stains on its blazon, the flow of customers and monies to Switzerland did not 
dry up. The same applies to its neighbour, Liechtenstein. This raises the ques-
tion of the empirical evidence of a causal relationship between money launder-
ing accusations on the one hand, and investment withdrawals because of the 
reputational loss on the other hand.211 
 Maybe we should look at ‘reputational risk’ differently. With the socio-
political construction of laundering, the authorities created a new reputational 
risk of ‘untrustworthiness’. This is not about cheating or prejudicing clients, but 
‘helping criminals’. And because non-compliance is easily equated to ‘helping 
criminals’, now every company and state is cautious about its reputation. The 
authorities have achieved this partly by ‘copy-paste’ recycling and indiscrimi-
nately throwing together various examples, some of which are not money-
laundering in the strict sense of the term, but which apparently help strengthen 
the popular “threat imagery” (Van Duyne , 2010, p. 356). However, there is no 
evidence that in this respect the authorities reflect any public concern, as until 
                                               
211  In 2002 the UK Financial Services Authority fined the Royal Bank of Scotland for money 
laundering control failings (see FSA, 2002). In 2009 the media reported (see Mann, The Miami 
Herald, 11 May 2009) that Lloyds TSB Bank, an international bank based in the United King-
dom, agreed to pay $350 million to the US authorities for violating US federal and New York 
state laws. Lloyds TSB was found to have falsified information on electronic fund transfers from 
Iranian and Sudanese banks to US banks in violation of US sanctions and trade restrictions (this 
subject will be discussed again later in this thesis). The violations equalled to money laundering. 
However, it remains a question whether this has scared off any of these banks’ customers.  
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now the affluent normal citizen continued to look for financial secrecy services 
delivered by efficient and trustworthy banks. As he is looking for such services 
for concealing his own assets, he and other similar customers know very well 
that this is just a euphemism for laundering. As long as the financial institution 
has the reputation of returning their (concealed) savings, they will feel little 
concern about reputational risk related to money laundering. From this per-
spective ‘reputational risk’ is a construction largely shaped by regulators and law 
enforcement agencies. This does not mean that it is a soft concept: once an 
institution has been labelled as associated with money laundering, it faces seri-
ous consequences,212 but not necessarily from customers.  
 
c. The moral issue  
While the enforcement of the anti-money laundering regime appears to have 
been supported with somewhat misguided or insincere rhetoric and have been 
undermined by the lack of sufficiently methodical research, the key point of the 
regime should not be dismissed. Above all, money laundering allows criminals 
to thrive and enjoy their proceeds. It ensures that crime pays and this is why 
anyone who facilitates it deserves to be punished.  
A good example of how laundering can help to ensure impunity appears to 
be the case of the Bulgarian businessman Konstantin Dimitrov who was 
killed in 2003. Dimitrov, also known as Kosyo Samokovetsa, was alleged to 
have earned millions of dollars from contraband trafficking in the Balkans 
and was investigated for money laundering. In late 2006, three years after 
his murder, the authorities launched a money laundering investigation 
against his widow, Angelina Dimitrova. In anticipation of Bulgaria’s acces-
sion to the EU, the general prosecutors’ office stated that it had compiled a 
list of individuals whose property was potentially the subject of confiscation 
under the Law on Confiscation of Illicitly Gained Property. One of the first 
cases initiated under the law was against Angelina Dimitrova. However, the 
outcome of the case was widely reported by the press as ‘a fiasco’. Accord-
ing to the forensic examination by auditors, lawyers and investigators, Dimi-
trov’s records listed as a source of licit income what appeared to be quite a 
successful potato production business, amongst other things. When he was 
murdered in 2003 his wealth  (including assets in the UK) was estimated at 
$60 million. Yet in 2006 the authorities managed to confiscate only a small 
fraction of it: assets that cost $39.000 at the time of acquisition by Dimitrov 
                                               
212  Including penalties and sometimes costly trials.  
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that were now estimated at about $150.000. These assets included a small 
flat in the seacoast city of Varna, one fourth of a flat in Sofia, and a garage. 
Dimitrov’s main assets, including hotel Konstantin Palace, had already been 
allegedly laundered and sold by his widow prior to the launch of the inves-
tigation. She reportedly earned BGN 4 million (approximately $2,6 mil-
lion), in exchange for the hotel, through front companies. While the au-
thorities had difficulties establishing the real amount of all illegitimately 
gained assets and prevent the laundering and sale of these assets, Angelina 
Dimitrova had little trouble showing that she and her late husband had le-
gitimately earned nearly half a million dollars between 1990 and 1999, in-
cluding about $277.641 from potato production, financial support from 
Dimitrov’s parents amounting to $30.000, income from a restaurant busi-
ness and other trading activities and presents from friends.213 While the sale 
of assets had likely involved wire transfers abroad, the potato production 
legend is not a sophisticated laundering technique that would involve inter-
national transactions and offshore corporate vehicles (i.e. the use of the ad-
vantages that globalisation offers). Dimitrov has declared profits from potato 
production and has probably duly paid profit tax.  
 
What is the moral? One does not need to be cynical to see the irony in this 
story. Even after his death, Dimitrov managed to ridicule the authorities, while 
his widow continued to enjoy the fruits of the alleged crime. The story could 
have ended there, because as broad as it is, the application of the laundering 
definition is largely subject to convenient political choices. The continuation of 
the Dimitrov story demonstrates that, despite draconian laws and the broad 
laundering definition, (or because of it) the process of enforcing justice had 
been at fault somewhere along the line. Would Dimitrov’s widow be allowed 
to remain in possession of the criminal heritage? 
 The size of the entire estate of Angelina Dimitrova remains a question. 
However, in appeal proceedings with regard to those assets that were to be 
confiscated, in 2008 the Supreme Appeal Court ruled, after all, that Angelina 
Dimitrova and her late husband could not have made their money (or not, at 
least, a substantial portion of it) through growing potatoes. Apparently, as the 
court revealed, they were not registered as agricultural producers at the time 
when they were supposed to be dealing in the potato business and were not 
                                               
213  See Bulgarian media reports including Radoeva, Monitor of 30 November 2006, Standard of 30 
November 2006, see also Mediapool, 7 December 2003. 
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able to produce documents to proof the purchase of potato seed or fertilisers.214 
As it appears, the Dimitrovs had not thought it through well enough.215  
 
3.3.2. Different earners – different forms of conduct 
 
It seems obvious that money laundering is required for large-scale earnings, 
although the law does not differentiate between ‘large’ and ‘small’ money laun-
dering. In practice, there is a commonly accepted average threshold of €15.000 
($10.000 in the US216) by which financial transactions should be reported or be 
subject to customer due diligence as required by the Third EU Directive, 
unless, with smaller sums, the acting person behaves ‘suspiciously’.217 No ex-
plicit guidance has been given as to how and whether we should watch out 
only for large-scale criminal earners. As a matter of fact, small transactions also 
have to be scrutinised lest they might be a component in a ‘smurfing chain’218 
in order to remain under the €15.000 threshold. 
 Hence, the proceeds from all sorts of crimes are categorised using a com-
mon denominator, regardless of the nature of crime, the volume of money and 
                                               
214  See Bulgarian media reports, including Dnevnik of 10 August 2008. 
215  Yet, it appears that in separate proceedings for alleged contraband activities and related launder-
ing Angelina Dimitrova was acquitted in 2010. Reportedly the judge ruled that since the of-
fence of contraband could not be proven, there was no money laundering, although the deci-
sion was apparently not final (see Dnevnik, 26 May 2010). 
216  In some circumstances the requirements are more complicated. For instance, in the US, Money 
Services Businesses have to comply with two different dollar thresholds that require a SAR. As 
explained on the website of the US Internal Revenue Service, the thresholds depend on the 
stage of discovery and the type of transaction involved. A $2.000 threshold applies if a customer 
is conducting or attempting to conduct a transaction(s) that aggregates to $2.000 or more - the 
$2.000 front door rule for transactions which are face-to-face with the customer. A threshold of 
$5.000 applies for transactions identified by issuers of money orders or traveler’s checks from a 
review of clearance records - the $5.000 back door rule which applies after the records have 
been processed at the issuer level, i.e. the back door (IRS website, last updated on 30 November 
2010). 
217  In the US any transaction in currency of $10.000 or more requires filing a Currency Transaction 
Report (CTR). Regardless of the amount, if there is suspicion that the money is the proceeds of 
crime or the customer is trying to avoid the BSA reporting requirements or in some other way 
is violating the law, a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) has to be filed. In Europe, the Third 
EU Directive, article 22, states that Member States shall require the reporting institu-
tions/persons to promptly inform the FIU where the institution knows, suspects or has reason-
able grounds to suspect that the transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist financing. 
Article 7 states that the reporting institutions shall apply customer due diligence: (a) when estab-
lishing a business relationship; (b) when carrying out occasional transactions amounting to 
€15.000 or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several opera-
tions which appear to be linked; (c) when there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist 
financing, regardless of any derogation, exemption or threshold; (d) when there are doubts 
about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained identification data. 
218  ‘Smurfing’ is the practice of structuring a transaction into a series of transactions of smaller 
amounts in order to avoid regulatory and law enforcement scrutiny.  
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the characteristics of its earner. But it seems quite obvious that different catego-
ries of criminals have different goals, different laundering (or rather crime-
money management) needs and different financial conduct. Different forms of 
financial conduct have different impacts on the economy (as discussed earlier). 
The unwanted effects of crime money and laundering are largely determined 
by the nature of the predicate crime and the related volume and ‘colour’ of the 
proceeds (which will be discussed in the next section). 
 The criminal activities of the ‘usual suspects’, e.g. drug dealers, the kind of 
offenders legislation has been historically aimed at, who usually have to deal 
with large quantities of quickly raised cash, generate different money launder-
ing needs compared to criminal earners such as alleged money launderer 
Robert Maxwell (Reuter and Truman, 2005). High-cash business is often the 
easiest way for drug dealers to launder their money. However, Maxwell needed 
a more sophisticated and instant laundering vehicle for the money he report-
edly siphoned off from the London pension fund of Maxwell Mirror Group 
Newspaper PLC in 1991.  
 Stripping off the assets of a bank bringing it to bankruptcy or siphoning off 
the money from a pension fund, can generate a massive profit exceeding several 
hundred million dollars. The perpetrators of such offences are not ‘the usual 
suspects’. Rather, they are usually well educated and well connected people 
with insider knowledge and in a position of trust.219 In order to instantly pro-
vide a legitimate appearance to their massive profits, such offenders would need 
to undertake an equally massive money laundering operation, either concur-
rently with the offence or subsequently. If not carried out well, the impact of 
such a money laundering operation would be distinctly visible, as in the case of 
Maxwell. On the contrary, the impact of money laundering undertaken by 
criminal gangs is less visible and more difficult to prove because it is spread over 
time. The activities of a gang are not limited to a single crime but include con-
sistent perpetration of offences, each on a smaller scale. Additionally, a large 
proportion of the revenues of organised crime groups is usually being distrib-
uted between the numerous group members in portions too small to require 
the use of laundering techniques. 
                                               
219  The profiles of the various offenders often reflect the laundering modus operandi. If these are the 
‘usual suspects’, i.e. the kind of offenders legislation has been historically aimed at, they will be 
seeking to launder the money in an easy, simple way, for instance via cash-based business such as 
restaurants and pizzerias. If they are sophisticated offenders, their laundering schemes will be 
likely head and shoulder above the schemes applied by the ‘usual suspects’, simply because these 
sophisticated offenders are in a position of trust and have access to better resources in the upper-
world. 
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 The revenues of fraudsters can also be spread over time (e.g. VAT fraud), 
but these will be interwoven in their ‘upperworld’ business. In the case of elite 
crime ‘high-fliers’ such as Stanford and Madoff, the laundering activities are 
naturally spread over long periods of time, but that is mainly due to the fact 
that in such cases the predicate crime coincides with the laundering offence.  
 In some cases, where the scope and type of criminal activities require a 
large-scale money laundering operation and a high level of organisation, the 
flow of funds can move from the countries of origin to countries of investment, 
for instance from Russia to the UK, and return with a transformed, ‘legitimate’ 
appearance.  
 As previously discussed, where the criminal money earners do not wish to 
‘put their money to work’, e.g. invest in a legitimate enterprise for instance 
through privatisation procedures, they may simply seek to move their funds to 
banks of high discretion, e.g. offshore (even if interest rates there are low). 
 Concealment of crime-money and large-scale laundering operations may 
necessitate cross-border transfers and offshore structures, while laundering, in 
the strict sense of the term, of smaller amounts of crime money can be done in 
a domestic context with no need for offshore accounts and shell firms. There is 
the broad category of smaller criminal earners whose activities are less, or not at 
all, international in scope and who do not need to take advantage of globalisa-
tion in order to launder their funds. In fact, even big criminal earners can gen-
erate and launder crime proceeds domestically, but need to pay attention to 
their ‘financial space’ in which they plan their laundering. 
 Allegedly, laundering in certain sectors is considered easy and a kind of 
natural aspect of the nature of the enterprise. However, this normally holds true 
under routine criminal controls and is aided by corruption. Public procurement 
schemes can be facilitated by corrupt officials, making obtaining evidence or 
even disclosure difficult. Property development is another sector, although the 
launderer cannot act alone: investing ‘funny’ or ‘hot’ money and keeping the 
books in order requires a ‘pre-wash’ and accountancy support. It is said that 
high cash businesses such as consumer product retailers, restaurants and catering 
services, gambling and betting, (where it is difficult to precisely check incoming 
and outgoing money flows), can all be used for money laundering. While this is 
true, it is in fact the business volume which determines the space for launder-
ing. For example, the artificial increase of the turnover of a restaurant may 
appear easy, but without increase in profit there is no or little white money 
generated. Increasing the profit is not easy because an increase of turnover en-
tails increasing expenses: staff and the buying of food and drink. Indeed, to 
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launder in a businesslike fashion, one must be able to run a business properly. 
For this, few criminal earners have the required skill. As a matter of fact, as 
previously noted, in his research of crime-money management patterns in the 
Netherlands, Van Duyne (2003b) has found little empirical proof of sophisti-
cated laundering schemes (but that concerns the ‘usual suspects’ as opposed to 
sophisticated ‘elite crime’ high-fliers). Analysing the laundering conduct of 
high-earners (€450.000 plus income) he arrived at the following results: 
 
Table 2 









Export 31 9 2 42 
Ownership disguise 10 5 4 19 
Justification     
• Loan back 3 3  6 
• Payroll  2   2 
• Speculation      
• Bookkeeping  7 4 2 13 
‘Untraceable’ 4 8 2 14 
 
As can be observed in the table, fraudulent bookkeeping occurred much less 
than simply exporting the money out of the country. It was also surprising that 
corporate criminals displayed much less effort to launder their crime-money 
inside their firm by means of fraudulent accounting. Most entrepreneurs simply 
took it out of their firm to spend it on the pleasures of life. 
 The point is that usually the scale of earning and the predicate crime are 
likely to determine the subsequent criminal financial management conduct of 
the criminal earner. But this is not an undimensional causal path dictated by the 
volume of crime-money only. To understand money management, one also 
has to understand the socio-economic culture in which this takes place. For 
example, a criminal earner of an ethnic non-integrated minority is more likely 
to export the money to his home country. The indigenous crime-entrepreneur 
has other ideas: unless he reinvests his money in a licit business, his money trails 
lead to an expensive lifestyle (e.g. expensive travels frequently documented by 
credit card payments). Therefore, the effect of criminal money management 
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conduct on the economy and society as a whole can vary widely, naturally first 
of all by volume. One may wonder whether the manifestations should really be 
brought under one denominator. 
 The way money from large-scale economic crime is laundered sometimes 
mirrors serious ambitions, for example concerning the ‘licit’ firm which is also 
the source of the criminal income. This depends on how criminal earners pro-
ject themselves in society. The 200 illegal cartel builders in the Dutch construc-
tion industry netted tens of millions euros and even established a separate firm 
only for clearing mutual claims and handling the related fraudulent documents, 
and thereby the laundering. This was, in effect, a high-level, high-earning or-
ganisation. However, apart from already having presumably a high licit salary 
(at least as far as the senior managers are concerned), the firms also kept the 
crime-money, thereby strengthening their economic and social position (Van 
Duyne et al., 2005; Van Duyne and Van Dijck, 2007a). This type of crime-
money earner should be targeted differently when compared to the lavish 
spenders or small earners who may not even need laundering in the strict sense 
of the term. Petty or ‘mid-level’ criminals can enjoy their crime-money by 
simply spending it on daily needs. Crime money can be blissfully enjoyed as 
long as it is not questioned (by the tax authorities, privatisation agencies, banks 
and so on). However, given the skewed distribution of criminal income, when 
all criminal earnings are categorised the same, it remains a question how suc-
cessful and how valid this one size-fits-all approach is. 
 
3.3.3. Differentiation between money from various crimes 
 
Seriousness of predicate crimes and money laundering 
Although money laundering is a consequential crime that depends on predicate 
crimes, according to criminal law, it is a separate offence with its own maxi-
mum penalty, not necessarily related to the maximum penalty of other of-
fences. This means that the laundering consequences of a successful embezzle-
ment, for example, may carry a higher sentence than the actual embezzlement. 
The question is whether this is the right approach.  
 When we consider the effects of crime-money and money laundering in 
terms of seriousness, we have to take into account the nature of the predicate 
crime and its seriousness. As discussed earlier, the seriousness of crime can often 
be subjective as it is largely based on value-based perceptions. Seriousness is a 
complex variable that reflects the relative weight of wrongfulness and harmful-
ness of an offence (O’Connell and Whelan, 1996). The assessment of crime 
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seriousness is an important exercise as the degree of blameworthiness and harm 
determine the criminal blameworthiness and the potentially related punish-
ment. There are various methods in evaluating and ranking the seriousness of 
crime, including public surveys of perceptions and statistical and monetary as-
sessments based on measuring losses from crime and the expenses incurred by 
victims and so on. Results produced by different methodologies may differ to 
the extent that certain variables are taken into account or left out (see for in-
stance Cohen, 1988). Moreover, while there may be a degree of uniformity in 
the average rankings, research shows that individual perceptions may also vary 
widely, thus challenging the general consensus of perceived crime seriousness 
(see Durham, 1988; Davis and Kemp, 1994; Kwan et al., 2002; Paulin et al., 
2003). 
 Additionally, perceptions change over the years. For instance, for a long 
time criminologists believed that the public had little concern about white-
collar crime until a series of high-profile cases appeared to have raised people’s 
awareness (see Goff and Nason-Clark, 1989). Recent allegations of large-scale 
fraud schemes, specifically the Madoff and Stanford cases that shook the indus-
try in 2008-09, have added to this feeling of seriousness. For many years now 
drug trafficking has been perceived as a serious crime and, as reviewed in pre-
vious chapters, the powerful war on drugs developed into a war on money 
laundering. Laundering became to be perceived almost as equally seriously as 
drug trafficking.  
 Policy makers have continuously sought to convince the public of the need 
to fight money laundering (as reviewed in the previous section) but little atten-
tion has been paid to the relationship between the seriousness of laundering and 
the varying degree of seriousness of the underlying criminal conduct, and to the 
way the various types of conduct should be treated. As reviewed earlier, there 
have been prosecutions on laundering charges for the simple act of cashing 
embezzled cheques or paying rent with tainted money. Yet it seems that pro-
fessional launderers, the ones who are really deep into the laundering business 
(and perhaps, there are not so many of them around), somehow manage to stay 
out of sight of law enforcement and prosecutors. As soon as one wants to con-
ceptualise a ‘seriousness scale,’ one realises that ‘seriousness of laundering’ is 
very composite and as artificially complex as the internationally adopted legal 
definition of laundering. The degree of seriousness of the laundering offence 
depends on the nature of the laundering activity, which produces a scale of its 
own. Laundering is such a broad concept covering a wide variety of conduct to 
which different degrees of blameworthiness can be attached. Furthermore, the 
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degree of seriousness of laundering also depends on the dimension of serious-
ness of the predicate crime, as perceived.220  
 Firstly, there is the seriousness of the predicate crime (for profit) in terms of 
harm inflicted upon specific victims. But is this seriousness a good measure for 
determining the seriousness of laundering? There is no one size-fits-all relation-
ship or any adequate way to compare and summarise/balance these relation-
ships under a common denominator. For instance, stealing a painting by Van 
Gogh is not quite the same as stealing the precious family silver, irrespective of 
its monetary value.  
 Secondly, there is the scale of seriousness in terms of volume: tax fraud, 
which is always large in its aggregate form, may cause little or no harm to spe-
cific individuals but can be excessively harmful to the economy and society as a 
whole. In particular, ‘not harming specific individuals’ applies to income tax 
fraud. However, corporate tax or VAT fraud may be detrimental to other firms 
and reinvesting the crime money into the fraudster’s own firm may push fellow 
entrepreneurs out of business. 
 Thirdly, there is also the consensual crime, like some forms of corruption (if 
it is not extortion), drugs trade and, to an extent, human smuggling,221 which 
has a different degree of seriousness.  
 It is important to consider these aspects of seriousness within sentencing 
practices for laundering.222 But unfortunately existing legislation and sentencing 
practices across countries do not necessarily reflect this need adequately. In the 
US, in the early 1990s, following mounting criticism from practitioners who 
asserted that a money laundering charge could result in a significantly higher 
guideline sentence than if the underlying offence alone was charged, the US 
Sentencing Commission determined that, indeed, the existing penalty structure 
did not accurately reflect offences’ seriousness. For example, according to the 
Commission’s findings, the money laundering offence level was higher than the 
underlying conduct’s offence level in 52,5% percent of drug-related cases and 
in 96% percent of the non-drug cases (see US Sentencing Commission, 1995). 
An effort was made to improve the situation and amend the US Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, §2S1.1. Laundering of Monetary Instruments; Engaging in 
Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Unlawful Activity, which tie 
                                               
220 There are two tendencies: (a) to connect the seriousness of laundering to the predicate crime, or 
(b) to give laundering an independent seriousness weight. It can have a higher maximum pen-
alty than the predicate offence. In the Netherlands you can be convicted for laundering even if 
the underlying crime has remained unspecified.  
221  As opposed to human trafficking which is not consensual.  
222  Particularly with regard to ‘self-laundering’.  
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offence levels for money laundering to the seriousness of the underlying crimi-
nal conduct.223 However, such efforts to refine the way of determining the 
seriousness of the laundering offence are inconsistent across countries (or rather 
consistently unfruitful), despite the drive for globally universal anti-money 
laundering policies.224 There have been some efforts to form a debate about this 
issue in Europe but these efforts remain fragmented as they are stalled by a bu-
reaucratic and inflexible, at times almost stagnant, policy-making system that 
has been built over many years and is largely determined by political choices. In 
this regard an interesting observation was made during a debate of the UK 
House of Lords in December 2009 concerning the Report of the European 
Union Committee on Money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Lord 
Jopling, Chairman of the European Union Select Committee’s Sub-
Committee, noted that:  
“given the immense burden of the regime on the private sector, we questioned whether 
the regime should apply where the underlying criminal offence is minor or even trivial. 
Some of our witnesses, especially the Law Society, agreed with us. We recommended 
that the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 should be amended to exclude minor offences. 
The Government, in a response that I commend for its careful consideration of our 
recommendations and, to be fair, its full response to them, explained at length why an 
all-crimes approach should be retained. They pointed out that there may be little cor-
relation between the sums laundered and the seriousness of an offence, that an activity 
may be suspicious irrespective of value and that something that the reporting institu-
tion may regard as trivial may look very different to SOCA when considered with 
other intelligence.” (House of Lords debates, 2009, paragraph 7225).  
 
Lord Jopling then expressed his disappointment that the Government could not 
accept the recommendation and noted that, if that should be the case, it is all 
the more important that the government consult more fully with the private 
sector and give more feedback on their work. And that, of course, as we know, 
largely remains wishful thinking.  
                                               
223  The guideline links the sentencing levels to the type of offence and the value of laundered 
money. For example, offence levels for theft are lower than for forcible extortion or drug traf-
ficking. The guideline directs a court to increase the base offence level if the defendant knew or 
believed that the funds he has handled were proceeds of unlawful activity, or were intended to 
promote unlawful activity (see related cases United States of America v. Abdillah S. ABDI and 
United States of America v. Abdirahman Sheik-Ali Isse). 
224  Harmonisation of anti-laundering policies appears to be limited to criminalisation, structural 
measures and investigative aspects but not sentencing. Besides, although significant progress has 
been made in terms of improving the exchange of information between financial intelligence 
units, there is still a lot to be achieved in this area. 
225  Retrieved online, therefore no page number is available.  
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 As elaborated earlier, national anti-money laundering regimes are still based 
on extensively broad concepts (but in international politics decision takers rest 
as soon as there is agreement on shared concept, even if it is loosely defined). 
This means that if we want to assess the seriousness of the underlying criminal 
conduct, there is a logical uncertainty about the seriousness of the laundering 
offence. The range of it can stretch from establishing a sophisticated laundering 
firm for false accounting (the Dutch cartel conspiracy, see Van Duyne and Van 
Dijck, 2007a) to letting your friends hide their crime money in your kitchen. 
The laundering aide might even be unaware of the exact nature of the predi-
cate crime. He might think that the money was from tax evasion when in fact 
it was the premium for a contract killing. The undeterminable scope of applica-
tion of the laundering concept, because it is severed from the predicate of-
fences, may result in all kinds of absurd interpretations in legal practices. This 
demonstrates that this legal point of relating the consequential crime to the 
preceding crime has not been well scrutinised. 
 
The ‘colour’ of crime money 
Arguments of policy makers about the effects of crime money and money 
laundering create a real threat image (as discussed earlier) and are largely fo-
cused on the idea that any use of crime-money is evil. While by no means 
should we tolerate criminals enjoying the proceeds of their crimes, it is empiri-
cally wrong to put all crime-money under a common denominator (as argued 
in the previous section) as is usual in the official rhetoric. If we can describe 
metaphorically the monies from crimes with different degrees of seriousness as 
having different colours, the money from crimes perceived as more serious 
would be darker than the money from less serious crimes. Using the same 
metaphor, it seems that policy makers perceive almost all crime money as 
equally dark, with probably just drugs proceeds226 ahead of all other moneys. 
For example, in the Netherlands sentencing is based on the seriousness of ‘af-
fecting the integrity of the financial system’ which means that the consequence 
of the ‘integrity dogma’ is that no distinction is made between the various col-
ours of crime money. But, as remarked, crimes for profit vary widely: from tax 
evasion and commercial fraud to drugs, human trafficking and the more exotic, 
art crime. However, the colour of the predicate crime and the cultural back-
grounds of the perpetrator may still peep through in the sentencing for laun-
dering but only to exhibit inadequacies. The young Turkish man who smug-
                                               
226  And lately also human trafficking. 
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gled €25.000 strapped to his body (drug related) received a prison sentence; the 
illegal cartel conspirators laundering tens of millions euros received a few weeks 
community service (see Nelemans, 2009). 
 The monies derived from the various predicate offences should logically 
have different nuances of ‘taint’ or ‘colour’ and different relationships to the act 
of laundering. Independent from that, the impact on society (as reviewed ear-
lier) can economically and socially be different.227 Furthermore, money laun-
dering itself can be a source of proceeds for those who facilitate laundering or 
deal with it professionally. These proceeds need to be laundered too or –under 
the broad meaning– are laundered as soon as they are spent. By cooking the 
books, the mob’s accountants, lawyers and bankers present the laundering 
transactions as legitimate while earning their fees for these services constitutes a 
derivative laundering act. If we compare the colour of their earnings with the 
earnings of their principals, the former would probably be less dark,228 although 
policy makers seem to consider them just as dark. To make things slightly more 
complex, laundering the proceeds of laundering is the third degree derivative. 
But it does not automatically share the evilness of the predicate crime (unless 
the ‘integrity dogma’ is invoked).  
 If we accept the relevance of the relationship between the predicate crime 
and the consequential laundering act, then the nuance of crime money’s colour 
should be ‘measured’ by the extent of the harm caused by the predicate of-
fence, which means that the proceeds from the most ‘serious’ offences would 
be ink-black. The colour of the proceeds from less serious crimes would be less 
dark, probably greyish. Predictably, there is the question of what social values 
and interests deserve criminal law protection and how punishments should be 
valued as proportionate. There is no simple answer to these questions (see 
comments on evaluation methods above). Despite globalisation and the USA’s 
aspiration to establish a universal order, national systems of social values and 
criminal law continue to vary in terms of substantive law as well as punishment.  
 As discussed previously, certain acts are not yet considered a crime in all 
jurisdictions, which has led to the emergence of ‘jurisdiction shopping’, a phe-
nomenon facilitated by globalisation (see Passas, 2002). Criminals can share the 
same advantages of globalisation as legal business enterprises. The diversity be-
tween jurisdictions in their political, economic, cultural and law systems ham-
pers the mobility of law enforcement efforts. Control systems have been seri-
                                               
227  These consequences may be different from the moral relationship to the ‘colour’. 
228  This is not always the case, because if ‘cooking the books’ makes the accountants effectively 
accomplices to the crime, it is just as reprehensible, thus having the same ‘colour’. 
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ously challenged to detect and prevent cross-border crime under conditions of 
discrepancies in law enforcement resources and regulations across the borders. 
The existing asymmetries between countries have a criminogenic effect in that 
they create a unique incentive for criminal entrepreneurs to profit from cross-
border transactions by taking advantage of these ‘criminogenic asymmetries’ 
(see Passas, 1998, 1999, 2002).   
 These asymmetries indicate that there is a certain degree of subjectivity in 
defining which acts cause harm and should be denounced as crimes. For exam-
ple, abortion is legal in most countries, but in some, like Poland, it is illegal or 
subject to severe limitations (as mentioned previously). Where on the colour 
scale would we put the income earned by doctors who perform illicit abortion 
operations? While in some jurisdictions insider trading or cartel building are 
criminal offences, in others they are an administrative transgression. A range of 
acts that would constitute tax evasion, hence a serious predicate offence, in 
many countries, are treated as civil matters in Switzerland. Prostitution is an-
other debatable crime. Even soft drug trade is not universally regarded as a 
serious crime. For instance, personal use of cannabis is largely tolerated in the 
Netherlands.229  
 The fact that certain acts have not been commonly denounced as (serious) 
crimes makes the assessment of taint nuances, particularly concerning sentenc-
ing, more difficult. ‘Serious offences’ vary widely and money-laundering laws 
generally do not acknowledge nuances of crime money’s colour. In many 
countries drug trafficking, child pornography and large-scale tax evasion are 
considered to be serious crimes and are treated almost equally under anti-
money laundering laws, despite the fact that the harm caused by these crimes is 
different in extent and nature. In other words, while the maximum penalty for 
the various predicate crimes varies (reflecting their extent of seriousness), the 
maximum penalty for laundering is the same, although it would make sense, 
summarising previous observations, if the maximum penalty for laundering was 
tied to the predicate offence as a proportion of, let us say, 2/3. 
 Child pornography should, no doubt, be defined as one of the most serious 
crimes by the gravity of harm it causes and the seriousness of offenders’ culpa-
bility. In 2006, during public hearings held by the US House Committee on 
                                               
229  Since 1976, the Dutch law has distinguished between hard (e.g. heroin, cocaine and ecstasy) and 
soft (cannabis) drugs. The possession of a small amount (less than 30 grams) of cannabis for per-
sonal use is tolerated and carries only a minor punishment, if at all prosecuted (see States News 
Service, 10 July 2007). 
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Energy and Commerce230 it was suggested that the business of sexually exploit-
ing children was worth $20 billion a year (Brockman, New York Times, 2006). 
Provided this figure is accurate and not politically motivated, it follows that 
each year substantial proceeds from child pornography must require laundering. 
However, estimates of crime money flows, including from child pornography 
and sexual exploitation, vary and remain largely speculative and unreliable. 
Despite the inconclusiveness of such estimates, it seems that policy makers still 
single out illegal drug sales,231 rather than child pornography or any other illicit 
activity, as the ‘evil of evils’.232 This may be because the illicit drug trade indus-
try is allegedly worth significantly more than other crime-industries. Is the size 
of a specific crime industry the basis on which policy makers decide which 
crime is the biggest threat to society and therefore should be the top priority on 
their agenda? It seems that speculative figures are often used to justify specific 
policies but are not necessarily the actual reason for such policies. Otherwise, if 
the economic and financial weight of a crime was the basis for such ranking, 
policy makers should rank economic and elite crime higher than any other 
crime. There is consistent and international evidence that in terms of illegal 
profits economic or ‘elite’ crime rates much higher than those of the drug in-
dustry (Verhage and Ponsaers, 2009; Reuter and Truman, 2005). But eco-
nomic crime has no threat image (it is no wonder that former Nasdaq233 chair-
man Madoff, who is apparently less scary than any drug dealer, reportedly man-
aged to mail more than $1 million in watches, diamond jewellery and other 
valuables to relatives and others despite being on bail234). It appears that policy 
making simply responds to images and political convenience, despite the ensu-
ing inconsistency. And politically, policy makers get away with it.  
 
The ‘darkest’ money  
When we look at the foundations for assessing the darkest shade of money, we 
find much inconsistency. According to the UNODC World Drug Report of 
                                               
230  A standing committee of the US House of Representatives. 
231  And perhaps lately also human trafficking which appears to be increasingly attracting public 
attention. 
232  For instance, based on the 2009/2010 report of the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA), previously cited (see section 3.2.3. of this thesis), it appears that SOCA prioritises its 
tasks with not much difference to the 1980s’ realities and allocates the majority of its resources to 
drug-related offences. 
233  Nasdaq is a US stock exchange market based in New York City. The acronym stands for ‘Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations.’ 
234  This matter received wide coverage. See for instance report by Bray published in Dow Jones 
News Service on 14 January 2009. 
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2007,235 drug trafficking remains the single most profitable sector of transna-
tional criminality (despite contrary reports concerning the profits from eco-
nomic crime, particularly latest reports236 on financial fraud).  
 Indeed, illicit drugs trade is a problem on a global scale. Germany is an ex-
ample of how drug trafficking routes, originally defined by natural, geographi-
cal and social circumstances, share the opportunities of the globalisation proc-
esses.  
Dealers from Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil distribute cocaine in Ger-
many. According to some estimates, nearly 90 % of the heroin market in 
Germany is controlled by Turkish groups who import opiates from Af-
ghanistan, Iran and Pakistan (the ‘golden half moon’), and Laos, Thailand 
and Myanmar (‘golden triangle’) into Turkey. From there (after turning the 
opiates into heroin) it is then transported to Germany through Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary. Asian groups operate in parallel with the Turkish 
dealers. The retail trade also involves black Africans (particularly from Nige-
ria). Hashish is being sold mainly by dealers from Morocco and Lebanon, 
but consumers also obtain hashish from the Netherlands. Synthetic drugs are 
offered by local dealers and dealers from the Netherlands and Poland, as the 
basic material for their production is available in Europe (see Suendorf, 
2001; also Paoli, 2000; Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). 
 
This is just one of a range of examples relating to various countries that suggest 
a high level of pervasiveness of drug traffickers and an impressive international 
and financial scope of activities.  
 Do these facts and figures about the scope of illicit drug trafficking mean 
that it is the biggest threat to society; hence the laundering of its proceeds 
                                               
235  The World Drug Report of 2007 quotes the figures from 2005. The UNODC reports that the 
value of world illicit drugs trade is estimated at some $320 billion. The 2007 World Drug Re-
port states that the value of illicit drugs trade is considerably greater than the value of trade in 
other major criminal commodities, for example $32 billion from global human trafficking (Bel-
ser, International Labour Organization, 2005; UNODC, 2007) or $1 billion from illicit firearms 
trade (Small Arms Survey, 2002; UNODC, 2007). An OECD 2004 report quotes the US Na-
tional Intelligence Council’s estimates that narcotics trafficking is worth $100-300 billion a year. 
According to the same report, other major illicit industries generate significantly less revenues. 
For instance, annual revenues from automobile theft (in the USA and Europe alone) are esti-
mated at $9 billion; $7 billion from human smuggling and $1 billion from theft of intellectual 
property. According to UNODC 2010 report, the opiate market generates an annual turnover 
of up to $65 billion, of which some $55 billion for heroin alone (UNODC, 2010).  As discussed 
previously, however, such figures are disputable. Needless to say one quotes the other and so 
‘truths’ emerge. 
236  Specifically, 2008 and 2009 media reports on large-scale financial irregularities and irresponsible 
conduct (if not criminal) that brought the markets to a credit crunch, and the Madoff and Stan-
ford cases. 
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should be the top target (of all other proceeds from less ‘evil’ crimes) in the 
fight against laundering? Clearly drug addiction has a devastating effect as it 
feeds a culture that destroys families and society, i.e. it causes secondary harm to 
others. That is the common wisdom. Therefore policy makers claim that drugs 
trade has to be criminalised, reiterating arguments stretching back more than a 
century (Van Duyne and Levi, 2005).  
 However, if that has to be the case, this common wisdom should apply to a 
range of other goods and services, most of them licit.237 Interestingly, consum-
ers of illicitly traded cigarettes are not necessarily regarded as victims of crime, 
although they should be, considering the potentially dangerous contents of the 
counterfeit cigarettes.238 The victims are the legitimate producers and traders 
who suffer from distorted competition (through counterfeit products), as well 
as states, which suffer losses as a result of the evasion of excise duty. Particularly 
in the case of cigarette smuggling, the authorities have highlighted the eco-
nomic harm caused to the states as a result of substantial lost tax revenues.239 
The question here is whether policy makers rely on the fight against money 
laundering as a weapon against cigarette smuggling. In this respect an interest-












                                               
237  Alcohol and gambling addiction also causes secondary harm to others but nevertheless alcohol 
and gambling are licit commodities and services. They are not perceived as ‘the evil of evils’ and 
their consumers are not regarded as victims. The role of diamonds in fuelling armed conflicts in 
parts of Africa has been recognised by the United Nations General Assembly. Yet diamonds are 
not a banned commodity either. Cigarettes also create a health damaging addiction, though its 
effect in the short-term is arguably not as dangerous as the effect of (some) drug consumption. 
238  See Van Dijck, 2007b for analysis of potential links between cigarette smuggling and terrorism 
financing. 
239  According to the Framework Convention Alliance, which serves as an umbrella for organisa-
tions working on the World Health Organisation’s “Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol”, each year the illicit tobacco trade causes taxation losses of $33 billion globally (see report in 
The Nation (Thailand) of 23 March 2007). 
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The EU battle with the tobacco giants 
The litigation comprised a series of civil actions beginning 2000.240 In 2001, the 
EU filed a lawsuit in New York against Marlboro cigarettes producer, Philip 
Morris, accusing the company of collusion in tobacco smuggling to EU coun-
tries, particularly by intentionally oversupplying countries neighbouring the 
EU. It was also claimed, among other things, that Philip Morris facilitated and 
controlled smuggling activities by fixing prices on smuggled cigarettes through-
out the world. The EU raised similar claims against several other tobacco com-
panies, particularly RJR Nabisco (part of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco group) 
and Japan Tobacco and their affiliated entities.241 According to the complaint 
filed with the US District Court Eastern District of New York (Complaint 
European Community -v- RJR Nabisco et al.), the plaintiff accused the defen-
dants of violations of the RICO statute arising from the “defendants’ involvement 
in organized crime in pursuit of a massive, ongoing smuggling scheme. Defendants have 
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, including but not limited to money launder-
ing, wire fraud, mail fraud, and acts in violation of the Travel Act…” (p. 3 of the 
complaint). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired with others to 
promote and conceal their smuggling activities and that in the process of smug-
gling cigarettes, the defendants engaged the services of drug traffickers and 
money launderers, thereby facilitating or engaging in money laundering. The 
defendants were also accused of repatriating proceeds “through money laundering 
and other acts of concealment, all of which threaten the integrity of the United States 
financial system” (p. 97 of the complaint). In February 2002 the lawsuit was 
dismissed with regard to the smuggling claims on the basis of the ‘revenue 
                                               
240  Plaintiffs began filing these lawsuits in 2000 under the RICO statute and subsequently the cases 
developed a complicated procedural history. Initially, the Departments of Colombia filed suit 
against Philip Morris, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, British American Tobacco 
South America Ltd., and their affiliated companies, see Department of Amazonas v. Philip Mor-
ris Companies, 186 F.Supp.2d 231, No. 00 Civ. 2881(NGG). Shortly thereafter, the European 
Community (EC, which later became EU), on behalf of itself, sued RJR Nabisco, Philip Mor-
ris, Japan Tobacco, British American Tobacco, Brown & Williamson, and their affiliates, see 
European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 134 F.Supp.2d 297, No. 00 Civ. 6617(NGG), 
and the action was consolidated with the Amazonas action. The district court subsequently de-
consolidated the cases and dismissed the EC’s lawsuit because the EC itself did not have standing 
under RICO, although it reserved decision on the defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Ama-
zonas case. See European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F.Supp.2d 456, 459, 500-02 
(E.D.N.Y.2001) ("European Community I"). In August 2001 the EC, this time with ten of its 
member states as co-plaintiffs, again filed suit against RJR Nabisco and Philip Morris, and the 
case was marked related to the still-pending Amazonas case. See European Community v. RJR 
Nabisco, Inc., 186 F.Supp.2d 231, No. 01 Civ. 5188(NGG). 
241  In 1999 Japan Tobacco Inc. completed its acquisition of RJR Nabisco Holdings Corporation’s 
non-US tobacco operations. In the lawsuit filed by the EU, Japan Tobacco was a defendant 
both individually and as a successor to R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International, Inc.  
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rule,’242 a centuries-old common-law principle that prohibits foreign govern-
ments from collecting unpaid taxes through US courts. Although the plaintiffs’ 
complaints did not distinguish between ‘smuggling’ and ‘money laundering’ 
claims alleging both types of conduct as predicate acts of racketeering under 
RICO, the district court treated them separately in its decision. As a result, 
while dismissing the smuggling claims with prejudice, the court dismissed the 
money laundering claims without prejudice. This allowed the EU to refile a 
new lawsuit, based on money laundering laws. In October 2002 the EU filed a 
suit against the R.J. Reynolds group of companies. The 149-page complaint 
outlines in detail allegations of R.J. Reynolds’ involvement in corrupt business 
practices in Europe and Latin America, including dealings with members of the 
Italian Mafia and Russian organized crime groups, Colombian drug cartels and 
senior government officials in the Balkans, particularly Montenegro. In the 
meantime the plaintiffs also challenged the dismissal of the claims raised under 
the RICO statute, including by referring, on appeal, to the passing of the USA 
PATRIOT Act243 of 2001, which amended RICO to include terrorism-related 
offenses as predicate acts. In their appeal the plaintiffs alleged a link between the 
smuggling activities, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The 
dispute with Philip Morris dragged on until early 2004 when the company and 
the European Community, together with 10 EU Member States, signed a 12-
year $1,25 billion agreement that includes the enforcement of measures against 
cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting. Philip Morris agreed to work with EU 
regulators and law enforcement authorities in the fight against contraband and 
trade in counterfeit cigarettes by implementing a better system of control over 
its supply chain, from manufacturing to the end consumer. According to a press 
report by Echikson published in Wall Street Journal on 6 April 2004, Philip 
Morris and EU representatives tried to avoid the word ‘penalties’ and said the 
payouts would be used to fight tax evasion. According to the same article, the 
                                               
242  There were several related cases. With regard to the action against Japan Tobacco and its affili-
ates, European Community v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., No. 02-7323 (2d Cir.), it was decided that 
the district court did not have jurisdiction over the complaint, as none of the defendants had 
been served at the time the district court dismissed the action on the merits. With regard to the 
other two actions, (i) the action filed by the European Community against RJR Nabisco, Inc., 
et al. and Phillip Morris International, et al., (European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.) No. 
02-7330 (2d Cir.), and (ii) Department of Amazonas v. Philip Morris Companies, No. 02-7325 
(2d Cir.), the court held that the smuggling claims are foreclosed by Attorney General of Can-
ada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 
U.S. 1000 (2002), which held that the revenue rule bars a RICO suit brought by a foreign sov-
ereign to enforce its tax laws. 
243  The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism, Pub.L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
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deal did not affect the separate money-laundering lawsuit that was filed against 
R.J. Reynolds in 2002. Representatives of R.J. Reynolds told the press that the 
company had not had any discussions about settling the lawsuit and had no 
plans for settlement. Unlike R.J. Reynolds, it appears that Japan Tobacco In-
ternational decided to follow Philip Morris’ approach. In 2007 the media re-
ported that Japan Tobacco International also agreed to pay the European Un-
ion $400 million in a deal to tackle the illicit trade in cigarettes in return for 
legal immunity.244  
 
In view of the agreements reached between Philip Morris and Japan Tobacco, 
on the one hand, and the EU, on the other, it seems that the authorities are 
prepared to adopt a different approach – economic measures – to ensure that 
cigarette smuggling is contained. Whether the payouts will contain tainted 
money that can affect the integrity of the EU financial system is apparently not 
an issue. Neither is the harm that cigarettes cause to health. It is interesting, 
however, given the US drive to globalise efforts in the fight against money 
laundering, that this time the US judiciary made it so difficult for the EU to 
pursue its claims. Moreover, the ‘revenue rule,’ on the basis of which the 
smuggling claims were apparently dismissed, somehow contradicts the spirit of 
the US victory in the recent case against UBS (mentioned previously) where 
the bank was required to disclose the details of numerous accounts of its clients 
in Switzerland.  
 Policy makers preach that only a ‘war’ on drugs and related money launder-
ing can effectively help root out the ‘evil’, although there is little evidence that 
aggressive law enforcement measures and penal approach can effectively uphold 
public health and solve social problems. The 2007 World Drug Report of the 
UNODC argues that “drug control is working and the world drug problem is being 
contained” (p. 1). Yet the report includes findings which contradict this state-
ment.245 Even a quick look at the price development versus the consumption 
prevalence makes clear that the war against drugs has not been particularly suc-
                                               
244  See for accounts Weinstein and Levin, Los Angeles Times, 31 October 2002; Echikson, The Wall 
Street Journal, 6 April 2004; Bloomberg News, Los Angeles Times, 3 May 2005; Laitner, Financial 
Times, 14 December 2007; See also relevant EU press releases on http://europa.eu.  
245  The report, for instance, notes that the success in the reduction of coca cultivation between 
2000 and 2006 did not lead to a decline in cocaine production. Furthermore, the report admits 
that “the most alarming trend with regard to cocaine has been its rapid rise in Europe over the last few years” 
(p. 90). The United Kingdom, despite its robust regime against illicit drugs trade and money 
laundering, has the highest cocaine prevalence rates in Europe, after Spain. The 2008 World 
Drug Report of the UNODC states that “[o]n the demand side, despite an apparent increase in the 
absolute number of cannabis, cocaine and opiates users, annual prevalence levels have remained stable in all 
drug markets” (p. 7). 
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cessful.246 Given these contradictory messages, it appears inapt to determine any 
kind of rank-order of ‘darkness’ based on the underlying findings presented in 
such reports because these findings can be manipulated and subjectively pre-
sented.247  
 Nowadays it is basically a matter of common belief that drugs are evil. 
Drugs are demonised and anything related to them shares this demonisation 
(including drug money, the pitiful mules and the pathetic junkies in the street). 
All arguments on this matter constitute some kind of anti-drug theology in 
which facts and research will only have a place on the policy making agenda if 
they support policy makers’ objectives. Fact-based counter arguments are ne-
glected. It is, for example, largely ignored that the element of free-will victimi-
sation that thrives on self-indulgent pleasure-seeking is largely present in the 
drugs business,248 the same way it is present in the gambling, alcohol and ciga-
rette businesses.249  
 As Clarkson (1998) argues, the criminalisation of a type of certain conduct is 
justified if it presents an instrument for effective and necessary counter-acting of 
this conduct. There is no convincing evidence that the warfare concept in 
                                               
246  Since 1986 the prices of most drugs have declined. Since 1990 the street prices for opiates have 
gone down from €200 to €54 per gram. Those of cocaine went from €135 to €70 per gram 
(UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007). As noted earlier, this trend has continued in the past 
two decades to a varying de-gree, depending on the type of drugs and the region (see 
UNODC, 2010). 
247  The augmented FATF figures are an example of how research findings can be moulded into a 
shape that conveniently fits policy-makers’ objectives (see Van Duyne and Levi, 2005).  
248  This aspect seems to be overlooked by policy makers whose attention is largely focused on the 
supply side. The war on drugs is based on the belief that if supply is eliminated, there will be no 
drugs consumption. However, Polish ‘kompot’ demonstrates how demand can be self-sufficient 
(see Krajewski, 2000). ‘Kompot’ or ‘Polish heroin’, the production technology for which was 
developed by a chemistry student from Gdansk in the early 1970s, could be easily produced in 
an ordinary kitchen. It was distributed by addicts to other addicts as a matter of personal favour. 
After 1989 a growing tendancy for commercialisation of the drug distribution was observed: 
drug related activities became increasingly profit oriented (Krajewski, 2000). 
249  At the same time, those at the far end of the supply chain are often farmers living in deprived 
areas. Some of them have little choice and practically no other means to sustain their living but 
through poppy and coca cultivation (although we should also bear in mind that synthetic drug 
operators produce in affluent countries for other affluent countries driven by the very same cus-
tomers’ self-indulgent pleasure-seeking). The UNODC admits that: “The general political context 
also shapes drug supply. Drug cultivation thrives on instability, corruption and poor governance. The world’s 
biggest drug producing centres are in regions beyond the control of the central government, like South Af-
ghanistan, South-West Colombia and East Myanmar. Until government control, democracy and the rule of 
law are restored, these regions will remain nests of insurgency and drug production - and represent the biggest 
challenge to containment” (UNODC, World Drug Report, 2007). Moreover, the UNODC 2010 
report (p. 4) states: “In the past decade, drug control has matured. Policy has become more responsive to 
the needs of those most seriously affected, along the whole chain of the drug industry – from poor farmers who 
cultivate it, to desperate addicts who consume it [. . .]. Slowly, people are starting to realize that drug addicts 
should be sent to treatment, not to jail.” 
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rooting out drug trafficking has worked since it started a century ago and there 
is a strong opinion among researchers that policies should be reconsidered.250 
There are inconsistencies and discrepancies at a macro level as well as at case 
level, including in sentencing practices. As illustrated in previous chapters, 
while in some cases one may receive a disproportionately significant punish-
ment for merely providing a safe place for friends’ proceeds, in other cases 
money laundering charges appear to let ‘Mr Big’ get away with a relatively 
much less  punitive response. 
 The war against ‘the worst evil of all evils’, drugs trade, as previously noted, 
has been extended into a war against money laundering. The latter, both at 
micro level and at macro level (as the various drug reports discussed above seem 
to demonstrate), appears to achieve little in terms of rooting out the drugs trade 
and drug related crimes. But unabatedly the war against money laundering 
appears to be used as a new universal remedy against all kinds of crimes, serious 
and less serious, creating a lethargic state of pleasant but illusory satisfaction that 
at least something is being achieved. If little is achieved, it means the threat is 
still there and more efforts should be deployed in order to curb it. 
 
Less stained or just as dark? Economic crime and corruption 
Unlike the illicit drugs trade, crime against property causes direct harm and the 
element of free-will victimisation is absent. Yet we tend to view the colour of 
proceeds from drugs trade as darker. Historically, under US pressure, drug re-
lated offences were the first crime to be named as predicate to money launder-
ing, even though other acts were recognised as crimes long before drug related 
offences. The recognition of theft, for instance, as a public wrong, certainly 
preceded the criminalisation of drug trafficking. Of course, other kinds of profit 
oriented crimes, from alcohol smuggling to bank robberies, had become the 
common target of prosecution long before the criminalisation of drug traffick-
ing. However, it appears that for political and fiscal reasons, as discussed in pre-
vious chapters, it was the war on drugs that turned the normal law enforcement 
                                               
250  In 2009 Professor Nut was sacked from his position as the chairman of the anti-drug policy 
advisory committee of the British government after expressing his view, based on extensive re-
search, that approach to at least some drugs, such as cannabis, should be reconsidered. Following 
his dismissal, several of the committee members resigned in support of Professor Nut. The me-
dia reported that an earlier attempt to draw the attention of the government to the possibility of 
declassification of some drugs had also failed (see reports by Lydall, The Evening Standard, 2 No-
vember 2009; Jenkins, The Evening Standard, 3 November 2009). 
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activity into an intense ‘war on crime money and money laundering’.251 Being 
proclaimed an immediate threat, drug trafficking had therefore to be addressed 
with full force. 
 Speaking in terms of volumes, it has already been indicated previously that 
the financial magnitude of corruption and elite crime, with its economic and 
social impact on society, may well surpass every other type of crime. Neverthe-
less, as observed before, for a long time money laundering has been more fre-
quently associated with ‘usual suspect’ crimes: drug trafficking and other forms 
of ‘traditional’ crimes for profit such as human trafficking, rather than with elite 
crime, such as the theft of public property or inter-corporate bribery (Levi, 
2001).252 It took some time before fraudsters and white-collar criminals, such as 
the management of Enron, were concurrently prosecuted for laundering. 
 Worldwide, the history of financial fraud has a long record, one major ex-
ample from the 1990s is the French bank Credit Lyonnais, which attracted 
significant controversy as a result of alleged illegal deals such as the purchase of 
insurance company Executive Life, embezzlement and lack of accountability 
(see McClintick, Forbes, 13 December 1999). However, it seems that in the US 
only the Enron and Worldcom scandals in the early 2000s put corporate crime 
and financial fraud more firmly on the political agenda (partly because too 
many US pensioners were affected). Similarly, in Western Europe, policy mak-
ers’ awareness of fraud rose in the early 1980s following a series of “scandals and 
increasing budgetary deficits, which plagued many countries” (Van Duyne et al., 2003a, 
p. 11). Germany, perhaps being one of the first to recognise the real effects of 
fraud on fair trade and income distribution, adopted in 1976 the First Law to 
Combat Economic Crime, which had a particular focus on deceit, loan shark-
ing and bankruptcy fraud. However, even these progressive developments in 
Germany seemed insufficient to prevent and reduce fraud (Van Duyne et al., 
2003a). It is telling that in Germany, as in many other countries, economic 
crime is usually not subsumed under the denominator of the ‘usual suspect’ 
organised crime activities, which are then of course considered as more serious.  
                                               
251  As previously noted, although the first published use of the term ‘money laundering’ dates back 
to the Watergate scandal in the early 1970s, it became urgent for the US Government to use the 
criminalisation of money laundering as a ‘justified cause’ only in the era of the cocaine boom in 
the 1980s. The immense flows of money generated by the illegal drug trade could have moti-
vated any government, not only of the USA, to declare ‘war on money laundering’ as a con-
tinuation of the ‘war on drugs’. 
252  We are currently observing a trend of the US authorities seeking to expand the reach and en-
forcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (introduced in 1977) which may lead to a 
higher number of money laundering charges related to elite crime and corruption.   
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 Particularly in the field of economic crime we meet various unsolved ques-
tions related to laundering; one of the most interesting relating to illegal sav-
ings. This can be seen in, for example, environmental crime. The Naples pollu-
tion scandal253 raises the question what the laundering relates to in a situation 
where, for example, €50.000 in expenses is saved by dumping the waste in the 
fields instead of delivering it to the legal waste site or the processing plant. Ac-
cording to the Strasbourg Convention, the matter is clear: illegal savings are an 
economic advantage from criminal offences and are therefore to be considered 
‘proceeds’. 
 Corruption is another crime with a long record but, as in the case with 
fraud, it took some time before policy makers undertook a more decisive ac-
tion. During the Cold War little attention was paid to corruption in the inter-
national setting: it could be argued that a corrupt regime could expect support 
from the Western powers and reputable international organisations as long as it 
remained staunchly anti-communist.254 In the 1990s – after the fall of the Wall 
– the situation began to gradually change and corruption became to be recog-
nised as a global problem. Notably, the anti-corruption ‘war’ enfolded in the 
1990s when the US, in pursuing its long-term objective of world dominance, 
no longer had the convenient justification of fighting the communist threat to 
uphold its policies. And again, notably, the ‘war’ began to mainly target bribery 
of foreign officials (this subject will be discussed in section 4.4.3.). At last, the 
1997 OECD Convention Against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions,255 (which came into effect on 15 February 
1999), criminalised the offering, promising and giving of a bribe to a foreign 
public official in order to obtain or retain international business deals. How-
                                               
253  The problem was covered by the press in Italy and internationally (see report by Hooper in the 
Guardian, 3 June 2008). 
254  Examples of such developments appear to be well documented. A report by AFRODAD 
(2005) notes that “During the Cold War era the US government and its European partners rewarded a 
number of African nations (e.g. Zaire and Malawi) for being allies or for saying they were against commu-
nism. But the authoritarian regimes in these African countries did not care about economic growth. They just 
looted their countries and destroyed any economic potential for their people” (p. 19). For instance, among 
those lending to “the corrupt regime” (p. 10) of Mobuto of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of 
the Congo) the report mentions the IMF and the World Bank: “The IMF and the World Bank 
were also used as instruments in servicing American policy and geostrategy during the Cold War in that they 
rewarded Mobutu for his fight against communism in Central Africa especially Angola and Chad” (p. 26). 
Some analysts have also noted that the IMF and the World Bank provided economic aid to 
Samuel Doe’s regime in Liberia and other countries “on the basis of perceived belief that a country 
was toeing a capitalist line, and not on the basis of sound economic policies or genuine democratisation princi-
ples” (first paragraph of an online retrieved article, Newvision.co.ug, 2005). 
255  These developments were largely driven by the US, which introduced its Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in 1977. 
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ever, little has been done to effectively tackle domestic political corruption such 
as illegal party financing and corrupt lobbying practices. Efforts in that respect 
have been half-hearted, to say the least, and undermined by the use of double 
standards.  
 It appears that although corruption money is just as dark, or even darker 
than drug money, the main anti-money laundering driving force, the US, vac-
illates and other countries follow suit. As Prevenslik-Takeda notes in her 2003 
report on the status of the UN Convention against Corruption (which entered 
into force on 14 December 2005, becoming the first global legally binding 
anti-corruption agreement), the final consensus was achieved at the expense of 
the convention’s effectiveness. Particularly problematic were clauses on political 
party financing, the non-mandatory provisions on most offences under the 
criminalisation chapter including bribery in the private sector, and the Conven-
tion’s monitoring mechanism. Following a last minute ultimatum by the US, 
tacitly supported by China, Japan and Singapore, the original article 10 ‘Fund-
ing of Political Parties’ was replaced by a weak optional provision. It appears 
that the authorities have always been less concerned about proceeds from do-
mestic corruption than about proceeds from drug trafficking.  
 Corruption has different forms and while petty corruption may indeed be 
perceived as less serious than drug trafficking, grand corrupt practices are usu-
ally more sinister than we can imagine. The link to money laundering is also 
more significant and menacing, albeit often understated, than we normally 
imagine. As previously noted, the concept of proceeds from corruption, in-
cluding corrupt party financing, is an interesting one. Where does the launder-
ing start and end? Winning a government contract, being elected as a member 
of parliament or appointed to an executive post by paying bribes and using 
proceeds from corruption – these transgressions may constitute a crime in itself, 
but they can also be viewed as laundering. Is using the subsequent proceeds, for 
example, salary, to pay living expenses, laundering too? There is a problematic 
relationship with laundering in cases where corruption does not consist of 
monetary bribes, but favours such as helping a political friend’s son with a job 
or meting out an unusual lenient sentence in return for another monetary fa-
vour. What exactly is being ‘laundered’ is unclear, even though there is clearly 
an illegal advantage?256   
                                               
256  The investigation into alleged corrupt practices involving Jacque Chirac while he was mayor of 
Paris (see report by Willsher in the Guardian, 18 December 2009) is an interesting case: report-
edly, the money of the city was being used to pay salaries to party supporters for meaningless 
jobs. There are illegal advantages, but what are the proceeds and where is the laundering? 
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 In any event, the question remains how much can be achieved when there 
is little political will to fight corruption. In Transparency International’s 2003 
Global Corruption Report, Peter Eigen, the then chairman of Transparency 
International, noted that in the majority of the OECD member countries the 
political will to prosecute major bribery cases is lacking.257 As long as corrup-
tion prevails, efforts to fight economic crime and money laundering will render 
little results. If tax evasion and laundering practices have been widely spread in 
Russia, it is largely because the phenomenon has been for a long time con-
doned and even facilitated by corrupt officials inside banks and the supervisory 
authorities (see for instance Kosals and Ryvkina report on Russia’s shadow 
economy, 2002). Things began to change gradually during the 2000s when 
some government officials chose a different path to corruption. In 2006 Andrey 
Kozlov, head of bank supervision at Russia’s Central Bank, who was oversee-
ing the withdrawal of licences from banks accused of laundering, was mur-
dered. Media reports suggested that he was targeted for his efforts to clean up 
the industry (see for instance BBC report of 14 September 2006). It appears, 
indeed, that Kozlov posed a threat to highly-placed interests. Informal inter-
views with bank industry specialists reveal that in Russia, during the 1990s, 
over 400 banks258 were established for the sole purpose of facilitating tax eva-
sion and money laundering. Since the early 2000s the number has decreased by 
nearly fifty percent due to enhanced financial controls and efforts (perhaps still, 
to an extent, selective and fragmented) to crack down on corruption.  
 Corruption is a fence for crime profiteering. It can even eliminate the need 
for laundering as long as it keeps all predicate crimes insulated from exposure. 
One could argue that politically motivated fabricated intelligence that serves to 
                                               
257  Matters become more complicated if to the outright corruption we add crime or unethical 
behaviour (this further blurs the line) that is condoned (if not facilitated) by the state as were the 
financial pyramids in Albania during the 1990s. Elbirt (1997), who headed the Resident Office 
of the World Bank (WB) in Tirana at the time, notes that the WB warned Albania and advised 
to outlaw the pyramids. Yet their advice was not only ignored but Albanian officials were often 
seen in the company of pyramid masterminds at public venues. The Central Bank governor 
urged the Cabinet and then President Berisha to prohibit pyramid entities from collecting de-
posits. The Central Bank suggested as grounds for doing so that, according to the banking law, 
deposit collection is an activity that can only be carried out by licensed banks. The pyramids had 
no licence. Towards the end of 1996, however, judges appointed by the president ruled that the 
funds collected by the pyramids constituted bilateral loans, and were therefore not subject to the 
banking law but the civil code. In other words, the judges found an excuse not to outlaw the 
pyramids. The lack of will on the part of the government and the judiciary to take any action 
against the pyramids appeared evident.  
258  This figure indeed can be disputed but, without a doubt, the wide-spread tax evading schemes 
and what became known as obnalichivaniye (see Kosals and Ryvkina, 2002) in Russia needed, at 
the very least, the tacit support of a horde of bankers and corrupt officials.  
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justify wars in oil-rich countries or countries perceived to have hostile regimes 
is also a form of grand corruption and fraud. Unfortunately, at least at this stage, 
there is still little political will to challenge corrupt practices. Yet, with regard 
to drug trafficking, policy makers are prepared to go the extra mile and fight a 
war. In an ideal penal law system one would like to have a system of severity 
rankorder of predicate crimes, which would then be reflected in the apprecia-
tion of the related laundering as a consequential offence. However, while clear 
yardsticks for such a rankorder are missing, political preferences and choices 
prevail. Therefore it is little surprising that it appears that there is a lot of arbi-
trariness in the use of anti-money laundering laws as an instrument to fight 
crime for profit.  
 This state of affairs results in a disorderly colour spectrum. While the US 
sentencing guidelines appear to recognise the ‘colour of crime money’ idea, 
FATF’s central (and almost metaphysical) dogma about preserving the ‘integrity 
of the financial system’ counters it and allows no fluctuation in the shade of the 
colour. That said, in law enforcement investigations, prosecution and sentenc-
ing practices around the world some offenders are distinguished from others 





4. Money laundering, transition and globalisation 
Existing literature on money laundering as well as the common view in the 
regulated sector appear to show signs of bias towards developing and emerging 
markets by associating them with a higher risk of money laundering. This as-
sumption is largely based on the belief that developing countries and countries 
in transition are plagued by a hidden economy and corruption. It is also based 
on serious doubts about the presence of ‘good’259 governance. Is that assump-
tion correct? This chapter will look into the logic behind such a presumption 
and into the impact that the process of globalisation, in the form of integration 
of the transition societies into the ‘old’ capitalist world, has had with regards to 
money laundering activities.  
 
4.1. Opening the borders: opening the floodgates? 
 
In this section we will review the situation prior to the opening of the borders 
of the Eastern socialist bloc, the roots of crime and the alleged incentives of 
state security services to get involved in crime for profit during those years. We 
will also examine the link between opening the borders and the subsequent 
capital flight that may relate to ‘laundering’ activities and discuss what the appli-
cation of this broad label entails. But first the criminal (and crime-money) situa-
tion before 1989 will be reviewed. 
 
4.1.1. The situation prior to opening the borders 
 
Criminal entrepreneurship in the region 
The fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s marked a change in the geopoliti-
cal and economic ideology landscape in Europe. The former socialist countries 
began liberalising their markets creating investment opportunities for interna-
tional capital. Opening the borders, however, entailed that along with exposure 
to international capital, technologies and know-how, the transition economies 
                                               
259  Good governance includes more than just democratic governance: it encompasses also the idea 
of the ‘rule of law’. Italy is a democracy, but there are reasons to doubt the proper serving of law 
there given the cases of parlamentarians and government officials, including Prime Minister Sil-
vio Berlusconi, coming under scrutiny over allegations of corruption. In 2010 the Rome-based 
state audit court reported that cases of corruption increased by 229% percent in 2009 from 2008 
(report by Alimenti et al., Reuters, 2010). 
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were at risk of absorbing also the Western world’s objectionable elements such 
as criminal phenomena that could thrive presumably only in market econo-
mies.260 Cross-border crime, such as drug and cigarettes smuggling, human 
trafficking and other (serious) crimes became a topical issue in the former so-
cialist countries. Krajewski (2000), for instance, notes that while, during the 
socialist regime, Poland suffered from a drug culture (consumption of the home 
made Polish kompot mentioned earlier), the opening of the borders turned this 
drug culture into a profit oriented business and brought in the phenomenon of 
cross-border drug criminality. Crime grew rapidly across the whole former 
socialist block (see Joutsen, 2000; also for country reports on the Czech Re-
public and Ukraine, see Scheinost, 2000, and Osyka, 2000, respectively). The 
capitalist sun cast deep shadows.  
 However, there is also evidence that profit-oriented crime was not an en-
tirely new phenomenon in the former socialist countries. As Joutsen notes 
(2000), what became recognised as organised crime in Central and Eastern 
Europe in fact took root in corruption and ‘the shadow economy’ of the pre-
ceding socialist society.  
 There is evidence that criminal entrepreneurship actually existed during the 
socialist era but it was associated with violence on a significantly smaller scale 
(certainly not as evident as during the wild times in Chicago or the East End of 
London, and even the so-called ‘thieves in law’ in Russia would not take their 
guns out in the Red Square to execute rivals) and was often closely intertwined 
with the political elite (see Rawlison, 1996; Friedman, 2000; Dimitrova, 2005), 
and probably for these reasons it was also less visible. There was theft, there was 
embezzlement, there was also some form of goods and human smuggling.261 
Some of these crimes involved cross-border activities, as the following case 
illustrates:  
In 1965 Eduard Kurtenkov was employed at the diamond-manufacturing 
factory Crystal in Smolensk, Russia. Almost immediately he began stealing 
diamonds. At the early stages of his illegal dealings Kurtenkov used an in-
termediary, Eduard Alexandrov, for clients in Moscow. Having learned a 
                                               
260  These criminal elements did not stem only from the ‘usual suspects’ crimes, such as drugs related 
crimes, but also from the greed of multinational corporations (see Markovska, 2007, for an ac-
count of pharmaceutical western firms penetrating the Ukrainian market). 
261  Reportedly during the 1960s and 1970s, when emigration from the Soviet Union was strictly 
controlled and considered as a betrayal to the homeland, many Jews attempted to cross the bor-
der illegally (which until the fall of the Wall was largely considered an act of liberation but sub-
sequently became relabelled as human smuggling). Some of them were later prosecuted (see 
Kuznetsov, 2004).  
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few lessons from Alexandrov, Kurtenkov began dealing with Moscow cli-
ents directly. In Moscow Kurtenkov met Alexandra Kristensen, who was 
fictitiously married to a Finn and had contacts with foreign visitors in Mos-
cow. Kurtenkov began selling diamonds to her, which she in turn sold on 
to foreigners. A frequent buyer was a national of Yugoslavia, who smuggled 
the diamonds to Berlin, hiding them in his mouth. In Berlin he sold them; 
with the profit he purchased a special material used in Tashkent to sew 
robes. The fabric was then sold to illegal sewing workshops in Tashkent 
through another accomplice known as Musaidov. Investigators were alerted 
by border control that Kristensen regularly received shipments of this mate-
rial at Moscow Sheremyyetevo airport. The scam involved not only dia-
mond smuggling and illegal tailoring shops but also illegal foreign exchange 
operations. The ring was busted on the eve of the 1980 Moscow Olympic 
Games, when about 50 people were arrested as part of a wider operation to 
cleanse Moscow of criminal elements.262  
 
Similar schemes existed also in other sectors of the economy where there was 
an opportunity for profiteering (laundering, as a legal concept, did not exist yet 
in these countries). These schemes were part of the ‘shadow economy’. But 
this ‘shadow economy’ included not only trade in stolen or illicit goods but also 
other transactions that otherwise would have been legal and ethical if not pri-
vately conducted. The economy was largely monopolised by the state and 
revenues were supposed to flow into the state budget, not into private pockets.  
 Some of the shadow economic transactions were driven by the lack of spe-
cific goods, which otherwise were legally available in the Western world. 
Scheinost notes (2000, p. 38): 
“Under the conditions of a state managed ‘deficit economy’, the shadow economy took 
the form of a system of mutual exchanges and scarce goods and services, which were 
available only to some privileged professions (‘networks of mutual favours’). These 
exchange relationships involved usually the abuse of state property for professional 
purposes. This phenomenon was very common and widespread, but it still concerned 
mainly minor offences, though some succeeded in amassing a substantial, undeclared 
wealth.” 
 
The totalitarian regime managed to restrain, to an extent, domestic (mainly 
violent and street) crime. However, there were sufficient criminal minds who 
were prepared to engage in sinister activities. They needed to expand interna-
                                               
262  The case study is based on a documentary, “The Diamond Web”, forecasted on Lubyanka 
show on the Russian TV channel ORT on 30 January 2005. 
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tionally in order to take advantage of the market economies outside the socialist 
block.  
 
The international element  
a. The Mob 
Criminals from the former socialist countries had begun to form their interna-
tional webs long before the collapse of the socialist regime and the opening of 
the borders.  
 When, in the early 1970s, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev allowed the lim-
ited emigration of Soviet Jews, reportedly thousands of hard-core criminals 
(either of Jewish status or who claimed to be of Jewish decent) immigrated to 
the US where they resumed their criminal activities (Friedman, 2000).  
 Many controversial figures, who emigrated alongside honest Soviet Jews, 
apparently worked with state security and intelligence agents from the socialist 
block and were better placed than anyone else to take advantage of globalisa-
tion. For instance, Smillie et al. (2000) describes how the Russian-born Shabtai 
Kalmanovich, who was believed to be a Soviet spy (see also Vaknin, 2002), 
established his presence in Freetown in Sierra Leone in the second half of the 
1980s and used Sierra Leone to allegedly circumvent the weapons, diamonds 
and gold embargoes on South Africa. Reportedly, Kalmanovich not only 
smuggled diamonds and laundered money263 himself but also brought in other 
money launderers and dealers to Sierra Leone. For example, Marat Balagula, an 
alleged kingpin of the Russian mafia in New York, was one of Kalmanovich’s 
associates in Sierra Leone (Smillie et al., 2000; see also Friedman, 2000).  
 Research suggests (see below) that in some respects socialist state security 
services operated in a similar way to the Mob and engaged in international 
activities which the West qualified as criminal. It would probably be fair to say 
that one of the most frequent targets of allegations and criticism has been the 
Bulgarian former State Security Service, DS (which stands for Durzhavna Sigur-
nost,264 see below), alleged to have been involved in international drug traffick-
ing (see Sterling, 1994; Adamoli et al., 1998; Douglass, 1990; Krajewski, 2000; 
Passas, 2002; Manolova, 2002; Dimitrova, 2005), although the secret services of 
other states, for instance the former Yugoslav secret services, were similarly 
active (see Logonder, 2008). For example, the notorious Arkan was apparently 
allowed to commit crimes, such as bank robbery, abroad and, it was alleged, he 
                                               
263  Laundering was not yet internationally criminalised but the anti-laundering campaign was 
gradually developing with the introduction of the Vienna Convention in 1988. 
264  Durzhavna Sigurnost translates as ‘state security’. 
 183 
was supported by the Yugoslav secret services in his escape from a Dutch 
prison. Obviously, a considerable amount of crime-money was involved in 
these transactions (and some of these included the use of laundering tech-
niques).265 However, over the years this matter became highly politicised and, 
what was apparently state profit-oriented crime, came to be viewed in the West 
as an ideological Communist-led war against democratic Western states.  
 
b. State security services: the case of the Bulgarian DS 
In his book, “Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America and the West”, Joseph 
D. Douglass (1990) suggests that there was a global communist conspiracy, led 
by the Soviets and China, to establish control over society globally through 
spreading and controlling drug sale and consumption. This echoed an older 
allegation raised by one of the most prominent former officials of the US Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics, Harry Anslinger266 (also known as the ‘Drug Tsar’), 
who during the 1950s, in the Cold War era, accused ‘Red China’ of under-
mining the West by making it drug-dependent (see Bewley-Taylor, 2002, 
2002a).  
 Former Bulgarian spy, Colonel Stefan Sverdlev, who defected in 1970, 
claimed that in 1967, during a meeting in Moscow, the secret services of all 
member countries of the Warsaw Treaty agreed on a plan aimed at destabilising 
the West through various means, including control of the drugs trade (Dimi-
trova, 2005). Bulgaria was chosen as a strategic transit point because of its geo-
graphical location. A Bulgarian state export-import company called Kintex267 
(Dimitrova, 2005; see also Douglass, 1990; Sterling, 1994; Passas, 2002; 
Manolova, 2002), registered in 1966, was to play an important role in the drugs 
trade and other special operations of the previously mentioned Bulgarian State 
Security Service or Durzhavna Sigurnost, DS, including crime-money manage-
ment involving laundering techniques.268 According to Sverdlev, Turkish drug 
                                               
265  As a native Bulgarian, the author of this thesis has access to original media sources and academic 
research materials in Bulgarian language and has therefore focused on the Bulgarian DS.  
266  He was first Commissioner of the Treasury Department’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) 
from 1930 to 1962. 
267  There have been numerous press reports, both in Bulgaria and internationally, on Kintex’s 
alleged involvement in the illicit trafficking of goods, drugs and arms.  
268  Bulgarian government Resolution N 148 (dated 31 July 1978) envisaged that Kintex controlled 
the hidden transit trade involving goods traded under special international trade regimes; transac-
tions in monetary instruments and securities; as well as goods of special or high value, but for 
which the clients-deliverers had no official permission to transit through neighbouring countries 
or to import into the country of final destination (see Manolova, 2002). The document appears 
to have given the go-ahead to transactions that circumvented international trade regimes to en-
sure economic benefits. However, this would hardly explain the conspiracy theory regarding 
sabotaging the West. 
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dealers and DS agents could often be seen in hotel Vitosha in Sofia. DS agents 
allegedly helped Turkish dealers269 to pass drugs onto dealers in Western 
Europe and the USA.270   
 This repeatedly exposed alleged conduct, on the part of not only DS but 
secret services in general, was more likely to have been driven by the need to 
pump in slush funds, i.e. a desperate need for unaccounted money, rather than 
any ideological beliefs271 (as long as we understand that ideology is often mis-
used as a tool to enforce power and influence).  
 Security services have the capability of carrying out complex operations in a 
highly clandestine manner using undercover agents and shifting money across 
the world. Besides, no doubt, security services do need to maintain connections 
to the criminal world as this may be necessary for certain risky operations (see 
for instance Logonder, 2008, for an account of the Yugoslav secret services’ 
activities). That is the nature of their work and part of their intelligence gather-
ing effort. However, when these connections are used to illicitly generate 
money (or strengthen the belief that crime is on the increase and therefore any 
counter-activities should be deemed as justified), then clearly the problem is 
that state agencies abuse the system.  
 US agencies (specifically the CIA, as reviewed earlier), have also been ac-
cused of involvement in drug trafficking (see Van Duyne and Levi, 2005, for a 
detailed account of drug trafficking history in Europe and further afield). Alle-
gations about the US secret services using drug money to fund covert opera-
tions against unfriendly governments and insurgent groups, including commu-
nists (see Lifschultz, 1988 and 1992; Scott, 1992; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005) 
or the French intelligence services resorting to opium resources to fund its war 
operations against Vietnamese nationalist insurgents (during the Franco-
Vietnamese war) (McCoy, 1972/2003; Lewis, 1985; Van Duyne and Levi, 
                                               
269  The role of Turkish dealers, for instance, would hardly be consistent with the conspiracy theory 
that the socialist block wanted to sabotage the West through global drug control. 
270  CIA’s former deputy director for intelligence Dr Ray S. Cline notes that Bulgaria was a ‘strange 
case’ and that the CIA had identified it as the new centre for directing narcotics and arms traf-
ficking between Europe and the Near East (Douglass, 1990). In 1984 John Lawn, DEA’s then 
deputy administrator, testified to a congressional committee that starting from 1970 Kintex had 
sold heroin and morphine base to European traffickers as well as guns throughout the Middle 
East (Shinkle, 2003). For that reason the DEA severed cooperation with Bulgaria and resumed it 
at the start of the market reforms in 1989 (Shinkle, 2003). 
271 Dimitrova (2005) quotes an anonymous source, a former Bulgarian intelligence officer, according 
to whom there were no ‘official’ drug trafficking channels as such, i.e. created by DS, but that 
the Bulgarian security services had maintained contacts with drug traffickers and rendered some 
protection for over twenty years. Dimitrova’s source notes that, during all those years, revenues 
from drug trafficking had been going into the treasury.  
 185 
2005) come as little surprise. And such funding operations inevitably involve 
the use of laundering techniques.  
 
State funds embezzlement: socialist crime-money 
During the socialist era some members of the ruling elite with easy access to 
money and privileged information were lured by the opportunity to profiteer 
and take advantage of the lack of proper public accountability. During those 
years, however, gross impropriety was not as endemic as it became towards the 
end of the regime when the embezzlement of state funds seems to have esca-
lated and expanded on a massive scale (see Manolova, 2002). Those in the up-
per political echelons who were able to see the insecurity of the political system 
and foresee its collapse, reportedly ensured continuity in their control over 
national assets by diverting part of these assets into private companies and ac-
counts, using laundering techniques. Such processes occurred in many of the 
former socialist countries, including East Germany, former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria 
and Russia. Frydman et al. notes (1996) that in countries such as Hungary, 
Poland and Russia, several years before the collapse of the regime, “personal 
enrichment among Party ranks became a semi-official part of last-gasp ‘reform’ policies 
pursued by the regime”.272 The last few months of the regime were marked by 
active asset pilfering and ‘spontaneous privatisation’.273 ‘Spontaneous privatisa-
tion’ was largely associated with allegations of corruption and cronyism. Ac-
cording to some analysts, the most notorious instances of ‘spontaneous privati-
sation’ occurred in Hungary in 1988 and 1989 (Frydman et al., 1996; see also 
Gatsios, 1992; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997). But the phenomenon was 
also wide-spread in all other countries of the former socialist block, e.g. 
Czechoslovakia and then the Slovak Republic (see Mikloš, 1995), Yugoslavia 
and Serbia (see Sukovič, 2001), Poland (see Rondinelli and Yurkiewicz, 1996), 
Russia and Ukraine (see Frydman et al., 1993) and further afield (see Lieber-
man, 1994; Frydman et al., 1993). 
                                               
272  The first paragraph of the section entitled “The Rise of the Kleptoklatura” (no page number is 
available, as the article was retrieved online). 
273  ‘Spontaneous privatisation’ is a term coined to denote forms of privatisation where the assets 
were still state-owned but increasingly used in private interest, often, by their managers (see 
Stanchev, 2004c). This occurred mainly in the last few years of the former regime or during the 
early years of transition to market economy, when official privatisation laws were either lacking 
or still in their infancy.  
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 Bulgaria was no exception.274 Bulgarian nomenclature knew that the col-
lapse of the regime would mean loss of markets and revenues. So they had to 
be prepared for that. Capital flight in Bulgaria had begun before the opening up 
of the country’s borders and it was reportedly the result of massive asset strip-
ping and funds embezzlement: socialist-state crime-money flowing out of the 
country. And of course, these transactions largely required the use of laundering 
techniques.275  
 The existing network of Bulgarian trade firms registered abroad came to be 
used as a convenient channel to funnel money out of the country in the years 
preceding the collapse of the regime. The Bulgarian authorities, including DS 
and the foreign trade ministry, set up companies in Western Europe to pene-
trate the market system of the capitalist world and conduct export-import op-
erations (see Manolova, 2002). But at some point these companies came to be 
used also for exporting funds, as many of those who worked in the foreign 
trade sector and were familiar with the network of corporate entities, were able 
to abuse the system. According to Manolova (2002), off-record economic 
transactions in the activities of these companies were a common practice. She 
discovered secret filings, according to which, Icomev (a company, registered 
abroad but operating in Bulgaria under Resolution N 148, mentioned earlier), 
was to receive $7 million yearly from the Bulgarian state. However, Manolova 
found no records of sales, revenues and taxes. It would be practically impossible 
to trace and recover such money from ‘non-existing’ transactions. 
 Manolova (2002) describes how funds were channelled out of the country 
through various schemes, including the purchase of outdated equipment and 
licences for ‘know-how’ from foreign companies. The equipment and licences 
cost millions of dollars but were of no use to state enterprises. Those directly 
involved in the schemes were, of course, aware of that but they had little to 
lose. They were able to personally benefit from these schemes, firstly by divert-
ing money into personal accounts abroad, and secondly, by pocketing substan-
tial kick-backs.  
                                               
274  As mentioned earlier, the author of this thesis is a native Bulgarian and therefore case studies in 
this chapter centre primarily on Bulgaria. Additionally, it is worth noting that to an extent Bul-
garia was a special case because of its higher dependancy on the Warsaw Treaty. Bulgaria was 
largely regarded as the most loyal ally of the Soviet government in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The country was most dependent on the trade within the Warsaw Treaty (see Dobrinski, 1997; 
Dimitrov, 2004) and therefore, of all socialist countries in Europe, Bulgaria was economically 
probably most affected by the collapse of the socialist regime.  
275  These were the early years of development of the legal concept of laundering, around the time 
of the adoption of the Vienna Convention and the Basle Statement of Principles.  
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 Money was channelled out of the country also through the purchase and 
crediting of foreign firms and funding of some economically non-viable pro-
jects abroad (Manolova, 2002). It is difficult to attribute the losses from that 
time merely to poor management. But we can only speculate how much of 
that money went into the personal pockets of some of those who were in-
volved in these activities.  
 The outflow of capital, which was apparently accompanied by large-scale 
corruption and embezzlement, contributed to the economic crisis that occurred 
when the socialist system collapsed.276 Without a doubt, the Bulgarian nomen-
clature benefited from the massive, yet largely unrecorded, outflows of funds. 
The nomenclature had inside knowledge that the economy was no longer 
sustainable and that the regime was coming to an end (see Stoev, 2004; 
Manolova, 2002). The nomenclature needed to ensure that party funds would 
remain intact and in the hands of a limited number of people who had privi-
leged information about the channels of money flows. During the 1980s, com-
panies registered abroad, mushroomed in the process of creating vehicles for 
‘red capital’277 flight. Money was reportedly being channelled not only to less 
developed countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and South America, but 
also to the West, into developed countries such as Western Germany (see 
Manolova, 2002). However, the system of reporting suspicious transactions was 
yet to be developed and any of these outflows could have hardly been recorded 
as laundering.  
 An aspect of the criminal management was the disappearance of written 
evidence. As mentioned above, records of revenues from that time are scarce 
and unclear, which makes the tracing of money virtually impossible.278 Impor-
tant documents, which could have shed more light on the missing funds and 
                                               
276  In March 1990 the Bulgarian government declared unilaterally a moratorium on foreign debt 
repayment (in 1991 Bulgaria’s foreign debt amounted to 150% of GDP; as of the end of 1992 
the Bulgarian foreign debt amounted to $11,3 billion, $8,5 billion of which was owed to West-
ern private banks (see Stoev, 2004)). Around the same time, other countries including Poland 
and Russia also defaulted (see Zank, 2001). The crisis was caused by a number of factors, nota-
bly the collapse of an economically unsustainable regime. In the case of Bulgaria, firstly, in the 
late 1980s, Soviet subsidies had already stopped while Bulgaria continued to credit countries in 
the Middle East and elsewhere. Secondly, the government borrowed funds from Western banks 
but little was invested in productive economic areas. But most importantly, there was also ap-
parently an element of mismanagement or criminal management.   
277  As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the term ‘red capital’ was coined in the 1990s to denote 
the Communist Party funds allegedly embezzled by high-ranking representatives of the former 
regime and channelled out of Bulgaria.   
278  While the national debt was growing, profits from foreign trade were apparently disappearing. 
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the accumulation of debt, have disappeared from the secret archives of the Bul-
garian Foreign Trade Bank279 (see Manolova, 2002; see also Stoev, 2004).280  
 As noted earlier, in the late 1980s, just before the collapse of the regime, 
capital flight escalated and was also streamlined. On 9 January 1989, during a 
meeting of the Bulgarian council of ministers, the then Economy Minister 
Stoyan Ovcharov presented a confidential report, which predicted the end of 
the planned economy and the beginning of the transition to market economy. 
According to this report, a number of key firms were to be set up in each in-
dustry. Certain groups of individuals were to be responsible for taking control 
over the various economic areas. A limited number of people, including 
economists from the upper echelons of the party as well as state security service 
agents, were reportedly assigned with the task to ‘prepare the transition to de-
mocracy.’ Similar processes occurred in other former socialist countries, includ-
ing East Germany, former Czechoslovakia and Poland (Manolova, 2002).  
 This ‘transition to democracy’ proved to be a coordinated grand theft. Po-
litical entrepreneurs in Bulgaria became highway robbers (Stoev, 2004). 
Through all stages of red capital flight, in order to conceal the traces of profit, 
including embezzled aid to poorer countries and revenues from illegal re-
export transactions and arms trade, the nomenclature needed to create compa-
nies in Bulgaria and abroad, and place trusted agents to carry out the work and 
effectively ‘launder’ the ‘red money’. Ironically, as it seems, those who had 
previously been actively involved in anti-capitalism propaganda were the ones 
who, in the early years of transition, became the nouveaux riches. They created 
the first private banks and took control over the best state assets at the expense 
of ordinary taxpayers (Hristova and Stanchev, 2004; Stanchev, 2004a, 2004b, 
2004c).  
 The most convincing evidence of the massive accumulation of capital of 
unknown origin, largely laundered in the West, was the fact that a powerful 
business elite emerged in Bulgaria (and other transition countries) too quickly 
after the collapse of the regime. It is inconceivable how relatively young people 
                                               
279  The Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank was established in 1964 as a state-owned bank to serve the 
state’s international payments and finance. In 1994 the bank was renamed Bulbank and in the 
late 1990s it was privatised.  
280  These documents included a list of 161 firms, which received funds totalling $1 billion between 
1985 and 1989. During the same period the state held its reserve currency in seven accounts. 
While in 1985 the total amount of currency reserve amounted to $2,46 billion, by 1990 the 
amount had decreased to $490 million. A large portion of the funds disappeared during the last 
few months of this period – between 1 December 1989 and 6 April 1990. As a result of this, 
among other factors, Bulgaria had to stop paying its foreign debt (see also Capital Weekly’s Blog, 
12 September 2010). 
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such as Iliya Pavlov, the founder of the controversial conglomerate MultiGroup 
(now defunct), and Emil Kyulev, a high-profile banker in Bulgaria, could have 
become so wealthy so soon after the beginning of the transition. It appears that 
they had the resources to successfully launch and develop their private business 
ventures. Given the obscurity of these resources, it is plausible to assume that 
the capital used by many of the nouveaux riches at that time had gone through 
some sort of laundering process before being re-invested. But who, if anybody, 
asked critical questions at the time?281 Certainly not the western banks through 
which the funds transited, or the authorities that let the money be invested in 
privatisation.    
 Clearly asset stripping had begun before the opening of the borders. In the 
case of Bulgaria, as we have seen, asset stripping was largely accompanied by 
capital flight. But this was just the criminal prelude: the most significant part of 
the national assets in the socialist block was apparently yet to be pilfered.  
 
4.1.2. The transition years  
 
The transition to market economy meant that national assets had to be placed 
in private hands. The lack of an adequate legal framework made it possible for 
the former nomenclature and a number of time-servers and opportunists to 
seize considerable shares of the national wealth. The distribution of national 
resources, which had started before the collapse of the regime, continued after 
that point but in the form of official privatisation.  
 Privatisation was tainted with allegations of corruption in all countries of the 
former socialist block (see Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997; see for further 
specific country analysis Mikloš, 1995; Sukovič, 2001; Rondinelli and 
Yurkiewicz, 1996; Frydman et al., 1993). However, there is relatively little 
proof that asset stripping under the cover of privatisation has been accompanied 
by massive capital flight. The reason for this is not the absence of capital flight, 
but the lack of reliable official statistics on capital outflows and the lack of pub-
lic statistics on suspicious reports on such inflows in the West. These are either 
lacking (in the early years of transition282) or they failed to capture all ‘shadowy’ 
cross-border flows of funds.  
 
 
                                               
281  When both were killed in the early years of this decade, it was rumoured that they had become 
defiant with those who had created them. 
282  See Antzoulatos and Sampaniotis, 2001, for an account of availability of published balance of 
payments data in the transition countries during the 1990s. 
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The case of Russia  
Yet it seems that Russia makes a significant high point, as no other country has 
attracted as much attention with regard to capital flight (and allegedly related 
laundering – see below) during the transition period. According to Antzoulatos 
and Sampaniotis (2001), capital flight became a serious problem for all Eastern 
European countries during the 1990s. They, however, admit that the problem 
has received little attention and that the few existing studies on capital flight in 
the transition economies have focused primarily on Russia rather than any 
other country. It appears that the scale of capital flight in Central and Eastern 
Europe or the new independent states never reached the gravity it reached in 
Russia.283 According to Garibaldi et al. (2001), among the transition countries 
Russia was the only net exporter of capital in the late 1990s.  
Abalkin and Whalley (1999) suggest that capital flight from Russia 
amounted to $56-70 billion in 1992-93. According to some estimates, be-
tween 1994 and 2000 the average annual amount of capital flight from Rus-
sia was $20 billion or approximately $150 per capita (Loungani and Mauro, 
2000, Loungani and Mauro also quote data provided by the Russian au-
thorities, according to which capital flight was around $11 billion yearly be-
tween 1994 and 1998; see also Tikhomirov, 1997; Loukine, 1998; Abalkin 
and Whalley, 1999; Cooper and Hardt, 2000, for an account of further es-
timates). These estimates were done in accordance with the ‘hot money’ 
measure, while according to the ‘broad’ measure, the amount was $15 bil-
lion or approximately $100 per capita (Loungani and Mauro, 2000).284 
 
At the same time, some studies indicate that capital flight from Croatia, Hun-
gary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia was not only substan-
tially lower, but after some time it reversed: capital in-flight. During the early 
years of transition capital flight from these countries averaged $15 per capita 
(according to the ‘hot money 1’ measure), while between 1993-98 capital flight 
reversed with average inflows of $75 per capita (Fisher and Sahay, 2001; see 
also Sheets, 1996). The situation was similar in the Baltic States (Loungani and 
Mauro, 2000).  
                                               
283  A number of authors note that Russia has been a ‘special case’ (see Loungani and Mauro, 2000; 
Fisher and Sahay, 2000; Garibaldi et al., 2001). 
284  The measures are generally defined as follows: (i) hot money 1: net errors and omissions plus net 
flows of non-FDI, non-portfolio investment assets and liabilities held by entities other than the 
monetary authorities, general government, and banks; (ii) hot money 2: hot money 1 plus net 
flows of non-FDI, non-portfolio investment assets and liabilities held by banks; (iii) broad meas-
ure: hot money 2 plus net flows of portfolio investment assets and liabilities in the form of debt 
securities (see Loungani and Mauro, 2000). 
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 Some studies also suggest that capital flight from Russia intensified in 1996-
97 (Loungani and Mauro, 2000) just prior to the 1998 financial crisis. It slightly 
declined after the crisis and the rouble depreciation because of tightened capital 
controls, but soon resumed, increasing again with the oil price increase 
(Westin, 2000).  
 Generally, it is believed that capital flight is driven by the need to ensure the 
best possible environment for capital return when the existing environment is 
unsteady. Therefore flight capital is not part of the usual investment portfolio 
such as maybe a UK investment in the German real estate market. Economic 
and political instability, as well as high taxation, drive capital away. However, 
some capital may leave the country to escape regulatory measures. This means 
that flight capital may include not only funds from legitimate activities which 
flee the country for legitimate purposes such as fears of devaluation or an inse-
cure banking system. Flight capital may also include two additional broad cate-
gories of money: legitimate funds which leave the country for illegitimate pur-
poses such as tax evasion; illegitimately earned money which seeks a harbour 
from regulatory retaliation measures. These categories can often overlap be-
cause the evaded tax becomes criminal income. Also, criminals may seek to 
take their money out of the country not only to escape confiscation but also to 
achieve a higher return on their investment or to launder their money.  
 The UNODCCP,285 for instance, quotes estimates made by Abalkin (1998) 
that between 1992 and 1997 the amount of capital flight from the Russian 
Federation that is likely to have been related to money laundering (it is again 
not clear from the report how it was related) is $133 billion. Abalkin and 
Whalley (1999) also suggest that 33%286 of the estimated $68 billion accumu-
lated abroad by Russian residents in 1994-97 comprised illegal capital flight, 
while 37% could be defined as ‘semi-legal’ (again, it is not quite clear what this 
entails). The remaining portion of these funds came from various informal fi-
nancial transactions. The authors of this study clearly suggest that a substantial 
part of Russian flight capital comprised tainted, i.e. criminal money.  
 Does this mean that capital flight was largely related to money laundering, 
and, if so, in what way? Abalkin and Whalley (1999) highlight that the main 
reason for Russian capital flight was political and economic instability, rather 
than the fear of expropriation. This applied to a large part of the international 
                                               
285  The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
286  Other researchers suggest that around one third of capital flight comes from illegal activities (see 
Cooper and Hardt, 2000).  
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transactions287 carried out during the early and mid-1990s. However, there was 
also capital that left the country, not because of general instability, but to escape 
scrutiny from regulators. The difference, however, between money flows that 
escape regulators and money flows that escape instability (as long as these relate 
to tainted money), is blurred: tainted money is always targeted by regulators. 
The internationally adopted definition of money laundering sets the term in a 
broad sense. Therefore, it is easy to accept that if a large portion of capital flight 
was tainted money (for instance from tax evasion), then the volume of flight 
capital relating to laundering (for instance, of the tax money) indeed reached 
high figures (which brings us back to the same tautology that shapes a vicious 
circle). 
 At least on three main occasions Russia came under scrutiny, specifically as a 
source of flight capital related to money laundering: privatisation, the financial 
crisis in 1998 and IMF funding.288 Press reports have extensively covered these 
events. 
 Privatisation in Russia was accompanied by massive asset stripping and re-
lated capital flight. Stiglitz (2002, p. 144) notes:  
“Privatization, accompanied by the opening of the capital markets, led not to wealth 
creation but to asset stripping. It was perfectly logical. An oligarch who has just been 
able to use political influence to garner assets worth billions, after paying only a pit-
tance, would naturally want to get his money out of the country.” 
 
As in the other transition countries, privatisation in Russia began with instances 
of ‘spontaneous privatisation’. As Stiglitz observes (2002, p. 158): 
“Privatization in Russia turned over large national enterprises, typically to their old 
managers. Those insiders knew how uncertain and difficult was the road ahead. Even 
if they were predisposed to do so, they dared not wait for the creation of capital mar-
kets and the hosts of other changes that would be required for them to reap the full 
value of any investments and restructuring. They focused on what they could get out 
of the firm in the next few years, and all too often, this was maximized by stripping 
assets.”  
 
                                               
287  In addition to international transactions there was also a form of ‘internal capital flight’ or ‘dol-
larisation’, i.e. active use of foreign currency, particularly US dollars, instead of local currency by 
local residents (see Abalkin and Whalley, 1999; also Cooper and Hardt, 2000).  
288  Press reports indicate that in late 2003 and 2004 capital flight somewhat intensified again. This 
was just after the Russian government had launched its first attacks against the oil company 
Yukos. This subsequent capital flight was largely driven by the political uncertainty and fears of 
state monopolisation and to a large extent comprised outflows of foreign investments.  
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However, in the opinion of Stiglitz and many other analysts, the most notori-
ous instance of reprehensible privatisation in Russia was the loans-for-share 
programme. It was invented in the mid-1990s by a number of individuals close 
to the government under then president Boris Yeltsin. The effect of the pro-
gramme was that the government exchanged Russia’s most valuable national 
assets for bank loans that were apparently bound to never be repaid. The banks 
which granted the loans were controlled by those who invented the pro-
gramme. As Stiglitz further notes (2002, p. 159): 
“These privatizations had no political legitimacy. And [. . .] the fact that they had 
no political legitimacy made it even more imperative that the oligarchs take their funds 
quickly out of the country – before a new government that might try to reverse the pri-
vatizations or undermine their position came to power.” 
 
The ownership of privatised companies was usually transferred to offshore 
firms.289 Thus, formerly state-owned assets were now held in other jurisdictions 
via complex schemes of trusts and nominee shareholdings, which made the 
assets virtually unreachable. Revenues usually flew offshore as well. In particu-
lar, companies in the energy sector were largely believed to have contributed to 
capital flight by non-repatriation of export earnings (see Loungani and Mauro, 
2000; Kadochnikov, 2005). False over-billing by foreign ‘clients’ or false losses 
written off as bad debts, misrepresentation of export earnings, fake advance 
import payments and other transactions evading regulations are some of the 
usual methods that have been used in Russia for covering capital flight and 
related money laundering (see Cooper and Hardt, 2000; see also Loungani and 
Mauro, 2000; Jack, Financial Times, 1999).  
 We should not forget, however, that a large part of the privatisation deals 
and export-import trade agreements were carried out in line with the then 
existing regulations, or rather (on some occasions) the lack of regulations. Of 
course, the unethical and corrupt methods of privatisation raise the question of 
its illegitimacy. Given the defective legislation, it is difficult or even impossible 
now, to prove that many of those assets have been acquired illegitimately, let 
alone by outright criminal means.290  
                                               
289  Records in the Russian company registry indicate that during the 1990s an extensive number of 
Russian firms, including privatised companies and major Russian enterprises, had a non-
transparent shareholder structure with a number of layers of offshore firms and nominee share-
holders. There is now an increasing trend of bringing in transparency in company corporate 
structures, specifically in large firms which seek to form partnerships with foreign investors. 
290  Many of those seeking to gain control over enterprises were alleged to have acquired their initial 
stakes through unlawful privatisation, and to have subsequently violated the rights of other 
shareholders in order to acquire further shares. There have been numerous media reports on this 
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 Along with asset stripping during privatisation (much of which was unethi-
cal but not necessarily illegal), Russia also experienced asset stripping related to 
the liberalisation of the financial sector, particularly the banking system. In ad-
dition to financial pyramids such as the notorious investment enterprise MMM, 
a number of banks also operated as pyramids on the verge of bankruptcy. In the 
early 1990s many banks delayed financial transactions and payments to clients 
seeking to gain a quick profit from the short-term investment of the deferred 
money. Additionally, throughout the 1990s, and especially around the time of 
the financial crisis in 1998, a number of banks went bankrupt leaving their 
customers virtually with nothing. Many of these banks were used by their 
owners to steal the money from their clients under the convenient cover of the 
financial crisis. Financial assets were shifted to foreign bank accounts and off-
shore entities with all trails concealed. A large portion of the stripped assets was 
transferred via bridge banks to newly established banking institutions (see 
UNODCCP, 2001).291 While a few bankers became the subject of investiga-
tion, the majority remained untouchable and unharmed by regulators and law 
enforcement authorities.  
 A similar process took place when the IMF granted a loan to the Russian 
state during the time of the 1998 crisis. In July 1998 the IMF agreed to grant 
$11,2 billion out of a total $22,6 billion package, of which $6 billion was to be 
granted by the World Bank and the rest was to come from the Japanese gov-
ernment. The funds were to be provided in several instalments. In July 1998 
the IMF granted $4,8 billion292 (see Stiglitz, 2002, for an account of the events). 
Throughout 1998, in the months preceding the August 1998 peak of the crisis, 
investors sought ways to flee Russia but this apparently did not stop the money 
lenders, i.e. the IMF inter alia. Subsequently, as it appears, the main reason why 
Russia became again the target of global critical scrutiny was not so much the 
                                                                                                              
subject. In late 2004 Russia’s Audit Chamber produced a report on the results of analysis of pri-
vatisation in 1993-2003. The report provided a long list of enterprises the privatisation of which 
was marred by violations of laws and regulations (see Yurova, RIA Novosti, 2004). However, 
there have been relatively few cases where the authorities have sought to reverse privatisation of 
specific enterprises. In 2006, in relation to discussions on parial privatisation revision, the media 
quoted Alexander Shokhin, a representative of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entre-
preneurs, as saying: “If there were any violations in the privatization process and the statute of limitations 
has not expired, the results can be reviewed […] [b]ut if moral and ethnical standards are concerned, then it 
would be senseless to review the deals” (reported by RIA Novosti, 2006, 4th paragraph). 
291  The topic has been extensively covered by the press.  
292  Other reports suggest that money from earlier IMF parcels, in particular from 1996, has been 
channelled by Russia’s Central Bank to a firm it allegedly controlled, Financial Management 
Co. (or Fimaco), registered in the Channel Island of Jersey. The IMF announced that it was 
looking into these reports (see World Bank’s newsletter Beyond Transition, 1999; also Cooper 
and Hardt, 2000) but it is not quite clear what exactly has been unearthed since then. 
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flight of investment, but the alleged flight of the very funds granted by the IMF 
to stem the crisis. As soon as the first instalment was made, the money was 
allegedly largely taken out of the country. Circumstantial evidence of this 
widely reported assertion consists of the fact that approximately three weeks 
after the loan was granted, Russia announced a moratorium on debt payments, 
which could mean that the granted money hardly reached its designated goal. 
As Stiglitz (2002, p. 150) observed:  
“We felt that it would take days or even weeks for the oligarchs to bleed the money 
out of the country; it took merely hours and days. [. . .] the billions of dollars that 
[the IMF] had given (loaned) to Russia was showing up in Cypriot and Swiss bank 
accounts just days after the loan was made [. . .].” 
 
In the following years after the crisis the Russian and international media re-
ported293 on continuous attempts by regulatory authorities to track down the 
missing funds. In particular, in May 2002 the media reported that representa-
tives of the Russian Audit Chamber requested assistance from the Swiss au-
thorities to trace funds which amounted to nearly $5 billion.  
 High-ranking auditors were quoted by the media as saying that the money 
‘dissolved’ as soon as it was allocated to several banks, including SBS-Agro (also 
mentioned in UNODCCP report, 2001).  
 To make the story even more complicated we should add the Bank of New 
York connection. Bonner and O’Brien reported in The New York Times on 19 
August 1999 that millions of dollars had passed through the Bank of New York 
in a large-scale ‘money laundering’ operation carried out by Russian organised 
crime groups. Additionally, it was claimed in the press that the Bank of New 
York had handled IMF stolen funds. The affair became widely known as the 
BONY money-laundering scandal.294  
 While Russian capital flight seems to have attracted most of the attention of 
international regulatory organisations, press and academic researchers, devel-
opments in some other countries, specifically Ukraine and Bulgaria, closely 
mirrored the events in Russia. Corrupt privatisation practices, cronyism and 
                                               
293  See, for example, reports in the media, including Rozhnov, Novaya Gazeta, 27 May 2002, and 
Kupchinsky, Radio Free Europe, 27 June 2002. 
294  The Ukraine-born alleged leader of the Russian underworld, Semyon Mogilevich, was report-
edly one of the key figures in the BONY money laundering operation (see Friedman, 2000; 
Bonner and O’Brien, The New York Times, 1999). According to internet references and press re-
ports, Mogilevich settled down in Hungary in the early 1990s (having first immigrated to Israel 
during the 1980s), where he established a number of companies and is likely to have invested 
vast amounts of tainted money. As mentioned above, capital flight from Hungary was on a rela-
tively small scale in the early 1990s, and even reversed in the second half of the 1990s - invest-
ment inflows may well have included Mogilevich’s money.  
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rent-seeking,295 asset stripping and capital flight have been equally common 
phenomena there too, and consequently, the lack of adequate scrutiny of 
money’s origin, i.e. a wealth of laundering opportunities (see Van Duyne and 
Donati, 2008, for an account on Serbia).  
 
Bulgaria 
Similar problems have occurred in Bulgaria. Bulgarian ‘credit millionaires’, for 
instance, as they became known, were largely the product of transition that 
lacked the necessary check-and-balances system and an adequate legal frame-
work. The phenomenon of ‘credit millionaires’ emerged during the 1990s and 
referred to companies and individuals who managed to obtain unsecured cred-
its that were extended by private and state-owned banks and were never (fully) 
repaid. These unwise or corrupt lending practices were one of the main reasons 
for the financial crisis in Bulgaria in 1996, when many banks collapsed. Accord-
ing to the Bulgarian Secret Service Files Commission,296 the total amount of 
bad debts, including unsolicited ones, was estimated to be BGN 608 million 
($273 million), of which BGN 83 million ($37 million) was unsecured.297 Ev-
geni Dimitrov, then deputy chairman of the Commission, confirmed to the 
media that the majority of the companies which had taken credits made no 
investments at all. Some of the loan-takers exported the money out of the 
country. Dimitrov suggested that this would not have been possible without a 
‘political umbrella’, that is to say protection from, and collaboration with, cer-
tain political leaders.  
 During the 1990s, a number of crony banks which had absorbed money 
from the state budget, international financial aid and money from private de-
positors went bankrupt with the money almost literally evaporating. As Peev 
(2002) notes, the key factors forcing new domestic capitalists to take their 
money abroad included fear of confiscation. Although estimates about capital 
flight are largely tentative, media reports298 suggest that according to Bulgarian 
prosecutors, capital flight amounted to $20 billion during the late 1980s and 
                                               
295  Rent-seeking is the practice of seeking to profit by manipulating the economic environment, 
rather than by producing any actual added value.  
296  The commission, also known as Commission Andreev, was created in 2001 and dissolved in 
2002 amidst political battles and debates as to whether there should be access to the archives of 
the former Secret Service.  
297  Reports emerged in various Bulgarian media, including on national TV channels and the Bulgar-
ian National Radio. See also Vatahov, SofiaEcho, 11 April 2002; some other sources quote differ-
ent estimates.  
298  See article by Lazarova, Epohalni Vremena, 21 July 2006 (Lazarova quotes radio Darik News as 
original sources). 
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early 1990s. Large quantities of money were reportedly transferred abroad via 
Bulgarian foreign trade companies (despite emerging anti-money laundering 
legislation, some of this money was allowed to be placed in Western banks).299 
It has also been suggested in the press that only in 1990 the amount of state 
funds transferred from the currency reserve into private hands abroad was esti-
mated at $2 billion (see interview with former prime-minister of Bulgaria, 
Dimitur Popov, in Dnes, 21 January 2010). 
 Other studies suggest that approximately $13 billion of state assets was trans-
ferred to cronies of the nomenclature between 1985 and 1995 (Pejkov, 1996) 
and it is likely that this sum was largely taken out of the country.  
 Clearly, in its largest part, these estimates refer to capital flight that had 
started before the opening of the borders (as discussed in the previous section) 
but continued after that point. However, it continued not because there were 
no longer cross-border barriers but because the start of transition made national 
assets easily available under the pretext of privatisation and market liberalisation. 
Indeed, the fall of cross-border barriers and globalisation offered laundering 
opportunities. The people who took advantage of that (many of them were 
reportedly cronies of political leaders with access to ‘red capital’, as discussed 
previously) had to insure themselves against consequent expropriation.  
 An article by Antonova published in Sega on 29 July 2003 quotes Professor 
Vladimir Kvint as saying that between 1990 and 2003 around $7 billion fled 
Bulgaria.300 The same article also quotes the then finance minister Milen Vel-
chev commenting on Kvint’s assertion. According to Velchev, the main part of 
the flight capital has returned to Bulgaria and has flown into the privatisation 
process. Velchev noted that the Bulgarian legislation had not created any barri-
ers to the repatriation of flight capital, for instance, via offshore firms. Indeed, if 
we look at corporate filings listing the shareholders of newly acquired assets in 
Bulgaria during the 1990s, we will see that many of these assets were bought by 
offshore firms. The lack of adequate legislation and check-of-balances systems 
implies, of course, the possibility that not only domestic tainted money can 
return as investment, but also foreign tainted money can easily flow into transi-
                                               
299  It has been suggested in the media that money was also taken out of the country literally in 
suitcases. According to some representatives of the former regime, reports about money taken 
out of the country, including in suitcases, remain speculation (see interview with Georgy Atana-
sov, former prime minister, Kovachev, 24 Chasa, 1 November 2009). 
300  According to him, $3billion fled Albania and over $170billion fled Russia. 
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tion countries. This means that there may have also been a reverse effect: dirty 
western capital seeking a ‘laundering refuge’ in the East.301  
 
Ukraine and other former socialist countries 
Similar to Russia and Bulgaria, inadequate economic policies during the early 
transition years in Ukraine resulted in the expansion of the underground econ-
omy and substantial capital flight which, according to some estimates, reached 
nearly $2 billion in 1993 (see McCarthy et al., 1994). Similar to Russia, in 
Ukraine too, during the early years of transition, the need to contain the politi-
cal-criminal nexus received little attention (Shelley, 1999). 
 Almost all other transition countries have experienced comparable problems 
(massive bank fraud and a major financial crisis, although, as noted above, less 
so in terms of capital flight), at some stage. Lithuania was among the first, ex-
periencing a crisis in 1995, when some of the country’s major banks were 
closed and senior bank executives were arrested on suspicion of fraud. Russia 
was hit in 1998 (as mentioned above), while in Croatia the crisis occurred in 
1999. According to Baloun and Scheinost (2003) the practice of siphoning off 
assets and funds from banks, savings and credit cooperatives and other organisa-
tions was widespread in the Czech Republic too (they describe the phenome-
non as ‘tunnelling’). 
 Although it is likely there were inflows of tainted money into the transition 
countries, there is little evidence to suggest that large drug trafficking cartels and 
other organised crime groups from all over the world rushed to invest or de-
posit their ill-gotten earnings with banks in these countries.302 Rather, it was 
tainted proceeds generated in the transition countries that flew into the West-
                                               
301  The same applies to investment inflows into Russia (even though they were of relatively small 
scale during the 1990s). The Center for Strategic and International Studies (1999), a Washing-
ton-based think tank, suggests that between 1992 and 1999 the total net foreign direct invest-
ment in Russia amounted to $11,6 billion. Although difficult to prove, it is possible that part of 
it was reversed capital.  
302  There have been media reports suggesting that tainted or hot money had been invested in 
transition countries, including Bulgaria. For instance, (as previously mentioned) it has been re-
ported that IRA has been laundering crime proceeds through the acquisition of property in 
Eastern Europe, particularly Bulgaria, where IRA was believed to have invested in property de-
velopments valued at around €15 million and to have intended to buy a bank to facilitate its fi-
nancial operations (see Murray and Cusack, 2006). Based on informal discussions with contacts 
in the banking sector in the West, it appears that Bulgaria has been viewed by many, for a num-
ber of years, as a possible laundering destination for dirty capital. However, there is little evi-
dence that investment of organised crime proceeds was done on a massive scale in Bulgaria or 
other transition countries, on a scale larger than anywhere in the West (this subject will be dis-
cussed later). 
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ern financial system for the perfect whitewash effect303 and as a measure against 
expropriation. Organised crime bosses, along with many of those who enriched 
themselves during privatisation and the liberalisation of the financial system 
(also those who participated in the asset distribution prior to the collapse of the 
regime) could have easily taken their money out and then brought it back into 
the country as foreign investment, i.e. laundered. The opening of the borders 
was not the reason for the massive outflows, as the outflow had begun prior to 
that point. However, the process of integration of the former socialist countries 
into the global capitalist world certainly facilitated the circulation of dirty 
money. The years of transition to market economy was a time of opportunity 
to steal under the pretext of privatisation. It was a time of crime money genera-
tion. Partly through this global circulation of dirty money, illegally and unethi-
cally derived wealth eventually became gentrified. 
  
4.1.3. The gentrification of crime money 
 
Some compliance officers at international financial institutions still view Bul-
garia as having a ‘bad rep’304 (bad reputation). Many also fear dealing with large 
businesses in Ukraine and some other emerging markets. However, business in 
Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine and other former socialist countries has undergone a 
process of evolution (as mentioned elsewhere in this thesis). Transition in these 
countries started with massive asset stripping and organised crime. Hostile take-
overs and corporate raids involved physical threats and intimidation (see Fire-
stone, 2010, for an account of this phenomenon in Russia).  
 Gradually, however, many of those high-flying businessmen who had ac-
cumulated their wealth during the transition years (albeit in a highly controver-
sial manner) realised that if they wanted to expand and look for financial re-
sources on international stock markets, they would need to restructure their 
businesses, streamline them into transparent and ‘clean’ corporate structures that 
every international investor would be happy to deal with. Indeed, despite their 
somewhat ‘bad rep’, Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine have managed to attract the 
interest of investors. The risk became to be viewed by many as ‘manageable’. 
This means, perhaps, that the evolution of business has been accompanied by 
an international process of reconciliation with (or perhaps to an extent even 
                                               
303  The Bank of New York scandal is a good example of such a process. Tainted money was alleg-
edly channelled from Russian and Latvian banks, inter alia, through offshore banks into the Bank 
of New York (see Block and Weaver, 2004).  
304  A professional slang used by some compliance officers.  
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facilitation of) what appears to have been ‘transition washing.’ But this process 
of gentrification has been observed not just in the emerging and developing 
countries. In the end, the requirements of economy and taxation grind all col-
ours of money into white (or “diffusion by integration” as once happened in the 
US, see Van Duyne, 2003b, p. 76).    
 
4.2. The hidden economy and money laundering  
 
Money laundering is usually associated with predatory crime and contraband 
trade. However, conceptually it is also associated with the hidden economy, 
especially considering that (as time went by) tax evasion in most jurisdictions 
became also a predicate offence – in terms of monetary volume, a major predi-
cate crime indeed. This implies, given the broad definition of money launder-
ing, that in countries with considerable hidden economy the volume of money 
laundering is also high: almost a tautology. Nevertheless, this link seems to be 
almost as elusive as comparing apples and oranges because of their essentially 
different nature (speaking in strict terms), the fuzziness of the two concepts (of 
laundering and of hidden economy, although tax evasion, which is related to 
both phenomena, is quite an unambiguous term) and the difficulty to identify 
one single method to measure them. This section will examine the multi-
dimensional concept of the hidden economy, the range of different approaches 
in measuring its size and the feasibility of linking the results of such measure-
ments to money laundering. 
 
4.2.1. Definition of hidden economy 
 
Clearly, the argument of policy makers that money laundering is a threat to 
society sounds more convincing if figures show substantial money laundering 
volumes. Quirk (1997) notes that in order to demonstrate the significance of 
the money-laundering phenomenon for the macro-economy, it is necessary to 
prove that it takes place on a large scale relative to the overall economic activ-
ity. One way of demonstrating this is to link money laundering to the hidden 
economy, especially in countries where the hidden economy is regarded as 
considerable, almost by definition. Walker (1995), for example, suggests that as 
criminals make no official records of their income, the understatement of in-
come could be regarded as an indicator of money laundering (see also National 
Criminal Intelligence Service, 2003, and Walker, 2004). As easy as it may 
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seem, however, as Quirk (1997) notes, early attempts by economists and law 
enforcement bodies to measure the hidden economy as a substitute for money 
laundering has resulted in a wide range of estimates. It remains an issue as to 
how reliable such estimates can be, given the uncertainty surrounding both 
phenomena.  
 The phenomenon of the hidden economy is often described as ‘shadow’, 
‘underground’, ‘virtual’, ‘grey’ or ‘black’. Hidden economy exists not only in 
the countries of transition but also in developing as well as underdeveloped 
economies. But more importantly, it also exists in advanced economies. The 
transition and developing countries share this economic phenomenon with 
virtually all ‘old’ capitalist states (Henry and Sills, 2006); hence, it is inherent in 
any country with a ‘price wedge’,305 either on labour, products or income. 
However, it is more evident in markets of transition as the emergence of a 
parallel, hidden market which functions in conjunction with the legitimate 
mainstream economy is believed to be part of the transition process. As we 
have seen in the previous section, hidden economy had existed prior to the 
opening of the borders but it quickly expanded after that point. To an extent, 
the hidden economy can be described as the reverse side of defective govern-
ment.306  
 Evidence of the size of hidden economy is evasive. There is also no clear 
consensus with regard to the terminology and definition of the hidden econ-
omy. Terms are often used interchangeably. There are various approaches or 
combinations to approximate the volume of the black economy. 
 A World Bank research paper by Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) distin-
guishes two main types of hidden economy. First, it is the unofficial economic 
activity of ‘non-criminal nature’, which involves the provision of legitimate 
products or services, but the added value remains unrecorded because of delib-
erate misreporting or evasion. In this respect, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) 
particularly point out the informal post-socialist economies in the former Soviet 
Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).307 The second type of 
                                               
305 This is understood as the difference between international prices or prices of imported goods and 
the price of comparable goods/services produced domestically (see Jones and Walkenhorst, 
2003).  
306  Which confirms the point that it can also exist in advanced markets.  
307  Indeed, in the early years of transition, many emerging small and medium-sized businesses with 
little or no entrepreneurial experience sought to fill in niches that had been previously occupied 
by state-owned enterprises. In order to survive they had to mitigate the burden of high tax and 
other costs of administrative requirements. As the legal framework at the time was not yet de-
veloped and provided rather inadequate regulatory mechanisms, businesses had the opportunity 
to ‘visibly’ operate while enjoying partly ‘invisible’ financial results. This means that they created 
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hidden economy, according to the same study, is of a criminal and even violent 
nature. It is historically strong in Latin America and Asia, where drug ‘cartels’ 
have operated for decades gradually spreading their clandestine activities further 
afield.  
 Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996, p. 3), for instance, note that unofficial 
economy in an economic regulatory sense “is mostly non-violent and non-criminal 
(in contrast to drug cartels, for instance). [. . .] But the noncriminal un-official economy 
appears to be much larger in most of the FSU and CEE states. [. . .] In contrast with 
informal sectors in Latin America and Asia, for instance, a sharp dichotomy between 
official and unofficial activities is often absent in the FSU and CEE states.” However, 
those who have lived in the CEE and FSU countries have observed that they 
have also suffered from the emergence of a ‘violent’ economy. Illegal prostitu-
tion, child pornography, human trafficking and other activities such as extor-
tion, which involve the provision of illegal products and services or legal ser-
vices but through violence (racketeering), have been on the rise during the 
1990s, since the collapse of the previous regime (see O’Neill, 1997; Volkov, 
2002; Anastasijevic, 2006; Gounev, 2006).  
 Many would agree with such categorisation of the hidden economy, with 
the caveat that the first type of hidden economy can also have violent features, 
such as the untaxed cigarettes market in Germany where Vietnamese vendors 
could fall victim to extortion by country fellowmen (see Von Lampe, 2002).308 
What clearly links these two types of hidden economy is that for various rea-
sons the financial results remain unrecorded or are only partly recorded, which 
means that less or no tax is being paid (with the reservation that, in the case of 
criminal activities, tax may be paid on the successfully laundered income; see 
comments below). Despite the different views and definitions, it is widely as-
sumed that income which remains unrecorded – or else defined as ‘evading 
tax’, ‘escaping official detection’ and ‘falling outside the purview of government 
accounting’ – is the main component of a hidden economy (see Bhattacharyya, 
                                                                                                              
a visible value and sold it for profit but this profit was misrepresented in order to pay less tax. As 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996, p. 4) point out, these unofficial activities were conducted in 
“close proximity to official activities (often within a continuum in the same line of business), [. . .] hover[ing] 
flexibly between officialdom and unofficialdom, largely motivated by government-induced incentives.” 
308  See also Hornsby and Hobbs (2007) for an account of the violence creeping into the UK smug-
gling scene, not due to the smugglers themselves but to violent criminals taking advantage of a 
relatively non-violent market. 
 203 
1999; Thomas, 1992; Feige, 1990; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Fleming et al., 
2000).309  
 Fleming et al. (2000) notes that there are four broadly comparable compo-
nents of the shadow economy which comprise: the household and informal sec-
tors, as well as the criminal and irregular sectors.310 The household sector is 
household production, while the informal sector is defined as economic activi-
ties that circumvent the costs but are also excluded from the benefits of law 
(Fleming et al. quotes Feige, 1990). By definition, neither the household nor 
the informal sectors operate necessarily in violation of any institutional rules and 
laws (except for maybe, in certain cases, taxation311), contrary to the criminal 
and irregular sectors but it is often difficult to draw a line.312 It is especially diffi-
cult to distinguish between the official and hidden economy concerning licit 
goods and services sold unrecorded, and between the various types of hidden 
economy when unrecorded work leads to savings used for transactions with 
registered goods and services. The economic spheres overlap in a broad transit 
zone. The shadow economy is like a big self-contained “aquarium” (see Van 
Duyne, 1994b, pp. 54-55), part of which we do not see, but effects are felt 
elsewhere (and taxed all the same). The lack of conceptual clarity and, particu-
larly, the broad definition of laundering, do not make things any easier. All this 
                                               
309  With the caveat that it is the primary income which is not recorded, but the tax and benefits 
derived from spending this income may be recorded: VAT, sales tax and so on (except for con-
sumer goods smuggled into the country). 
310  Fleming et al. (2000) notes that in addition to the definitional approach which describes the 
shadow economy as ‘unrecorded economic activity’, there is also behavioural approach, which 
seeks to explain the causes and underpinnings of the shadow economy. He argues that the par-
ticipation in the shadow economy can be viewed as a change in behaviour of market players 
that occurs as a reaction to institutional constraints. Both the definitional and behavioural ap-
proaches identify these four broadly comparable components of the shadow economy. 
311  According to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 1993), the hidden or underground 
economy should be distinguished from the informal sector as the latter is not necessarily deliber-
ately evading tax. The ILO defines the informal sector as a group of production units, which 
form part of the household sector as household enterprises. Many believe that household pro-
duction should be included in the official national accounts (see Sloman, 2000; Thomas, 2003). 
The ILO (1993) for instance seeks to take account of the workforce involved in this sector. 
312  The matter is further complicated by interpretations as to whether household and informal 
sectors contribute to GDP. Thomas (2003) notes that the informal sector includes workers who 
work from home but sell their output in the market, whereas households’ output is consumed 
within the household, i.e. it is not a subject to a market transaction. Yet in countries with typi-
cally large families the household economy may be important to the official system. Vaury 
(2003) observes that household production creates a value ‘forgotten’ by GDP. So can be volun-
tary work and work in the public sector but these can hardly be categorised as hidden economy. 
This means that whether a certain value is included in the official GDP cannot be reliably used 
to distinguish the hidden from the official economy.  
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makes analysis and measurement highly tentative, particularly when we have to 
look at tax evasion from the perspective of money laundering.  
 The categorisation of the shadow economy into four sectors as outlined 
above - criminal, irregular, household and informal - is not suitable for the 
purposes of our present analysis as it is conceptually complicated, implies over-
laps313 and may include elements that do not violate any laws and regulations.314  
 Furthermore, on some occasions, household production can also be part of 
the criminal sector because it involves the production of illegitimate goods. In 
Poland, for instance, in the 1970s and 1980s, an illegal drug called ‘Polish her-
oin’, also known locally as kompot (mentioned previously in this thesis) was 
literally produced in people’s kitchens. If it was ever provided to other addicts, 
it was done as a favour rather than for profit (Krajewski, 2000). This household 
production was part of the criminal sector and, therefore, some might argue 
that it would be wrong to describe it as part of the national economy and 
GDP. However, it can also be argued that the criminal sector involves market 
transactions (see Taylor, 2002), which generate an added value and income 
largely spent on legitimate goods or kept as savings in banks, and it is therefore 
part of the national economy and GDP. Is drug smuggling hidden economy? 
Drug smuggling is certainly a clandestine activity. However, it is clandestine 
not necessarily because smugglers seek to evade taxes, but because of the illegal 
nature of the commodity. Drug smugglers do not pay tax on their original 
criminal proceeds or on the added value from the criminal transactions but they 
may well pay tax on their laundered income. Is the sale of stolen goods part of 
the hidden economy and is the ‘black’ market part of the hidden economy? It 
can be argued, for instance, that the sale of stolen goods on the black market 
does not add any value to the unofficial GDP315 (or we can even say that it has 
a negative added value as the fence’s price is lower than the added value), while 
the production of piracy CDs and counterfeit goods creates a new value, 
though in an illegal way (that must be offset against the loss in the legal produc-
                                               
313  The concepts of ‘informal’ and ‘irregular’ sectors seem to overlap in certain respects. Both com-
prise activities that by nature are legitimate but in both sectors tax and other state requirements 
are circumvented. However, in the case of the irregular sector the circumvention is deliberate 
and unlawful. In addition, the informal sector overlaps with the household sector or is a part of 
it. 
314  As previously noted, the household sector is not necessarily breaking taxation laws. There may 
be do-it-yourself work and neighbour help that avoids rather than evades tax (see Mirus and 
Smith, 1997; Schneider and Enste, 2000) but that can be a matter of interpretation. The au-
thorities might argue that it is always on the egde of law breaking, at least concerning the hidden 
income, which requires measures of concealment.  
315  It can also be argued that it does add value between the seller and the buyer. However, the 
predicate crime implies only a shift of wealth (from owner to thief). 
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tion of the merchandise). As Thomas (2003) notes, it is also important to con-
sider that certain products may be regarded as illegal in some jurisdictions, 
while in others they are legitimately offered on the market. Such goods and 
services may be, for instance, soft drugs and services in the sex industry or alco-
hol in Muslim-culture dominated countries. On the other hand, household 
production of legitimate goods and services may fall into the category of the 
irregular sector.316  
 As it appears, the concept of the hidden economy is multi-dimensional. To 
avoid confusion, however, and for the purposes of this section, we will distin-
guish ‘criminal economy’ from ‘hidden economy.’ The criminal business, which 
involves the creation and distribution of illegitimate goods and services such as 
drug smuggling and child pornography, and may in fact duly pay tax on laun-
dered criminal incomes, will be referred to as ‘criminal’ or ‘underworld’ sector 
or economy.  
 The ‘hidden’ economy, as opposed to the ‘criminal’ economy, will be re-
garded as:  
economic activities, which involve the production of legitimate goods and 
services and are aimed at earning a material gain through market transactions 
(including barter deals) but the activities, and respectively, the gain remain 
unrecorded and unreported or are misrepresented to evade the administra-
tive burden and costs of various institutional requirements such as tax, li-
censing fees, import and export duties and other costs related to legal opera-
tion.  
 
The ‘hidden’ economy involves genuine transactions, albeit unrecorded or 
misrepresented. For the purposes of this section, fraudulent activities aimed at 
making a financial gain through defrauding the state will be considered part of 
the ‘criminal’ economy. This will include, for instance, VAT fraud (even if 
there are legitimate goods involved but they are only a cover rather than a 
primary objective of the transactions) or benefit fraud. However, as we will see 
in the next section, it is often difficult to divide between the criminal and hid-
                                               
316  For instance, in Bulgaria, homemade rakiya (a national brandy) is not merely a commodity for 
sale but a cultural tradition similarly to preparing pickled vegetables. Nevertheless, on 1 January 
2007 (when the country became an EU member), home-brewing of rakiya became subject to 
excise duty. At the time, for the average Bulgarian with a monthly wage of €200, and especially 
in the countryside where pensioners might receive as little as €40, to pay BGN 2,2 (about €1,1) 
tax per litre of rakiya (BGN 4.4 per litre if the amount exceeds 30 litres) bordered on extortion 
(wages have grown since but, at least as of 2010, remain among the lowest in Europe). This 
meant that many had to start brewing rakiya at home without paying the excise duty, thereby 
forming part of the irregular sector. However, to apply the money laundering concept, in the 
strict sense, in this case would be simply inapt.  
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den economies especially when it comes to defrauding the state through the 
existing system of tax and other duties.  
 The concepts of ‘hidden’, ‘informal’ and so on, are adjectives from a certain 
economic or political measurement perspective. After all, unless money is taken 
out of the jurisdiction and not returned, the fiscal mill turns every colour into 
white as has been argued in previous sections. But the way things stand now, a 
feeling of uneasiness creeps in: the line between economic and political dimen-
sions is becoming blurred. Laundering by hiding the money under your mat-
tress creates no value but the broad laundering definition does not allow for 
distinguishing that from what constitutes an economic phenomenon. On the 
other hand, laundering in the strict sense of the term is a transaction: it adds 
value as it helps money slip from the shadow into the official economy. Money 
laundering is only an economic phenomenon if it consists of a transaction. 
Economy is production and distribution (plus subsequent consumption), hence 
it is about transactions and added value.317 A crime-money transaction is eco-
nomic conduct involving crime-money and creating an added value (usually, 
with at least one other party, although laundering can be done by just one per-
son alone). If there is no transaction and no added value, there is no active (as 
opposed to passive) economic conduct and, hence, we would not expect any 
visible and immediate effect on the economy. But there is still a penal-law con-
struction and that is laundering in the broad sense. It is a legal construction after 
the fact which essentially relates to hiding of ‘unrecorded/criminal in-
come/wealth,’ i.e. handling one’s crime money (neutral indication), which is 
‘crime-money management’. The broad construction of laundering, deter-
mined by its definition, is artificial and so is its scope in economic terms. De-
pending on the definition, the scope shrinks or expands. Therefore it would 
seem impractical to seek an operational connection between money laundering 
in its broad sense and the domain of observables (to the extent those can be 
observed), such as the hidden economy, economy in general, and crime-
money transactions. That means that the two domains can be connected if one 
applies a proper operational definition of money laundering.  
 The next section will look into this matter from an empirical perspective. It 
will examine whether such operational links can be identified between the 
hidden economy as unrecorded economic activities and the criminal sector, in 
particular financial crime and money laundering in a narrow and broad sense.  
 
                                               
317  Except for self-sufficient economic units. 
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4.2.2. The link between hidden economy and laundering 
 
The impact of the various unofficial activities largely depends on the context 
and the environment in which they occur. While the criminal economy 
(meaning the ‘usual suspects’ crimes such as drug trafficking) is commonly 
branded as evil, we tend to be more sympathetic to activities that merely cir-
cumvent tax or administrative burdens. However, in many jurisdictions tax 
evasion and employer fraud, as well as hiring illegal immigrants, are criminal 
offences too. Hence any subsequent use of the ill-gotten benefits constitutes 
money laundering, including in the strict sense of the term if, for instance, the 
employer fraudulently covers up his illegal tax savings and the unrecorded em-
ployment. In the West, tax evasion is increasingly brought within the orbit of 
money laundering and prosecuted as such. 
 Claiming social benefits, for instance, while being unofficially employed 
counts as fraud and, as such, it is a predicate offence to money laundering. A 
report by Lord Grabiner (2000) quotes data from the UK Benefits Agency, 
which suggests that in the UK, at any one time, 120.000 people were working 
and fraudulently claiming benefits leading to benefits overpayments of over 
£450 million a year (as of the time of the report318). Lord Grabiner provides a 
number of real examples, one of which is an unemployed family man who 
claimed Jobseeker’s Allowance while doing several decorating jobs for 
neighbours in return for ‘cash-in-hand’ to earn some money for Christmas. 
Another example is a London-based organisation of bogus companies, which 
specialised in large-scale benefit, mortgage and property fraud, import of illegal 
immigrants, and illegal cocaine dealing. The organisation filed over 500 fraudu-
lent benefit claims, worth around £4 million. Additionally, there was evidence 
that it was involved in 50 cases of identity fraud. Clearly, there was money 
laundering going on and on a fairly large scale.  
 In the UK, as in other EU member states, social benefit fraud, single or 
organised, is a major problem and it clearly needs to be tackled. However, as 
Lord Grabiner’s report indicates, the intent and scale differ on a case-by-case 
basis. While the family man who was trying to earn some extra money before 
Christmas is only technically a money launderer, the organisation which com-
mitted fraud repeatedly and on a massive scale, should be considered a fully-
fledged fraud-and-money laundering enterprise. By fraudulently earning the 
                                               
318  As of 2010, this has remained a significant problem in the UK and increasingly across Europe. 
According to a 2010 report by the National Fraud Authority in the UK, in 2008-09, the UK 
Department for Work and Pensions reported benefit fraud losses of £1.1 billion. 
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benefits, the organisation was concurrently providing a legitimate appearance to 
the money. The same applied to the illegal labour organisations in other mem-
ber states, like the koppelbaas in the Netherlands (Van Duyne and Houtzager, 
2005). 
  Within the realm of the hidden economy we have two different dimen-
sions: an economic and a penal law dimension (as discussed previously). For 
obvious fiscal and penal law reasons, both are hidden. Some aspects of em-
ployer fraud, e.g. hiring workers without recording their salary, health insur-
ance and so on, fall into the category of the hidden economy. However, by 
definition the employer defrauds and, thus, slips into the criminal economy, 
which comprises also all kinds of other fraud, including financial fraud and 
ponzi schemes.  
 In certain types of fraud (for instance, some forms of investment fraud and 
ponzi schemes) there is no value added, no exchange of goods and services. 
This is an illegal and predatory shift of assets from the victim to the fraudster, 
while the hidden economy typically involves actual and consensual exchange, 
albeit unreported, of licit goods and services. For example, with black-market 
trading that involves tax evasion such as VAT, excise and social insurance eva-
sion, a value is being added but unrecorded. However, it would seem inapt to 
classify large-scale fraudulent social benefit claims as part of the hidden econ-
omy. Intentionally unreported or misreported economic activity usually relates 
to fraud (or tax evasion) and, therefore, normally by definition is part of the 
criminal economy,319 but by its nature it is part of the hidden economy, which is 
illegal but not necessarily criminal. That is only the case if concealment leads to 
criminalised law breaking. A good example is illegal cartel building, which is an 
administrative transgression in many jurisdictions. But to hide a cartel it may be 
required to commit accountancy fraud, which is a serious criminal offence. 
Despite the obvious overlaps in criminal law terms, financial fraud and hidden 
economy remain two different phenomena in economic terms. But they are 
often mixed up which impedes analysis.  
 Laundering needs can also be different as in the criminal economy the subject 
of laundering is criminal profits, while in the hidden economy the subject of 
laundering is illegal savings - and we should exclude here social benefit, subsidy 
fraud, fraudulent VAT reclaims and non-contributions where we have illegal 
earnings rather than illegal savings (interestingly, in the case of environmental 
                                               
319  The situation across countries may vary to an extent. For instance, as mentioned elsewhere, 
some tax related offences are administrative rather than criminal offences in Switzerland.  
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fraud we have an illegal saving, i.e. the saving of high processing costs).320 
Laundering the savings overlaps with the act of covering up the evasion of tax 
and other due payments. But this act of covering up does not always occur. 
The broad definition, however, even where there is no covering up, equates 
the management of illegal savings, including their spending, to laundering. The 
broad definition inevitably urges such an equation.321 So here we hit again on 
the over-stretched application of the legal laundering clause (for relevant com-
ments, in the context of Serbia, see Van Duyne and Donati, 2008). It simply 
does no justice to the underlying variety of situations and types of financial 
conduct for the consideration of which more realistic dimensions of the money 
laundering definition must be used.  
 The hidden and criminal economies can be described as two different sub-
sets of the total unrecorded economy (see Van Duyne and Donati, 2008) and 
although they overlap, it would be helpful to distinguish them from each other, 
and even further disaggregate them into subsets, for the purposes of researching 
laundering and other criminal behaviours. Even if we cannot completely sepa-
rate the criminal from the hidden economy, we can allocate them to two sepa-
rate dimensions. ‘Hidden economy’ belongs to the realm of the economy. 
‘Criminal economy’ is a penal law phenomenon within the economy. Launder-
ing is a construction in the penal law world, although its material effects are to 
be observed in the economy. In its strict sense, laundering occurs in the crimi-
nal economy. Within the remit of the hidden economy, it would be more 
appropriate to speak of concealment and money management rather than of 
laundering, even though in the legal world concealing is laundering.  
 
4.2.3. Measuring the hidden economy – measuring money launder-
ing (or observables v. non-observables)? 
 
The existence of the hidden economy is an undeniable fact, whether in West-
ern Europe, the Eastern European transition countries, or elsewhere. In the 
countries of transition, one can say that practically everyone who has lived 
there has personally witnessed, or has most likely been a party to, unrecorded 
                                               
320  Fraud is a bridge between the criminal and legitimate economy. By nature it is part of the 
criminal economy but it occurs within the boundaries of the legitimate economy. This particu-
larly applies to environmental fraud, which can be more complicated than just illegal waste 
dumping.  
321  It urges an equation of the use and management of criminal savings, gross criminal revenues and 
net criminal profit with laundering, even though part of the money may be used to cover busi-
ness costs or daily needs without any fraudulent cover-up. 
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business transactions. Especially during the early transition years not only many 
transactions for daily living were settled without receipts, also many business 
transactions went unrecorded. Private enterprises mushroomed but the majority 
were bound to be wound up sooner or later. Entrepreneurs had little business 
experience and insufficient funds, and could therefore only undertake small-
scale operations. A few were capable of making long-term investments but 
these were mainly people who were close to the former regime (and, report-
edly, had access to communist party funds or ‘red capital’ as discussed earlier – 
see section 4.1.). The legal framework and regulatory mechanisms were inade-
quate to ensure a level playing field while corruption was widespread. The 
economy was still institutionally and structurally weak. Short-sighted business 
investment and limited financial capabilities meant that many businesses oper-
ated inefficiently or even at a loss. Banks often provided loans to loss-making 
industries and therefore themselves became largely loss making institutions. The 
banking system was vulnerable to economic depression and open to abuse as 
well (as reviewed in previous sections).  
 Financial volatility of the market, general macroeconomic instability, in-
cluding inflation risk, the considerable administrative burden and all costs re-
lated to legal operations, especially the tax burden, stimulated small and me-
dium-sized market players to conceal their income. Many even went fully ‘un-
derground’ and avoided registration as an enterprise (some of this was maybe a 
heritage from the socialist era’s black markets: ‘stay away from the state’). De-
spite the lack of anti-money laundering laws during the early transition years, 
conceptually money laundering must have existed, given the broad definition 
of the phenomenon, if tax evasion was so endemic. Although inconclusive in 
detail, findings from various surveys demonstrate the existence of considerable 
hidden economy (specifically tax evasion) and provide statistical indicators of its 
dynamics over time, which helps to form a view of its scale (see below). How-
ever, can any of the approaches and indicators that are applied to assess the 
extent of the hidden economy, and tax evasion in particular, be effectively used 
to also measure money laundering, if the two phenomena overlap so strongly? 
And if one does so (see Unger et al., 2006), what descriptive or explanatory 
value would this exercise have, given the broad laundering definition? 
 There are a number of approaches to assess the informal and black econ-
omy. Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), for instance, used the results of empirical 
micro-surveys conducted in the early to mid-1990s in Ukraine. They inter-
viewed representatives of small and medium-sized enterprises from different 
samples. The majority of entrepreneurs admitted that they engaged in unofficial 
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operations.322 Household surveys revealed that, while officially employed 
workers in Ukraine were finding it difficult to cope with the cost of living, 
there were individuals who were not officially employed and received no social 
aid but were able to provide for their family, afford a car, pay their rent and so 
on. Were all these people money launderers? Yes, under the broad umbrella 
they were and, consequently, this research could be considered a money laun-
dering measurement? But how meaningful would that qualification and the 
outcomes be?  
 A recent study of the Serbian economy also reveals that households’ expen-
ditures significantly surpass the total household income (see Van Duyne and 
Donati, 2008). In such cases, unless people live on credit or long term savings, 
they are most likely spending unrecorded, i.e. untaxed, income. Does that 
make them money launderers? Yes they too are, demonstrating again the 
meaninglessness of broad constructions. 
 Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) examined the link between official GDP 
growth and electricity power consumption323 in order to estimate the changes 
in the unofficial economy between 1989 and 1994. They proceeded from the 
assumption that electricity consumption indicates the conduct of economic 
activity and therefore its growth correlates with the growth in economic activ-
ity. Where electricity consumption has grown but no growth of the official 
economic activity has been recorded, this presumably would mean that the 
electricity has been used in unofficial, i.e. unrecorded economic activities.324  
 Each of these methods, however, has its caveats. Empirical surveys and in-
terviews only cover a limited number of market players and therefore do not 
necessarily provide a full picture of the hidden economy. Econometrical meth-
ods based on assessing discrepancies between official GDP levels and expendi-
tures, such as electricity consumption, are based on methodological assump-
tions, including assumed levels of consumption efficiency and elasticity, and are 
subject to errors. Nevertheless, results based on such methods may provide 
                                               
322  According to the study, estimated unofficial activities in Ukraine comprised about 25% of the 
overall economy in 1992. In the following three years estimates ranged between 47% and 59%. 
An additional survey conducted in 1994 indicated that about 70% of state enterprise employees 
or former state enterprise workers were engaged in unofficial activities, from which they derived 
over half of their income. 
323  Similar methods include assessment of discrepancies between national income and expenditure 
statistics. 
324  The authors conclude that during the reviewed period the unofficial economy in Ukraine 
tripled in size reaching over 40% of the overall economy, while the official economy declined to 
less than half of its 1989 size. Using the same method, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) estimated 
that in the mid-1990s, on average, the unofficial economy in CEE ranged between 21% and 
24%, while in the FSU it was about 36% to 39% of overall GDP. 
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some indication of the dynamics of unofficial activities, and indirectly, of the 
extent of tax evasion as an observable economic phenomenon. However, 
without providing information about the structure and management of the 
unlawfully saved income, these methods seem inapt to shed light on the penal 
law money laundering construction(s).  
 A study by the Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms (CSSR) in Chisi-
nau undertaken in 1997 used labour market indicators325 to prove the emer-
gence of hidden economy in the following former Soviet republics: Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajiki-
stan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The CSSR estimated that between 1991 and 
1994 the average share of the hidden economy as a per-centage of GDP in 
these countries almost doubled reaching about 40%. From 1994 to 1997 the 
size of the hidden economy slightly decreased with about 3 to 5% to its previ-
ous level. The cases of Georgia and Uzbekistan presented the two extremes. 
The increase of the hidden economy in Georgia was the highest, reaching 
nearly 100% in 1994, and by 1997 decreased to about 60% of the GDP, while 
the size of the shadow economy in Uzbekistan remained nearly the same 
throughout the whole period from 1991 to 1997, retaining the level at about 
20% of the GDP. However, migration and other demographic factors may 
distort the picture and lead to errors in the application of this method. Fur-
thermore, as with the above-mentioned methods, it would seem inappropriate 
for us to try to link the results from such measurement of an observable eco-
nomic conduct to the legal construction ‘money laundering’.  
 Another indication of the hidden economy is the level of tax evasion, 
which can directly be linked to money laundering. As unofficial economic 
activities are largely aimed at evading tax, the amount of tax losses to the state 
budget can be used to assess the size of the hidden economy. In its study the 
CSSR reported results from analysis in Moldova for 1997 – first quarter of 
1998. According to the CSSR, during this period, tax evasion decreased in the 
first quarter of 1998, which could mean that the size of the hidden economy 
also decreased. Similar to other methods, this one is not entirely reliable, as it is 
not possible to catch all unofficial activities through routine fiscal auditing of 
enterprises. Besides, accounts’ fiddling is committed (by its nature) within re-
corded economic activities with the aim of obtaining illegal monetary advan-
tages. Tax evasion may also take place at the end of perfectly legitimate and 
                                               
325  The CSSR appears to have based their labour market analysis on a comparison between the 
offering and demand of labour in a given period and between the numbers of employed at the 
beginning and the end of a given period. 
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officially recorded economic operations. It may be that the created value is 
being registered and the revenues are being recorded but inflated expenses 
reduce the amount of tax that has to be paid. Such transactions may never be 
detected and accordingly never taken into account in assessments of the hidden 
economy. Illicit advantages derived from these transactions are “canned launder-
ing” (mentioned earlier, see Van Duyne, 2003b, p. 72), wrapped up in the licit 
transaction. Therefore they take place in the licit economy, while, in a legal 
sense, being both part of the hidden and criminal economy.  
 So we have a conceptual problem: if running a non-registered shop is black 
economy, then defrauding the tax authorities by inflating expenses and hiding 
income should qualify as fraud in the registered economy. What construction 
should be imposed remains a question of debate. Perhaps we should simplify 
constructions and consider the application of a simple dichotomy: recorded 
versus unrecorded. And within ‘recorded’ one has the subset of ‘wrongly re-
corded’. These simple categories cover ‘observable conduct’. The rest is after-
the-fact criminal or fiscal law (re)construction.   
 The CSSR also applied official cross-border trade data to assess the amount 
of unofficial export-import activities. The discrepancies between domestic out-
put and exports of goods can be used as an indication of the existence of unof-
ficial economic activities.326 However, such analysis should take into account 
the possibility that some of the exported goods may have been produced else-
where but have been re-exported from a specific country to benefit from cross-
border trade agreements between this country and the country of import.327  
 Once again, it appears difficult to link this method of measuring a sector of 
the hidden economy to the money-laundering phenomenon, especially when 
it comes to legitimate goods. One thing to consider is when locally produced 
legitimate goods remain unrecorded. Another is when export of recorded 
goods takes place in an illicit way in order to launder money, or to originate 
proceeds by ‘over-exporting’.  
                                               
326  The study quotes Romanian data from Curierul National, according to which the volume of 
Moldavian sugar exports to Romania exceeded by 1,8 times (450.000 tons) the officially re-
corded volume of production of sugar in Moldova. Similar to this is the situation with exports 
of wine. According to Russian and Moldavian official statistics, exports of sparkling wine from 
Moldova to Russia exceeded (by 1,6 times) the amount produced in Moldova. Perhaps in this 
particular case, the term ‘criminal’ should be used, rather than simply ‘unofficial’, as the activity 
described is outright fraud.  
327  For instance, the authors of the study noted that part of the sugar exported from Moldova to 
Romania had in fact been produced in Ukraine, while Vermouth exported from Moldova to 
Russia had been produced in Hungary and Bulgaria. 
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 Money launderers can use various illegal instruments in international trade 
and trade finance, such as over- and under-invoicing or over- and under-
shipment of goods (see Palmer, 2001; Thanasegaran and Shanmugam, 2007) 
but that is not quite the same as unrecorded production of legitimate goods. 
Furthermore, when it comes to re-exporting, there are well-developed VAT 
fraud mechanisms but that, again, is a different type of conduct consisting of 
money-making and laundering at the same time, while it can consist of real 
goods or invoices alone which are passed along the links of the VAT fraud 
chain. With such multi-facetted economic manifestations, the confusing over-
lap makes it difficult to distinguish between money laundering, fraud and tax 
evasion, let alone to measure them. A narrower concept construction would 
enable us to look into each phenomenon separately (to the extent possible) but 
that would not be an encompassing concept.  
 Another indicator of the hidden economy is believed to be the amount of 
foreign cash in circulation. Firstly, it is observed that market players tend to use 
cash instead of deposit money and bank transfers in unofficial activities. Sec-
ondly, because of high inflation risk, particularly during the early years of tran-
sition, businesses preferred to use stable foreign currencies (substitution curren-
cies), usually US dollars or Deutsche Marks, in their market transactions. Šošić 
and Faulend (2002) have sought to evaluate the dynamics of the ‘underworld 
economy’328 in Croatia by using the denomination displacement method, 
which is based on the link between the denomination structure of the local 
currency and the denomination structure of the substitution currency 
(Deutsche Mark at the time).329 The authors note that inflation is a major factor 
for errors, as due to inflation processes, the denomination structure of currency 
becomes an unreliable criterion.330 Besides, even if we accept as fact that high-
denomination foreign currency is used in large-scale transactions within the 
hidden economy, how does this relate to money laundering? Quirk (1996) 
suggests, as reviewed earlier, that a rise in crime can lead to a fall in official 
broad money demand and in currency demand as the related proceeds are be-
                                               
328  The authors use this term throughout their paper. It cannot be excluded that in their research 
they have included analysis of both hidden economy of non-criminal nature and shadow activi-
ties of criminal nature (elsewhere defined as irregular and criminal sectors).  
329  This study refers to the earlier transition period, i.e. the 1990s. The authors suggest that in ‘dol-
larised’ countries, such as Croatia and Russia, market players largely use high-denomination for-
eign currency banknotes instead of domestic currency, particularly in large-scale transactions 
such as the purchase of a car or real estate. 
330  Šošić and Faulend also use the electricity consumption method and monetary methods, such as 
the Gutmann approach, and demonstrate that the use of different concurrent methods can, to an 
extent, increase the reliability of findings. 
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ing laundered in parallel financial markets (explained earlier, see section 3.3.1.). 
However, here again we see concepts from different domains, i.e. economic 
conduct and penal law construction, being mixed up.  
 Schneider and Enste (2000)331 point out that hidden economy also exists in 
the developed market economies. They quote data on the size of the hidden 
economy as a percentage of GDP derived through the currency demand ap-
proach in the OECD countries from 1994 to 1997. The data indicates a slight 
increase of about 1% from the original level. Over a longer period the increase 
is significantly larger: 
 
Table 3 
Growth of shadow economy relative to GNP 
Selected West European countries and the United States, 1960–95 





Increase in Shadow 
Economy % 
Sweden  2 16 14 
Denmark    4,5    17,5 13 
Norway    1,5 18    16,5 
Germany 2    13,2    11,2 
United States    3,5     9,5 6 
Austria    0,5 7    6,5 
Switzerland  1    6,7    5,7 
Source: Schneider and Enste (2000, p. 81), calculations based on the currency demand 
approach (rounded figures). 
 
Undoubtedly, hidden economy exists not only in transition and developing 
countries but also in the developed markets, as we have seen above, even to in 
the most ‘decent’ economies. However, the hidden economy is believed to be 
far more considerable in the developing and transition countries.332 Does this 
                                               
331  Schneider and Enste (2000) also used data from different sources, obtained through the physical 
input (electricity consumption) and discrepancy method assessments, to compare the changes in 
the size of the hidden economy as a percentage of GDP in FSU and CEE from 1989 to 1995. 
According to their analysis, the general tendency of the hidden economy during this period was 
to grow and the hidden economy almost doubled in the majority of countries. 
332  World Bank former chief economist Stiglitz (2002) observes that the combination of privatisa-
tion, liberalisation and decentralisation in the transition countries was expected to lead quickly to 
a significant production growth but this did not happen. In Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Slo-
vakia the level of GDP in 2000 remained the same as a decade earlier and in the majority of 
transition economies the level of GDP actually declined. In Russia, in 2000, it was less than 
two-thirds of the 1989 level; in Ukraine it amounted to one third of what it was a decade ear-
lier; in Moldova it was less than one third of the GDP level ten years earlier (see Stiglitz, 2002, 
quoting World Bank data). Stiglitz notes that data on household consumption, i.e. how much 
households spent on food and other living costs, corroborated the decline in GDP level. How-
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really mean that money laundering is more considerable in the developing and 
transition countries? Besides, it is possible that the scope of the hidden econ-
omy in developing and transition countries will downscale to the size of the 
hidden economy in market economies.333 Does this mean that money launder-
ing will downscale along with the hidden economy? Not necessarily, as in a 
well-registered economy one needs more money-laundering constructions, 
while in a loosely regulated economy with many hidden spots, it is easy to slip 
money unseen into the licit economy. But now we are talking about the nar-
row definition of money-laundering and about law breaking conduct (designing 
fraudulent constructions) and not about the inconsistent fusing together of two 
ill-defined concepts: hidden economy and money-laundering. 
 As we have seen, indicators of the hidden economy cannot reliably be used 
to prove the existence and to measure the volume of money laundering in 
economic terms (see Van Duyne, 1994b, for a critical analysis of money laun-
dering assessment methods). There is hardly any bridge between these indica-
tors and the construction of laundering. Therefore, to use the understatement 
of income by criminals as an indicator of money laundering, as Walker (1995, 
2004) suggests (see previous chapters), without using any further refining meas-
urements, will be of little help in providing precise analysis of laundering in the 
strict sense of the term.  
 In the next chapter we will review the common perceptions, illusions and 
reality about money laundering in developing and developed countries.  
 
4.3. The global map of money laundering  
 
This chapter will compare the developing and developed economies in relation 
to the money-laundering phenomenon. It is generally assumed that the phe-
nomenon is more clearly present in developing countries, given their back-
ground and record of corruption, questionable privatisation processes and hid-
den economy, as opposed to the developed countries which are economically 
                                                                                                              
ever, Stiglitz also admits that many believe the decline in official GDP has been compensated by 
an increase in barter transactions and unofficial economic activities. 
333  The hidden economy is not a static factor. It changes under the influence of changes in the 
economic environment. The share of the various components of the hidden economy can also 
change. For instance, a study by Coalition 2000 and Vitosha Research (2005) indicates that be-
tween 2002 and 2004 the share of unrecorded employment and non-payment of national insur-
ance in the hidden economy of Bulgaria grew. On the other hand, the share of unrecorded 
economic transactions in the early to mid 2000s, compared to a decade earlier, has evidently de-
creased (Coalition 2000 and Vitosha Research, 2005).  
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more advanced and presumably have a more robust anti-money laundering 
regime and, therefore, better capabilities to fight laundering. In this chapter we 
will test the logic of this assumption, examining some of the key arguments pro 
and against it. 
 
4.3.1. Country classifications  
 
During the Cold War there was a clear divide between the capitalist and social-
ist countries (as discussed in previous chapters), and between the First World 
and the Second World. There was also the Third World. The term was coined 
by demographer Alfred Sauvy, in an article published in the French magazine 
L’Observateur on 14 August 1952, who referred to the poorest countries in the 
world, especially in Latin America, Africa and Asia, that were unaligned with 
either the socialist bloc or the capitalist bloc (Quinion, 2005). Now the Third 
World countries are often called under-developed, developing or industrialis-
ing. Many of the former socialist economies are also described as developing or 
industrialising. There is also the category of ‘emerging markets’. The term was 
reportedly coined in the early 1980s by Antoine van Agtmael, who then 
worked for the World Bank’s International Financial Corporation (Authers, 
Financial Times, 2006). The expression referred to economies with low-to-
middle per capita income (as defined by the World Bank) but it quickly came 
to denote opening and liberalising developing countries in a stage of steady 
transition to developed economies.334 
 There are different classification methodologies and different views of how 
we should define the various categories of countries according to the level of 
wealth and economic development. Some countries may fall into the category 
of developed economies according to some classifications, but be described as 
developing markets according to other classifications. Some developing coun-
tries might prefer to see a slowdown in multilateral trade liberalisation and to 
remain qualified as ‘developing’ in order to keep the preferential trade terms 
the status entails.335  
                                               
334  In 2003 Goldman Sachs published a report suggesting that the BRIC-like economies (BRIC 
stands for Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are developing rapidly and by 2050 are likely to out-
rival the developed economies (O’Neill et al., 2005). 
335  The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), formed in 1947, was succeeded by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Under a GATT clause, in the 1970s developing 
countries were given access to the markets of the developed countries without having to lower 
their own import barriers. These preferences continued to be applied within the WTO. How-
ever, within the WTO there has been an increasing pressure on all members to engage in multi-
lateral trade liberalisation. But talks have stalled on several occasions as some develop-ing coun-
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 The IMF (2008), for instance, has categorised the following 32 economies 
as ‘advanced’: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Malta, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Slove-
nia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the United States of Amer-
ica, and the newly industrialised East Asian Tigers - Hong Kong,336 Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan.  
 The World Bank has identified 60 ‘high income countries,’337 of which 
some are classified as developing by the UN (2005). The list compiled by the 
World Bank includes major tax havens such as the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Isle 
of Man, the Cayman Islands, the Channel Islands and Liechtenstein.  
 It is even less clear which countries among the developing economies fall 
into the category of emerging markets. The online business data provider ISI 
Emerging Markets lists on its website (www.securities.com) over 80 emerging 
economies, including Russia and the former socialist block in Central and East-
ern Europe, although some of these are included by the IMF and the World 
Bank in the category of advanced or high-income economies.  
 For the purposes of this thesis we shall primarily focus on the following 
broad categories: 
 the original members of the FATF338 (referred hereafter as ‘developed’, ‘ad-
vanced’ or, in some contexts, ‘capitalist’ countries) – USA, Japan, Germany, 
France, UK, Italy, Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Australia – versus  
 the developing countries (former socialist block and the Third World coun-
tries339) and  
                                                                                                              
tries have feared that they will have relatively little or no gain from lib-eralisation as they are 
asked to grant significant tariff cuts while having to face protectionism in developed markets. For 
instance, as the media has reported, the talks in Seattle in 1999 “broke down because the developing 
countries were pre-sented with a lousy deal by the west and were sick of being ignored and patron-ised. 
Countries like Bangladesh and India walked away from the negotiating ta-ble rather than accept Bill Clin-
ton’s idea that core labour standards should be written into trade deals, seeing the move as a form of backdoor 
protectionism.” (see report by Elliot in The Guardian, 2001). 
336  Hong Kong is viewed as a developed economic entity although it is an administrative region of 
China which is a developing country. 
337  World Bank’s website, Data and Statistics: Country Groups. 
338  As previously mentioned, in 1989 the leaders of the G7 countries, at their Eco-nomic Summit, 
established the FATF. A number of the FIUs created by some FATF members formed the Eg-
mont Group in 1995 (FINTRAC Annual Report 2003). 
339  The description ‘Third World’ countries remains conditional as some countries in Africa, South 
America and Asia have also had socialist regimes. Nevertheless, we will use this term for con-
venience to distinguish underdeveloped countries in Africa, South America and Asia from the 
former socialist block in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
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 some offshore centres, without aiming at covering every single country.  
 
The reason for such a division is that the original members of the FATF are not 
only economically advanced (in fact, the world’s richest nations) but are also 
pioneers in the fight against money laundering, i.e. they supposedly have a 
better mechanism for protection against laundering than the rest of the world 
(or, at least, than the majority of the developing countries or rather, are more 
worried about the effects of crime-monies, being arguably the major drug con-
sumer countries). 
 We will focus on these developed countries, on the one hand, and the for-
mer socialist block in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, on the 
other, but will also touch upon some countries further afield.  
 
4.3.2. Background of the developing economies 
 
The former socialist block and the big theft 
Since the fall of the Wall, the former socialist countries have come a long way 
in their transition to market economies. Some of them, like Slovenia for in-
stance (see IMF classification above), are now regarded as advanced alongside 
major economic powers such as the USA and the UK. But during their transi-
tion period, especially the early years, the economic and political state of the 
former socialist countries was clearly different to that in the developed coun-
tries. Most importantly, the former socialist countries were in a process of a 
major distribution of national assets. “Because there should be a redistribution of 
property, there shall be a revolution.” Chesterton’s340 observation appears quite 
appropriate to apply to the context of the democratisation reforms in the for-
mer socialist block which, if not revolutionary, were clearly fundamental.  
 What distinguished those countries from the capitalist economies was ar-
guably the need to redistribute a large portion of the national production fac-
tors and assets. In order to transform into market economies, these had to be 
privatised presumably by those with the incentive to manage these assets in the 
most efficient and viable way. Regrettably, as reviewed in earlier sections, this 
became a great opportunity not only for people with entrepreneurial spirit, but 
also for some high-flying thieves to enrich themselves. To use again the words 
                                               
340  Gilbert Keith Chesterton, a British novelist. The quotation is from “What’s wrong with the 
world” by Chesterton. 
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of Chesterton: “Thieves respect property. They merely wish the property to become 
their property that they may more perfectly respect it.”341  
 The opportunity to grab a piece of the national wealth under the cover of 
privatisation was an opportunity not only to steal but also launder at the same 
time. Firstly, because tainted money could flow into the economy, specifically 
through privatisation, without any adequate checks of the origin of the funds. 
Secondly, because even when money was clean, if the privatisation deal was 
unfair and corrupt, the acquired assets would have been tainted by corruption 
but the deal would have largely remained unchallenged.  
 Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund preached quick priva-
tisation, despite the economic instability in the countries of transition and the 
lack of a strong legal framework ensuring privatisation’s transparency, fairness 
and efficiency. Corruption in these countries was far more rampant than in 
market economies (perhaps with some few exceptions such as, notoriously, 
Italy) but the real danger of corruption was at that stage neglected. In the fol-
lowing years, after the collapse of the socialist regime, many questioned the 
legitimacy of privatisation. As Stiglitz (2002, p. 58), a one-time World Bank 
insider, observes, “privatization has made matters so much worse that in many coun-
tries today privatization is jokingly referred to as ‘briberization’.”  
 During the transition years public procurement has been a particularly vul-
nerable area with state officials being tempted to manipulate the law and dis-
tribute contracts in a non-transparent way among their cronies.342 In this sector 
violations of the law can be so well hidden that the gain from corruption will 
practically become instantly laundered. As a result, parts of the criminal econ-
omy become part of the state and family household, and so does laundering, 
losing its distinctive meaning. Ill-gotten assets can still be questioned at some 
point, if their owner happens to side with the wrong power clique, i.e. it is 
often a matter of internal power politics whether corrupt conduct will remain 
unchallenged (for example, Serbia did not fare much better, see Pesić, 2007). 
 There is no doubt that during the years of transition some national assets 
were acquired in an unfair and non-transparent way (as reviewed in more detail 
                                               
341  A quotation from “The Man Who was Thursday” by Gilbert Keith Chesterton.  
342  In Bulgaria, for instance, one can take a look at the public procurement contract registry to see 
clear signs of striking irregularities. In addition to public procurement and EU funded projects 
(including EU rural and farm aid) as well as privatisation, the media has also reported on corrupt 
practices in relation to land swaps in Bulgaria. In 2010 the media reported that the swaps of state 
land (largely forests) for fragmented low-quality private land “were one of the most intolerable form” 
of corruption in the preceding four years and cost Bulgaria some 8 billion levs ($5.74 billion) in 
losses (paragraph 9, Tsolova, Reuters News, 3 February 2010).  
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in earlier sections), but the majority of these dealings are now apparently irre-
versible. Due to the high level of corruption and manipulation of the law at the 
time, it is now hard to prove their illegitimacy. In addition to that, a large 
number of those who took advantage of the lack of rules or broke the existing 
ones and became involved in corrupt practices and criminal activities, sought to 
gradually legitimise their business and become ‘decent’ businessmen. This ap-
plies not only to the big and sophisticated earners who benefited from corrupt 
practices in privatisation but also to the ones who were involved in less sophis-
ticated crimes. Thus, having started with a revolution, the transition period 
turned into an evolutionary financial cleansing, a process of mixing legitimate 
with illegitimate business and conveniently smoothing the irregularities of the 
early transition years (the process of gentrification, discussed earlier in this the-
sis). Even though the business of a number of these ‘transformed’ businessmen 
may have retained some criminal elements, it is now largely viewed as legiti-
mate. A significant number of the corruptly (or unethically) privatised compa-
nies have been subsequently sold to reputable foreign investors, thus leaving no 
chance for law enforcement authorities to retrace the initially invested tainted 
money. All is well that ends well.  
 
Other emerging markets and Third World countries  
Similarly, Third World countries have also suffered and continue suffering from 
widespread corruption. Many of them have been torn by civil wars for years. 
For many, wars such as in Sierra Leone became a way to profiteer (see Smillie 
et al., 2000). Armed conflicts in Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan 
have created opportunities for abuse of natural resources (Mwenda, 2003). But, 
while the majority of the former socialist countries are now economically more 
advanced and are well underway with enforcing modern financial control sys-
tems, many of the Third World countries, especially in Africa, still seriously lag 
behind others, both in terms of economic progress and institution building. 
Consequently, the fight against corruption remains seriously hindered. Al-
though anti-corruption laws and bodies have been put in place in many of the 
African countries, critics continue to see “a wide gap between governments’ anti-
corruption rhetoric and the impunity enjoyed by public officials” (Alabi, 2003, p. 215). 
Privatisation across the region, specifically in West Africa, has been flawed by 
opportunities for large-scale corruption (see Alabi, 2003). Nigeria was on the 
FATF non-cooperative countries blacklist until mid-2006 (being listed in 2001, 
see FATF, 2007). African countries were among the last ones to set up financial 
intelligence units. Given the usual non-transparent way of functioning of gov-
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ernmental institutions in many of these countries, one may wonder what the 
term ‘suspicious transaction’ would exactly denote. Retrospectively, it is not 
surprising that approximately five years ago cocaine traders diverted their risky 
direct transport route through Europe instead to pass through West Africa (Van 
Duyne and Levi, 2005). It would appear that this diversion hardly met any 
resistance, given the state of law enforcement and the corrupting additional 
income for the locals hired for aiding the process. 
 Poverty stricken countries in South America and Asia not only suffer from 
corruption but are also major producers of drugs. Economic instability and 
corruption fuel widespread social unrest in South America (see Herrera et al., 
2003).  
 Governments in Asia have sought to tackle corruption but the problem 
remains a major issue in local politics (see Bolongoita, 2003; Singh, 2003). For 
a number of years Indonesia, Myanmar (Burma) and the Philippines were 
blacklisted by the FATF. In fact, military-ruled Myanmar was the last country 
to be de-listed by the FATF in 2006 (see FATF, 2007). One may wonder 
whether that was for good reasons or whether it was politically motivated. At 
the moment (as of January 2011) there are no non-co-operative countries and 
territories (NCCTs) on FATF’s list. However, in 2008, the FATF issued a 
series of statements expressing concerns about what it viewed as ‘deficiencies’ in 
the anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regimes of 
Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, São Tomé and Principe, and the 
northern part of Cyprus.343 As there is little empirical research into this matter, 
it remains an issue as to how and to what extent the black-listed countries and 
those described as having ‘deficiencies’ suffered from this ’name and shame’ 
policy (see Sharman, 2006, for relevant considerations). It is unclear what hap-
pened in the world of observable money laundering transactions after the point 
of de-listing. Should the de-listing mean that there is now less laundering in 
those countries than before or have their anti-money laundering regimes be-
come more efficient? Was it only a matter of enacting the requested legislation, 
setting up an FIU and some additional tokens of outward compliance? Indeed, 
the FATF is exerting immense foreign policy leverage, through its peer pres-
                                               
343  On its website the FATF states that most of these jurisdictions have since then taken some steps 
towards implementing AML/CFT systems. It further states that in June 2009, the FATF 
adopted new procedures for identifying non-cooperative and high-risk jurisdictions and started 
the process of reviewing the AML/CFT regimes of a limited number of jurisdictions. After re-
views are completed, jurisdictions found to be high-risk or non-cooperative will be publicly 
identified (FATF’s website, “Identifying and responding to the threat of high-risk jurisdictions”, 
accessed 31 January 2011). 
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sure reviews, ensuring compliance to its recommendations (even if only out-
ward compliance). However, it is doubtful that the FATF can vouch that dirty 
money is not being laundered in those tax havens that the FATF has consid-
ered less of a concern, or in the developed markets that appeared to have never 
been a concern to the FATF. But have the developed countries achieved im-
munity to money laundering and dirty money? We will touch upon that issue 
in the next section. 
 
4.3.3. Developed v. developing economies and something in be-
tween  
 
Do all the observations above mean that developing countries have provided a 
vast range of possibilities to launder on a massive scale? Are the developing 
economies more attractive to launderers than the developed market economies? 
 Despite extensive research into crime trends in both developing and devel-
oped economies, the evidence of money laundering activities is anecdotal. It is 
hard to prove that money laundering in any of the developing countries has 
been more or less than in any of the developed countries. This uncertainty is 
magnified by what we remarked earlier about the definition confusion, result-
ing in the observation that any involvement in business in developing countries 
with their shadow economies is largely tantamount to laundering.  
 The exposure to tainted money would presumably be significantly higher in 
an environment that lacks a strong legal framework, reliable institutions and is 
prone to corruption. And vice versa: it should be lower in countries that have a 
robust anti-money laundering and anti-corruption regime. However, case stud-
ies carried out by financial intelligence units, the FATF and other organisations, 
indicate that money laundering takes place in transition and developed market 
economies likewise. Given the profit-oriented crime rate, one would hardly 
expect something else. But this concerns the whole range of financial crime-
money involvement, including the daily receiving and spending of crime 
money. Things are different when one looks for an accumulation of capital, 
with the accompanying laundering and investment risks. In fact, there is a rea-
son to believe that many money launderers would prefer the environment of 
the developed countries. The clean appearance of crime money gained in de-
veloped countries would be far trustworthier than in any developing country. 
Besides, black money owners prefer efficient and reliable banks like any other 
businessman (Harvey, 2005; Van Duyne et al., 2005). Tainted money does not 
necessarily behave any differently from white money: both avoid instability and 
 224 
regulators and both seek a good return on their investment. The money of the 
former head of state of Nigeria, the late Sani Abacha, has been no exception. 
 Let us look at China as an example. It is a country still dominated by a one 
party regime, but in many respects it functions as a market economy. It has 
gradually opened its economy to foreign investment. Goldman Sachs’ study 
describes China as a BRIC economy, i.e. an emerging market that steadily 
transits into a developed country (O’Neill, 2005). Yet in some respect we can 
also compare it to the 19th-century-Charles Dickens’ England, where exploita-
tion of cheap labour was largely regarded as inevitable. But is China a money 
laundering resort for crime-money from ‘good countries’? China has been 
criticised for ‘laundering’ illegally derived materials such as timber (see earlier 
comments in section 3.1.14.). Generally, notoriously high levels of corruption 
help generate crime-money and, at the same time, provide laundering mecha-
nisms. As reported in the media, according to a March 2006 report of the US 
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the majority 
of money laundering cases in China involve proceeds from corruption (Bureau 
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2006; see also Lees, 
World Politics Watch Exclusive, 5 October 2006). The report quotes IMF’s esti-
mates that laundered funds in China “may total as much as $24 billion annually” 
(p. 129). Notably the report highlights that money laundering in China is also 
largely connected to tax evasion and that Hong Kong-registered companies 
play a major part in such schemes. In its report (2006, see also the latest report 
of 2010) the US authority has included China in the category of ‘Jurisdictions 
of Primary Concern’ with regard to money laundering. The three categories 
defined in the report are: ‘Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern’; ‘Coun-
tries/Jurisdictions of Concern’; ‘Other Countries/ Jurisdictions Monitored’. 
Jurisdictions of Primary Concern are those that are identified as “major money 
laundering countries” (p. 30 of the 2010 report). Remarkably, Austria, Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US also feature in the same category (with Bel-
gium listed in the second category and Sweden in the third one). It appears that 
the US authorities have acknowledged the fact that staggering amounts of 
tainted money are floating into advanced economies from different parts of the 
world, including Nigeria, Bulgaria, Russia and China (of which, notably, only 
Bulgaria is in second category, whereas Nigeria, Russia and China are in the 
first one). The report, however, notes: “the focus in considering whether a country or 
jurisdiction should be included in this category [Jurisdictions of Primary Concern] is on 
the significance of the amount of proceeds laundered, not of the anti-money laundering 
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measures taken. This is a different approach taken than that of the Financial Action 
Task Force’s Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) exercise, which 
focuses on a jurisdiction’s compliance with stated criteria regarding its legal and regulatory 
framework, international cooperation, and resource allocations.” (p. 30 of the 2010 
report). 
 Bad money goes to ‘good countries’ but the ‘good countries’ evaluate the 
‘bad countries’ and exert pressure on them. Over the years it has clearly tran-
spired that the ‘good countries’ apply double standards which has led to the 
absurd situation of prejudiced treatment against the ‘bad countries,’ while ‘good 
countries’ serve as laundering destinations too. Requirements for public disclo-
sure of corporate information (which is so important for due diligence purposes 
in financial transactions) allow a convenient corporate veil in many places like 
the US state Delaware and Dubai. However, who would dare to say those 
places should be avoided for a high money laundering risk? As an article in The 
Independent noted in 2004, when Guatemala was removed from the FATF list, 
“[t]he total [of blacklisted countries] is down from 30 in the 1990s and 15 in 2001, 
though why Dubai - considered by many to be the world’s main money-laundering centre 
- is not on the list remains a puzzle to many financial services experts” (Lashmar, 
2004).344  
 There is evidence that the United States itself is often used as a money-
laundering destination for, inter alia, Chinese tainted money.345 When, in 2006, 
the Chinese authorities arrested Chen Liangyu, Bangkok-based British journal-
ist Graham Lees reported that financial investigators from the West wondered 
whether the trace of Liangyu’s money would lead to the United States. Chen 
was the party secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of China and was alleged to have been involved in corrupt practices, 
including a social security fund fraud scheme. Following Chen’s arrest, investi-
gators revealed that a large portion of the dirty money from that particular 
scheme and other crimes was leaving via Hong Kong. The US was confirmed 
as one of the favourite destinations for laundering (Lees, 2006). According to 
Xinhua news agency (quoted by Lees, 2006), the USA was the main destina-
tion, among 14 countries, for a $5,2 billion embezzlement by forty senior offi-
                                               
344 Similar to Delaware, Dubai is somewhat of a state within a state in the UAE. In 2001, 16 juris-
dictions, including the UAE, were referred to FATF’s NCCTs process and were reviewed in 
two rounds, but the UAE was not identified as NCCT (FATF, 2007), despite the lax corporate 
disclosure regime in Dubai.  
345  The problem of brand piracy in China raises an interesting question: what happens with the on-
going laundering that brand piracy produces which appears to be tolerated by the Chinese au-
thorities and, apparently, is orderly integrated in the Chinese GDP? 
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cials. Investigators estimated that 21% of the money was ‘washed up’ in the 
USA. Hong Kong-based lawyer and risk management advisor Peter Gallo is 
quoted by Lees commenting that “the money, like the people who took it, are at-
tracted to the more sophisticated economies, and the anti-money laundering efforts of the 
financial industries in those jurisdictions do not appear to be a deterrent.”346 Gallo has 
further noted: “Despite all the usual assurances from the private banking industry, even 
in a highly regulated environment like the US, the [post 9/11] Patriot Act had little 
effect on the private banking industry.”347 
 Similar to China,348 Russia has also seen staggering amounts of tainted 
money leaving the country and flowing to the West, specifically to the US. 
The Bank of New York scandal (previously mentioned) is an example and it 
does not stand alone. Russia has severely suffered from all the dangers that can 
be brought about by inadequately regulated transition and impromptu privatisa-
tion processes. Media reports and research papers, including a study by So-
longo, a staff member of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and 
Crime Prevention (Solongo, 2001), indicate that (as discussed in previous sec-
tions), in the 1990s, capital flight from Russia was significant and that it was 
likely to be largely related to money laundering (which, under the broad defi-
nition of laundering, is quite feasible). Solongo observes (2001, p. 1) that dur-
ing the transition period, Russia offered “a golden opportunity for those seeking to 
acquire huge assets rapidly by criminal actions while remaining undetected or under ar-
rangements the criminality of which is hard or even impossible to prove.”349 However, 
despite widespread corruption and criminality in Russia, Solongo admits (2001, 
p. 4) that Russia has been largely perceived “as a source of illicit proceeds, rather 
than their safekeeping haven.” As previously discussed, during the 1990s grand 
embezzlement, massive asset stripping and tax evasion were prevalent. A large 
portion of the criminally derived proceeds was transferred abroad. As Solongo 
notes, Russia offered a good ‘placement’ opportunity.350 After the placement 
stage, however, money had to be wired across border, often to offshore juris-
dictions or developed countries in the West, in order to undergo what is gen-
erally called ‘layering’ and ‘integration’ (reviewed in earlier sections). Solongo 
                                               
346 Paragraph 5 (the article was derived online and no page number is available). 
347 See the last paragraph of the article.  
348  See Schulte-Kulkmann, 2007, for analysis of recent anti-money laundering developments in 
China. 
349  As previously discussed, certain aspects of the legal framework in Russia were so weak that even 
if flagrantly unethical, on many occasions highly contentious business actions were not necessar-
ily criminal, according to the letter of the law. 
350  At least for local crime-money, as Western criminals may not have dared to place their money 
in Russia.  
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states that according to Russian prosecutors and law enforcement representa-
tives, the criminal proceeds were usually taken outside Russia and criminals 
themselves often found a safe haven abroad. They further argue, as Solongo’s 
study indicates, that “the misapprehension of the political realities in the Russian Fed-
eration by the foreign authorities often play into the hands of criminals, who manage to 
obtain from these authorities decisions on their non-extradition or political protection” 
(Solongo, 2001, p. 16). As a result, Russian authorities were often unable to 
locate or, if located, to confiscate the proceeds.  
 There is hardly a comprehensive study on the extent and specifics of in-
vestment (who, when, where and how it has progressed), in the West, of 
tainted money from Russia or other emerging and developing countries. How-
ever, Solongo and various media sources cite a number of examples where 
individuals associated with controversy in their home country have managed to 
set up companies in ‘decent’ jurisdictions such as the USA. Solongo mentions 
that Russian banker Alexandre Konanykhine, whom the Russian prosecutors 
wanted to be extradited from the US to Russia to stand trial for financial 
crimes, was granted political asylum in the US.351 Solongo also refers to Se-
myon Mogilevich, the Ukraine-born alleged leader of the Russian underworld 
(previously mentioned), who, despite his notoriety, appears to have managed to 
set up companies in the USA, Canada and elsewhere relatively unimpeded 
until some of his operations attracted intense attention from the authorities.352 
Regardless of whether Mogilevich or others have been proven guilty, their 
money was associated with some controversy and yet it slipped through the 
anti-money laundering system of the West. As Solongo (2001) and Shelley 
(2000) note, developed countries become richer benefitting from the flows of 
                                               
351 According to media reports, since arriving in the USA with his wife in 1993, Konanykhine “has 
lived a life of extremes” having gone “from being a jet-setting Internet banker with an apartment in the 
Watergate and matching his-and-hers BMWs, to a prisoner, to a political refugee, to a successful business-
man again and back to a prisoner, awaiting deportation” (Farah, The Washington Post, 2004, paragraph 
4). When Konanykhine went to the USA in the early 1990s, he reportedly introduced himself 
as the US vice-president of Menatep Bank (Evening Standard, 2005). This is the very same bank 
the owner of which, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was imprisoned for financial crimes, including tax 
evasion, in Russia (as previously mentioned). Interestingly, as noted in the Evening Standard 
(2005, paragraph 2), the US authorities have exhibited a level of hypocrisy having “condemned the 
prosecution of Khodorkovsky, accusing Russia of ‘backsliding’ on democracy” while at the same time in-
vestigating him for suspected money-laundering involving the Russian mafia and ex-KGB offi-
cers. 
352  Solongo notes that he has been investigated in a number of jurisdictions, including in relation to 
allegatons that he defrauded stock investors through his YBM Magnex International, Inc. (a 
company incorporated in Canada, but headquartered in Newtown, Bucks County, Pennsyl-
vania, see Offshorealert, 2003). 
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tainted capital coming from the developing and transition countries, including 
Russia. 
 Bulgaria has suffered similar problems. As mentioned in earlier sections, 
both clean and tainted money from Bulgaria was channelled to other countries 
on many occasions and for different reasons, ranging from unwillingness to pay 
taxes to the need for full scale laundering. In earlier sections we reviewed the 
phenomenon of ‘red capital’. Party funds allegedly embezzled by leaders of the 
former regime were transferred abroad to later return (at least partly) to Bul-
garia as legitimate and largely presented as ‘western’ capital to be invested in the 
Bulgarian economy. An extensive number of companies in the West were 
either newly set up or bought off-shelf to be later used as a vehicle for currency 
transfers. The West accepted this money not only from senior representatives of 
the regime, but also from proxies, front men, and from alleged mobsters and 
controversial businessmen, such as Konstantin Dimitrov (see previous sections), 
who were able to open accounts with reputable banks and buy property in the 
UK, the USA and other highly regulated jurisdictions. The late Konstantin 
Dimitrov, for example, who is alleged to have earned his fortune through rack-
eteering, contraband and drug dealing, has reportedly left to his widow proper-
ties in London worth over €3,2 million, including five luxury shops and a flat 
in one of London’s most affluent areas, South Kensington (Iliev, Standard News, 
2008).353  
 Western countries are a favourite destination also for tainted capital from 
Africa. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Nigerian corrupt officials transfer 
most of their ill-gotten wealth outside the country, primarily to the UK. Peel 
(2006) quotes a senior Nigerian law enforcement officer saying that approxi-
mately 90% of Nigerian state governors have property in the UK and accounts 
in their, or family members, names. According to him, the majority of the 
money flowing from Nigeria to Britain is “government-related [. . .] corrupt money 
being laundered” (Peel, 2006, p. 19). At a meeting of the Commonwealth Par-
liamentary Association in June 2002, Nigeria’s then President Olusegun 
Obasanjo noted that funds stolen from the treasuries of developing countries 
hide in the financial institutions of the western world (Alabi, 2003). 
                                               
353  As discussed, in earlier sections, after Dimitrov’s murder in Amsterdam in 2003, the Bulgarian 
authorities sought to trace and seize his assets. This included assets held in London. However, it 
appears that the UK authorities were not as co-operative as the Bulgarian authorities had ex-
pected. The media reported that after initially imposing a freezing order on the widow’s flat in 
March 2007, several months later, the UK authorities returned the flat to Dimitrov’s widow. 
Representatives of the Bulgarian authorities were quoted as saying that they would request an 
explanation from their UK counterpart as to the reasons for that decision (BgVesti, 2007).   
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 However, we would hardly read about such property transactions in the 
annual reports of the FIUs from the 1990s and early 2000s. Now that interna-
tional regulations belatedly require enhanced know-your-customer scrutiny 
into Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) (see next section) and other high-risk 
clients, will this be allowed to happen again? 
 It seems that despite robust anti-money laundering regimes in the West, 
substantial volumes of tainted money still finds its way into the developed 
economies. Estimates as to the scope of laundered funds in the developed and 
developing countries can only be speculative. Indeed, crime-money does not 
always need to cross borders as it can be used or laundered domestically. After 
this domestic (usually corruption supported) laundering, it may start to travel 
abroad, if only to avoid potential expropriation. But it seems that policy makers 
are primarily concerned about those international (cash) money movements 
that expose the financial system only of the western world to ‘contamination’ 
(and this concern seems to be merely outward appearance, given the benefits 
developed countries gain from the inflows of capital) or are they rather con-
cerned about developed countries losing capital, regardless of colour or smell? 
The process of exposure is a two-way street but it appears that the developed 
countries would rather black-list yet another developing country instead of 
looking properly into the problems on their own side of the track. Corporate 
crime and fraudulent accounting practices in the USA have probably generated 
and laundered tainted funds on a scale much larger than any crime industry (see 
Dininio and Anechiarico, 2003, for comments on corporate crime and mislead-
ing accounting in North America).354   
 Indeed, Enron’s fraudulent accounting scam largely relied on offshore sub-
sidiaries to keep its debt profile low (see media reports, including Clark and 
Carrell, The Guardian, 22 February 2008; see also Dininio and Anechiarico, 
2003). However, this does not mean that it all has to be blamed on the offshore 
centres. Policy makers from the West have restlessly insisted that offshore cen-
tres should tighten their anti-money laundering regimes. But as a matter of fact, 
financial centres such as the Isle of Man, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and 
Guernsey, were among the first economies to establish a financial intelligence 
unit even before most of the FATF founding members (see next section). What 
should be remembered is that the equation of ‘kept offshore’ and ‘being laun-
dered’ has now become debatable. Irrespective of how many accounts (offshore 
                                               
354  The cases of Madoff and Stanford who were accused of fraud in 2009 revealed a massive scale of 
alleged fraudulent activities.   
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or in developing countries) through which the money flows, its appearance 
may remain open to multiple interpretations. However, as soon as it slips 
through the financial system of an advanced economy (e.g. because a banker has 
overlooked a ‘red-flag’, turned a blind eye or has been bribed), its appearance 
becomes trustworthy, that is, it is ‘really’ laundered.  
 We constantly hear about know-your-customer rules becoming tighter and 
advanced economies becoming more reluctant to work with ‘non-cooperative’ 
states or states which have deficiencies in their anti-money laundering re-
gime.355 Interestingly enough, however, little information is available about the 
level of efficiency in the advanced countries as regards preventing wealthy ty-
coons from investing their money of obscure origin in the fancy neighbour-
hoods of cities in the West, including West London. How many SARs have 
reached SOCA or its predecessor, NCIS? There are numerous rumours about 
Russians buying expensive properties in West London, but no official conclu-
sive report about this has been issued. It is unknown whether or how much of 
the investments flowing from ‘bad countries’ into the ‘good countries’ resulted 
in suspicious activity reports. But there is enough evidence, as reviewed earlier, 
to suggest that ‘good countries’ also prove to be ‘good safe havens’ for ‘bad 
money’.  
 
4.4. The global anti-money laundering war 
 
Over the years the anti-money laundering war, with its integral intelligence 
gathering system of FIUs and reporting institutions, has risen to unprecedented 
levels of information collection and dissemination on a global scale. This sec-
tion will further review the measures imposed on the financial industry and 
other regulated businesses and will address some of the issues that arise from the 
regulatory framework, including the Third EU Council Directive of 2005 
(2005/60/EC ),356 within which the process of intelligence gathering takes 
place.357  
                                               
355 On 25 February 2009 the FATF issued a Statement expressing concerns regarding deficiencies 
in the anti-money laundering regimes of Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and São 
Tomé and Príncipe (FATF, 2009).  
356  Although the EU Directive applies specifically to EU Member States, other countries, where 
similar regulations have been introduced, face similar challenges as those arising from the EU 
Directive. As noted in earlier sections, EU legislation was largely based on developments driven 
by the US. 
357  This subject was examined in detail in “On the frontline against money-laundering: the regula-
tory minefield” (Gelemerova, 2008). 
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4.4.1. The hit-or-miss approach  
 
By extending the meaning of money laundering, to include the movement and 
concealment of crime money, policy makers have effectively created a tool for 
gathering intelligence about predicate crimes (Gold and Levi, 1994). As men-
tioned previously, critics such as Van Duyne, have on many occasions argued 
that the authorities have used conveniently augmented figures to expand their 
powers. However, some could argue that policy makers’ effort has been justi-
fied by the need to ensure that crime does not pay. Indeed, there is some merit 
to the anti-money laundering regime with its related ‘threat imagery’ and that is 
that it can help gather financial intelligence to identify predicate crimes. How-
ever, given the lack of clarity, consistent feedback from FIUs to reporting insti-
tutions and the lack of precise criteria for identifying tainted money and suspi-
cious or unusual transactions (Gelemerova, 2008), it remains debatable whether, 
or to what extent, this tool is useful or has been used efficiently. Indeed, thus far 
no testable performance measures have been implemented to demonstrate the 
efficiency and efficacy of this tool. Although government agencies, often jointly 
with the financial industry associations, seek to provide guidance358 (e.g. in the 
form of handbooks and typologies) to reporting institutions, in certain cases this 
guidance remains broad, and, in some respects, impractical.  
 In 2006 the UK Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG)359 pro-
duced a comprehensive guidance manual (later updated)360 that provides exam-
ples of high-risk customers and suspicious transactions, for instance, customers 
based in (or doing business in) high-risk jurisdictions. Examples also include: 
corporate customers with complex business ownership structures; politically 
exposed persons; customers engaged in cash-intensive businesses; the use of 
non-resident companies in circumstances where the customer’s needs do not 
appear to support such economic requirements; transfers to and from high-risk 
jurisdictions without reasonable explanation; and unusual investment transac-
                                               
358  The FATF, the Basel Committee and other international bodies have also issued guidance at 
various points on know-your-customer rules and risk management. Available guidance, how-
ever, appears to be primarily focused on the banking sector despite the need for more detailed 
guidance also with respect to other parts of the regulated sector. 
359  An industry organisation comprising a number of financial sector trade bodies engaged in pro-
viding advisory services on compliance with legal and regulatory requirements and good prac-
tice. 
360  An updated version of this manual was issued in December 2007. The guidance was issued in 
two parts: a) Guidance for the UK Financial Sector, Part I, b) Guidance for the UK Financial 
Sector, Part II: Sectoral Guidance (Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, December 2007; 
available on the JMLSG website – www.jmlsg.org.uk). Subsequently the guidance manual was 
revised and updated. Also, Part III was issued in October 2010.  
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tions without an apparently discernible profitable motive. Examples of transac-
tions that could trigger suspicion in relation to terrorism include frequent inter-
national ATM (automated teller machine) activity. Although such examples 
provide some general guidance, they remain largely vague. It appears, for in-
stance, that staff at reporting institutions may interpret such guidance to the 
effect that almost any customer from Eastern Europe, Russia or the Middle East 
could be regarded as a potential risk factor, i.e. a potential money launderer, 
irrespective of the type of transactions they undertake.361  
 The risk of money laundering is itself an unclear concept too. Does it relate 
only to a specific transaction (as more commonly understood) or generally to a 
customer and his/her activities? For instance, the JMLSG manual interchangea-
bly refers to (a) knowledge or suspicion that a transaction might involve money 
laundering; and (b) knowledge or suspicion that a customer might be involved 
in money laundering, which is not quite the same thing (see Gelemerova, 
2008).362 Additionally, money laundering, as defined in international law, is 
such a broad concept – our continuous theme - that even marginal irregularity 
may trigger suspicion. In turn suspicion prompts reporting to the relevant FIU. 
Yet suspicion is also a vague term, “a variable that depends on different mindsets, 
subjective judgement and interpretation” (Gelemerova, 2008, p. 41).  
 The JMLSG notes that suspicion is indeed subjective and “falls short of proof 
based on firm evidence” (JMLSG, 2007, p. 121). JMLSG’s handbook notes that 
UK courts have defined ‘suspicion’ as something beyond mere speculation, and 
based on some foundation, for example: “A degree of satisfaction and not necessarily 
amounting to belief but at least extending beyond speculation as to whether an event has 
occurred or not”; and “Although the creation of suspicion requires a lesser factual basis 
than the creation of a belief, it must nonetheless be built upon some foundation” (p. 
121). On its website the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which 
incorporates the UK FIU, refers to R v Da Silva [2006] All ER (D) 131 (Jul) in 
which the Court decided that suspicion would arise when: “there was a possibil-
ity which was more than fanciful, that the relevant facts existed. This is subject in an 
appropriate case, to the further requirement that the suspicion so formed should be of a 
                                               
361  As an example of poor practice and lack of a “robust approach to classifying the money laundering risk 
associated” with clients, the UK’s financial regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
drew attention to a wholesale small firm that classified all of its clients as low or medium risk 
even though most of them were based in Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East 
(FSA, 2008, p.12). 
362  A customer can be involved in money laundering without the specific transaction being con-
nected to money laundering.  
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settled nature.”363 The clarification provided by JMLSG and SOCA may be 
helpful but still leaves a broad scope for interpretation (which, as a matter of 
fact, is not necessarily a bad thing if it is in combination with clearer criteria for 
discerning tainted money and for reporting suspicious transactions).  
  Interpretation and, more importantly, implementation of anti-money laun-
dering measures became an even bigger challenge after the events of 11 Sep-
tember 2001, when the criteria for reporting suspicious transactions were ex-
panded to include transactions that may be linked to terrorist financing (this 
issue has been particularly highlighted in the Third EU Directive) although it 
may have little to do with laundering in the strict sense of the term. The result 
of this is that, in addition to potentially dirty money, reporting institutions now 
have to be able to identify clean money that may be used for terrorist financ-
ing.364 However, how to effectively implement this in practice remains an issue. 
The little guidance that has been provided (the situation varies across countries) 
remains broad. It is generally advised, as a matter of due diligence, to search 
national and international blacklists and sanctions lists to check whether names 
of customers or potential partners appear on such lists. However, it is not clear 
whether this is sufficient and how connections to ‘countries of risk’ should be 
treated (see Gelemerova, 2008). It appears that particular ethnic or national 
groups could potentially become targets of constant suspicion and scrutiny (see 
Gold and Levi, 1994).  
 Additional challenges arise from the implementation of the requirement of 
the Third EU Directive in relation to the identification of domestic or foreign 
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).365 For instance, with regard to PEPs in 
other Member States or third countries, Article 13 of the Third Directive re-
quires reporting institutions to take adequate measures to establish, inter alia, the 
source of funds involved in a specific business relationship or transaction. This 
means, first, that reporting institutions have to establish whether or not a cus-
tomer is a PEP; and, second, they have to undertake further research in order 
                                               
363  SOCA notes that in K Limited v National Westminster Bank plc (HMRC and SOCA inter-
vening) [2006] All ER (D) 131 (Jul) the Court has decided that this definition should apply in 
both criminal and civil cases. See SOCA, “Frequently asked questions (FAQs)”, subsection “Q. 
What is Suspicion?”).  
364  For instance, in some circumstances charities can be used as a front for (or vehicle of) terrorist 
financing: banks that carry out financial transactions involving, or on behalf of, charities may find 
themselves in a situation which necessitates that they report to the relevant FIU; however, banks 
may overlook important underlying risks due to the lack of sufficient and clear guidance in ex-
isting regulations.  
365  According to the Directive (Article 3 [8]), PEPs are “natural persons who are or have been entrusted 
with prominent public functions and immediate family members, or persons known to be close associates, of 
such persons”. 
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to determine whether the PEP’s funds have a legitimate origin (something that 
even the police and tax authorities may have difficulty establishing). It appears 
that due diligence checks which are aimed at identifying PEPs can be used as a 
tool to gather intelligence on potential white-collar crime and tax evasion, 
which also entails intelligence on the subsequent money laundering. However, 
the lack of standards and consistency in applying due diligence measures across 
institutions and countries ultimately means that intelligence, if any, will be 
gathered largely on a hit-or-miss basis. It is plausible that if the main ‘fish’ being 
caught will be of a fiscal nature, the provision will in the end develop into an 
international tax-evasion intelligence collecting instrument. The Directive at-
tempts to provide some guidance on due diligence but it remains too broad 
(see for more details Gelemerova, 2008).366   
 According to the EU Directive, risk is generally higher in countries where 
corruption is endemic (see section 4.4.3. on considerations concerning corrup-
tion issues and money laundering). Apparently the European Commission as-
sumes that reporting institutions have existing knowledge about the political 
environment in the countries of residence of their customers which is not nec-
essarily the case (see Gelemerova, 2008). It appears that almost any customer 
who comes from an emerging market country and is a PEP, or is associated 
with a PEP, can be viewed as a potential money launderer. The implementing 
measures directive (2006/70/EC) clarifies that after an individual has ceased to 
exercise a prominent public function, subject to a minimum period, this indi-
vidual is no longer to be regarded as a PEP (point 5 of the introduction). The 
directive further stipulates that “without prejudice to the application, on a risk-
sensitive basis, of enhanced due diligence measures, where a person has ceased to be en-
trusted with a prominent public function [. . .] for a period of at least one year, institu-
tions [. . .] shall not be obliged to consider such a person as politically exposed” (Article 
2, paragraph 4, p. 32). In reality, however, this can be interpreted to the extent 
that in certain circumstances, on a risk-sensitive basis, some individuals can be 
regarded as PEPs even after a year has elapsed. As previously noted, in emerg-
ing markets, politics and business are closely intertwined. Thriving business-
men, some of which are former politicians, often maintain relationships with 
current politicians, i.e. PEPs, as a way of guaranteeing support for their own 
                                               
366  For instance, if ‘complete normal customer due diligence measures,’ prescribed in the Directive, 
imply the necessity of establishing and verifying the identity of any given customer, it remains 
unclear how far beyond that point reporting institutions should go in applying ‘enhanced due 
diligence measures’. Additionally, the category of PEP also includes immediate family members 
or close associates of a PEP, even though it may prove difficult to establish whether a customer 
is related to a PEP, unless the customer explicitly declares that such a relationship exists.  
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interests. This ultimately means that former politicians and/or legislators turned 
businessmen can also be viewed as PEPs in certain situations, on a risk-sensitive 
basis (Gelemerova, 2008).  
 Given the lack of clearer criteria, it appears that both financial and non-
financial reporting institutions are prepared to work with PEPs and their associ-
ates if these are relatively wealthy and do not seem to be outright criminals. As 
a matter of good risk management practice reporting institutions, specifically 
banks, should know all potential transaction risks, political risks, reputational 
risks and so on, that may be associated with their customers. However, it is not 
very clear whether and when money laundering/terrorist financing risks have 
to become a deal-breaker and, more importantly, to trigger submitting a SAR 
to the relevant FIU. The whole due diligence industry has been largely driven 
by anti-money laundering ‘know-your-customer’ legislation367 and fear of re-
lated sanctions. Yet it has been built on an unstable basis of subjective principles 
that leave scope for interpretation. An important question, for instance, is 
whether the wealth of newly defined ‘legitimate’ businessmen, including in 
some instances PEPs or those formerly involved in questionable activities, is still 
in some way tainted (the ‘crime-money heritage’ question).  
 It remains an issue how seriously a reputational concern should be taken 
when it arises from historical controversies (especially given that with regard to 
a specific crime the relevant statute of limitations may have expired or the 
crime has remained unproven). As mentioned earlier, the process of cleansing 
or gentrification of wealth demonstrates a tendency of reconciliation with such 
reputational concerns, regardless of the ethical and moral implications. Clearly 
if a potential risk exists, this does not necessarily mean that a specific transaction 
is suspicious or that the customer is a money launderer. However, in the ab-
sence of clear standards and precise criteria, and most importantly, given the 
broad definition of money laundering, it is difficult to make judgements and to 
strike balances (see Gelemerova, 2008). 
 According to Séverine Anciberro, a representative of the European Banking 
Federation, the EU should be considered a single jurisdiction and PEPs from 
EU Member States should be regarded as domestic PEPs because credit institu-
tions in Member States are already implementing relevant due diligence proce-
dures (Anciberro, 2005). Anciberro notes that the banks in Europe would have 
preferred if PEPs were regarded as a risk factor only in cases where transactions 
                                               
367  As discussed elsewhere in this thesis (see section 4.4.3.), legislation against the bribery of foreign 
officials and other laws, regulations and restrictions are also increasingly becoming a major driv-
ing force behind the development of due diligence practices.   
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were particularly substantial or complex368 in nature, thereby posing enhanced 
money laundering and reputational risks. Such an approach would necessitate 
the undertaking of enhanced due diligence investigations only in circumstances 
where PEPs appear to have engaged in a suspicious transaction. The Federa-
tion’s proposal, however, was not adopted, even though the proposal made 
perfect sense. Yet one major problem affected the logic of the proposal: the 
consistency in applying due diligence measures, not only across countries (even 
within the EU) but also across economic sectors and reporting institutions 
within one specific jurisdiction, remains an issue. 
  Considering the way the anti-money laundering system has been designed, 
it is difficult to determine whether some reporting institutions are diligent at all 
and whether within other institutions due diligence work is being taken to 
excessive extremes. There is a distinct lack of a standard approach and consis-
tency as well as of effective evaluations of due diligence procedures and their 
effects across industries and jurisdictions. The same applies to risk assessment. 
Even within one specific institution risks may be viewed differently. While a 
qualified anti-money laundering officer may feel it necessary to warn of poten-
tial reputational and regulatory concerns associated with their clients, officers on 
the private banking side may be less concerned about these issues and press for 
the deal to go ahead. This is often the case where it is difficult to verify or 
prove reputational concerns, particularly those that are based on rumours. Pre-
sumably it would not be necessary to report to the relevant FIU if the concern 
was based on mere speculation. However, there is scope for interpretation on 
this point (Gelemerova, 2008). 
 As previously noted, it appears that the due diligence industry is increasingly 
driven by legislation and the fear of sanctions rather than by the rational need 
for sound risk management practices. The ultimate result of the general fuzzi-
ness of criteria and guidelines for due diligence reporting is that FIUs and their 
regulatory partners are unlikely to be receiving the quality intelligence from 
reporting institutions that they expect. 
 Banks have also noted that other challenges posed by the Directive arise 
from the requirement to identify beneficial owners369 and not to engage in 
correspondent relationships with banks known for allowing their accounts to 
                                               
368  This ultimately means a transaction that is complicated and not straight-forward and therefore 
requiring closer scrutiny. Such transactions may appear non-transparent, e.g. structured in multi-
ple layers and involving a number of obscure offshore entities. 
369  Beneficial owners are those wielding ultimate control over the customer and/or the individual 
or entity on whose behalf a transaction is conducted. The Directive requires establishing the 
identity of beneficial owners holding over 25% of the shares in a business. 
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be used by a shell bank(s). Anciberro (2005) stresses that the obligation to know 
the customer’s customer is generally not workable, specifically with regard to 
correspondent relationships. Sound risk management practices conform to this 
requirement in any event but, in some cases, it might be difficult to verify the 
identity of the ultimate owner. Even where sound risk management practices 
aim at identifying the beneficial owners, such identifications may be based on 
unsubstantiated information. European banks have expressed their concern that 
reliable and independent sources of information are not always easily accessible 
to banks (Anciberro, 2005). The availability of public records, including infor-
mation on ownership, varies widely within the EU and across the world. 
 In its guidance the JMLSG stresses that firms should encourage their staff to 
“think risk” (JMLSG, 2007, p. 9). The JMLSG appears to appeal to individuals’ 
common sense, intelligence and motivation. Certainly individual commitment 
and care are of significant importance. However, “the need for ‘quality intelligence’ 
also requires a clear basis for developing shared standards that ensures optimal objectivity 
and consistency in decision-making” (Gelemerova, 2008, p. 41).  
  It appears that in a joint international effort to fight money laundering, 
policy makers have laid down requirements, while providing insufficient practi-
cal guidance as to how to implement them. The approach to be adopted in all 
these matters is apparently to be largely defined by the reporting institutions 
themselves on a discretionary basis. Even if reporting institutions diligently 
undertake enhanced due diligence research, it remains an issue at what point, 
and under what circumstances, does the gathered information become useful 
intelligence for regulators. Due to insufficient feedback from the regulators as 
well as law enforcement agencies (police and prosecution), this question cannot 
be answered. The demand of transparency is not heeded by those who demand 
it in the first place. 
 
4.4.2. The AML risk: how much of it is too much? 
 
The Third EU Directive calls for a risk-based approach. It requires enhanced 
customer due diligence in situations of a higher risk of money laundering 
and/or terrorist financing. It also requires the implementation of adequate 
measures to compensate for the higher level of risk in situations in which the 
customer has not been physically present for identification purposes. The Di-
rective stresses that reporting institutions should apply enhanced due diligence 
on ‘a risk-sensitive basis’ but it appears that each institution can decide for 
themselves when, and to what extent, to undertake in-depth due diligence.  
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  The banking industry in the EU has generally approved of the introduction 
of the risk-based approach (Anciberro, 2005). The European Commission 
(Commission Staff Working Document, 2006) has admitted that even prior to 
the introduction of the Third Directive many reporting institutions had been 
adhering to such risk-based practices in non-face-to-face identification proce-
dures. It is believed that if aptly applied, the risk-based approach can help to 
better focus resources and avoid costs not commensurate with risks.  
 Developments in the EU mirror developments in the US where the risk-
based approach has become important as well. FinCEN’s director, James Freis, 
notes that matching risk-based examination to risk-based obligations helps 
achieve regulatory efficiency and better organises the allocation of examination 
resources (Freis, 2007). This can be considered a response to the complaint 
that, for instance, compliance in the money service businesses (MSBs) in the 
US has led to a significant increase in costs. McClain (2007) has stressed that 
MSBs bear the cost of the US BSA enforcement strategy and that compliance 
with Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) and Currency Transaction Report 
(CTR) requirements has led to direct and substantial costs, not just in the MSB 
industry, but also across the entire financial services sector. This in turn has led 
to higher fees charged to customers.  
 Given the high cost of compliance, the move to a risk-based approach, i.e. 
ultimately less prescription, was generally welcomed because nearly all other 
prior changes in the anti-money laundering system had largely led to over-
regulation and over-compliance, with little or no evident decrease in purported 
money laundering. For illustration, tables 1 and 2 (below) indicate that the 
overall number of suspicious transactions reports submitted to the FIUs of sev-
eral countries has increased over the years, specifically since 1994 and prior to 
the recognition of the risk-based concept by the Third Directive (in some 
countries peaking in 2002 following the terrorist attacks of 2001).370 According 
to McClain (2007), regulatory pressures in the USA, in the absence of clear 
guidance, have resulted in a large number of defensive SAR filings and dupli-
cate CTR filings. He also notes that the volume of suspicious transaction re-
ports places a burden on government agencies, specifically FinCEN, as it has to 
processes a large amount of data of dubious value as a result. Specifically, 
McClain notes that in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 increased regulatory 
scrutiny led to defensive SAR filings which reported even marginally irregular 
activity.  
                                               




Statistics of suspicious transaction reports by jurisdiction 
Number of Suspicious Activity Report Filings by Year  
in some European Countries 
State 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Belgium  2.183 3.926 5.771 7.747 
Germany372  3.282 2.935 3.289  
France  684 866 902 1.213 
Netherlands  
- unusual 












UK  15.007 13.170 16.125 14.148 
Source: European Commission, 1998 
 
Table 4 (continued) 
States 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Belgium  13.120 9.953 11.234 10.148 9.938 
Germany  8.261 6.602 8.062 8.241 10.051 
France  8.719 9.019 10.842 11.553 12.047 
Holland  
- unusual 















UK  56.023* 94.718* 154.536* 195.702 21.3561 
Source: FIUs’ Annual Report(s) 
* Source: Van Duyne et al., 2007 
 
Table 5 
Number of Suspicious Activity Report Filings by Year in the USA 
Institution  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Depository 
Institution  




- - - - - 
Casinos and 
Card Clubs  




- - - - - 
Subtotal  62.473 81.242 97.078 120.941 163.184 
 
                                               
371  As noted previously, all figures in this paper are in Continental European annotation. 
372  The 2004 annual report of Bundeskriminalamt, Germany’s FIU, provides the following figures: 
1994 – 2.873, 1995 - 2.759, 1996 – 3.019, 1997 – 3.137. 
 240 
Table 5 (continued) 
Institution  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  
Depository 
Institution  












- - 4.267 5.705 6.936 8.129 
Subtotal  204.915  281.373  507.217  689.414  919.230  1.078.894  
Source: FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review – By the Numbers (Issue 9, January 2008) 
 
It is evident from these tables that the number of suspicious transaction reports 
has increased over the years. However, this has not necessarily resulted in better 
quality reports. Policy makers believe that by applying a risk-based approach 
reporting institutions will reduce the number of poor quality reports. This will 
mean that the quality of intelligence provided to FIUs will improve.  
 Yet the important question of how to identify and assess risks remains press-
ing. As mentioned previously, not only across countries and sectors but also 
within a specific institution risks may be viewed differently by the various de-
partments of that institution. Even where reporting institutions are always on 
the alert and are able to spot risks, they should also be able to decide whether 
these risks necessarily require enhanced due diligence and/or reporting to the 
relevant FIU. This means that in the first instance they need to know what 
exactly ‘high-risk’ is. In other words, how much AML risk is too much not to 
report? This implies that a risk-threshold has to be operationalised. However, a 
general operational risk-threshold does not exist: each financial and commercial 
sector, as well as jurisdiction, will have a threshold of its own. This means that 
even within one specific cross-border operation, for instance in trade finance, 
the parties involved on the different ends, in different jurisdictions, may look 
upon risks in different ways. Thus, just elaborating on the risk definition is 
unlikely to alleviate the burden of the financial institutions without any further 
effort in standardising compliance practices and the necessary resources across 
countries. And for that standardisation to be achieved account should be taken 
also of specific contexts.   
 Indeed, by standardising we should by no means hope to achieve a universal 
program of measures that can be applied to every kind of situation, as the au-
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thorities strongly discourage the implementation of one-size-fits-all approach.373 
However, rules should be made clearer and the attitude towards compliance, 
and more importantly, towards the execution of compliance measures, requires 
a higher level of consistency across countries and sectors. Otherwise, how 
much can be achieved in terms of due diligence, when in one country checks 
can be easily performed, while in other countries you stumble over the lack of 
accessible records and strong traditions in preserving secrecy? 
 Another important question is - what happens when something does not 
appear to be risky (or is under the risk-threshold) but, in the end, results in far 
more serious implications than initially expected? Besides, it should be taken 
into account that in applying a risk-based approach there exists a ‘reverse risk’, 
i.e. the risk of being wrong, or in statistical terms, the possibility of false positive 
and false negative errors (Gelemerova, 2008). This issue can be addressed only 
within a system of adequate feedback from regulators and law enforcement 
agenicies which enables reporting institutions to validate risk-characteristics. 
However, state agencies fail to provide adequate feedback and this defect ap-
pears to be a global one (see Van Duyne, 2007a; Verhage, 2010). 
 It is not clear what the implications would be if a PEP or another risk factor 
slips through the system and whether banks should be held accountable.374 In 
addition, real professional launderers will attempt to manipulate their risk pro-
file (or the risk profiles of their clients) downwards (as they do already today). 
In simple terms: who wants to be or look like a PEP?   
 Although it may be difficult to prove in a criminal context that a banker had 
doubts about a transaction but decided to ignore it (Levi, 1993), law enforce-
ment authorities and regulators can probably always find a reason for a sanction. 
Sanctions, however, do not necessarily result in better quality intelligence (Ge-
lemerova, 2007) but can lead to over-compliance (see Harvey, 2005) in the 
                                               
373  For instance, in January 2009 the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) fined Aon Limited, a 
UK insurance broker, for having a one-size-fits-all approach and thus “failing to take reasonable 
care to establish and maintain effective systems and controls to counter the risks of bribery and corruption asso-
ciated with making payments to overseas firms and individuals” (FSA, 2009, retrieved online and 
therefore no page number is available; see also FSA, 2009a). Although this concerned the com-
pany’s anti-corruption compliance system, such measures are closely intertwined with anti-
money laundering compliance, especially within the regulated sector of reporting institutions 
(see section 4.4.3.). 
374  The JMLSG handbook, mentioned earlier, notes that the FSA is unlikely to take enforcement 
action if a firm demonstrates that it has put in place an effective system of controls. But what es-
sentially ‘an effective system’ means is unclear. The guide and other available guidance typically 
use broad terms such as ‘reasonable care’, ‘reasonable steps’, ‘appropriate steps’, ‘appropriate pro-
cedures’ etc., which fall short of explicitly defining the minimum prescribed standard that would 
guarantee defence against enforcement action (Gelemerova, 2008).  
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form of over-reporting. Additionally, despite the fact that reporting institutions 
are given the opportunity to make their own risk assessment and on that basis 
to decide on the scope of due diligence, there are situations which require en-
hanced due diligence in any event. For instance, even if reporting institutions 
regard a situation as ‘low-risk’, it appears that, according to the Third Directive, 
correspondent banking relationships with respondent institutions from third 
world countries as well as non-domestic PEPs and their sources of wealth in 
any event should be subject to enhanced due diligence.  
 Ultimately what is important to remember within the remits of the risk-
based approach is that reporting institutions should know who it is they are 
dealing with, i.e. the know-your-customer rule about establishing the cus-
tomer’s identity, nature of business, place of employment, sources of funds, and 
so on (Gelemerova, 2008). On that basis, reporting institutions have to deter-
mine the level of risk, and, depending on the level of risk, decide on the scope 
of due diligence. Clearer criteria would certainly make things easier. Ambigu-
ous and ill-defined terminology as well as the lack of systematic feedback from 
the authorities and FIUs375 to the reporting institutions are among the major 
setbacks in financial intelligence gathering. It is obvious that, in the absence of 
clearer criteria, risk assessment and risk-based decision-making can be a risky 
undertaking in itself as it largely depends on the intuition, common sense and 
conscientiousness of individual staff members (Gelemerova, 2008). At an AML 
event in New York in 2007, financial services executives expressed a concern 
that the risk-based approach, with prosecutors acting as supervisors, was being 
used to actually raise the compliance standards rather than make things easier 
(see Davis, 2007). Compliance officers may now have to take into account, not 
so much their own judgement of AML risks, but rather the latest regulatory 
sanctions and enforcement actions (see Davis, 2007). When in the absence of 
clear standards it is the regulatory risk, rather than actual AML risk, that drives 
institutions to report, the danger is that the risk-based approach may in turn 
slide back to over-compliance (see Harvey, 2005). In the end, the real risk to 
the banks is the combination of regulators and sanction-related reputation dam-
age. And in that order, we should stress again: money-launderers do not take 
money out of the bank, they bring it into it. So we cannot expect money laun-
                                               
375  The usual excuse is that the authorities cannot provide feedback on specific cases because this 
can compromise investigations (if any). However, reporting institutions/persons do not neces-
sarily expect feedback to mention specific individuals or companies but to provide generic guid-
ance and assurances that reporting officers understand the rules. More detailed feedback in terms 
of general statistics can also be helpful.  
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dering risks to decrease any time soon. On the contrary, as it appears, banks and 
other regulated institutions will be facing an increasing need to conduct due 
diligence checks.   
 
4.4.3. The global financial Panopticon  
 
Intelligence gathering tools ancillary to AML/KYC rules 
Earlier in this thesis we asked ourselves whether the global Panopticon is the 
much desired panacea against crime for profit. The anti-money laundering 
regime with its KYC system and obligation to report suspicious activities ap-
pears to be turning, indeed, into some form of a global Panopticon. Although 
the reporting obligation applies only to the regulated sector (i.e. banks and 
other financial services institutions among others), the aiding and abetting of-
fences, particularly in combination with the range of other ancillary compliance 
issues arising from the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), sanction 
lists,376 non-proliferation (of weapons of mass destruction)377 and anti-terrorism 
regulations, especially in a penal-law globalised environment, can make virtu-
ally everyone accountable. For instance, let us imagine that, in a hypothetical 
scenario, a UK steel trader A sells steel produced by a Russian steel maker B. B 
is controlled by a controversial businessman C. The steel is sold to a German 
car-maker D and a US aircraft manufacturer E. D has just been bailed out by 
the German government and so it is partly government-owned. A uses agents 
to sell the steel. You may think that none of this has anything to do with 
                                               
376  A range of national and supra-national bodies and organisations, such as the US OFAC, admin-
ister and enforce sanctions and restrictions. For instance, the US OFAC, Office of Foreign As-
sets Control of the US Department of the Treasury, administers and enforces economic and 
trade sanctions designed to protect US foreign policy and national security interests and targeted 
against certain jurisdictions, regimes, terrorists, narcotics traffickers, those engaged in the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the US national security, foreign 
policy or economy (for further details see US Department of the Treasury’s website at: 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/).   
377  In addition to the range of trade sanctions and restrictions there are also regula-tions relating to 
the export of dual-use items and technology aimed at ensuring the disarmament and non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Fuhrmann (2006) notes that proliferators use front 
companies, intermediaries and often forgery in order to circumvent export controls. Therefore 
banks and other financial institutions have to seek to ensure that they do not facilitate prolifera-
tors. As a result, the concept of ‘suspicious transaction’ expands to include also transfers that re-
late to the export of dual-use substances (e.g. such that can be used both for the production of 
fertilisers and the making of explosives). Fuhrmann (2006) highlights that the authorities must go 
beyond merely informing the private sector about export control. In cooperation with the pri-
vate sector, they must develop an agreed set of international best practices, standardised compli-
ance programmes and a channel for communication to share intelligence relating to end-users of 
proliferation concern. It is important to devise strategies of engagement driven by incentives, 
rather than by punishment (Fuhrmann, 2006). 
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money laundering, let alone with reporting any suspicious activity to financial 
intelligence units. However, any marginal irregularity in the trade finance 
documentation submitted by A’s agent in the US to its servicing bank in the 
US can trigger the suspicion of a vigilant bank officer. A commonly considered 
red-flag such as a risky product or a risky jurisdiction, or a PEP link can also 
trigger suspicion.  
 Let us imagine that in the described case, a bank officer discovers that C, the 
owner of the Russian steel maker (whose products are being sold by the agent), 
is deemed as a PEP (for reasons subjective and not quite clear to the banker). 
He decides that this warrants further scrutiny. As a result, he discovers that the 
agent’s documents contain contact details of an office in Iran, although it is not 
quite clear why. However, being aware of the US sanctions against Iran and 
the AML/anti-terrorism legislation, the banker decides that the transaction is 
suspicious and the matter should be reported to FinCEN. In the end, the tip-
off to FinCEN, (which originated as a simple know-your-customer check), 
triggers an investigation into all parties involved which goes beyond the remit 
of anti-money laundering regulations. As it turned out, the agent in the US had 
issued inflated invoices to the US aircraft manufacturer. This could have been 
pure fraud but may have also been related to offences with which we associate 
a far more sinister ‘threat imagery’, i.e. the gain from the deception may have 
been a drop in the ocean of terrorist funding.  
 Due diligence may be an explicit obligation for the regulated sector only, 
but the lack of awareness and of an explicit obligation for those outside that 
sector does not appear to provide defence in cases where companies fail to 
comply with the range of rules and prohibitions other than anti-money laun-
dering regulations, such as anti-bribery, counter terrorism, non-proliferation 
and other sanctions and restrictions, that are closely intertwined with KYC 
rules and AML regulations.378 Thus, if the US aircraft manufacturer E is not 
prosecuted as an accomplice in money laundering, it may be fined by the US 
authorities for failing to keep efficient compliance and control systems and 
preventing potential terrorist financiers from raising and laundering funds.379 
The UK trader A may be fined for similar reasons in the UK. Moreover, if it 
turns out that A’s agent in Germany has greased the palms of a senior manager 
                                               
378  For those within the regulated sector the US authorities have even issued a manual of which a 
section is aimed to help companies check how they manage ‘OFAC risk’ compared to Bank Se-
crecy Act expectatations (FFIEC, BSA/AML Examination Manual, July 2006).   
379 The US Counter Terrorism Sanctions apply to all US persons and entities (companies, non-
profit groups, government agencies and so on) wherever located. 
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of the German car-maker in order to ensure the purchase of the steel, then A 
may be prosecuted under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (‘FCPA’)380 
and may be sanctioned in the UK for failing to take reasonable care to establish 
and maintain effective systems to counter the risks of bribery and corruption of 
overseas firms and individuals (see Aon Limited case, FSA, 2009 and 2009a).381 
Additionally, disguising the funds allocated for the bribe can be qualified as 
laundering, which brings us back to the anti-money laundering regulations.  
 The FCPA, especially when coupled with anti-money laundering regula-
tions, has become a powerful tool to keep businesses with international expo-
sure on their toes (see Gelemerova, 2010). Similarly to drug trafficking and 
anti-money laundering policies (as described earlier in this thesis), the US has 
also been the driving force behind legislative developments in the area of cor-
ruption of foreign officials. As was the case with AML  developments, aware-
ness of the phenomenon was first raised during the Watergate scandal when it 
became known that a considerable number of US companies maintained ‘slush 
funds’ and were engaged in systematic bribery of foreign officials and political 
parties to gain business. These corrupt payments were concealed from audit and 
public scrutiny (see SEC Report, 1976; Thomsen, 2008). Large-scale corrup-
tion is a complex matter which is often connected to a range of other, not less 
complex crimes, such as fraud and money laundering, for ‘tautological reasons’, 
particularly given the broad definition. Not only may it require laundering in 
the narrow and broad sense of the term, but laundering may be inherent: in-
built by tautology. The nature of the relationship between the corporation and 
the government official is concealed, as is the concealment of the promise, offer-
ing and receiving of the advantage and the subsequent reward. The corruptly 
gained advantage is illegal (e.g. the contracts that Siemens was alleged by US 
prosecutors to have obtained through bribery were ‘proceeds’ too, and the 
manner in which they originated was concealed). The subsequent reward con-
stitutes an ‘illegal advantage’ too; both, the corruptly gained advantage and the 
reward, qualify as ‘proceeds’, the handling or concealing of which, is laundering 
under the broad definition of international regulations (see Gelemerova, 2010).  
                                               
380  Perhaps a much more likely scenario, one might think, would be to have goods sold to a Nige-
rian government-controlled firm, as the level of perceived corruption in Nigeria is much higher. 
However, cases of FCPA prosecution in the past ten years or more clearly indicate that indi-
viduals in developed countries are not too reticent either when it comes to engaging in corrupt 
practices (see Gelemerova, 2010).  
381  As a result of the bail-out of the German car-maker, i.e. the government taking control over it, 
its executives can be considered government officials as interpreted by the US authorities in the 
context of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (see Gelemerova, 2010).   
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 The scale of malpractice unearthed in the aftermath of the Watergate scan-
dal required action. So it was decided that criminalisation would be the most 
effective deterrent (see Staggers, 1977). Thus, in 1977, the FCPA, the first ma-
jor US law that addressed bribery of foreign officials, was adopted. However, it 
was important to ensure that other countries introduced similar legislation to 
level the playing field so that non-US firms did not have a competitive advan-
tage over US firms (Gelemerova, 2010). In 1997 US lobbying efforts finally led 
to the adoption of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions (the ‘OECD Convention’), which, in fact, in 
some respects was even more rigid than the FCPA. Thirty-three countries 
committed to complying with it and making the bribery of foreign officials a 
criminal offence (see for more details Gelemerova, 2010). The US had to adjust 
the FCPA to the more rigid requirements of the OECD Convention and thus, 
in 1998 the US Congress introduced the International Anti-Bribery Act, which 
essentially expanded the FCPA’s scope and reach.382  
 In addition to its anti-bribery provisions383 the FCPA also contains impor-
tant accounting provisions which require US security issuers384 to maintain 
                                               
382  Firstly, the FCPA now included payments made to secure any improper advantage, in addition to 
criminalising payments made to influence a decision of a foreign official or to induce him to do 
or omit to do any act. Secondly, public officials now included also officials of public interna-
tional organisations. Thirdly, in addition to domestic concerns and issuers under the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act, the scope was expanded to apply to all foreign persons who commit an act in 
furtherance of a foreign bribe while in the US. Fourthly, it was expanded to assert jurisdiction 
over US businesses and nationals for acts in furtherance of unlawful payments outside the US. 
Fifthly, the amendmends eliminated the disparity in penalties applicable to US nationals and for-
eign nationals employed by, or acting as, agents of US companies (previously, foreign nationals 
were subject only to civil penalties) (see Gelemerova, 2010, where the subject is discussed in de-
tail). 
383  In summary, FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit any person, while in the territory of the 
USA, US issuers and domestic concerns, their subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, agents 
and stockholders, from making use of any means corruptly in furtherance of giving anything of 
value to a foreign official in order to obtain or retain business, or secure any improper advantage. 
The term corruptly indicates an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient which means that the 
act of bribery does not have to have taken place or have produced results for the FCPA to be 
enforced. Furthermore, although the FCPA provides an exemption for facilitating or grease 
payments (i.e. such that are made to expedite a routine governmental action), a number of legal cases 
indicate that that there is scope for interpretation. For instance, in United States v. Kay, 2004, it 
was confirmed that the law also applies to undue advantage in the form of favourable tax or cus-
toms treatment. It essentially means that any questionable payment made to obtain an undue ad-
vantage over industry rivals and/or increase profits, including through favourable tax or customs 
treatment, can fall within the scope of the FCPA (for further analysis see Gelemerova, 2010). 
384  ‘Issuers’ are companies issuing and selling securities on the stock-exchange. Under the FPCA, 
issuers are US or foreign entities which have a class of securities registered pursuant to the US 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or which are required to file reports under the same Act.  
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internal accounting controls and keep accurate records of all transactions. These 
provisions place the FCPA in particularly close proximity to AML regulations, 
as any company which seeks to conceal an illicit payment in the context of the 
FCPA (e.g. a bribe or expenses for entertainment of a government official, and 
so on), for instance, by using false accounts or false contracts, can become the 
subject both of FCPA prosecution and a money laundering investigation (Ge-
lemerova, 2010). 
 Indeed, FCPA’s language, similar to that of the anti-laundering law, was cast 
in terms designed to avoid any loopholes and expand FCPA’s reach as far as 
possible. Of particular relevance is the fact that the law enables the US authori-
ties to assert territorial jurisdiction over any foreign person when there is some 
connection to the territory of the US or use of the interstate or foreign com-
merce of the US. For the territorial principle to apply it suffices, for instance, to 
have an office or a representative in the US, make payments through a US 
bank or send emails via a US server. The global reach of the FCPA (and its 
aggressive enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, see Gelemerova, 2010), especially in combination with 
similar legislation introduced outside the US,385 now means that companies 
with international operations and some connection to the territory of the US 
have to ensure that they apply due diligence as a major element of their anti-
corruption efforts (for comments from industry experts see McCann, 2009). 
But unlike anti-money laundering due diligence which is an explicit obligation 
for the regulated sector, anti-corruption due diligence does not appear to have 
been explicitly prescribed. Yet the numerous cases of FCPA prosecution, in-
cluding the cases of the German Siemens and the Norwegian Statoil, indicate 
that those companies which fail to maintain efficient controls and prevention 
systems face the risk of sanctions. Key to efficient control and prevention is, 
indeed, due diligence, especially in avoiding successor and agent liability. Not 
only does it discourage corrupt conduct, but it also provides opportunities for 
self-reporting in order to avoid prosecution and mitigate any possible punish-
ment (see Gelemerova, 2010). Thus, the self-reporting (or voluntary disclosure 
procedures) fit perfectly well into the intelligence gathering mechanism oper-
ated by the authorities.  
 
 
                                               
385  The UK Bribery Act of 2010 (expected to come into force in 2011) is even stricter than the 
FCPA in some respects, including with regard to facilitation payments. 
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Cracks in the Panopticon? 
Those within the regulated sector (i.e. the reporting institutions under AML 
regulations) at least know they have to conduct the basic know-your-customer 
checks, although the risk-based approach seems to be putting the benchmark 
higher and higher. For those outside the regulated sector, due diligence is not 
an explicit obligation. But they are becoming increasingly aware of the com-
plex nature of the range of compliance risks, including those arising from the 
FCPA/OECD Convention and other anti-bribery legislation, trade sanctions, 
non-proliferation controls and other restrictions, and so they too inevitably 
become part of the global Panopticon. So far, so good. Only it is not clear, 
with so much law enforcement and regulatory aggression, how much can be 
achieved when there is a web of interconnected compliance issues, restrictions 
and obligations, yet significant uncertainty with regard to compliance standards 
and the practical implementation of rules and procedures. This often means that 
due diligence is either absent or is simply turned into a simplified ‘tick the box’ 
exercise, especially in a situation of economic downturn when it is a matter of 
priority for businesses to cut back on costs (Gelemerova, 2010). Furthermore, it 
may be an increasingly globalised penal-law environment but it is still a consid-
erably fragmented environment when it comes to putting compliance (anti-
money laundering, anti-corruption and so on) measures into practice. Stan-
dards, attitudes, corporate cultures, availability of public sources of information, 
privacy and data protection laws, due diligence and legal practices vary from 
country to country (see Gelemerova, 2010). Even within one specific banking 
organisation with long traditions in due diligence and compliance, what is 
preached at headquarters, is not necessarily practiced company-wide.  
 Surely all this must impact on the efficiency of the global Panopticon. In-
deed, as we can see, there is no evidence that money laundering activities have 
diminished or will diminish any time soon. So how effective then is the global 
AML regime, also in relation to the FCPA? Notably, a number of high-profile 
FCPA investigations have uncovered that alleged bribery payments of consider-
able amounts had been made by reputable firms, over relatively long periods of 
time, often involving false contracts as well as accounts and/or firms registered 
in tax haven jurisdictions (see Gelemerova, 2010). In those cases all signs of 
money laundering (as broadly understood under the international regulations) 
were present but, for some reason, apparently remained unnoticed for some 
 249 
considerable time.386 The same applies to the range of elite crime cases that 
shook the industry in the early years of this decade, e.g. Enron and WorldCom, 
followed by the Madoff and Stanford cases in 2009. Are we not seeing big 
cracks in the global Panopticon? 
 These observations underline the fact that the fight against money launder-
ing is based on a rhetoric political superstructure with dire consequences in the 
compliance orbit but little or no evidence of success. The entire business, glob-
ally, is called upon to conduct due diligence and gather information to ensure 
that profit-oriented crime does not pay, but thus far little has been done by the 
authorities to ease and streamline the process of information gathering387 or to 
design some performance measurement procedure.  
 Moreover, we usually hear about compliance when it comes to ‘threat im-
agery’ mainly related to the ‘usual suspects’, e.g. drug trafficking, but at present 
also terrorism, nuclear-weapons proliferation financing and other similar haz-
ards that have a highly political connotation. We have also started hearing 
about the hazards of corruption of foreign officials. For some reason, however, 
little is done to raise awareness of laundering activities relating to domestic 
corruption, environmental crime, elite crime and other inconvenient topics. In 
addition, we hear much about laundering involving real estate transactions 
while finding so little empirical substantiation (Van Duyne et al., 2009). At the 
same time we hear little of suspicious trade in artwork, although whitewashing 
illegal archeological finds by false documents of provenance is a laundering act 
in the strict sense of the term. Similarly, the auctioning and re-auctioning of 
stolen art is a method by which a white-wash effect can be achieved (Charney, 
2009).  
 Irrespective of how many dodgy offshore banks and offshore companies 
through which crime money has gone, at the place of investment the origin of 
this money can still be questioned. The advantages which globalisation offers to 
money launderers are not necessarily the perfect laundering solution. Domestic 
laundering, for instance, through real estate fraud, investment in artwork or 
corruptly gaining public procurement contracts can sometimes be much easier. 
                                               
386  Even if any of these anti-corruption investigations has been triggered by a tip-off to a financial 
intelligence unit, it remains a question as to how soon this tip-off was made after the start of the 
corrupt activities.  
387  While the FIUs are responsible for gathering information relating to laundering and terrorist 
financing, other bodies may be designated for collecting reports on suspected breach of trade 
sanctions, foreign bribery and non-profileration legislation and other restrictions, despite all this 
being suspected crime predicate to money laundering. It appears that there is a need of stream-
lining the reporting and intelligence gathering process. 
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As noted previously, while the international banking industry has been under 
intense scrutiny for a number of years, the extent of scrutiny over other sectors, 
including real estate agents, art dealers and auction houses, or government offi-
cials involved in public procurement, remains a question. In terms of financial 
scale, money that can be circulated and gained through real estate or artwork 
indeed can reach excessive amounts. According to Bulgarian prosecutor Pla-
men Panayotov, the fraudulent trade in properties can be much more profitable 
[and safer] than illegal drug trafficking or prostitution.388 But fraud and elite 
crime do not have the threat image of drug trafficking, as we have seen. 
 
 
                                               
388  Banker Weekly, 26 September 2009. 
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5. Panopticon built on quicksand.                         
Concluding Remarks  
5.1. Fighting laundering: the sacrifices on behalf of a vague vir-
tue? 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the applicability and adequacy of the 
legal term ‘money laundering’ in the context of globalisation, particularly the 
globalisation of money laundering and of the fight against it. If the purpose of 
designing the anti-money laundering system has been to curb economic crime 
and the related money laundering, has the anti-money laundering system been 
built on solid grounds, i.e. on clear definitional basis, or is rather built on a 
constantly shifing platform similar to a Panopticon built on quicksand?  
 As we have seen, the language of anti-money laundering policies contains 
much vagueness. The set of copied definitions reviewed in this thesis does not 
touch the essence of money laundering: to provide a justification for the own-
ership of the proceeds. As far as the ‘financial life’ of the criminal is concerned, 
he wants to spend his ill-gotten profits worry free and this implies: removing 
the traces of the predicate crime and avoiding nasty questions about one’s 
wealth. The most effective ‘laundering method’ is: do not draw the attention of 
the law. Policy makers have expanded this to include any handling of crime 
money, including keeping it under your mattress. For good reasons one can 
criticise this as not being laundering in the strict sense of the term. However, 
the legislators have given it that name and the world accepted that. Is this 
global ‘etikettenschwindel’389? Yes, and that is what most money laundering 
legislation appears to be all about. But the legislators and law enforcement 
agencies can happily live with that. 
 This vague and all-encompassing language chosen by policy makers urges 
sacrifices from the financial sector (and other industries, as discussed in the pre-
vious section) in terms of material efforts: training courses, extra staff or a sepa-
rate compliance department. Such cost is always viewed by companies as sig-
nificant, no matter how small it is compared to the investment companies are 
prepared to make in market research or advertisement, for instance. Market 
                                               
389  This usually means that different labels are given to the same content. Here we have a reverse 
‘etikettenschwindel’: the label of laundering remains the same but given the ambiguity of the 
meaning of laundering, its content is changed to accommodate to changed political require-
ments. 
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research can generate business, whereas compliance is largely viewed merely as 
a cost-generating unit.390 Such are the commercial realities.  
 For small and medium-sized companies it is significantly more difficult. 
While it cannot be expected from smaller companies to have separate depart-
ments dealing with compliance issues, the required extra alertness is neverthe-
less a burden. Businesses are in a state of continuing uncertainty whether risks 
have been correctly assessed lest they may be browbeaten by the supervisors. 
Consequently, from a management perspective, the main risks appear to come 
from the regulatory supervisors, not from the launderers. This means that com-
panies inevitably build up their compliance attitude and efforts towards warding 
off attention from regulators rather than avoiding the broader corporate risk 
which includes being defrauded by unscrupulous partners or employees (Gele-
merova, 2010).  
 Furthermore, sacrifices have been made in terms of safeguards for preserving 
confidentiality on matters relating to clients. This has become a particularly 
sensitive matter for a number of groups of professionals, such as lawyers (as 
discussed previously), accountants and notaries, who have become part of the 
AML-regulated sector. As we have seen, significant uncertainty has been cre-
ated, for instance, with regard to lawyers who now have to think twice before 
accepting to work for individuals suspected of involvement in crime for profit. 
But, after all, who is beyond suspicion? If all this is unambiguously for the ‘gen-
eral good’, these sacrifices could be considered justified. But how certain is this 
without performance measures? Disclosing confidential information to the 
authorities in order to assist them in tackling ‘serious’ crime and ensuring that 
everyone abides by the law is a good cause indeed. In an ideal world (although 
in an ideal world there would be no crime), the state administration and those 
responsible for the fight against crime would be incorruptible. But we do not 
live in a perfect world and the system is open to abuse. Performance account-
ability is lacking or insufficient, while there is no indication that crime for profit 
is declining. The level of availability of illegal drugs has remained, more or less, 
the same or has increased while prices have decreased; financial and economic 
crime – the main criminal earning facility – is still relatively low on the policy 
makers’ agenda or, at best, has gone up on the agenda slightly, but given the 
enforcement history, probably only temporarily. Despite law enforcement’s 
broad powers, estimates provided by national and international authorities sug-
                                               
390  Compliance and fraud prevention officers can actually save cost that is arising from regulatory 
and law enforcement sanctions and the more general corporate risk of being defrauded, for in-
stance. 
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gest ever increasing volumes of money laundering. One may wonder why. Is 
the problem really that significant or does the reported size of the problem 
reflects the authorities’ tendency to indulge in the ‘big figure game’, increasing 
their importance as well as justifying their claim for tougher law enforcement 
measures and bigger budgets? 
 In addition to the material sacrifices there is the eroding of the law because 
of the self-laundering ramification and the lack of precision which is character-
istic for the entire AML system. The ambiguity of definitions leads to arbitrary 
results and uncertainties in the application of penal law, which is particularly 
problematic in the context of globalisation when law enforcement and regula-
tory efforts should be standardised globally to fight crime that is claimed to be 
globally spread. But standardisation requires precision of conceptual definition. 
How far should we go with the criminalisation of the various financial aspects 
of a criminal’s conduct? Should any use of crime-money be qualified as money 
laundering, even where the criminal is involved in licit transactions following 
the predicate crime? It seems that anything can be construed as a form of use of 
crime property and an intent to launder. US law envisages also the very broad 
intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity as a possible laundering 
prerequisite. Not all countries have verbatim introduced into their legal systems 
the broad money laundering definition advocated by the USA. As noted ear-
lier, Austria has not criminalised self-laundering. But countries which deviate 
from the broad definition that is so religiously fostered by the USA risk to be 
criticised for uncooperative attitude, extradition and forfeiture regime gaps. Of 
course, the authorities should seek to ensure that crime does not pay and that 
justice is done, but that has to be done through mechanisms that do not erode 
the legal certainty, lex certis, principle, the legal safeguards of justice. It appears 
that the broad money laundering definition has allowed prosecutors to erode 
the basic principle of law, lex certis, without even having to make a prima facie 
case. And all this started in the name of combating drug trafficking accompa-
nied by a lot of ‘threat imagery’. But was it really the drug menace only? As we 
have seen in previous sections, there is a valid reason to believe that, in fact, tax 
evasion prompted this sacrifice. But the drug issue was apparently a convenient 
political crowbar to open the door to the taxman. What is it then that policy 
makers are aiming for? If we fight money laundering as a way of fighting the 
underlying crimes, hoping this will decrease drug trafficking and tax evasion, it 
is time to reflect on a less costly and better defined and structured instrument 
with a less eroding effect on our legal system. 
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 Applying the AML strategy, as it stands now, as a general tool to fight crime 
is of little help because each type of criminal offence may require different 
complementing measures to reduce its prevalence. For instance, drugs form a 
social and public health problem and there may be better solutions in this di-
rection391 that could help curb the illegal trade and ipso facto reduce laundering. 
A stricter fiscal control policy with the application of a net-worth analysis 
would likewise reduce laundering opportunities. Looking for alternatives and 
intensified application of existing legal provisions should be seriously considered 
instead of plugging the money laundering clause in every legal loophole.  
 That said, there is nothing wrong with being able to use the money laun-
dering charge, where everything else fails, in order to ensure that crime does 
not pay. However, this has to be balanced against putting at risk the main prin-
ciples of law. For instance, if no predicate crimes are proven to the criminal 
standard of proof, why would the authorities not follow the civil recovery path 
instead of applying criminal procedures? Especially in cases of tax law violations 
and corruption offences, essentially crimes committed by the business and po-
litical elite, where proceedings get protracted for many years at the expense of 
the ordinary tax payer. In the end defendants are acquitted or escape with leni-
ent punishment, their assets remaining largely intact. If Mr Big was unable to 
prove a legitimate source for his income (which could have been firmly estab-
lished through a net-worth analysis), then this could have simply meant that he 
had failed to declare all his sources of income, which in turn could have meant 
classic tax evasion. He could be convicted of tax evasion and false accounting 
which again can be a cross-over into the criminal law world but without ne-
cesserily having to call that money laundering. Surely prosecuting for tax eva-
sion is effective enough without having to blurr the lines by calling tax evasion 
money laundering. However, as previously noted, it appears that for law en-
forcement authorities and prosecutors, pursuing a laundering conviction is far 
more admirable than proving tax evasion and/or using civil recovery proce-
dures.    
 It appears that the fight against money laundering has become a variable of 
political choices and subject to double standards rather than a targeted effort to 
curb crime for profit. The ‘threat imagery’ and the self-laundering charges are 
                                               
391 There may be means, more effective than prohibition and warfare, to fight the abuse of drugs. 
Regulating the cannabis market and the medical provision of a maintenance dose (for instance, 
based on the experience in Switzerland and the Netherlands) could be considered as measures 
that address both the supply and the demand side (currently the focus is on the supply side, as 
discussed earlier). 
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conveniently used to ease the fight against the laundering of drug trafficking 
proceeds, human trafficking and other crimes attributed to the ‘usual offenders’. 
Meanwhile the low level of priority of the fight against elite crime is becoming 
inconveniently glaring. History has shown that it is not easy to keep such of-
fences high on the political agenda (Van Duyne, et al., 2003a). We find a similar 
differentiation when it comes to ‘non-cooperative’ countries: here we have 
‘usual suspect’ countries too, which are more likely to be labelled as such than 
any of the industrialised countries where most of the crime money finally ends 
up.  
 
5.2. Gathering intelligence or randomly wasting resources 
 
It seems that somehow, despite its overarching design, the AML regime is not 
utilised in the most efficient way. It appears to primarily focus on the banking 
and money transmission businesses. If this is because it is the best way to gather 
intelligence on crime money management and logistics structures (as this is 
where dirty money is most likely to resurface from the underworld) and gain 
leads to predicate crimes, then we should not merely ‘fight’ money laundering – 
rather, we should watch it and follow the money trail. If the design of the entire 
reporting system was aimed at gathering intelligence, then why not to make 
rules clearer and start referring to things as they are? It is one thing to criminal-
ise any crime-money management, labelling it as laundering, without distin-
guishing between the predicate offender and the professional launderer thus 
affecting the basic principle of law, lex certis; it is quite another to criminalise 
laundering in the narrow sense but leave the obligation to report any suspicious 
activity. It appears that by jeopardising the lex certis in order to achieve political 
convenience, we have replaced one hazard with another: in order to curb 
money laundering policy makers have undermined the basic safeguards of law. 
 The system, as it stands now, certainly needs a higher level of clarity. FIUs 
have to receive more feedback from the regulatory and law enforcement agen-
cies they provide intelligence to. In turn FIUs have to provide feedback to the 
reporting institutions, which rarely happens. The flow of information is usually 
one-way, although FIUs and regulators also need to be accountable, including 
for omissions and failures.392 FIUs and other law enforcement agencies have to 
put in place mechanisms for regular and methodical feedback to reporting insti-
tutions. Money laundering is after all not so much a threat to society but rather 
                                               
392  As noted in Gelemerova, 2008. 
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the ‘Achilles Heel’ of criminal activity by which offenders can be identified 
(Gelemerova, 2008). Similarly to a radar system, it sends pulses that help regula-
tory and law enforcement bodies to spot criminals. Through intelligence pro-
vided in suspicious transaction reports, FIUs can identify leads to predicate 
crimes. However, this can only be ensured by a system that is well designed 
and equipped to spot such transactions. Reporting institutions cannot be left 
entirely to their own devices, as they are largely profit-oriented and cannot be 
expected to act as unpaid detectives (Gelemerova, 2008). Indeed, policy makers 
started their anti-money laundering war by setting up some prescriptive rules 
and standards, and then, for better or for worse, introduced the risk-based ap-
proach. As a result, at present there are some minimal prescribed standards as to 
what elements risk assessment and compliance systems should contain (e.g. due 
diligence checks, a whistleblower hotline, strict record keeping and entertain-
ment policy), but there is significant inconsistency as to the actual implementa-
tion of what companies have on paper (see Gelemerova, 2008, and Gele-
merova, 2010). As the existing minimal standards are insufficiently clear and 
inconsistently applied, the result is a simplified and, often, mindless exercise of 
ticking boxes with unclear contents. The risk-based approach has certainly its 
benefits but it has to rest on unambiguous principles and clear minimal stan-
dards. Therefore, despite the introduction of the risk-based approach, further 
clarity in rules is imperative. The need for clarity is pressing because anti-
money laundering policies, with their imbedded obligation to report suspicious 
transactions and all the ancillary anti-corruption, non-proliferation and anti-
terrorist financing laws, sanctions and other retrictions, is turning into a norma-
tive set of rules nonetheless. 
 More attention has to be paid to the practical side of achieving a balance 
between the profit-oriented nature of the reporting institutions, their fear of 
regulatory and law enforcement sanctions and the need to ensure a reasonable 
level of transparency of business. Reporting institutions would certainly benefit 
from having basic prescribed standards and automated knowledge-based sys-
tems, or artificial intelligence networks (Gold and Levi, 1994) in an effort to 
minimise the margin of subjective assessment and establish an optimal suspicion 
threshold (Gelemerova, 2008). Most importantly, if money laundering as a 
global phenomenon has to be tackled on a global scope, it is necessary to en-
sure that not only general legislative framework but also relevant guidance, 
standards and criteria, as well as implementation are consistent across countries. 
The FATF has sought to achieve some level of consistency in the anti-money 
laundering approach across the world. However, it remains a question whether 
 257 
all specific measures it has recommended have indeed worked, even if they 
have been seriously adopted. After all, it is still crime business –as-usual. Further 
effort in achieving clarity and consistency is needed. Otherwise there is a 
chance that crime for profit and money laundering will continue to flourish 
due to, inter alia, cross-border opportunities arising from regulatory and law 
enforcement inconsistencies across countries (as previously discussed, ‘crimino-
genic asymmetries’, see Passas, 2002). However, that should not stand in the 
way of context determined compliance, lest the authorities start thinking again 
in terms of a universal ‘golden bullet’.  
 
5.3. Measuring the money laundering phenomenon 
 
As reviewed in this thesis, any meaningful analysis of the money laundering 
phenomenon proves to be quite a difficult exercise. The legal construction of 
money laundering is so broad that even in a penal-law globalised environment, 
what we see as money laundering, here and there, is like a patchwork of tax 
evasion and hidden economy, a little bit of money under the mattress, quite a 
lot of money sitting in a bank account offshore, and probably even some in-
vested in reputable businesses but not so much by drug traffickers, rather by 
elite crime high-flyers. The definition, as it stands now, does not allow recog-
nising differences in financial conduct and intentions, and nuances in crime 
money colour. From the literature on laundering one cannot deduce whether 
such a differentiation was ever intended; rather we have observed an indis-
criminate extending of the frontline wherever there was a political opportunity 
to do so.  
 Building up the AML regime on the basis of such a loosely and ill-
constructed money laundering definition is equal to building a Panopticon on 
quicksand. The lack of clarity only leads to more sacrifices without any guaran-
tee of observable results in our social and economic life. Academic research, 
that is so necessary for the efficient functioning of legislative, law enforcement 
and regulatory bodies, will have to take into account the lack of clarity with 
regards to the money laundering definition and all related AML compliance 
issues. Particularly, an account should be taken of the confusion arising from 
the inconsistent and interchangeable application of the narrow and broad men-
ings of money laundering. 
 While the fight against such a broad phenomenon appears to involve much 
political rhetoric, the tools used by the authorities to ‘fight’ this broad phe-
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nomenon can actually be of much more help but are not used wisely. In the 
end, the system bites but, as it appears, it primarily bites the small fry and the 
unaware. 
 
5.4. The global Panopticon – concluding remarks 
 
As we have seen, although crime for profit has existed since at least the time of 
King Hammurabi, the money laundering phenomenon started to receive im-
mediate urgency during the 1970s when the US authorities introduced the 
Bank Secrecy Act. It was expected that the BSA could be used as an intelli-
gence tool to control the flows of money (leaving the US), thus intended to 
create some form of a global Panopticon. However, after this failed to achieve 
the desired results, during the 1980s it was decided to make the movement of 
tainted money a separate criminal offence, allegedly to control drug money. 
However, as this did not suffice either, the US authorities took the drive out-
side the USA imposing its anti-money laundering standards globally, largely 
through the FATF, founded in 1989. Through peer pressure, the FATF suc-
ceeded in imposing its recommendations mainly on developing countries and 
jurisdictions traditionally known as tax havens. Financial intelligence units were 
set up in nearly every country to collect information on suspicious transactions 
from a range of reporting institutions. National and international anti-money 
laundering legislation, including the EU Directives, has thus become indeed a 
global financial control instrument – a Panopticon. However, has money laun-
dering been curbed? In the end, we have almost forgotten why we started all 
this. It is almost as if it is not the laundering that counts, but the possibility to 
exert control and to empower the prosecution. Yet this extended system of 
control does not appear to be working. Rather, given the lack of performance 
measures, we do not know how it is working: even concerning unintended 
effects we learn anecdotally. Its definitional basis, as we have seen, is unclear 
resulting in uncertainties and inadequacies in the application of penal law and 
regulations. Left to their own devices, reporting institutions struggle to under-
stand whether their compliance procedures are adequate and often resort to a 
simplified ‘tick-the box’ exercise in due diligence. Should they be blamed for 
that? After all, the most primary threat to them is not the launderer bringing 
money to the bank, but the browbeating regulator who may take money out of 
the bank by fining them. Such a simplified risk avoidance approach takes us 
nowhere, because what matters is responsibility, and that goes beyond tick-the-
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box compliance. But there are limits to what corporate responsibility can do on 
its own (see Vogel, 2005; Caulkin, 2006) in the absence of explicit rules and 
clearer regulations. Moreover, if the money laundering phenomenon is of a 
global scope, regulatory and law enforcement efforts should be consistent across 
countries. While the penal law approach has been accepted almost universally, 
the practical implementation of due diligence and reporting practices has re-
mained inconsistent across businesses, sectors and countries, largely due to ill-
defined terms, unclear rules and varying legal and corporate cultures. It is in-
deed a Panopticon built on quicksand. However, despite the obvious lack of 
clarity impeding the efficient functioning of the global Panopticon, the authori-
ties continue to pursue their warfare unabated and further tighten their control. 
One may wonder what is more threatening: the age-old laundering phenome-







6. Addendum  
US Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (amended) 
 
TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 95  
§ 1956. Laundering of monetary instruments 
(a)  
(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents 
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a 
financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity—  
(A)  
(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or  
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 7201 or 7206 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or  
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part—  
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the 
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or  
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,  
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the prop-
erty involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more 
than twenty years, or both. For purposes of this paragraph, a financial transaction shall 
be considered to be one involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity if it is part 
of a set of parallel or dependent transactions, any one of which involves the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity, and all of which are part of a single plan or arrangement.  
(2) Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or 
transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through 
a place outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or through a 
place outside the United States—  
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or  
(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, 
transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and 
knowing that such transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in 
part—  
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the 
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or  
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,  
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the mone-
tary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, transmission, or transfer, 
whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. For the 
purpose of the offense described in subparagraph (B), the defendant’s knowledge may 
be established by proof that a law enforcement officer represented the matter specified 
in subparagraph (B) as true, and the defendant’s subsequent statements or actions indi-
cate that the defendant believed such representations to be true.  
(3) Whoever, with the intent—  
(A) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;  
(B) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of prop-
erty believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or  
(C) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law,  
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conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving property represented 
to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or property used to conduct or facili-
tate specified unlawful activity, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not 
more than 20 years, or both. For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (2), the term 
“represented” means any representation made by a law enforcement officer or by an-
other person at the direction of, or with the approval of, a Federal official authorized to 
investigate or prosecute violations of this section.  
(b) Penalties.—  
(1) In general.— Whoever conducts or attempts to conduct a transaction described in 
subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3), or section 1957, or a transportation, transmission, or transfer 
described in subsection (a)(2), is liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not 
more than the greater of—  
(A) the value of the property, funds, or monetary instruments involved in the transac-
tion; or  
(B) $10,000.  
(2) Jurisdiction over foreign persons.— For purposes of adjudicating an action filed 
or enforcing a penalty ordered under this section, the district courts shall have jurisdic-
tion over any foreign person, including any financial institution authorized under the 
laws of a foreign country, against whom the action is brought, if service of process 
upon the foreign person is made under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the 
laws of the country in which the foreign person is found, and—  
(A) the foreign person commits an offense under subsection (a) involving a financial 
transaction that occurs in whole or in part in the United States;  
(B) the foreign person converts, to his or her own use, property in which the United 
States has an ownership interest by virtue of the entry of an order of forfeiture by a 
court of the United States; or  
(C) the foreign person is a financial institution that maintains a bank account at a finan-
cial institution in the United States.  
(3) Court authority over assets.— A court may issue a pretrial restraining order or 
take any other action necessary to ensure that any bank account or other property held 
by the defendant in the United States is available to satisfy a judgment under this sec-
tion.  
(4) Federal receiver.—  
(A) In general.— A court may appoint a Federal Receiver, in accordance with sub-
paragraph (B) of this paragraph, to collect, marshal, and take custody, control, and pos-
session of all assets of the defendant, wherever located, to satisfy a civil judgment under 
this subsection, a forfeiture judgment under section 981 or 982, or a criminal sentence 
under section 1957 or subsection (a) of this section, including an order of restitution to 
any victim of a specified unlawful activity.  
(B) Appointment and authority.— A Federal Receiver described in subparagraph 
(A)—  
(i) may be appointed upon application of a Federal prosecutor or a Federal or State 
regulator, by the court having jurisdiction over the defendant in the case;  
(ii) shall be an officer of the court, and the powers of the Federal Receiver shall include 
the powers set out in section 754 of title 28, United States Code; and  
(iii) shall have standing equivalent to that of a Federal prosecutor for the purpose of 
submitting requests to obtain information regarding the assets of the defendant—  
(I) from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the Department of the Treas-
ury; or  
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(II) from a foreign country pursuant to a mutual legal assistance treaty, multilateral 
agreement, or other arrangement for international law enforcement assistance, provided 
that such requests are in accordance with the policies and procedures of the Attorney 
General.  
(c) As used in this section—  
(1) the term “knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents 
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity” means that the person knew the prop-
erty involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form, though not 
necessarily which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under State, Federal, or 
foreign law, regardless of whether or not such activity is specified in paragraph (7);  
(2) the term “conducts” includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating, or 
concluding a transaction;  
(3) the term “transaction” includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, 
or other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, with-
drawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, 
purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instru-
ment, use of a safe deposit box, or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, 
or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected;  
(4) the term “financial transaction” means  
(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce  
(i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or  
(ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or  
(iii) involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or  
(B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the 
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree;  
(5) the term “monetary instruments” means  
(i) coin or currency of the United States or of any other country, travelers’ checks, 
personal checks, bank checks, and money orders, or  
(ii) investment securities or negotiable instruments, in bearer form or otherwise in such 
form that title thereto passes upon delivery;  
(6) the term “financial institution” includes—  
(A) any financial institution, as defined in section 5312 (a)(2) of title 31, United States 
Code, or the regulations promulgated thereunder; and  
(B) any foreign bank, as defined in section 1 of the International Banking Act of 1978 
(12 U.S.C. 3101);  
(7) the term “specified unlawful activity” means—  
(A) any act or activity constituting an offense listed in section 1961 (1) of this title ex-
cept an act which is indictable under subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31;  
(B) with respect to a financial transaction occurring in whole or in part in the United 
States, an offense against a foreign nation involving—  
(i) the manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as such 
term is defined for the purposes of the Controlled Substances Act);  
(ii) murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, destruction of property by means of explo-
sive or fire, or a crime of violence (as defined in section 16);  
(iii) fraud, or any scheme or attempt to defraud, by or against a foreign bank (as defined 
in paragraph 7 of section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978)); [1]  
(iv) bribery of a public official, or the misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of 
public funds by or for the benefit of a public official;  
(v) smuggling or export control violations involving—  
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(I) an item controlled on the United States Munitions List established under section 38 
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778); or  
(II) an item controlled under regulations under the Export Administration Regulations 
(15 C.F.R. Parts 730–774);  
(vi) an offense with respect to which the United States would be obligated by a multi-
lateral treaty, either to extradite the alleged offender or to submit the case for prosecu-
tion, if the offender were found within the territory of the United States; or  
(vii) trafficking in persons, selling or buying of children, sexual exploitation of children, 
or transporting, recruiting or harboring a person, including a child, for commercial sex 
acts;  
(C) any act or acts constituting a continuing criminal enterprise, as that term is defined 
in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 848);  
(D) an offense under section 32 (relating to the destruction of aircraft), section 37 (relat-
ing to violence at international airports), section 115 (relating to influencing, impeding, 
or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member), 
section 152 (relating to concealment of assets; false oaths and claims; bribery), section 
175c (relating to the variola virus), section 215 (relating to commissions or gifts for 
procuring loans), section 351 (relating to congressional or Cabinet officer assassination), 
any of sections 500 through 503 (relating to certain counterfeiting offenses), section 513 
(relating to securities of States and private entities), section 541 (relating to goods falsely 
classified), section 542 (relating to entry of goods by means of false statements), section 
545 (relating to smuggling goods into the United States), section 549 (relating to re-
moving goods from Customs custody), section 554 (relating to smuggling goods from 
the United States), section 641 (relating to public money, property, or records), section 
656 (relating to theft, embezzlement, or misapplication by bank officer or employee), 
section 657 (relating to lending, credit, and insurance institutions), section 658 (relating 
to property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agencies), section 666 (relating to theft 
or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds), section 793, 794, or 798 
(relating to espionage), section 831 (relating to prohibited transactions involving nuclear 
materials), section 844 (f) or (i) (relating to destruction by explosives or fire of Govern-
ment property or property affecting interstate or foreign commerce), section 875 (relat-
ing to interstate communications), section 922 (l) (relating to the unlawful importation 
of firearms), section 924 (n) (relating to firearms trafficking), section 956 (relating to 
conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure certain property in a foreign country), sec-
tion 1005 (relating to fraudulent bank entries), 1006 [2] (relating to fraudulent Federal 
credit institution entries), 1007 [2] (relating to Federal Deposit Insurance transactions), 
1014 [2] (relating to fraudulent loan or credit applications), section 1030 (relating to 
computer fraud and abuse), 1032 [2] (relating to concealment of assets from conservator, 
receiver, or liquidating agent of financial institution), section 1111 (relating to murder), 
section 1114 (relating to murder of United States law enforcement officials), section 
1116 (relating to murder of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected 
persons), section 1201 (relating to kidnaping), section 1203 (relating to hostage taking), 
section 1361 (relating to willful injury of Government property), section 1363 (relating 
to destruction of property within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), sec-
tion 1708 (theft from the mail), section 1751 (relating to Presidential assassination), 
section 2113 or 2114 (relating to bank and postal robbery and theft), section 2252A 
(relating to child pornography) where the child pornography contains a visual depiction 
of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, section 2260 (production of 
certain child pornography for importation into the United States), section 2280 (relat-
ing to violence against maritime navigation), section 2281 (relating to violence against 
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maritime fixed platforms), section 2319 (relating to copyright infringement), section 
2320 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit goods and services), section 2332 (relating to 
terrorist acts abroad against United States nationals), section 2332a (relating to use of 
weapons of mass destruction), section 2332b (relating to international terrorist acts 
transcending national boundaries), section 2332g (relating to missile systems designed to 
destroy aircraft), section 2332h (relating to radiological dispersal devices), section 2339A 
or 2339B (relating to providing material support to terrorists), section 2339C (relating 
to financing of terrorism), or section 2339D (relating to receiving military-type training 
from a foreign terrorist organization) of this title, section 46502 of title 49, United 
States Code, a felony violation of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 
(relating to precursor and essential chemicals), section 590 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 
U.S.C. 1590) (relating to aviation smuggling), section 422 of the Controlled Substances 
Act (relating to transportation of drug paraphernalia), section 38 (c) (relating to criminal 
violations) of the Arms Export Control Act, section 11 (relating to violations) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979, section 206 (relating to penalties) of the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act, section 16 (relating to offenses and punish-
ment) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, any felony violation of section 15 of the 
Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (relating to supplemental nutrition assistance program 
benefits fraud) involving a quantity of benefits having a value of not less than $5,000, 
any violation of section 543(a)(1) of the Housing Act of 1949 (relating to equity skim-
ming), any felony violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, any felony 
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) (relating to prohibitions governing atomic weapons) [3] envi-
ronmental crimes  
(E) a felony violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1251 et 
seq.), the Ocean Dumping Act (33 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.), the Act to Prevent Pollution 
from Ships (33 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f et 
seq.), or the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.); or  
(F) any act or activity constituting an offense involving a Federal health care offense;  
(8) the term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and 
any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States; and  
(9) the term “proceeds” means any property derived from or obtained or retained, 
directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross re-
ceipts of such activity.  
(d) Nothing in this section shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law 
imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for 
in this section.  
(e) Violations of this section may be investigated by such components of the Depart-
ment of Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and by such components of the 
Department of the Treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct, as appropriate, 
and, with respect to offenses over which the Department of Homeland Security has 
jurisdiction, by such components of the Department of Homeland Security as the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security may direct, and, with respect to offenses over which the 
United States Postal Service has jurisdiction, by the Postal Service. Such authority of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Postal Ser-
vice shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by 
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Postal Service, 
and the Attorney General. Violations of this section involving offenses described in 
paragraph (c)(7)(E) may be investigated by such components of the Department of 
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Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and the National Enforcement Investiga-
tions Center of the Environmental Protection Agency.  
(f) There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this section if—  
(1) the conduct is by a United States citizen or, in the case of a non-United States citi-
zen, the conduct occurs in part in the United States; and  
(2) the transaction or series of related transactions involves funds or monetary instru-
ments of a value exceeding $10,000.  
(g) Notice of Conviction of Financial Institutions.— If any financial institution or 
any officer, director, or employee of any financial institution has been found guilty of 
an offense under this section, section 1957 or 1960 of this title, or section 5322 or 5324 
of title 31, the Attorney General shall provide written notice of such fact to the appro-
priate regulatory agency for the financial institution.  
(h) Any person who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or section 
1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the com-
mission of which was the object of the conspiracy.  
(i) Venue.—  
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a prosecution for an offense under this section 
or section 1957 may be brought in—  
(A) any district in which the financial or monetary transaction is conducted; or  
(B) any district where a prosecution for the underlying specified unlawful activity could 
be brought, if the defendant participated in the transfer of the proceeds of the specified 
unlawful activity from that district to the district where the financial or monetary trans-
action is conducted.  
(2) A prosecution for an attempt or conspiracy offense under this section or section 
1957 may be brought in the district where venue would lie for the completed offense 
under paragraph (1), or in any other district where an act in furtherance of the attempt 
or conspiracy took place.  
(3) For purposes of this section, a transfer of funds from 1 place to another, by wire or 
any other means, shall constitute a single, continuing transaction. Any person who 
conducts (as that term is defined in subsection (c)(2)) any portion of the transaction may 
be charged in any district in which the transaction takes place.  
 
 
[1] So in original. The second closing parenthesis probably should not appear.  
[2] So in original. Probably should be preceded by “section”.  
[3] So in original. Probably should be followed by a semicolon.393 
 
§ 1957. Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from speci-
fied unlawful activity 
 (a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), knowingly en-
gages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of 
a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be 
punished as provided in subsection (b).  
(b)  
                                               
393 See Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/ usc_sec_18_ 
00001956----000-.html.   
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(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an offense under this sec-
tion is a fine under title 18, United States Code, or imprisonment for not more than 
ten years or both.  
(2) The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1) of not 
more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transac-
tion.  
(c) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required 
to prove the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived prop-
erty was derived was specified unlawful activity.  
(d) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are—  
(1) that the offense under this section takes place in the United States or in the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or  
(2) that the offense under this section takes place outside the United States and such 
special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United States person (as defined in section 
3077 of this title, but excluding the class described in paragraph (2)(D) of such section).  
(e) Violations of this section may be investigated by such components of the Depart-
ment of Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and by such components of the 
Department of the Treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct, as appropriate, 
and, with respect to offenses over which the Department of Homeland Security has 
jurisdiction, by such components of the Department of Homeland Security as the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security may direct, and, with respect to offenses over which the 
United States Postal Service has jurisdiction, by the Postal Service. Such authority of 
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Postal Ser-
vice shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by 
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Postal Service, 
and the Attorney General.  
(f) As used in this section—  
(1) the term “monetary transaction” means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or ex-
change, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instru-
ment (as defined in section 1956 (c)(5) of this title) by, through, or to a financial institu-
tion (as defined in section 1956 of this title), including any transaction that would be a 
financial transaction under section 1956 (c)(4)(B) of this title, but such term does not 
include any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as guar-
anteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution;  
(2) the term “criminally derived property” means any property constituting, or derived 
from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense; and  
(3) the term “specified unlawful activity” has the meaning given that term in section 
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